

WARS OF THE 19TH CENTURY







WELLINGTON.

"The Iron Duke," ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON, born 1769, died 1852, the victor of Waterloo and the deliverer of Europe from the menace of Napoleon. In English politics he is memorable as the minister who carried Catholic Emancipation in the teeth of fierce opposition.

WARS OF THE 19TH CENTURY

By MAJ.-GEN. C. W. ROBINSON, C.B.,
COLONEL MAUDE, C.B.,
LT.-COL. J. H. VERRINDER CROWE,
CAPTAIN C. F. ATKINSON,
and others.

ILLUSTRATED

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WARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS

CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

By French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1800) is meant the first part of the series of French wars which went on continuously, except for some local and temporary cessations of hostilities, from the declaration of war against Britain in 1792 to the final overthrow of Napoleon in 1815. The most important of these cessations—viz. the peace of 1801-1803—closes the “Revolutionary” and opens the “Napoleonic” era of land warfare, whilst in naval history the first period, treated below, is 1792-1799; and the second, 1799-1815, is included in the Napoleonic period.

France declared war on Austria on the 20th of April 1792. But Prussia and other powers had allied themselves with Austria in view of war, and it was against a coalition and not a single power that France found herself pitted, at the moment when the “emigration,” the ferment of the Revolution, and want of material and of funds had thoroughly disorganized her army. The first engagements were singularly disgraceful. Near Lille the French soldiers fled at sight of the Austrian outposts, crying *Nous sommes trahis*, and murdered their general (April 29). The commanders-in-chief of the armies that were formed became one after another “suspects”; and before a serious action had been fought, the three armies of Rochambeau, Lafayette and Lückner had resolved themselves into two commanded by Dumouriez and Kellermann. Thus the disciplined soldiers of the Allies had apparently good reason to consider the campaign before them a military promenade. On the Rhine, a combined army of Prussians, Austrians, Hessians and *émigrés* under the duke of Brunswick was formed for the invasion of France, flanked by two smaller armies on its right and left, all three being under the supreme command of the king of Prussia. In the Netherlands the Austrians were to besiege Lille, and in the south the Piedmontese also took the field. The first step, taken against Brunswick’s advice, was the issue (July 25) of a proclamation which, couched in terms in the last degree offensive to the French nation, generated the spirit that was afterwards to find expression in the “armed nation” of 1793-4, and sealed the fate of Louis XVI. The duke, who was a model sovereign in his own principality, sympathized with the constitutional side of the Revolution, while as a soldier he had no confidence in the success of the enterprise. After completing its preparations in the leisurely manner of the previous generation, his army crossed the French frontier on the 19th of August. Longwy was easily captured; and the Allies slowly marched on to Verdun, which was more indefensible even than Longwy. The commandant, Colonel Beaurepaire, shot himself in despair, and the place surrendered on the 3rd of September. Brunswick now began his march on Paris and approached the defiles of the Argonne. But Dumouriez, who had been training his raw troops at Valenciennes in constant small engagements, with the purpose of invading Belgium, now threw himself into the Argonne by a rapid and daring flank march, almost under the eyes of the Prussian advanced guard, and barred the Paris road, summoning Kellermann to his assistance from Metz. The latter moved but slowly, and before he arrived the northern part of the line of defence had been forced. Dumouriez, undaunted, changed front so

as to face north, with his right wing on the Argonne and his left stretching towards Châlons, and in this position Kellermann joined him at St. Menehould on the 19th of September.

Brunswick meanwhile had passed the northern defiles and had then swung round to cut off Dumouriez from Châlons. At the moment when the Prussian manœuvre was nearly completed, Kellermann, commanding in Dumouriez's momentary absence, advanced his left wing and took up a position between St. Menehould and Valmy. The result was the world-renowned Cannonade of Valmy (September 20, 1792). Kellermann's infantry, nearly all regulars, stood steady. The French artillery justified its reputation as the best in Europe, and eventually with no more than a half-hearted infantry attack, the duke broke off the action and retired. This trivial engagement was the turning-point of the campaign and a landmark in the world's history. Ten days later, without firing another shot, the invading army began its retreat. Dumouriez's pursuit was not seriously pressed, he occupied himself chiefly with a series of subtle and curious negotiations which, with the general advance of the French troops, brought about the complete withdrawal of the enemy from the soil of France.

Meanwhile, the French forces in the south had driven back the Piedmontese and had conquered Savoy and Nice. Another French success was the daring expedition into Germany made by Custine from Alsace. Custine captured Mainz itself on the 21st of October and penetrated as far as Frankfurt. In the north the Austrian siege of Lille had completely failed, and Dumouriez now resumed his interrupted scheme for the invasion of the Netherlands. His forward movement, made as it was late in the season, surprised the Austrians, and he disposed of enormously superior forces. On the 6th of November he won the first great victory of the war at Jemappes near Mons and, this time advancing boldly, he overran the whole country from Namur to Antwerp within a month.

Such was the prelude of what is called the "Great War" in England and the "Epopée" in France. Before going further it is necessary to summarize the special features of the French army—in leadership, discipline, tactics, organization and movement—which made these campaigns the archetype of modern warfare.

At the outbreak of the Revolution the French army, like other armies in Europe, was a "voluntary" long-service army, augmented to some extent in war by drafts of militia.

One of the first problems that the Constituent Assembly took upon itself to solve was the nationalization of this strictly royal and professional force, and as early as October 1789 the word "Conscription" was heard in its debates. But it was decreed nevertheless that free enlistment alone befitted a free people, and the regular army was left unaltered in form. However, a National Guard came into existence side by side with it, and the history of French army organization in the next few years is the history of the fusion of these two elements. The first step, as regards the regular army, was the abolition of proprietary rights, the serial numbering of regiments throughout the Army, and the disbandment of the *Maison du roi*. The next was the promotion of deserving soldiers to fill the numerous vacancies caused by the emigration. Along with these, however, there came to the surface many incompetent leaders, favourites in the political clubs of Paris, &c., and the old strict discipline became impossible owing to the frequent intervention of the civil authorities in matters affecting it, the denunciation of generals, and especially the wild words and wild behaviour of "Volunteer" (embodied national guard) battalions.

When war came, it was soon found that the regulars had fallen too low in numbers and that the national guard demanded too high pay, to admit of developing the expected field strength. Arms, discipline, training alike were wanting to the new levies, and the repulse of Brunswick was effected by manœuvring and fighting on the old lines and chiefly with the old army. The cry of *La patrie en danger*, after giving, at the crisis, the highest moral support to the troops in the front, dwindled

away after victory, and the French government contented itself with the half-measures that had, apparently, sufficed to avert the peril. More, when the armies went into winter quarters, the Volunteers claimed leave of absence and went home.

But in the spring of 1793, confronted by a far more serious peril, the government took strong measures. Universal liability was asserted, and passed into law. Yet even now whole classes obtained exemption and the right of substitution as usual forced the burden of service on the poorer classes, so that of the 100,000 men called on for the regular army and 200,000 for the Volunteers, only some 180,000 were actually raised. Desertion, generally regarded as the curse of professional armies, became a conspicuous vice of the defenders of the Republic, except at moments when a supreme crisis called forth supreme devotion—moments which naturally were more or less prolonged in proportion to the gravity of the situation. Thus, while it almost disappeared in the great effort of 1793-1794, when the armies sustained bloody reverses in distant wars of conquest, as in 1799, it promptly rose again to an alarming height.

While this unsatisfactory general levy was being made, defeats, defections and invasion in earnest came in rapid succession, and to deal with the almost desperate emergency the ruthless Committee of Public Safety sprang into existence. "The levy is to be universal. Unmarried citizens and widowers without children of ages from 18 to 25 are to be called up first," and 450,000 recruits were immediately obtained by this single act. The complete amalgamation of the regular and volunteer units was decided upon. The white uniforms of the line gave place to the blue of the National Guard in all arms and services. The titles of officers were changed, and in fact every relic of the old regime, save the inherited solidity of the old regular battalions, was swept away. This rough combination of line and volunteers therefore—for the "Amalgam" was not officially begun until 1794—must be understood when we refer to the French army of Hondschoote or of Wattignies. It contained, by reason of its universality and also because men were better off in the army than out of it—if they stayed at home they went in daily fear of denunciation and the guillotine—the best elements of the French nation. To some extent at any rate the political *arrivistes* had been weeded out, and though the informer, here as elsewhere, struck unseen blows, the mass of the army gradually evolved its true leaders and obeyed them. It was, therefore, an army of individual citizen-soldiers of the best type, welded by the enemy's fire, and conscious of its own solidarity in the midst of the Revolutionary chaos.

After 1794 the system underwent but little radical change until the end of the Revolutionary period. Its regiments grew in military value month by month and attained their highest level in the great campaign of 1796. In 1795 the French forces (now all styled National Guard) consisted of 531,000 men, of whom 323,000 were infantry (100 3-battalion demi-brigades), 97,000 light infantry (30 demi-brigades), 29,000 artillery, 20,000 engineers and 59,000 cavalry. This novel army developed novel fighting methods, above all in the infantry. This arm had just received a new drill-book, as the result of a prolonged controversy between the advocates of "lines" and "columns," and this drill-book, while retaining the principle of the line, set controversy at rest by admitting battalion columns of attack, and movements at the "quick" (100-120 paces to the minute) instead of at the "slow" march (76). On these two prescriptions, ignoring the rest, the practical troop leaders built up the new tactics little by little, and almost unconsciously. The process of evolution cannot be stated exactly, for the officers learned to use and even to invent now one form, now another, according to ground and circumstances. But the main stream of progress is easily distinguishable.

The earlier battles were fought more or less according to the drill-book, partly in line for fire action, partly in column for the bayonet attack. But line movements required the most accurate drill, and what was attainable after years of practice with regulars moving at the slow march was wholly impossible for new levies moving at 120 paces to the minute. When, therefore, the line marched off, it broke up into a shapeless swarm of individual firers. This was the form, if form it can be called, of the tactics of 1793—"horde tactics," as they have quite justly been called—and a few such experiences as that of Hondschoote sufficed to suggest the need of a remedy. This was found in keeping as many troops as possible out of the firing line. From 1794 onwards the latter becomes thinner and thinner, and instead of the drill-book form, with half the army firing in the line (practically in hordes) and the other half in support in columns, we find the rear lines becoming more and more important and numerous, till at last the fire of the leading line (skirmishers) becomes insignificant, and the decision rests with the bayonets of the closed masses in rear. Indeed, the latter often used mixed line and column formations, which enabled them not only to charge, but to fire close-order volleys—absolutely regardless of the skirmishers in front. In other words, the bravest and coolest marksmen were let loose to do what damage they could, and the rest, massed in close order, were kept under the control of their officers and only exposed to the dissolving influence of the fight when the moment arrived to deliver, whether by fire or by shock, the decisive blow.

The cavalry underwent little change in its organization and tactics, which remained as in the drill-books founded on Frederick's practice. But except in the case of the hussars, who were chiefly Alsations, it was thoroughly disorganized by the emigration or execution

of the nobles who had officered it, and for long it was incapable of facing the hostile squadrons in the open. Still, its elements were good, it was fairly well trained, and mounted, and not overwhelmed with national guard drafts, and like the other arms it duly evolved and obeyed new leaders.

In artillery matters this period, 1792-1796, marks an important progress, due above all to Gribeauval and the two du Teils, Jean Pierre (1722-1794) and Jean (1733-1820) who were Napoleon's instructors. The change was chiefly in organization and equipment—the great tactical development of the arm was not to come until the time of the *Grande Armée*—and may be summarized as the transition from battalion guns and reserve artillery to batteries of "horse and field."

The engineers, like the artillery, were a technical and non-noble corps. They escaped, therefore, most of the troubles of the Revolution—indeed the artillery and engineer officers, Napoleon and Carnot amongst them, were conspicuous in the political regeneration of France—and the engineers carried on with little change the traditions of Vauban and Cormontaigne. Both these corps were, after the Revolution as before it, the best in Europe, other armies admitting their superiority and following their precepts.

In all this the army naturally outgrew its old "linear" organization. Temporary divisions, called for by momentary necessities, placed under selected generals and released from the detailed supervision of the commander-in-chief, soon became, though in an irregular and haphazard fashion, permanent organizations, and by 1796 the divisional system had become practically universal. The next step, as the armies became fewer and larger, was the temporary grouping of divisions; this too in turn became permanent, and bequeathed to the military world of to-day both the army corps and the capable, self-reliant and enterprising subordinate generals, for whom the old linear organization had no room.

This subdivision of forces was intimately connected with the general method of making war adopted by the "New French," as their enemies called them. What astonished the Allies most of all was the number and the velocity of the Republicans. These improvised armies had in fact nothing to delay them. Tents were unprocureable for want of money, untransportable for want of the enormous number of wagons that would have been required, and also unnecessary, for the discomfort that would have caused wholesale desertion in professional armies was cheerfully borne by the men of 1793-1794. Supplies for armies of then unheard-of size could not be carried in convoys, and the French soon became familiar with "living on the country." Thus 1793 saw the birth of the modern system of war—rapidity of movement, full development of national strength, bivouacs and requisitions, and force, as against cautious manœuvring, small professional armies, tents and full rations, and chicane. The first represented the decision-compelling spirit, the second the spirit of risking a little to gain a little. Above all, the decision-compelling spirit was reinforced by the presence of the emissaries of the Committee of Public Safety, the "representatives on mission" who practically controlled the guillotine. There were civil officials with the armies of the Allies too, but their chief function was not to infuse desperate energy into the military operations, but to see that the troops did not maltreat civilians. Such were the fundamental principles of the "New French" method of warfare, from which the warfare of to-day descends in the direct line. But it was only after a painful period of trial and error, or waste and misdirection, that it became possible for the French army to have evolved Napoleon, and for Napoleon to evolve the principles and methods of war that conformed to and profited to the utmost by the new conditions.

Those campaigns and battles of this army which are described in detail in the present article have been selected, some on account of their historical importance—as producing great results; others from their military interest—as typifying and illustrating the nature of the revolution undergone by the art of war in these heroic years.

CHAPTER II

CAMPAIGN OF 1793 IN THE NETHERLANDS

THE year 1793 opened disastrously for the Republic. As a consequence of Jemappes and Valmy, France had taken the offensive both in Belgium, which had been overrun by Dumouriez's army, and in the Rhine countries, where Custine had preached the new gospel to the sentimental and half-discontented Hessians and Mainzers. But the execution of Louis XVI. raised up a host of new and determined enemies. England, Holland, Austria, Prussia, Spain and Sardinia promptly formed the First Coalition. England poured out money in profusion to pay and equip her Allies' land armies, and herself began the great struggle for the command of the sea.

In the Low Countries, while Dumouriez was beginning his proposed invasion of Holland, Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg, the new Austrian commander on the Lower Rhine,

advanced with 42,000 men from the region of Cologne, and drove in the various detachments that Dumouriez had posted to cover his right. The French general thereupon abandoned his advance into Holland, and, with what forces he could gather, turned towards the Meuse. The two armies met at Neerwinden on the 18th of March 1793. Dumouriez had only a few thousand men more than his opponent, instead of the enormous superiority he had had at Jemappes. Thus the enveloping attack could not be repeated, and in a battle on equal fronts the old generalship and the old armies had the advantage. Dumouriez was thoroughly defeated, the house of cards collapsed, and the whole of the French forces retreated in confusion to the strong line of border fortresses, created by Louis XIV. and Vauban. Dumouriez, witnessing the failure of his political schemes, declared against the Republic, and after a vain attempt to induce his own army to follow his example, fled (April 5) into the Austrian lines. The leaderless Republicans streamed back to Valenciennes. There, however, they found a general. Picot (comte de) Dampierre, was a regimental officer of the old army, who, in spite of his vanity and extravagance, possessed real loyalty to the new order of things, and brilliant personal courage. At the darkest hour he seized the reins without orders and without reference to seniority, and began to reconstruct the force and the spirit of the shattered army by wise administration and dithyrambic proclamations. Moreover, he withdrew it well behind Valenciennes out of reach of a second reverse. The region of Dunkirk and Cassel, the camp of La Madeleine near Lille, and Bouchain were made the rallying points of the various groups, the principal army being at the last-named. But the blow of Neerwinden had struck deep, and the army was for long incapable of service, what with the general distrust, the misconduct of the newer battalions, and the discontent of the old white-coated regiments that were left ragged and shoeless to the profit of the "patriot" corps. "Beware of giving horses to the 'Hussars of Liberty,'" wrote Carnot, "all these new corps are abominable."

France was in fact defenceless, and the opportunity existed for the military promenade to Paris that the allied statesmen had imagined in 1792. But Coburg now ceased to be a purely Austrian commander, for one by one allied contingents, with instructions that varied with the political aims of the various governments, began to arrive. Moreover, he had his own views as to the political situation, fearing especially to be the cause of the queen's death as Brunswick had been of the king's, and negotiated for a settlement. The story of these negotiations should be read in Chuquet's *Valenciennes*—it gives the key to many mysteries of the campaign and shows that though the revolutionary spirit had already passed all understanding, enlightened men such as Coburg and his chief-of-staff Mack sympathised with its first efforts and thought the constitution of 1791 a gain to humanity. "If you come to Paris you will find 80,000 patriots ready to die," said the French negotiators. "The patriots could not resist the Austrian regulars," replied Coburg, "but I do not propose to go to Paris. I desire to see a stable government, with a chief, king or other, with whom we can treat." Soon, however, these personal negotiations were stopped by the emperor, and the idea of restoring order in France became little more than a pretext for a general intrigue amongst the confederate powers, each seeking to aggrandize itself at France's expense. "If you wish to deal with the French," observed Dumouriez ironically to Coburg, "talk 'constitution.' You may beat them but you cannot subdue them." And their subjugation was becoming less and less possible as the days went on and men talked of the partition of France as a question of the moment like the partition of Poland—a pretension that even the émigrés resented.

Coburg's plan of campaign was limited to the objects acceptable to all the Allies alike. He aimed at the conquest of a first-class fortress—Lille or Valenciennes—and chiefly for this reason. War meant to the burgher of Germany and the Netherlands a special form of *haute politique* with which it was neither his business nor his inclination to meddle. He had no more compunction, therefore, in selling his worst goods at the best price to the army commissaries than in doing so to his ordinary customers. It followed that, owing to the distance between Vienna and Valenciennes, and the exorbitant prices charged by carters and horse-owners, a mere concentration of Austrian troops at the latter place cost as much as a campaign, and the transport expenses rose to such a figure that Coburg's first duty was to find a strong place to serve as a market for the countryside and a depot for the supplies purchased, and to have it as near as possible to the front to save the hire of vehicles. As for the other governments which Coburg served as best he could, the object of the war was material concessions, and it would be easy to negotiate for the cession of Dunkirk and Valenciennes when the British and Austrian colours already waved there. The Allies, therefore, instead of following up their advantage over the French field army and driving forward on the open Paris road, set their faces westward, intending to capture Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Dunkirk and Lille one after the other.

Dampierre meanwhile grew less confident as responsibility settled upon his shoulders. Quite unable to believe that Coburg would bury himself in a maze of rivers and fortresses when he could scatter the French army to the winds by a direct advance, he was disquieted and puzzled by the Austrian investment of Condé. This was followed by skirmishes around Valenciennes, so unfavourable to the French that their officers felt it would be

madness to venture far beyond the support of the fortress guns. But the representatives on mission ordered Dampierre, who was reorganizing his army at Bouchain, to advance and occupy Famars camp, east of Valenciennes, and soon afterwards, disregarding his protests, bade him relieve Condé at all costs. His skill, though not commensurate with his personal courage and devotion, sufficed to give him the idea of attacking Coburg on the right bank of the Scheldt while Clerfayt, with the corps covering the siege of Condé, was on the left, and then to turn against Clerfayt—in fact, to operate on interior lines—but it was far from being adequate to the task of beating either with the disheartened forces he commanded. On the 1st of May, while Clerfayt was held in check by a very vigorous demonstration, Coburg's positions west of Quiévrain were attacked by Dampierre himself. The French won some local successes by force of numbers and surprise, but the Allies recovered themselves, thanks chiefly to the address and skill of Colonel Mack, and drove the Republicans in disorder to their entrenchments. Dampierre's discouragement now became desperation, and, urged on by the representatives (who, be it said, had exposed their own lives freely enough in the action), he attacked Clerfayt on the 8th at Raismes. The troops fought far better in the woods and hamlets west of the Scheldt than they had done in the plains to the east. But in the heat of the action Dampierre, becoming again the brilliant soldier that he had been before responsibility stifled him, risked and lost his life in leading a storming party, and his men retired sullenly, though this time in good order, to Valenciennes. Two days later the French gave up the open field and retired into Valenciennes. Dampierre's remains were by a vote of the Convention ordered to be deposited in the Panthéon. But he was a "ci-devant" noble the demagogues denounced him as a traitor, and the only honour finally paid to the man who had tided over the weeks of greatest danger was the placing of his bust, in the strange company of those of Brutus and Marat, in the chamber of deputies.

Another pause followed, Coburg awaiting the British contingent under the duke of York, and the Republicans endeavouring to assimilate the reinforcements of conscripts, for the most part "undesirables," who now arrived. Mutiny and denunciations augmented the confusion in the French camp. Plan of campaign there was none, save a resolution to stay at Valenciennes in the hope of finding an opportunity of relieving Condé and to create diversions elsewhere by expeditions from Dunkirk, Lille and Sedan. These of course came to nothing, and before they had even started, Coburg, resuming the offensive, had stormed the lines of Famars (May 24), whereupon the French army retired to Bouchain, leaving not only Condé¹ but also Valenciennes to resist as best they could. The central point of the new positions about Bouchain was called Caesar's Camp. Here, surrounded by streams and marshes, the French generals thought that their troops were secure from the rush of the dreaded Austrian cavalry, and Mack himself shared their opinion.

Custine now took command of the abjectly dispirited army, the fourth change of command within two months. His first task was to institute a severe discipline, and his prestige was so great that his mere threat of death sentences for offenders produced the desired effect. As to operations, he wished for a concentration of all possible forces from other parts of the frontier towards Valenciennes, even if necessary at the cost of sacrificing his own conquest of Mainz. But after he had induced the government to assent to this, the generals of the numerous other armies refused to give up their troops, and on the 17th of June the idea was abandoned in view of the growing seriousness of the Vendéan insurrection. Custine, therefore, could do no more than continue the work of reorganization. Military operations were few. Coburg, who had all this time succeeded in remaining concentrated, now found himself compelled to extend leftwards towards Flanders,² for Custine had infused some energy into the scattered groups of the Republicans in the region of Douai, Lille and Dunkirk—and during this respite the Paris Jacobins sent to the guillotine both Custine and his successor La Marlière before July was ended. Both were "ci-devant" nobles and, so far as is ascertainable, neither was guilty of anything worse than attempts to make his orders respected by, and himself popular with, the soldiers. By this time, owing to the innumerable denunciations and arrests, the confusion in the Army of the North was at its height, and no further attempt was made either to relieve Valenciennes and Condé, or to press forward from Lille and Dunkirk. Condé, starved out as Coburg desired, capitulated on the 10th of June, and the Austrians, who had done their work as soldiers, but were filled with pity for their suffering and distracted enemies, marched in with food for the women and children. Valenciennes, under the energetic General Ferrand, held out bravely until the fire of the Allies became intolerable, and the civil population began to plot treachery, and to wear the Bourbon cockade in the

¹ Coburg refrained from a regular siege of Condé. He wished to gain possession of the fortress in a defensible state, intending to use it as his own depot later in the year. He therefore reduced it by famine. During the siege of Valenciennes the Allies appear to have been supplied from Mons.

² Henceforth to the end of 1794 both armies were more or less "in cordon," the cordon possessing greater or less density at any particular moment or place, according to the immediate intentions of the respective commanders and the general military situation.

open street. Ferrand and the representatives with him found themselves obliged to surrender to the duke of York, who commanded the siege corps, on the 28th of July, after rejecting the first draft of a capitulation sent in by the duke and threatening to continue the defence to the bitter end. Impossible as this was known to be—for Valenciennes seemed to have become a royalist town—Ferrand's soldierly bearing carried the day, and honourable terms were arranged. The duke even offered to assist the garrison in repressing disorder. Shortly after this the wreck of the field army was forced to evacuate Caesar's Camp after an unimportant action (Aug. 7-8) and retired on Arras. By this they gave up the direct defence of the Paris road, but placed themselves in a "flank position" relatively to it, and secured to themselves the resources and reinforcements available in the region of Dunkirk-Lille. Bouchain and Cambria, Landrecies and Le Quesnoy, were left to their own garrisons.

With this ended the second episode of the amazing campaign of 1793. Military operations were few and spasmodic, on the one side because the Allied statesmen were less concerned with the nebulous common object of restoring order in France than with their several schemes of aggrandisement, on the other owing to the almost incredible confusion of France under the regime of Danton and Marat. The third episode shows little or no change in the force and direction of the allied efforts, but a very great change in France. Thoroughly aroused by disaster and now dominated by the furious and blood-thirsty energy of the terrorists, the French people and armies at last set before themselves clear and definite objects to be pursued at all costs.

Jean Nicolas Houchard, the next officer appointed to command, had been a heavy cavalry trooper in the Seven Years' War. His face bore the scars of wounds received at Minden, and his bravery, his stature, his bold and fierce manner, his want of education, seemed to all to betoken the ideal sansculotte general. But he was nevertheless incapable of leading an army, and knowing this, carefully conformed to the advice of his staff officers Berthelmy and Gay-Vernon, the latter of whom, an exceptionally capable officer, had been Custine's chief of staff and was consequently under suspicion. At one moment, indeed, operations had to be suspended altogether because his papers were seized by the civil authorities, and amongst them were all the confidential memoranda and maps required for the business of headquarters. It was the darkest hour. The Vendéans, the people of Lyons, Marseilles and Toulon, were in open and hitherto successful revolt. Valenciennes had fallen and Coburg's hussar parties pressed forward into the Somme valley. Again the Allies had the decision of the war in their own hands. Coburg, indeed, was still afraid, on Marie Antoinette's account, of forcing the Republicans to extremities, and on military grounds too he thought an advance on Paris hazardous. But, hazardous or not, it would have been attempted but for the English. The duke of York had definite orders from his government to capture Dunkirk—at present a nest of corsairs which interfered with the Channel trade, and in the future, it was hoped, a second Gibraltar—and after the fall of Valenciennes and the capture of Caesar's Camp the English and Hanoverians marched away, via Tournai and Ypres, to besiege the coast fortress. Thereupon the king of Prussia in turn called off his contingent for operations on the middle Rhine. Holland, too, though she maintained her contingent in face of Lille (where it covered Flanders), was not disposed to send it to join the imperialists in an adventure in the heart of France. Coburg, therefore, was brought to a complete standstill, and the scene of the decision was shifted to the district between Lille and the coast.

Thither came Carnot, the engineer officer who was in charge of military affairs in the Committee of Public Safety and is known to history as the "Organizer of Victory." His views of the strategy to be pursued indicate either a purely geographical idea of war, which does not square with his later principles and practice, or, as is far more likely, a profound disbelief in the capacity of the Army of the North, as it then stood, to fight a battle, and they went no further than to recommend an inroad into Flanders on the ground that no enemy would be encountered there. This, however, in the event developed into an operation of almost decisive importance, for at the moment of its inception the duke of York was already on the march. Fighting *en route* a very severe but successful action (Lincelles, Aug. 18) with the French troops encamped near Lille, the Anglo-Hanoverians entered the district—densely intersected with canals and morasses—around Dunkirk and Bergues on the 21st and 22nd. On the right, by way of Furnes, the British moved towards Dunkirk and invested the east front of the weak fortress, while on the left the Hanoverian field marshal v. Freytag moved via Poperinghe on Bergues. The French had a chain of outposts between Furnes and Bergues, but Freytag attacked them resolutely, and the defenders, except a brave handful who stood to cross bayonets, fled in all directions. The east front of Bergues was invested on the 23rd, and Freytag spread out his forces to cover the duke of York's attack on Dunkirk, his right being opposite Bergues and his centre at Bambeke, while his left covered the space between Roosbrugge and Ypres with a cordon of posts. Houchard was in despair at the bad conduct of his troops. But one young general, Jourdan, anticipating Houchard's orders, had already brought a strong force from Lille to Cassel, whence he incessantly harried Freytag's posts. Carnot encouraged the garrisons of Dunkirk and Bergues, and caused the sluices to be opened. The

moral of the defenders rose rapidly. Houchard prepared to bring up every available man of the Army of the North, and only waited to make up his mind as to the direction in which his attack should be made. The Allies themselves recognized the extreme danger of their position. It was cut in half by the Great Morass, stretches of which extended even to Furnes. Neither Dunkirk nor Bergues could be completely invested owing to the inundations, and Freytag sent a message to King George III. to the effect that if Dunkirk did not surrender in a few days the expedition would be a complete failure.

As for the French, they could hardly believe their good fortune. Generals, staff officers and representatives on mission alike were eager for a swift and crushing offensive. "Attack" and "attack in mass" became the shibboleth and the catch-phrase of the camps" (Chuquet), and fortresses and armies on other parts of the frontier were imperiously called upon to supply large drafts for the Army of the North. Gay-Vernon's strategical instinct found expression in a wide-ranging movement designed to secure the absolute annihilation of the duke of York's forces. Beginning with an attack on the Dutch posts north and east of Lille, the army was then to press forward towards Furnes, the left wing holding Freytag's left wing in check, and the right swinging inwards and across the line of retreat of both allied corps. At that moment all men were daring, and the scheme was adopted with enthusiasm. On the 28th of August, consequently, the Dutch posts were attacked and driven away by the mobile forces at Lille, aided by parts of the main army from Arras. But even before they had fired their last shot the Republicans dispersed to plunder and compromised their success. Houchard and Gay-Vernon began to fear that their army would not emerge successfully from the supreme test they were about to impose on it, and from this moment the scheme of destroying the English began to give way to the simpler and safer idea of relieving Dunkirk. The place was so ill-equipped that after a few days' siege it was *in extremis*, and the political importance of its preservation led not merely the civilian representatives, but even Carnot, to implore Houchard to put an end to the crisis at once. On the 30th, Cassel, instead of Ypres, was designated as the point of concentration for the "mass of attack." This surprised the representatives and Carnot as much as it surprised the subordinate generals, all of whom thought that there would still be time to make the détour through Ypres and to cut off the Allies' retreat before Dunkirk fell. But Houchard and Gay-Vernon were no longer under any illusions as to the manœuvring power of their forces, and the government agents wisely left them to execute their own plans. Thirty-seven thousand men were left to watch Coburg and to secure Arras and Douai, and the rest, 50,000 strong, assembled at Cassel. Everything was in Houchard's favour could he but overcome the indiscipline of his own army. The duke of York was more dangerous in appearance than in reality—as the result must infallibly have shown had Houchard and Gay-Vernon possessed the courage to execute the original plan—and Freytag's covering army extended in a line of disconnected posts from Bergues to Ypres.

Against the left and centre of this feeble cordon 40,000 men advanced in many columns on the 6th of September. A confused outpost fight, in which the various assailing columns dissolved into excited swarms, ended, long after nightfall, in the orderly withdrawal of the various allied posts to Hondschoote. The French generals were occupied the whole of next day in sorting out their troops, who had not only completely wasted their strength against mere outposts, but had actually consumed their rations and used up their ammunition. On the 8th, the assailants, having more or less recovered themselves, advanced again. They found Wallmoden (who had succeeded Freytag, disabled on the 6th) entrenched on either side of the village of Hondschoote, the right resting on the great morass and the left on the village of Leysele. Here was the opportunity for the "attack in mass" that had been so freely discussed; but Houchard was now concerned more with the relief of Dunkirk than with the defeat of the enemy. He sent away one division to Dunkirk, another to Bergues, and a third towards Ypres, and left himself only some 20,000 men for the battle. But Wallmoden had only 13,000—so great was the disproportion between end and means in this ill-designed enterprise against Dunkirk.


Houchard despatched a column, guided by his staff officer Berthelmy, to turn the Hanoverians' left, but this column lost its way in the dense country about Loo. The centre waited motionless under the fire of the allied guns near Hondschoote. In vain the representative Delbrel implored the general to order the advance. Houchard was obstinate, and ere long the natural result followed. Though Delbrel posted himself in front of the line, conspicuous by his white horse and tricoloured sash and plume, to steady the men, the bravest left the ranks and skirmished forward from bush to bush, and the rest sought cover. Then the allied commander ordered forward one regiment of Hessians, and these, advancing at a ceremonial slow march, and firing steady rolling volleys, scattered the Republicans before them. At this crisis Houchard uttered the fatal word "retreat," but Delbrel overwhelmed him with reproaches and stung him into renewed activity. He hurried away to urge forward the right wing while Jourdan rallied the centre and led it into the fight again. Once more Jourdan awaited in vain the order to advance, and once more the troops broke. But at last the exasperated Delbrel rose to the occasion. "You fear the responsibility," he cried to Jourdan; "well, I assume

it. My authority overrides the general's and I give you the formal order to attack at once!" Then, gently, as if to soften a rebuke, he continued, "You have forced me to speak as a superior; now I will be your aide-de-camp," and at once hurried off to bring up the reserves and to despatch cavalry to collect the fugitives. This incident, amongst many, serves to show that the representatives on mission were no mere savage marplots, as is too generally assumed. They were often wise and able men, brave and fearless of responsibility in camp and in action. Jourdan led on the reserves, and the men fighting in the bushes on either side of the road heard their drums to right and left. Jourdan fell wounded, but Delbrel headed a wild irregular bayonet charge which checked the Hanoverians, and Houchard himself, in his true place as a cavalry leader, came up with 500 fresh sabres and flung himself on the Allies. The Hanoverians, magnificently disciplined troops that they were, soon reformed after the shock, but by this time the fugitives

Hondschoote was a psychological victory. Materially, it was no more than the crushing of an obstinate rearguard at enormous expense to the assailants, for the duke of York was able to withdraw while there was still time. Houchard had indeed called back the division he had sent to Bergues, and despatched it by Loo against the enemy's rear, but the movement was undertaken too late in the day to be useful. The struggle was practically a front to front battle, numbers and enthusiasm on the one side, discipline, position and steadiness on the other. Hence, though its strategical result was merely to compel the duke of York to give up an enterprise that he should never have undertaken, Hondschoote established the fact that the "New French" were determined to win, at any cost and by sheer weight and energy. It was long before they were able to meet equal numbers with confidence, and still longer before they could freely oppose a small corps to a larger one. But the nightmare of defeats and surrenders was dispelled.

The influence of Houchard on the course of the operations had been sometimes null, sometimes detrimental, and only occasionally good. The plan and its execution were the work of Berthelmy and Gay-Vernon, the victory itself was Jourdan's and above all, Delbrel's. To these errors, forgiven to a victor, Houchard added the crowning offence of failure, in the reaction after the battle, to pursue his advantage. His enemies in Paris became more and more powerful as the campaign continued.

Having missed the great opportunity of crushing the English, Houchard turned his attention to the Dutch posts about Menin. As far as the Allies were concerned Hondschoote was a mere reverse, not a disaster, and was counter-balanced in Coburg's eyes by his own capture of Le Quesnoy (Sept. 11). The proximity of the main body of the French to Menin induced him to order Beaulieu's corps (hitherto at Cysoing and linking the



Redrawn from a map in Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, by permission of Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

Dutch posts with the central group) to join the prince of Orange there, and to ask the duke of York to do the same. But this last meant negotiation, and before anything was settled Houchard, with the army from Hondschoote and a contingent from Lille, had attacked the prince at Menin and destroyed his corps (Sept. 12-13).

After this engagement, which, though it was won by immensely superior forces, was if not an important at any rate a complete victory, Houchard went still farther inland leaving detachments to observe York and replacing them by troops from the various camps as he passed along the cordon—in the hope of dealing with Beaulieu as he had dealt with the Dutch, and even of relieving Le Quesnoy. But in all this he failed. He had expected to meet Beaulieu near Cysoing, but the Austrian general had long before gone northward to assist the prince of Orange. Thus Houchard missed his target. Worse still, one of his protective detachments chanced to meet Beaulieu near Courtrai on the 15th, and was not only defeated but driven in rout from Menin. Lastly, Coburg had already captured Le Quesnoy, and had also repulsed a straggling attack of the Landrecies, Bouchain and other French garrisons on the positions of his covering army (12th).¹

Houchard's offensive died away completely, and he halted his army (45,000 strong excluding detachments) at Gaverelle, half-way between Douai and Arras, hoping thereby to succour Bouchain, Cambrai or Arras, whichever should prove to be Coburg's next objective. After standing still for several days, a prey to all the conflicting rumours that reached his ears, he came to the conclusion that Coburg was about to join the duke of York in a second siege of Dunkirk, and began to close on his left. But his conclusion was entirely wrong. The Allies were closing on *their* left inland to attack Maubeuge. Coburg drew in Beaulieu, and even persuaded the Dutch to assist, the duke of York undertaking for the moment to watch the whole of the Flanders cordon from the sea to Tournai. But this concentration of force was merely nominal, for each contingent worked in the interests of its own masters, and, above all, the siege that was the object of the concentration was calculated to last four weeks, *i.e.*, gave the French four weeks' unimpeded liberty of action.

Houchard was now denounced and brought captive to Paris. Placed upon his trial, he offered a calm and reasoned defence of his conduct, but when the intolerable word "coward" was hurled at him by one of his judges he wept with rage, pointing to the scars of his many wounds, and then, his spirit broken, sank into a lethargic indifference, in which he remained to the end. He was guillotined on the 16th of November 1793.

After Houchard's arrest, Jourdan accepted the command, though with many misgivings, for the higher ranks were filled by officers with even less experience than he had himself, equipment and clothing was wanting, and, perhaps more important still, the new levies, instead of filling up the depleted ranks of the line, were assembled in undisciplined and half-armed hordes at various frontier camps, under elected officers who had for the most part never undergone the least training. The field states showed a total of 104,000 men, of whom less than a third formed the operative army. But an enthusiasm equal to that of Hondschoote, and similarly demanding a plain, urgent and recognizable objective, animated it, and although Jourdan and Carnot (who was with him at Gaverelle, where the army had now reassembled) began to study the general strategic situation, the Committee brought them back to realities by ordering them to relieve Maubeuge at all costs.

The Allies disposed in all of 66,000 men around the threatened fortress, but 26,000 of these were actually employed in the siege, and the remainder, forming the covering army, extended in an enormous semicircle of posts facing west, south and east. Thus the Republicans, as before, had two men to one at the point of contact (44,000 against 21,000), but so formidable was the discipline and steadiness of manœuvre of the old armies that the chances were considered as no more than "rather in favour" of the French. Not that these chances were seriously weighed before engaging. The generals might squander their energies in the council chamber on plans of sieges and expeditions, but in the field they were glad enough to seize the opportunity of a battle which they were not skilful enough to compel. It took place on the 15th and 16th of October. The Allied army, chiefly Austrians, under Coburg, was besieging Maubeuge, and the Revolutionary army, preparing to relieve it, gathered behind Avesnes. Coburg disposed a covering force of 21,000 astride the Avesnes-Maubeuge road, 5000 on the right with their flank on the Sambre, 9000 in the centre, on a ridge in an amphitheatre of woods, and 6000 on the left, chiefly on the plateau of Wattignies. A long line of woods enabled the Republican commander, Jourdan, to deploy unseen; 14,000 men were to attack the right, 16,000 were sent towards Wattignies, and 13,000 were to demonstrate in the centre till the others had succeeded and then to attack. Meantime (though this part of the programme miscarried) the Maubeuge garrison, which was almost as strong as its besiegers, was to sally out. Even without the Maubeuge garrison Jourdan had a two-to-one superiority. But the French were still the undisciplined enthusiasts of Hondschoote. Their left attack progressed so long as it could use "dead ground" in the valleys, but when the Republicans reached

¹ In the course of this the column from Bouchain, 4500 strong, was caught in the open at Avesnes-le-Sec by 5 squadrons of the allied cavalry and literally annihilated.

the gentler slopes above, the volleys of the Austrian regulars crushed their swarms, and the Austrian cavalry, striking them in flank, rode over them. The centre attack, ordered by Carnot on the assumption that all was well on the flanks, was premature; like the left, it progressed while the slopes were sharp, but when the Republicans arrived on the crest they found a gentle reverse slope before them, at the foot of which were Coburg's best troops. Again the disciplined volleys and a well-timed cavalry charge swept back the assailants. The French right reached, but could not hold, Wattignies. But these reverses were, in the eyes of Carnot and Jourdan, mere mishaps. Jourdan wished to renew the left attack, but Carnot, the engineer, considered the Wattignies plateau the key of the position and his opinion prevailed. In the night the nearly equal partition of force, which was largely responsible for the failure, was modified, and the strength of the attack massed opposite Wattignies. Coburg meanwhile strengthened his wings. He heard that Jourdan had been reinforced up to 100,000. But he called up few fresh battalions and put into line only 23,000 men. In reality Jourdan had not received reinforcements, and the effects of the first failure almost neutralized the superiority of numbers and enthusiasm over discipline and confidence. But at last, after a long fight had eliminated the faint-hearted, enough brave men remained in the excited crowds held together by Carnot and Jourdan to win the plateau. Coburg then drew off. His losses were 2500 out of 23,000, Jourdan's 3000 out of 43,000. So ended the episode of Wattignies, which, alike in its general outline and in its details, gives a perfect picture of the character, at once intense and spasmodic, of the "New French" warfare in the days of the Terror.

To complete the story of '93 it remains to sketch, very briefly, the principal events on the eastern and southern frontiers of France. These present, in the main, no special features, and all that it is necessary to retain of them is the fact of their existence. What this multiplication of their tasks meant to the Committee of Public Safety and to Carnot in particular it is impossible to realize. It was not merely on the Sambre and the Scheldt, nor against one army of heterogeneous allies that the Republic had to fight for life, but against Prussians and Hessians on the Rhine, Sardinians in the Alps, Spaniards in the Pyrenees, and also (one might say, indeed, above all) against Frenchmen in Vendée, Lyons, Marseilles and Toulon.

On the Rhine, the advance of a Prussian-Hessian army, 63,000 strong, rapidly drove back Custine from the Main into the valleys of the Saar and the Lauter. An Austrian corps under Wurmser soon afterwards invaded Alsace. Here, as on the northern frontier, there was a long period of trial and error, of denunciations and indiscipline, and of wholly trivial fighting, before the Republicans recovered themselves. But in the end the ragged enthusiasts found their true leader in Lazare Hoche, and, though defeated by Brunswick at Pirmasens and Kaiserslautern, they managed to develop almost their full strength against Wurmser in Alsace. On the 26th of December the latter, who had already undergone a series of partial reverses, was driven by main force from the lines of Weissenburg, after which Hoche advanced into the Palatinate and delivered Landau, and Pichegru moved on to recapture Mainz, which had surrendered in July. On the Spanish frontier both sides indulged in a fruitless war of posts in broken ground. The Italian campaign of 1793, equally unprofitable, will be dealt with in Chapter V. Far more serious than either was the insurrection of Vendée and the counter-revolution in the south of France, the principal incidents of which were the terrible sieges of Lyons and Toulon.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGNS OF 1794-5

FOR 1794 Carnot planned a general advance of all the northern armies, that of the North (Pichegru) from Dunkirk-Cassel by Ypres and Oudenarde on Brussels, the minor Army of the Ardennes to Charleroi, and the Army of the Moselle (Jourdan) to Liège, while between Charleroi and Lille demonstrations were to be made against the hostile centre. He counted upon little as regards the two armies near the Meuse, but hoped to force on a decisive battle by the advance of the left wing towards Ypres. Coburg, on the other side, intended, if not forced to develop his strength on the Ypres side, to make his main effort against the French centre about Landrecies. This produced the siege of Landrecies, which need not concern us, a forward movement of the French to Menin and Courtrai which resulted in the battles of Tourcoing and Tournai, and the campaign of Fleurus, which, almost fortuitously, produced the long-sought decision.

The first crisis was brought about by the advance of the left wing of the Army of the North, under Souham, to Menin-Courtrai. This advance placed Souham in the midst of the enemy's right wing, and at last stimulated the Allies into adopting the plan that Mack had advocated, in season and out of season, since before Neerwinden — that of *annihilating the enemy's army*. This vigorous purpose, and the leading part in its execution

played by the duke of York and the British contingent, give these operations, to Englishmen at any rate, a living interest which is entirely lacking in, say, the sieges of Le Quesnoy and Landrecies. On the other side, the "New French" armies and their leaders, without losing the energy of 1793, had emerged from confusion and inexperience, and the powers of the new army and the new system had begun to mature. Thus it was a fair trial of strength between the old way and the new.

In the second week of May the left wing of the Army of the North—the centre was towards Landrecies, and the right, fused in the Army of the Ardennes, towards Charleroi—found itself interposed at Menin-Courtrai-Lille between two hostile masses, the main body of the allied right wing about Tournai and a secondary corps at Thielt. Common-sense, therefore, dictated a converging attack for the Allies and a series of rapid radial blows for the French. In the allied camp common-sense had first to prevail over routine, and the emperor's first orders were for a raid of the Thielt corps towards Ypres, which his advisers hoped would of itself cause the French to decamp. But the duke of York formed a very different plan, and Feldzeugmeister Clerfayt, in command at Thielt, agreed to co-operate. Their proposal was to surround the French on the Lys with their two corps, and by the 15th the emperor had decided to use larger forces with the same object.

On that day Coburg himself, with 6000 men under Feldzeugmeister Kinsky from the central (Landrecies) group, entered Tournai and took up the general command, while another reinforcement under the archduke Charles marched towards Orchies. Orders were promptly issued for a general offensive. Clerfayt's corps was to be between Rousselaer and Menin on the 16th, and next day to force its way across the Lys at Werwick and connect with the main army. The main army was to advance in four columns. The first three, under the duke of York, were to move off, at daylight on the 17th, by Dottignies, Leers and Lannoy respectively to the line Mouscron-Tourcoing-Mouveau. The fourth and fifth under Kinsky and the archduke Charles were to defeat the French corps on the upper Marque, and then, leaving Lille on their left and guaranteeing themselves by a cordon system against being cut off from Tournai (either by the troops just defeated or by the Lille garrison), to march rapidly forward towards Werwick, getting touch on their right with the duke of York and on their left with Clerfayt, and thus completing the investing circle around Souham's and Moreau's isolated divisions. Speed was enjoined on all. Picked volunteers to clear away the enemy's skirmishers, and pioneers to make good difficult places on the roads, were to precede the heads of the columns. Then came at the head of the main body the artillery with an infantry escort. All this might have been designed by the Japanese for the attack of some well-defined Russian position in the war of 1904. Outpost and skirmisher resistance was to be overpowered the instant it was offered, and the attack on the closed bodies of the enemy was to be initiated by a heavy artillery fire at the earliest possible moment. But in 1904 the Russians stood still, which was the last thing that the Revolutionary armies of 1794 would or could do. Mack's well-considered and carefully balanced combinations failed, and doubtless helped to create the legend of his incapacity, which finds no support either in the opinion of Coburg, the representative of the old school, or in that of Scharnhorst, the founder of the new.

Souham, who commanded in the temporary absence of Pichegru, had formed his own plan. Finding himself with the major part of his forces between York and Clerfayt, he had decided to impose upon the former by means of a covering detachment, and to fall upon Clerfayt near Rousselaer with the bulk of his forces. This plan, based as it was on a sound calculation of time, space, strength and endurance, merits close consideration, for it contains more than a trace of the essential principles of modern strategy, yet with one vital difference, that whereas, in the present case, the factor of the enemy's independent will wrecked the scheme, Napoleon would have guaranteed to himself, before and during its development, the power of executing it in spite of the enemy. The appearance of fresh allied troops (Kinsky) on his right front at once modified these general arrangements. Divining Coburg's intentions from the arrival of the enemy near Pont-à-Marque and at Lannoy, he ordered Bonnaud (Lille group, 27,000) to leave enough troops on the upper Marque to amuse the enemy's leftmost columns, and with every man he had left beyond this absolute minimum to attack the left flank of the columns moving towards Tourcoing, which his weak centre (12,000 men at Tourcoing, Mouscron and Roubaix) was to stop by frontal defence. No rôle was as yet assigned to the principal mass (50,000 under Moreau) about Courtrai. Vandamme's brigade was to extend along the Lys from Menin to Werwick and beyond, to deny as long as possible the passage to Clerfayt.

This second plan failed like the first, because the enemy's counter-will was not controlled. All along the line Coburg's advance compelled the French to fight as they were without any redistribution. But the French were sufficiently elastic to adapt themselves readily to unforeseen conditions, and on Coburg's side too the unexpected happened. When Clerfayt appeared on the Lys above Menin, he found Werwick held. This was an accident, for the battalion there was on its way to Menin, and Vandamme, who had not yet received his new orders, was still far away. But the battalion fought boldly, Clerfayt sent for his pontoons, and ere they arrived Vandamme's leading troops managed to come


up on the other side. Thus it was not till 1 A.M. on the 18th that the first Austrian battalions passed the Lys.

On the front of the main allied group the "annihilation plan" was crippled at the outset by the tardiness of the archduke's (fifth or left) column. On this the smooth working of the whole scheme depended, for Coburg considered that he must defeat Bonnaud before carrying out his intended envelopment of the Menin-Courtrai group (the idea of "binding" the enemy by a detachment while the main scheme proceeded had not yet arisen). The allied general, indeed, on discovering the backwardness of the archduke, went so far as to order all the other columns to begin by swerving southward against Bonnaud, but these were already too deeply committed to the original plan to execute any new variation.

The rightmost column (Hanoverians) under von dem Bussche moved on Mouscron, overpowering the fragmentary, if energetic resistance, of the French advanced posts. Next on the left, Lieutenant Field Marshal Otto moved by Leers and Watrelos, driving away a French post at Lis (near Lannoy) on his left flank, and entered Tourcoing. But meantime a French brigade had driven von dem Bussche away from Mouscron, so that Otto felt compelled to keep troops at Leers and Watrelos to protect his rear, which seriously weakened his hold on Tourcoing. The third column, led by the duke of York, advanced from Templeuve on Lannoy, at the same time securing its left by expelling the French from Willems. Lannoy was stormed by the British Guards under Sir R. Abercromby with such vigour that the cavalry which had been sent round the village to cut off the French retreat had no time to get into position. Beyond Lannoy, the French resistance, still disjointed, became more obstinate as the ground favoured it more, and the duke called up the Austrians from Willems to turn the right of the French position at Roubaix by way of a small valley. Once again, however, the Guards dislodged the enemy before the turning movement had taken effect. A third French position now appeared, at Mouvaux, and this seemed so formidable that the duke halted to rest his now weary men. The emperor himself, however, ordered the advance to be resumed, and Mouvaux too was carried by Abercromby. It was now nightfall, and the duke having attained his objective point prepared to hold it against a counter attack.

Kinsky meanwhile with the fourth column had made feints opposite Pont-à-Tressin, beyond Lannoy, the French resistance, still disjointed, became more obstinate as the ground favoured it more, and the duke called up the Austrians from Willems to turn the right of the French position at Roubaix by way of a small valley. Once again, however, the Guards dislodged the enemy before the turning movement had taken effect. A third French position now appeared, at Mouvaux, and this seemed so formidable that the duke halted to rest his now weary men. The emperor himself, however, ordered the advance to be resumed, and Mouvaux too was carried by Abercromby. It was now nightfall, and the duke having attained his objective point prepared to hold it against a counter attack.

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and had forced the passage of the Marque near Bouvines with his main body. But Bonnaud gave ground so slowly that up to 4 P.M. Kinsky had only progressed a few hundred paces from his crossing point. The fifth column, which was behind time on the 16th, did not arrive at Orchies till dawn on the 17th, and had to halt there for rest and food. Thence, moving across country in fighting formation, the archduke made his way to Pont-à-Marque. But he was unable to do more, before calling a halt, than deploy his troops on the other side of the stream.

So closed the first day's operations. The "annihilation plan" had already undergone a serious check. The archduke and Kinsky, instead of being ready for the second part of their task, had scarcely completed the first, and the same could be said of Clerfayt, while von dem Bussche had definitely failed. Only the duke of York and Otto had done their share in the centre, and they now stood at Tourcoing and Mouvaux isolated in the midst of the enemy's main body, with no hope of support from the other columns and no more than a chance of meeting Clerfayt. Coburg's entire force was, without deducting losses, no more than 53,000 for a front of 18 m., and only half of the enemy's available 80,000 men had as yet been engaged. Mack sent a staff officer, at 1 A.M., to implore the archduke to come up to Lannoy at once, but the young prince was asleep and his suite refused to wake him.

Matters did not, of course, present themselves in this light at Souham's headquarters, where the generals met in an informal council. The project of flinging Bonnaud's corps against the flank of the duke of York had not received even a beginning of execution, and the outposts, reinforced though they were from the main group, had everywhere been driven in. All the subordinate leaders, moreover (except Bonnaud), sent in the most despondent reports. "Councils of war never fight" is an old maxim, justified in ninety-nine cases in a hundred. But this council determined to do so, and with all possible vigour. The scheme was practically that which Coburg's first threat had produced and his first brusque advance had inhibited. Vandamme was to hold Clerfayt, the garrison of Lille and a few outlying corps to occupy the archduke and Kinsky, and in the centre Moreau and Bonnaud, with 40,000 effectives, were to attack the Tourcoing-Mouvaux position in front and flank at dawn with all possible energy.

The first shots were fired on the Lys, where, it will be remembered, Clerfayt's infantry had effected its crossing in the night. Vandamme, who was to defend the river, had in the evening assembled his troops (fatigued by a long march) near Menin instead of pushing on at once. Thus only one of his battalions had taken part in the defence of Werwick on the 17th, and the remainder were by this chance massed on the flank of Clerfayt's subsequent line of advance. Vandamme used his advantage well. He attacked, with perhaps 12,000 men against 21,000, the head and the middle of Clerfayt's columns as they moved on Lincelles. Clerfayt stopped at once, turning upon him and drove him towards Roncq and Menin. Still, fighting in succession, rallying and fighting again, Vandamme's regiments managed to spin out time and to commit Clerfayt deeper and deeper to a false direction till it was too late in the day to influence the battle elsewhere.

V. dem Bussche's column at Dottignies, shaken by the blow it had received the day before, did nothing, and actually retreated to the Scheldt. On the other flank, Kinsky and the archduke Charles practically remained inactive despite repeated orders to proceed to Lannoy, Kinsky waiting for the archduke, and the latter using up his time and forces in elaborating a protective cordon all around his left and rear. Both alleged that "the troops were tired," but there was a stronger motive. It was felt that Belgium was about to be handed over to France as the price of peace, and the generals did not see the force of wasting soldiers on a lost cause. There remained the two centre columns, Otto's and the duke of York's. The orders of the emperor to the duke were that he should advance to establish communication with Clerfayt at Lincelles. Having thus cut off the French Coutrai group, he was to initiate a general advance to crush it, in which all the allied columns would take part, Clerfayt, York and Otto in front, von dem Bussche on the right flank and the archduke and Kinsky in support. These airy schemes were destroyed at dawn on the 18th. Macdonald's brigade carried Tourcoing at the first rush though Otto's guns and the volleys of the infantry checked its further progress. Malbrancq's brigade swarmed around the duke of York's entrenchments at Mouvaux, while Bonnaud's mass from the side of Lille passed the Marque and lapped round the flanks of the British posts at Roubaix and Lannoy. The duke had used up his reserves in assisting Otto, and by 8 A.M. the positions of Roubaix, Lannoy and Mouvaux were isolated from each other. But the Allies fought magnificently, and by now the Republicans were in confusion, excited to the highest pitch and therefore extremely sensitive to waves of enthusiasm or panic; and at this moment Clerfayt was nearing success, and Vandamme fighting almost back to back with Malbrancq. Otto was able to retire gradually, though with heavy losses, to Leers, before Macdonald's left column was able to storm Watrelos, or Daendels' brigade, still farther towards the Scheldt, could reach his rear. The resistance of the Austrians gave breathing space to the English, who held on to their positions till about 11.30, attacked again and again by Bonnaud, and then, not without confusion, retired to join Otto at Leers.

With the retreat of the two sorely tried columns and the suspension of Clerfayt's attack between Lincelles and Roncq, the battle of Tourcoing ended. It was a victory of which the young French generals had reason to be proud. The main attack was vigorously conducted, and the two-to-one numerical superiority which the French possessed at the decisive point is the best testimony at once to Souham's generalship and to Vandamme's bravery. As for the Allies, those of them who took part in the battle at all, generals and soldiers, covered themselves with glory, but the inaction of two-thirds of Coburg's army was the bankruptcy declaration of the old strategical system. The Allies lost, on this day, about 4,000 killed and wounded and 1500 prisoners besides 60 guns. The French loss, which was probably heavier, is not known. The duke of York defeated, Souham at once turned his attention to Clerfayt, against whom he directed all the forces he could gather after a day's "horde-tactics." The Austrian commander, however, withdrew over the river unharmed. On the 19th he was at Rousseleer and Ingelminster, 9 or 10 m. north of Courtrai, while Coburg's forces assembled and encamped in a strong position some three miles west and north-west of Tournai, the Hanoverians remaining out in advance of the right of the Espierre.

Souham's victory, thanks to his geographical position, had merely given him air. The Allies, except for the loss of some 5500 men, were in no way worse off. The plan had failed, but the army as a whole had not been defeated, while the troops of the duke of York and Otto were far too well disciplined not to take their defeat as "all in the day's work." Souham was still on the Lys and midway between the two allied masses, able to strike each in turn or liable to be crushed between them in proportion as the opposing generals calculated time, space and endurance accurately. Souham, therefore, as early as the 19th, had decided that until Clerfayt had been pushed back to his old positions near Thielt he could not deal with the main body of the Allies on the side of Tournai, and he had left Bonnaud to hold the latter while he concentrated most of his forces towards Courtrai. This move had the desired effect, for Clerfayt retired without a contest, and on the 21st of May Souham issued his orders for an advance on Coburg's army, which, as he knew, had meantime been reinforced. Vandamme alone was left to face Clerfayt, and this time with outposts far out, at Ingelminster and Roosebeke, so as to ensure his chief, not a few hours', but two or three days' freedom from interference.

Pichegru now returned and took up the supreme command, Souham remaining in charge of his own and Moreau's divisions. On the extreme right, from Pont-à-Tressin, only demonstrations were to be made; the centre, between Baisieux and Estaimbourg, was to be the scene of the holding attack of Bonnaud's command, while Souham, in considerably greater density, delivered the decisive attack on the allied right by St Leger and Warcoing. At Helchin a brigade was to guard the outer flank of the assailants against a movement by the Hanoverians and to keep open communication with Courtrai in case of attack from the direction of Oudenarde. The details of the allied position were insufficiently known owing to the multiplicity of their advanced posts and the intricate and densely cultivated nature of the ground. The battle of Tournai opened in the early morning of the 22nd and was long and desperately contested. The demonstration on the French extreme right was soon recognized by the defenders to be negligible, and the allied left wing thereupon closed on the centre. There Bonnaud attacked with vigour, forcing back the various advanced posts, especially on the left, where he dislodged the Allies from Nechin. The defenders of Templeuve then fell back, and the attacking swarms—a dissolved line of battle—fringed the brook beyond Templeuve, on the other side of which was the Allies' main position, and even for a moment seized Blandain. Meanwhile the French at Nechin, in concert with the main attack, pressed on towards Ramegnies.

Macdonald's and other brigades had forced the Espierre rivulet and driven von dem Bussche's Hanoverians partly over the Scheldt (they had a pontoon bridge), partly southward. The main front of the Allies was defined by the brook that flows between Templeuve and Blandain, then between Ramegnies and Pont-à-Chin and empties into the Scheldt near the last-named hamlet. On this front till close on nightfall a fierce battle raged. Pichegru's main attack was still by his left, and Pont-à-Chin was taken and retaken by French, Austrians, British and Hanoverians in turn. Between Blandain and Pont-à-Chin Bonnaud's troops more than once entered the line of defence. But the attack was definitely broken off at nightfall and the Republicans withdrew slowly towards Lannoy and Leers. They had for the first time in a fiercely contested "soldier's battle" measured their strength, regiment for regiment, against the Allies, and failed, but by so narrow a margin that henceforward the Army of the North realized its own strength and solidity. The Army of the Revolution, already superior in numbers and imbued with the decision-compelling spirit, had at last achieved self-confidence.

But the actual decision was destined by a curious process of evolution to be given by Jourdan's far-distant army of the Moselle, to which we now turn.

The Army of the Moselle had been ordered to assemble a striking force on its left wing, without prejudicing the rest of its cordon in Lorraine, and with this striking force to operate towards Liège and Namur. Its first movement on Arlon, in April, was repulsed

by a small Austrian corps under Beaulieu that guarded this region. But in the beginning of May the advance was resumed though the troops were ill-equipped and ill-fed, and requisitions had reduced the civil population to semi-starvation and sullen hostility. We quote Jordan's instructions to his advanced guard, not merely as evidence of the trivial purpose of the march as originally planned, but still more as an illustration of the driving power that made the troops march at all and of the new method of marching and subsisting them.

Its commander was "to keep in mind the purpose of cutting the communications between Luxemburg and Namur, and was therefore to throw out strong bodies against the enemy daily and at different points, to parry the enemy's movements by rapid marches, to prevent any transfer of troops to Belgium, and lastly to seek an occasion for giving battle, for cutting off his convoys and for seizing his magazines." So much for the purpose. The method of achieving it is defined as follows. "General Hatry, in order to attain the object of these instructions, will have with him the minimum of wagons. He is to live at the expense of the enemy as much as possible, and to send back into the interior of the Republic whatever may be useful to it; he will maintain his communications with Longwy, report every movement to me and when necessary to the Committee of Public Safety and to the minister of war, maintain order and discipline, and firmly oppose every sort of pillage." How the last of these instructions was to be reconciled with the rest, Hatry was not informed. In fact, it was ignored. "I am far from believing," wrote the representative on mission Gillet, "that we ought to adopt the principles of philanthropy with which we began the war."

At the moment when, on these terms, Jourdan's advance was resumed, the general situation east of the Scheldt was as follows: The Allies' centre under Coburg had captured Landrecies, and now (May 4) lay around that place, about 65,000 strong, while the left under Kaunitz (27,000) was somewhat north of Maubeuge, with detachments south of the Sambre as far as the Meuse. Beyond these again were the detachment of Beaulieu (8000) near Arlon, and another, 9000 strong, around Trier. On the side of the French, the Army of the Moselle (41,000 effectives) was in cordon between Saargemünd and Longwy; the Army of the Ardennes (22,000) between Beaumont and Givet; of the Army of the North, the right wing (38,000) in the area Beaumont—Maubeuge and the centre (24,000) about Guise. In the aggregate the allied field armies numbered 139,000 men, those of the French 203,000. Tactically the disproportion was sufficient to give the latter the victory, if strategically, it could be made effective at a given time and place. But the French had mobility as a remedy for over-extension, and though their close massing on the extreme flanks left no more than equal forces opposite Coburg in the centre, the latter felt unable either to go forward or to close to one flank when on his right the storm was brewing at Menin and Tournai, and on his left Kaunitz reported the gathering of important masses of the French around Beaumont.

Thus the initiative passed over to the French, but they missed their opportunity, as Coburg had missed his in 1793. Pichegru's right was ordered to march on Mons, and his left to master the navigation of the Scheldt so as to reduce the Allies to wagon-drawn supplies—the latter an objective dear to the 18th-century general; while Jourdan's task, as we know, was to conquer the Liège or Namur country without unduly stripping the cordon on the Saar and on the Moselle. Jourdan's orders and original purpose were to get Beaulieu out of his way by the usual strategical tricks, and to march through the Ardennes as rapidly as possible, living on what supplies he could pick up from the enemy or the inhabitants. But he had scarcely started when Beaulieu made his existence felt by attacking a French post at Bouillon. Thereupon Jourdan made the active enemy, instead of Namur, his first object.

The movement of the operative portion of the Army of the Moselle began on the 21st of May from Longwy through Arlon towards Neufchâteau. Irregular fighting, sometimes with the Austrians, sometimes with the bitterly hostile inhabitants, marked its progress. Beaulieu was nowhere forced into a battle. But fortune was on Jourdan's side. The Austrians were a detachment of Coburg's army, not an independent force, and when threatened they retired towards Ciney, drawing Jourdan after them in the very direction in which he desired to go. On the 28th the French, after a vain detour made in the hope of forcing Beaulieu to fight—"les esclaves n'osent pas se mesurer avec des hommes libres," wrote Jourdan in disgust,—reached Ciney, and there heard that the enemy had fallen back to a strongly entrenched position on the east bank of the Meuse near Namur. Jourdan was preparing to attack them there, when considerations of quite another kind intervened to change his direction, and thereby to produce the drama of Charleroi and Fleurus—which military historians have asserted to be the foreseen result of the initial plan.

The method of "living on the country" had failed lamentably in the Ardennes, and Jourdan, though he had spoken of changing his line of supply from Arlon to Carignan, then to Mézières and so on as his march progressed, was still actually living from hand to mouth on the convoys that arrived intermittently from his original base. When he sought to take what he needed from the towns on the Meuse, he infringed on the preserves of the

Army of the Ardennes.¹ The advance, therefore, came for the moment to a standstill, while Beaulieu, solicitous for the safety of Charleroi—in which fortress he had a magazine—called up the outlying troops left behind on the Moselle to rejoin him by way of Bastogne. At the same moment (29th) Jourdan received new orders from Paris—(a) to take Dinant and Charleroi and to clear the country between the Meuse and the Sambre, and (b) to attack Namur, either by assault or by regular siege. In the latter case the bulk of the forces were to form a covering army beyond the place, to demonstrate towards Nivelles, Louvain and Liège, and to serve at need as a support to the right flank of the Ardennes Army. From these orders and from the action of the enemy the campaign at last took a definite shape.

When the Army of the Moselle passed over to the left bank of the Meuse, it was greeted by the distant roar of guns towards Charleroi and by news that the Army of the Ardennes, which had already twice been defeated by Kaunitz, was for the third time deeply and unsuccessfully engaged beyond the Sambre. The resumption of the march again complicated the supply question, and it was only slowly that the army advanced towards Charleroi, sweeping the country before it and extending its right towards Namur. But at last on the 3rd of June the concentration of parts of three armies on the Sambre was effected. Jourdan took command of the united force (Army of the Sambre and Meuse) with a strong hand, the 40,000 new comers inspired fresh courage in the beaten Ardennes troops, and in the sudden dominating enthusiasm of the moment pillaging and straggling almost ceased. Troops that had secured bread shared it with less fortunate comrades, and even the Liégeois peasantry made free gifts of supplies. "We must believe," says the French general staff of to-day, "that the idea symbolized by the tricolour, around which marched ever these sansculottes, shoeless and hungry, unchained a mysterious force that preceded our columns and aided the achievement of military success."

Friction, however, arose between Jourdan and the generals of the Ardennes Army, to whom the representatives thought it well to give a separate mission. This detachment of 18,000 men was followed by another, of 16,000, to keep touch with Maubeuge. Deducting another 6,000 for the siege of Charleroi, when this should be made, the covering army destined to fight the Imperialists dwindled to 55,000 out of 96,000 effectives. Even now, we see, the objective was not primarily the enemy's army. The Republican leaders desired to strike out beyond the Sambre, and as a preliminary to capture Charleroi. They would not, however, risk the loss of their connection with Maubeuge before attaining the new foothold.

Meanwhile, Tourcoing and Tournai had at last convinced Coburg that Pichegru was his most threatening opponent, and he had therefore, though with many misgivings, decided to move towards his right, leaving the prince of Orange with not more than 45,000 men on the side of Maubeuge-Charleroi-Namur.

Jourdan crossed the Sambre on the 12th of June, practically unopposed. Charleroi was rapidly invested and the covering army extended in a semicircular position. For the fourth time the Allies counter-attacked successfully, and after a severe struggle the French had to abandon their positions and their siege works and to recross the Sambre (June 16). But the army was not beaten. On the contrary, it was only desirous of having its revenge for a stroke of ill-fortune, due, the soldiers said, to the fog and to the want of ammunition. The fierce threats of St Just (who had joined the army) to *faire tomber les têtes* if more energy were not shown were unnecessary, and within two days the army was advancing again. On the 18th Jourdan's columns recrossed the river and extended around Charleroi in the same positions as before. This time, having in view the weariness of his troops and their heavy losses on the 16th, the prince of Orange allowed the siege to proceed. His reasons for so doing furnish an excellent illustration of the different ideas and capacities of a professional army and a "nation in arms," "The Imperial troops," wrote General Alvinczi, "are very fatigued. We have fought nine times since the 10th of May, we have bivouacked constantly, and made forced marches. Further, we are short of officers." All this, it need hardly be pointed out, applied equally to the French.

Charleroi, garrisoned by less than 3000 men, was intimidated into surrender (25th) when the third parallel was barely established. Thus the object of the first operations was achieved. As to the next neither Jourdan nor the representatives seem to have had anything further in view than the capture of more fortresses. But within twenty-four hours events had decided for them.

Coburg had quickly abandoned his intention of closing on his right wing, and (after the usual difficulties with his Allies on that side) had withdrawn 12,000 Austrians from the centre of his cordon opposite Pichegru, and made forced marches to join the prince of Orange. On the 24th of June he had collected 52,000 men at various points round Charleroi, and on the 25th he set out to relieve the little fortress. But he was in complete ignorance of the state of affairs at Charleroi. Signal guns were fired, but the woods drowned even the roar of the siege batteries, and at last a party under Lieutenant Radetzky

¹ Each of the fifteen armies on foot had been allotted certain departments as supply areas, Jourdan's being of course far away in Lorraine.

made its way through the covering army and discovered that the place had fallen. The party was destroyed on its return, but Radetzky was reserved for greater things. He managed, though twice wounded, to rejoin Coburg with his bad news in the midst of the battle of Fleurus.

On the 26th Jourdan's army (now some 73,000 strong) was still posted in a semicircle of entrenched posts, 20 m. in extent, round the captured town, pending the removal of the now unnecessary pontoon bridge at Marchiennes and the selection of a shorter line of defence.

Coburg was still more widely extended. Inferior in numbers as he was, he proposed to attack on an equal front, and thus gave himself, for the attack of an entrenched position, an order of battle of three men to every two yards of front, all reserves included. The Allies were to attack in five columns, the prince of Orange from the west and north-west towards Trazegnies and Ronceau wood, Quasdanovich from the north on Gosselies, Kaunitz from the north-east, the archduke Charles from the east through Fleurus, and finally Beaulieu towards Lambusart. The scheme was worked out in such minute detail and with so entire a disregard of the chance of unforeseen incidents, that once he had given the executive command to move, the Austrian general could do no more. If every detail worked out as planned, victory would be his; if accidents happened he could do nothing to redress them, and unless these righted themselves (which was improbable in the case of the stiffly organized old armies) he could only send round the order to break off the action and retreat.

In these circumstances the battle of Fleurus is the sum rather than the product of the various fights that took place between each allied column and the French division that it met. The prince of Orange attacked at earliest dawn and gradually drove in the French left wing to Courcelles, Roux and Marchiennes, but somewhat after noon the French under the direction for the most part of Kléber, began a series of counterstrokes which recovered the lost ground, and about 5, without waiting for Coburg's instructions, the prince retired north-westward off the battlefield. The French centre division, under Morlot, made a gradual fighting retreat on Gosselies, followed up by the Quasdanovich column and part of Kaunitz's force. No serious impression was made on the defenders chiefly because the brook west of Mellet was a serious obstacle to the rigid order of the Allies and had to be bridged before their guns could be got over. Kaunitz's column and Championnet's division met on the battlefield of 1690. The French were gradually driven in from the outlying villages to their main position between Heppignies and Wangenies. Here the Allies, well led and taking every advantage of ground and momentary chances, had the best of it. They pressed the French hard, necessitated the intervention of such small reserves as Jourdan had available, and only gave way to the defenders' counterstroke at the moment they received Coburg's orders for a general retreat.

On the allied left wing the fighting was closer and more severe than at any point. Beaulieu on the extreme left advanced upon Velaine and the French positions in the woods to the south in several small groups of all arms. Here were the divisions of the Army of the Ardennes, markedly inferior in discipline and endurance to the rest, and only too mindful of their four previous reverses. For six hours, more or less, they resisted the oncoming Allies, but then, in spite of the example and the despairing appeals of their young general Marceau, they broke and fled, leaving Beaulieu free to combine with the archduke Charles, who carried Fleurus after obstinate fighting, and then pressed on towards Campinaire. Beaulieu took command of all the allied forces on this side about noon, and from then to 5 P.M. launched a series of terrible attacks on the French (Lefebvre's division, part of the general reserve, and the remnant of Marceau's troops) above Campinaire and Lambusart. The disciplined resolution of the imperial battalions, and the enthusiasm of the French Revolutionaries, were each at their height. The Austrians came on time after time over ground that was practically destitute of cover. Villages, farms and fields of corn caught fire. The French grew more and more excited—"No retreat to-day!" they called out to their leaders, and finally, clamouring to be led against the enemy, they had their wish. Lefebvre seized the psychological moment when the fourth attack of the Allies had failed, and (though he did not know it) the order to retreat had come from Coburg. The losses of the unit that delivered it were small, for the charge exactly responded to the moral conditions of the moment, but the proportion of killed to wounded (55 to 83) is good evidence to the intensity of the momentary conflict.

So ended the battle. Coburg had by now learned definitely that Charleroi had surrendered, and while the issue of the battle was still doubtful—for though the prince of Orange was beaten, Beaulieu was in the full tide of success—he gave (towards 3 P.M.) the order for a general retreat. This was delivered to the various commanders between 4 and 5, and these, having their men in hand even in the heat of the engagement, were able to break off the battle without undue confusion. The French were far too exhausted to pursue them (they had lost twice as many men as the Allies), and their leader had practically no formed body at hand to follow up the victory, thanks to the extraordinary dissemination of the army.

Tourcoing, Tournay and Fleurus represent the maximum result achievable under the earlier Revolutionary system of making war, and show the men and the leaders at the

highest point of combined steadiness and enthusiasm they ever reached—that is, as a “Sansculotte” army. Fleurus was also the last great victory of the French, in point of time, prior to the advent of Napoleon, and may therefore be considered as illustrating the general conditions of warfare at one of the most important points in its development.

The sequel of these battles can be told in a few words. The Austrian government had, it is said, long ago decided to evacuate the Netherlands, and Coburg retired over the Meuse, practically unpursued, while the duke of York's forces fell back in good order, though pursued by Pichegru through Flanders. The English contingent embarked for home, the rest retired through Holland into Hanoverian territory, leaving the Dutch troops to surrender to the victors. The last phase of the pursuit reflected great glory on Pichegru, for it was conducted in midwinter through a country bare of supplies and densely intersected with dykes and meres. The crowning incident was the dramatic capture of the Dutch fleet, frozen in at the Texel, by a handful of hussars who rode over the ice and browbeat the crews of the well-armed battleships into surrender. It was many years before a prince of Orange ruled again in the United provinces, while the Austrian whitecoats never again mounted guard in Brussels.

The Rhine campaign of 1794, waged as before chiefly by the Prussians, was not of great importance. General v. Möllendorf won a victory at Kaiserslautern on the 23rd of May, but operations thereafter became spasmodic, and were soon complicated by Coburg's retreat over the Meuse. With this event the offensive of the Allies against the French Revolution came to an inglorious end. Poland now occupied the thoughts of European statesmen, and Austria began to draw her forces on to the east. England stopped the payment of subsidies, and Prussia made the Peace of Basel on the 5th of April 1795. On the Spanish frontier the French under General Dugommier (who was killed in the last battle) were successful in almost every encounter, and Spain, too, made peace. Only the eternal enemies, France and Austria, were left face to face on the Rhine, and elsewhere, of all the Allies, Sardinia alone continued the struggle in a half-hearted fashion.

The operations of 1795 on the Rhine present no feature of the Revolutionary Wars that other and more interesting campaigns fail to show. Austria had two armies on foot under the general command of Clerfayt, one on the Upper Rhine, the other south of the Main, while Mainz was held by an army of imperial contingents. The French, Jourdan on the lower, Pichegru on the Upper Rhine, had as usual superior numbers at their disposal. Jourdan combined a demonstrative frontal attack on Neuwied with an advance in force via Düsseldorf, reunited his wings beyond the river near Neuwied, and drove back the Austrians in a series of small engagements to the Main, while Pichegru passed at Mannheim and advanced towards the Neckar. But ere long both were beaten, Jourdan at Höchst and Pichegru at Mannheim, and the investment of Mainz had to be abandoned. This was followed by the invasion of the Palatinate by Clerfayt and the retreat of Jourdan to the Moselle. The position was further compromised by secret negotiations between Pichegru and the enemy for the restoration of the Bourbons. The meditated treason came to light early in the following year, and the guilty commander disappeared into the obscure ranks of the royalist secret agents till finally brought to justice in 1804.

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY

THE wonder of Europe now transferred itself from the drama of the French Revolution to the equally absorbing drama of a great war on the Rhine. “Every day, for four terrible years,” wrote a German pamphleteer early in 1796, “has surpassed the one before it in grandeur and terror, and to-day surpasses all in dizzy sublimity.” That a manœuvre on the Lahn should possess an interest to the peoples of Europe surpassing that of the Reign of Terror is indeed hardly imaginable, but there was a good reason for the tense expectancy that prevailed everywhere. France's policy was no longer defensive. She aimed at invading and “revolutionizing” the monarchies and principalities of old Europe, and to this end the campaign of 1796 was to be the great and conclusive effort. The “liberation of the oppressed” had its part in the decision, and the glory of freeing the serf easily merged itself in the glory of defeating the serf's masters. But a still more pressing motive for carrying the war into the enemy's country was the fact that France and the lands she had overrun could no longer subsist her armies. The Directory frankly told its generals, when they complained that their men were starving and ragged, that they would find plenty of subsistence beyond the Rhine.

On her part, Austria, no longer fettered by allied contingents nor by the expenses of a far distant campaign, could put forth more strength than on former campaigns, and as war came nearer home and the citizen saw himself threatened by “revolutionizing” and devastating armies, he ceased to hamper or to swindle the troops. Thus the duel took place on the grandest scale then known in the history of European armies. Apart from

the secondary theatre of Italy, the area embraced in the struggle was a vast triangle extending from Düsseldorf to Basel and thence to Ratisbon, and Carnot sketched the outlines in accordance with the scale of the picture. He imagined nothing less than the union of the armies of the Rhine and the Riviera before the walls of Vienna. Its practicability cannot here be discussed, but it is worth contrasting the attitude of contemporaries and of later strategical theorists towards it. The former, with their empirical knowledge of war, merely thought it impracticable with the available means, but the latter have condemned it root and branch as "an operation on exterior lines."

The scheme took shape only gradually. The first advance was made partly in search of food, partly to disengage the Palatinate, which Clerfayt had conquered in 1795. "If you have reason to believe that you would find some supplies on the Lahn, hasten thither with the greater part of your forces," wrote the Directory to Jourdan (Army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, 72,000) on the 29th of March. He was to move at once, before the Austrians could concentrate, and to pass the Rhine at Düsseldorf, thereby bringing back the centre of the enemy over the river. He was, further, to take every advantage of their want of concentration to deliver blow after blow, and to do his utmost to break them up completely. A fortnight later Moreau (Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle, 78,000) was ordered to take advantage of Jourdan's move, which would draw most of the Austrian forces to the Mainz region, to enter the Breisgau and Suabia. "You will attack Austria at home, and capture her magazines. You will enter a new country, the resources of which, properly handled, should suffice for the needs of the Army of the Rhine-and-Moselle."

Jourdan, therefore, was to take upon himself the destruction of the enemy, Moreau the invasion of South Germany. The first object of both was to subvert their armies beyond the Rhine, the second to defeat the armies and terrorize the populations of the empire. Under these instructions the campaign opened. Jourdan crossed at Düsseldorf and reached the Lahn, but the enemy concentrated against him very swiftly and he had to retire over the river. Still, if he had not been able to "break them up completely," he had at any rate drawn on himself the weight of the Austrian army, and enabled Moreau to cross at Strassburg without much difficulty.

The Austrians were now commanded by the archduke Charles, who, after all detachments had been made, disposed of some 56,000 men. At first he employed the bulk of this force against Jourdan, but on hearing of Moreau's progress he returned to the Neckar country with 20,000 men, leaving Feldzeugmeister v. Wartensleben with 36,000 to observe Jourdan. In later years he admitted himself that his own force was far too small to deal with Moreau, who, he probably thought, would retire after a few manœuvres.

But by now the two French generals were aiming at something more than alternate raids and feints. Carnot had set before them the ideal of a decisive battle as the great object. Jourdan was instructed, if the archduke turned on Moreau, to follow him up with all speed and to bring him to action. Moreau, too, was not retreating but advancing. The two armies, Moreau's and the archduke's, met in a straggling and indecisive battle at Malsch on the 9th of July, and soon afterwards Charles learned that Jourdan had recrossed the Rhine and was driving Wartensleben before him. He thereupon retired both armies from the Rhine valley into the interior, hoping that at least the French would detach large forces to besiege the river fortresses. Disappointed of this, and compelled to face a very grave situation, he resorted to an expedient which may be described in his own words: "to retire both armies step by step without committing himself to a battle, and to seize the first opportunity to unite them so as to throw himself with superior or at least equal strength on one of the two hostile enemies." This is the ever-recurring idea of "interior lines." It was not new, for Frederick the Great had used similar means in similar circumstances, as had Souham at Tourcoing and even Dampierre at Valenciennes. Nor was it differentiated, as were Napoleon's operations in this same year, by the deliberate use of a small containing force at one point to obtain relative superiority at another. A general of the 18th century did not believe in the efficacy of superior numbers—had not Frederick the Great disproved it?—and for him operations on "interior lines" were simply successive blows at successive targets, the efficacy of the blow in each case being dependent chiefly on his own personal qualities and skill as a general on the field of battle. In the present case the point to be observed is not the expedient which was dictated by the circumstances, but the courage of the young general, who, unlike Wartensleben and the rest of his generals, unlike, too, Moreau and Jourdan themselves, surmounted difficulties instead of lamenting them.

On the other side, Carnot, of course, foresaw this possibility. He warned the generals not to allow the enemy to "use his forces sometimes against one, sometimes against the other, as he did in the last campaign," and ordered them to go forward respectively into Franconia and into the country of the upper Neckar, with a view to seeking out and defeating the enemy's army. But the plan of operations soon grew bolder. Jourdan was informed on the 21st of July that if he reached the Regnitz without meeting the enemy, or if his arrival there forced the latter to retire rapidly to the Danube, he was not to hesitate to advance to Ratisbon, and even to Passau if the disorganization of the enemy admitted it, but in these contingencies he was to detach a force into Bohemia

to levy contributions. "We presume that the enemy is too weak to offer a successful resistance and will have united his forces on the Danube; we hope that our two armies will act in unison to rout him completely. Each is, in any case, strong enough to attack by itself, and nothing is so pernicious as slowness in war." Evidently the fear that the two Austrian armies would unite against one of their assailants had now given place to something like disdain.

This was due in all probability to the rapidity with which Moreau was driving the archduke before him. After a brief stand on the Neckar at Cannstadt, the Austrians, only 25,000 strong, fell back to the Rauhe Alb, where they halted again, to cover their magazines at Ulm and Günzburg, towards the end of July. Wartensleben was similarly falling back before Jourdan, though the latter, starting considerably later than Moreau, had not advanced so far. The details of the successive positions occupied by Wartensleben need not be stated; all that concerns the general development of the campaign is the fact that the hitherto independent leader of the "Lower Rhine Army" resented the loss of his freedom of action, and besides lamentations opposed a dull passive resistance to all but the most formal orders of the prince. Many weeks passed before this was overcome sufficiently for his leader even to arrange for the contemplated combination, and in these weeks the archduke was being driven back day by day, and the German principalities were falling away one by one as the French advanced and preached the revolutionary formula. In such circumstances as these—the general facts, if not the causes, were patent enough—it was natural that the confident Paris strategists should think chiefly of the profits of their enterprise and ignore the fears of the generals at the front. But the latter were justified in one important respect; their operating armies had seriously diminished in numbers, Jourdan disposing of not more than 45,000 and Moreau of about 50,000. The archduke had now, owing to the arrival of a few detachments from the Black Forest and elsewhere, about 34,000 men, Wartensleben almost exactly the same, and the former, for some reason which has never been fully explained but has its justification in psychological factors, suddenly turned and fought a long, severe and straggling battle above Neresheim (August 11). This did not, however, give him much respite, and on the 12th and 13th he retired over the Danube. At this date Wartensleben was about Amberg, almost as far way from the other army as he had been on the Rhine, owing to the necessity of retreating round instead of through the principality of Bayreuth, which was a Prussian possession and could therefore make its neutrality respected.

Hitherto Charles had intended to unite his armies on the Danube against Moreau. His later choice of Jourdan's army as the objective of his combination grew out of circumstances and in particular out of the brilliant reconnaissance work of a cavalry brigadier of the Lower Rhine Army, Nauendorff. This general's reports—he was working in the country south and south-east of Nürnberg, Wartensleben being at Amberg—indicated first an advance of Jourdan's army from Forchheim through Nürnberg to the south, and induced the archduke, on the 12th, to begin a concentration of his own army towards Ingolstadt. This was a purely defensive measure, but Nauendorff reported on the 13th and 14th that the main columns of the French were swinging away to the east against Wartensleben's front and inner flank, and on the 14th he boldly suggested the idea that decided the campaign. "If your Royal Highness will or can advance 12,000 men against Jourdan's rear, he is lost. We could not have a better opportunity." When this message arrived at headquarters the archduke had already issued orders to the same effect. Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Latour, with 30,000 men, was to keep Moreau occupied—another expedient of the moment, due to the very close pressure of Moreau's advance, and the failure of the attempt to put him out of action at Neresheim. The small remainder of the army, with a few detachments gathered *en route*, in all about 27,000 men, began to recross the Danube on the 14th, and slowly advanced north on a broad front, its leader being now sure that at some point on his line he would encounter the French, whether they were heading for Ratisbon or Amberg. Meanwhile, the Directory had, still acting on the theory of the archduke's weakness, ordered Moreau to combine the operations with those of Bonaparte in Italian Tirol, and Jourdan to turn both flanks of his immediate opponent, and thus to prevent his joining the archduke, as well as his retreat into Bohemia. And curiously enough it was this latter, and not Moreau's move, which suggested to the archduke that his chance had come. The chance was, in fact, one dear to the 18th century general, catching his opponent in the act of executing a manœuvre. So far from "exterior lines" being fatal to Jourdan, it was not until the French general began to operate against Wartensleben's *inner* flank that the archduke's opportunity came.

The decisive events of the campaign can be described very briefly, the ideas that directed them having been made clear. The long thin line of the archduke wrapped itself round Jourdan's right flank near Amberg, while Wartensleben fought him in front. The battle (August 24) was a series of engagements between the various columns that met; it was a repetition in fact of Fleurus, without the intensity of fighting spirit that redeems that battle from dullness. Success followed, not upon bravery or even tactics, but upon the pre-existing strategical conditions. At the end of the day the French

retired, and next morning the archduke began another wide extension to his left, hoping to head them off. This consumed several days. In the course of it Jourdan attempted to take advantage of his opponent's dissemination to regain the direct road to Würzburg, but the attempt was defeated by an almost fortuitous combination of forces at the threatened point. More effective, indeed, than this indirect pursuit was the very active hostility of the peasantry, who had suffered in Jourdan's advance and retaliated so effectually during his retreat that the army became thoroughly demoralized, both by want of food and by the strain of incessant sniping. Defeated again at Würzburg on the 3rd of September, Jourdan continued his retreat to the Lahn, and finally withdrew the shattered army over the Rhine, partly by Düsseldorf, partly by Neuwied. In the last engagement on the Lahn the young and brilliant Marceau was mortally wounded. Far away in Bavaria, Moreau had meantime been driving Latour from one line of resistance to another. On receiving the news of Jourdan's reverses, however, he made a rapid and successful retreat to Strassburg, evading the prince's army, which had ascended the Rhine valley to head him off, in the nick of time.

This celebrated campaign is pre-eminently strategical in its character, in that the positions and movements anterior to the battle preordained its issue. It raised the reputation of the archduke Charles to the highest point, and deservedly, for he wrested victory from the most desperate circumstances by the skilful and resolute employment of his one advantage. But this was only possible because Moreau and Jourdan were content to accept strategical failure without seeking to redress the balance by hard fighting. The great question of this campaign is, why did Moreau and Jourdan fail against inferior numbers, when in Italy Bonaparte with a similar army against a similar opponent won victory after victory against equal and superior forces? The answer will not be supplied by any theory of "exterior and interior lines." It lies far deeper. So far as it is possible to summarize it in one phrase, it lies in the fact that though the Directory meant this campaign to be the final word on the Revolutionary War, for the nation at large this final word had been said at Fleurus. The troops were still the nation; they no longer sought for a cause and for bare existence, and Moreau and Jourdan were too closely allied in ideas and sympathies with the misplaced citizen soldiers they commanded to be able to dominate their collective will. In default of a cause, however, soldiers will fight for a man, and this brings us by a natural sequence of ideas to the war in Italy.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR IN ITALY, FIRST PHASE

HITHERTO we have ignored the operations on the Italian frontier, partly because they were of minor importance and partly because the conditions out of which Napoleon's first campaign arose can be best considered in connexion with that campaign itself, from which indeed the previous operations derive such light as they possess. It has been mentioned that in 1792 the French overran Savoy and Nice. In 1793 the Sardinian army and a small auxiliary corps of Austrians waged a desultory mountain warfare against the Army of the Alps about Briançon and the Army of Italy on the Var. That furious offensive on the part of the French, which signalized the year 1793 elsewhere, was made impossible here by the counter-revolution in the cities of the Midi.

In 1794, when this had been crushed, the intention of the French government was to take the offensive against the Austro-Sardinians. The first operation was to be the capture of Oneglia. The concentration of large forces in the lower Rhone valley had naturally infringed upon the areas told off for the provisioning of the Armies of the Alps (Kellermann) and of Italy (Dumerbion); indeed, the sullen population could hardly be induced to feed the troops suppressing the revolt, still less the distant frontier armies. Thus the only source of supply was the Riviera of Genoa: "Our connexion with this district is imperilled by the corsairs of Oneglia (a Sardinian town) owing to the cessation of our operations afloat. The army is living from hand to mouth," wrote the younger Robespierre in September 1793. Vessels bearing supplies from Genoa could not avoid the corsairs by taking the open sea, for there the British fleet was supreme. Carnot therefore ordered the Army of Italy to capture Oneglia, and 21,000 men (the rest of the 67,000 effectives were held back for coast defence) began operations in April. The French left moved against the enemy's positions on the main road over the Col di Tenda, the centre towards Ponte di Nava, and the right along the Riviera. All met with success, thanks to Masséna's bold handling of the centre column. Not only was Oneglia captured, but also the Col di Tenda. Napoleon Bonaparte served in these affairs on the headquarter staff. Meantime the Army of the Alps had possessed itself of the Little St. Bernard and Mont Cenis, and the Republicans were now masters of several routes into Piedmont (May). But the Alpine roads merely led to fortresses, and both Carnot and Bonaparte — Napoleon had by now captivated the younger Robespierre and become the leading

spirit in Dumerbion's army—considered that the Army of the Alps should be weakened to the profit of the Army of Italy, and that the time had come to disregard the feeble neutrality of Genoa, and to advance over the Col di Tenda.

Napoleon's first suggestion for a rapid condensation of the French cordon, and an irresistible blow on the centre of the Allies by Tenda-Coni,¹ came to nothing owing to the waste of time in negotiations between the generals and the distant Committee, and meanwhile new factors came into play. The capture of the pass of Argentera by the right wing of the Army of the Alps suggested that the main effort should be made against the barrier fortress of Demonte, but here again Napoleon proposed a concentration of effort on the primary and economy of force in the secondary objective. About the same time, in a memoir on the war in general, he laid down his most celebrated maxim: "The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing." In the domain of tactics he was and remains the principal exponent of the art of breaking the equilibrium, and already he imagined the solution of problems of policy and strategy on the same lines. "Austria is the great enemy; Austria crushed, Germany, Spain, Italy fall of themselves. We must not disperse, but concentrate our attack." Napoleon argued that Austria could be effectively wounded by an offensive against Piedmont, and even more effectively by an ulterior advance from Italian soil into Germany. In pursuance of the single aim he asked for the appointment of a single commander-in-chief to hold sway from Bayonne to the Lake of Geneva, and for the rejection of all schemes for "revolutionizing" Italy till after the defeat of the arch-enemy.

Operations, however, did not after all take either of these forms. The younger Robespierre suffered with his brother in the *coup d'état* of 9th Thermidor, the advance was suspended, and Bonaparte, amongst other leading spirits of the Army of Italy, was arrested and imprisoned. Profiting by this moment, Austria increased her auxiliary corps. An Austrian general took command of the whole of the allied forces, and pronounced a threat from the region of Cairo (where the Austrians took their place on the left wing of the combined army) towards the Riviera. The French, still dependent on Genoa for supplies, had to take the offensive at once to save themselves from starvation, and the result was the expedition of Dego, planned chiefly by Napoleon, who had been released from prison and was at headquarters, though unemployed. The movement began on the 17th of September; and although the Austrian general Colloredo repulsed an attack at Dego (Sept. 21) he retreated to Acqui, and the incipient offensive of the Allies ended abruptly.

The first months of the winter of 1794-1795 were spent in re-equipping the troops, who stood in sore need after their rapid movements in the mountains. For the future operations, the enforced condensation of the army on its right wing, with the object of protecting its line of supply to Genoa and the dangers of its cramped situation on the Riviera suggested a plan roughly resembling one already recommended by Napoleon, who had since the affair of Dego become convinced that the way into Italy was through the Apennines and not the Alps. The essence of this was to anticipate the enemy by a very early and rapid advance from Vado towards Carcare by the Ceva road, the only good road of which the French disposed and which they significantly called the *chemin de canon*.

The plan, however, came to nothing; the Committee, which now changed its personnel at fixed intervals, was in consequence wavering and non-committal, troops were withdrawn for a projected invasion of Corsica, and in November 1794 Dumerbion was replaced by Schérer, who assembled only 17,000 of his 54,000 effectives for field operations, and selected as his line of advance the Col di Tenda-Coni road. Schérer, besides being hostile to any suggestion emanating from Napoleon, was impressed with the apparent danger to his right wing concentrated in the narrow Riviera, which it was at this stage impossible to avert by a sudden and early assumption of the offensive. After a brief tenure Schérer was transferred to the Spanish frontier, but Kellermann, who now received command of the Army of Italy in addition to his own, took the same view as his predecessor—the view of the ordinary general. But not even the Schérer plan was put into execution, for spring had scarcely arrived when the prospect of renewed revolts in the south of France practically paralysed the army.

This encouraged the enemy to deliver the blow that had so long been feared. The combined forces, under Devins,—the Sardinians, the Austrian auxiliary corps and the newly arrived Austrian main army,—advanced together, and forced the French right wing to evacuate Vado and the Genoese littoral. But at this juncture the conclusion of peace with Spain released the Pyrenees armies, and Schérer returned to the Army of Italy at the head of reinforcements. He was faced with a difficult situation, but he had the means wherewith to meet it, as Napoleon promptly pointed out. Up to this, Napoleon said, the French commanded the mountain crest, and therefore covered Savoy and Nice, and also Oneglia, Loano and Vado, the ports of the Riviera. But now that Vado was lost

¹ Liguria was not at this period thought of, even by Napoleon, as anything more than a supply area.

the breach was made. Genoa was cut off, and the south of France was the only remaining resource for the army commissariat. Vado must therefore be retaken and the line reopened to Genoa, and to do this it was essential first to close up the over-extended cordon—and with the greatest rapidity, lest the enemy, with the shorter line to move on, should gather at the point of contact before the French—and to advance on Vado. Further, knowing (as every one knew) that the king of Sardinia was not inclined to continue the struggle indefinitely, he predicted that this ruler would make peace once the French army had established itself in his dominions, and for this the way into the interior, he asserted, was the great road Savona-Ceva. But Napoleon's mind ranged beyond the immediate future. He calculated that once the French advanced the Austrians would seek to cover Lombardy, the Piedmontese Turin, and this separation, already morally accomplished, it was to be the French general's task to accentuate in fact. Next, Sardinia having been coerced into peace, the Army of Italy would expel the Austrians from Lombardy, and connect its operations with those of the French in South Germany by way of Tirol. The supply question, once the soldiers had gained the rich valley of the Po, would solve itself.

This was the essence of the first of four memoranda on this subject prepared by Napoleon in his Paris office. The second indicated the means of coercing Sardinia—first the Austrians were to be driven or scared away towards Alessandria, then the French army would turn sharp to the left, driving the Sardinian eastward and north-eastward through Ceva, and this was to be the signal for the general invasion of Piedmont from all sides. In the third paper he framed an elaborate plan for the retaking of Vado, and in the fourth he summarized the contents of the other three. Having thus cleared his own mind as to the conditions and the solution of the problem, he did his best to secure the command for himself.

The measures recommended by Napoleon were translated into a formal and detailed order to recapture Vado. To Napoleon the miserable condition of the Army of Italy was the most urgent incentive to prompt action. In Schérer's judgment, however, the army was unfit to take the field, and therefore *ex hypothesi* to attack Vado, without thorough reorganization, and it was only in November that the advance was finally made. It culminated, thanks once more to the resolute Masséna, in the victory of Loano (November 23-24). But Schérer thought more of the destitution of his own army than of the fruits of success, and contented himself with resuming possession of the Riviera.

Meanwhile the Mentor whose suggestions and personality were equally repugnant to Schérer had undergone strange vicissitudes of fortune—dismissal from the headquarters' staff, expulsion from the list of general officers, and then the "whiff of grapeshot" of 13th Vendémiaire, followed shortly by his marriage with Josephine, and his nomination to command the Army of Italy. These events had neither shaken his cold resolution nor disturbed his balance.

The Army of Italy spent the winter of 1795-1796 as before in the narrow Riviera, while on the one side, just over the mountains, lay the Austro-Sardinians, and on the other, out of range of the coast batteries but ready to pounce on the supply ships, were the British frigates. On Bonaparte's left Kellermann, with no more than 18,000, maintained a string of posts between Lake Geneva and the Argentera as before. Of the Army of Italy, 7000 watched the Tenda road and 20,000 men the coast-line. There remained for active operations some 27,000 men, ragged, famished and suffering in every way in spite of their victory of Loano. The Sardinian and Austrian auxiliaries (Colli), 25,000 men, lay between Mondovì and Ceva, a force strung out in the Alpine valleys opposed Kellermann, and the main Austrian army (commanded by Beaulieu), in widely extended cantonments between Acqui and Milan, numbered 27,000 field troops. Thus the short-lived concentration of all the Allied forces for the battle against Schérer had ended in a fresh separation. Austria was far more concerned with Poland than with the moribund French question, and committed as few of her troops as possible to this distant and secondary theatre of war. As for Piedmont "peace" was almost the universal cry, even within the army. All this scarcely affected the regimental spirit and discipline of the Austrian squadrons and battalions, which had now recovered from the defeat of Loano. But they were important factors for the new general-in-chief on the Riviera, and formed the basis of his strategy.

Napoleon's first task was far more difficult than the writing of memoranda. He had to grasp the reins and to prepare his troops, morally and physically, for active work. It was not merely that a young general with many enemies, a political favourite of the moment, had been thrust upon the army. The army itself was in a pitiable condition. Whole companies with their officers went plundering in search of mere food, the horses had never received as much as half-rations for a year past, and even the generals were half-starved. Thousands of men were barefooted and hundreds were without arms. But in a few days he had secured an almost incredible ascendancy over the sullen, starved, half-clothed army.

"Soldiers," he told them, "you are famished and nearly naked. The government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience, your courage, do you honour, but give you no glory, no advantage. I will lead you into the most fertile plains of the

world. There you will find great towns, rich provinces. There you will find honour, glory and riches. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage?"

Such words go far, and little as he was able to supply material deficiencies—all he could do was to expel rascally contractors, sell a captured privateer for £5000 and borrow £2500 from Genoa—he cheerfully told the Directory on the 28th of March that "the worst was over." He augmented his army of operations to above 40,000, at the expense of the coast divisions, and set on foot also two small cavalry divisions, mounted on the half-starved horses that had survived the winter. Then he announced that the army was ready and opened the campaign.

The first plan, emanating from Paris, was that, after an expedition towards Genoa to assist in raising a loan there, the army should march against Beaulieu, previously neutralizing the Sardinians by the occupation of Ceva. When Beaulieu was beaten it was thought probable that the Piedmontese would enter into an alliance with the French against their former comrades. A second plan, however, authorized the general to begin by subduing the Piedmontese to the extent necessary to bring about peace and alliance, and on this Napoleon acted. If the present separation of the Allies continued, he proposed to overwhelm the Sardinians first, before the Austrians could assemble from winter quarters, and then to turn on Beaulieu. If, on the other hand, the Austrians, before he could strike his blow, united with Colli, he proposed to frighten them into separating again by moving on Acqui and Alessandria. Hence Carcare, where the road from Acqui joined the "cannon-road," was the first objective of his march, and from there he could manœuvre and widen the breach between the allied armies. His scattered left wing would assist in the attack on the Sardinians as well as it could—for the immediate attack on the Austrians its co-operation would of course have been out of the question. In any case he grudged every week spent in administrative preparation. The delay due to this, as a matter of fact, allowed a new situation to develop. Beaulieu was himself the first to move, and he moved towards Genoa instead of towards his Allies. The gap between the two allied wings was thereby widened, but it was no longer possible for the French to use it, for their plan of destroying Colli while Beaulieu was ineffective had collapsed.

In connexion with the Genoese loan, and to facilitate the movement of supply convoys, a small French force had been pushed forward to Voltri. Bonaparte ordered it back as soon as he arrived at the front, but the alarm was given. The Austrians broke up from winter quarters at once, and rather than lose the food supplies at Voltri, Bonaparte actually reinforced Masséna at that place, and gave him orders to hold on as long as possible, cautioning him only to watch his left rear (Montenotte). But he did not abandon his purpose. Starting from the new conditions, he devised other means, as we shall see, for reducing Beaulieu to ineffectiveness. Meanwhile Beaulieu's plan of offensive operations, such as they were, developed. The French advance to Voltri had not only spurred him into activity, but convinced him that the bulk of the French army lay east of Savona. He therefore made Voltri the objective of a converging attack, not with the intention of destroying the French army but with that of "cutting its communications with Genoa," and expelling it from "the only place in the Riviera where there were sufficient ovens to bake its bread." (Beaulieu to the Aulic Council, 15 April.) The Sardinians and auxiliary Austrians were ordered to extend leftwards on Dego to close the gap that Beaulieu's advance on Genoa-Voltri opened up, which they did, though only half-heartedly and in small force, for, unlike Beaulieu, they knew that masses of the enemy were still in the western stretch of the Riviera. The rightmost of Beaulieu's own columns was on the road between Acqui and Savona with orders to seize Monte Legino as an advanced post, the others were to converge towards Voltri from the Genoa side and the mountain passes about Campo-freddo and Sassello. The wings were therefore so far connected that Colli wrote to Beaulieu on this day "the enemy will never dare to place himself between our two armies." The event belied the prediction, and the proposed minor operation against granaries and bakeries became the first act of a decisive campaign.

On the night of the 9th of April the French were grouped as follows: brigades under Garnier and Macquard at the Finestre and Tenda passes, Sérurier's division and Rusca's brigade east of Garesio; Augereau's division about Loano, Meynier's at Finale, Laharpe's at Savona with an outpost on the Monte Legino, and Cervoni's brigade at Voltri. Masséna was in general charge of the last-named units. The cavalry was far in rear beyond Loano. Colli's army, excluding the troops in the valleys that led into Dauphiné, was around Coni and Mondovi-Ceva, the latter group connecting with Beaulieu by a detachment under Irovera between Millesimo and Carcare. Of Beaulieu's army, Argenteau's division, still concentrating to the front in many small bodies, extended over the area Acqui-Dego-Sassello. Vukassovich's brigade was equally extended between Ovada and the mountain-crests above Voltri, and Pittoni's division was grouped around Gavi and the Bocchetta, the two last units being destined for the attack on Voltri. Farther to the rear was Sebottendorf's division around Alessandria-Tortona.

On the afternoon of the 10th Beaulieu delivered his blow at Voltri, not, as he anticipated, against three-quarters of the French army, but against Cervoni's detachment. This, after a long irregular fight, slipped away in the night to Savona. Discovering his mistake

next morning, Beaulieu sent back some of his battalions to join Argenteau. But there was no road by which they could do so save the détour through Acqui and Dego, and long before they arrived Argenteau's advance on Monte Legino had forced on the crisis. On the 11th (a day behind time), this general drove in the French outposts, but he soon came on three battalions under Colonel Rampon, who threw himself into some old earthworks that lay near, and said to his men, "We must win or die here, my friends." His redoubt and his men stood the trial well, and when day broke on the 12th Bonaparte was ready to deliver his first "Napoleon-stroke."

The principle that guided him in the subsequent operations may be called "superior numbers at the decisive point." Touch had been gained with the enemy all along the long line between the Tenda and Voltri, and he decided to concentrate swiftly upon the nearest enemy—Argenteau. Augereau's division, or such part of it as could march at once, was ordered to Mallare, picking up here and there on the way a few horsemen and guns. Masséna, with 9000 men, was to send two brigades in the direction of Carcare and Altare, and with the third to swing round Argenteau's right and to head for Montenotte village in his rear. Laharpe with 7000 (it had become clear that the enemy at Voltri would not pursue their advantage) was to join Rampon, leaving only Cervoni and two battalions in Savona. Sérurier and Rusca were to keep the Sardinians in front of them occupied. The far-distant brigades of Garnier and Macquard stood fast, but the cavalry drew eastward as quickly as its condition permitted. In rain and mist on the early morning of the 12th the French marched up from all quarters, while Argenteau's men waited in their cold bivouacs for light enough to resume their attack on Monte Legino. About 9 the mists cleared, and heavy fighting began, but Laharpe held the mountain, and the vigorous Masséna with his nearest brigade stormed forward against Argenteau's right. A few hours later, seeing Augereau's columns heading for their line of retreat, the Austrians retired, sharply pressed, on Dego. The threatened intervention of Provera was checked by Augereau's presence at Carcare.

Montenotte was a brilliant victory, and one can imagine its effects on the but lately despondent soldiers of the Army of Italy, for all imagined that Beaulieu's main body had been defeated. This was far from being the case, however, and although the French spent the night of the battle at Cairo-Carcare-Montenotte, midway between the allied wings, only two-thirds of Argenteau's force, and none of the other divisions, had been beaten, and the heaviest fighting was to come. This became evident on the afternoon of the 13th, but meanwhile Bonaparte, eager to begin at once the subjugation of the Piedmontese (for which purpose he wanted to bring Sérurier and Rusca into play) sent only Laharpe's division and a few details of Masséna's, under the latter, towards Dego. These were to protect the main attack from interference by the forces that had been engaged at Montenotte (presumed to be Beaulieu's main body), the said main attack being delivered by Augereau's division, reinforced by most of Masséna's, on the positions held by Provera. The latter, only 1000 strong to Augereau's 9000, shut himself in the castle of Cossaria which he defended *à la Rampon* against a series of furious assaults. Not until the morning of the 14th was his surrender secured, after his ammunition and food had been exhausted.

Argenteau also won a day's respite on the 13th, for Laharpe did not join Masséna till late, and nothing took place opposite Dego but a little skirmishing. During the day Bonaparte saw for himself that he had overrated the effects of Montenotte. Beaulieu, on the other hand, underrated them, treating it as a mishap which was more than counterbalanced by his own success in "cutting off the French from Genoa." He began to reconstruct his line on the front Dego-Sassello, trusting to Colli to harry the French until the Voltri troops had finished their détour through Acqui and rejoined Argenteau. This, of course, presumed that Argenteau's troops were intact and Colli's able to move, which was not the case with either. Not until the afternoon of the 14th did Beaulieu place a few extra battalions at Argenteau's disposal "to be used only in case of extreme necessity," and order Vukassovich from the region of Sassello to "make a diversion" against the French right with two battalions.


Thus Argenteau, already shaken, was exposed to destruction. On the 14th, after Provera's surrender, Masséna and Laharpe, reinforced until they had nearly a two-to-one superiority, stormed Dego and killed or captured 3000 of Argenteau's 5500 men, the remnant retreating in disorder to Acqui. But nothing was done towards the accomplishment of the purpose of destroying Colli on that day, save that Sérurier and Rusca began to close in to meet the main body between Ceva and Millesimo. Moreover, the victory at Dego had produced its usual results on the wild fighting swarms of the Republicans, who threw themselves like hungry wolves on the little town, without pursuing the beaten enemy or even placing a single outpost on the Acqui road. In this state, during the early hours of the 15th, Vukassovich's brigade,¹ marching up from Sassello, surprised them, and they broke and fled in an instant. The whole morning had to be spent in rallying

¹ Vukassovich had received Beaulieu's order to demonstrate with two battalions, and also appeals for help from Argenteau. He therefore brought most of his troops with him.

them at Cairo, and Bonaparte had for the second time to postpone his union with Sérurier and Rusca, who meanwhile, isolated from one another and from the main army, were groping forward in the mountains. A fresh assault on Dego was ordered, and after very severe fighting, Masséna and Laharpe succeeded late in the evening in retaking it. Vukassovich lost heavily, but retired steadily and in order on Spigno. The killed and wounded numbered probably about 1000 French and 1500 Austrians, out of considerably less than 10,000 engaged on each side—a loss which contrasted very forcibly with those suffered in other battles of the Revolutionary Wars, and by teaching the Army of Italy to bear punishment, imbued it with self-confidence. But again success bred disorder, and there was a second orgy in the houses and streets of Dego which went on till late in the morning and paralyzed the whole army.

This was perhaps the crisis of the campaign. Even now it was not certain that the Austrians had been definitively pushed aside, while it was quite clear that Beaulieu's main body was intact and Colli was still more an unknown quantity. But Napoleon's intention remained the same, to attack the Piedmontese as quickly and as heavily as possible, Beaulieu being held in check by a containing force under Masséna and Laharpe.

The remainder of the army, counting in now Rusca and Sérurier, was to move westward towards Ceva. This disposition, while it illustrates the Napoleonic principle of delivering a heavy blow on the selected target and warding off interference at other points, shows also the difficulty of rightly apportioning the available means between the offensive mass and the defensive system, for, as it turned out, Beaulieu was already sufficiently scared, and thought of nothing but self-defence on the line Acqui-Ovada-Bocchetta, while the French offensive mass was very weak compared with Colli's unbeaten and now fairly concentrated army about Ceva and Montezemolo.



On the afternoon of the 16th the real advance was begun by Augereau's division, reinforced by other troops. Rusca joined Augereau towards evening, and Sérurier approached Ceva from the south. Colli's object was now to spin out time, and having repulsed a weak attack by Augereau, and feeling able to repeat these tactics on each successive spur of the Apennines, he retired in the night to a new position behind the Cursaglia. On the 17th, reassured by the absence of fighting on the Dego side, and by the news that no enemy remained at Sassello, Bonaparte released Masséna from Dego, leaving only Laharpe there, and brought him over towards the right of the main body, which thus on the evening of the 17th formed a long straggling line on both sides of Ceva, Sérurier on the left, écheloned forward, Augereau, Joubert and Rusca in the centre, and Masséna, partly as support, partly as flank guard, on Augereau's right rear. Sérurier had been bidden to extend well out and to strive to get contact with Masséna, i.e. to encircle the enemy. There was no longer any idea of waiting to besiege Ceva, although the artillery train had been ordered up from the Riviera by the "cannon-road" for eventual use there. Further, the line of supply, as an extra guarantee against interference, was changed from that of Savona-Carcare to that of Loano-Bardinetto. When this was accomplished, four clear days could be reckoned on with certainty in which to deal with Colli.

The latter, still expecting the Austrians to advance to his assistance, had established his corps (not more than 12,000 muskets in all) in the immensely strong positions of the Cursaglia, with a thin line of posts on his left stretching towards Cherasco, whence he could communicate, by a roundabout way, with Acqui. Opposite this position the long strag-

gling line of the French arrived, after many delays due to the weariness of the troops, on the 19th. A day of irregular fighting followed, everywhere to the advantage of the defenders. Napoleon, fighting against time, ordered a fresh attack on the 20th, and only desisted when it became evident that the army was exhausted, and, in particular, when Sérurier reported frankly that without bread the soldiers would not march. The delay thus imposed, however, enabled him to clear the "cannon-road" of all vehicles, and to bring up the Dego detachment to replace Masséna in the valley of the western Bormida, the latter coming in to the main army. Further, part at any rate of the convoy service was transferred still farther westward to the line Albenga-Garessio-Ceva. Nelson's fleet, that had so powerfully contributed to force the French inland, was becoming less and less innocuous. If leadership and force of character could overcome internal friction, all the success he had hoped for was now within the young commander's grasp.

Twenty-four thousand men, for the first time with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery, were now disposed along Colli's front and beyond his right flank. Colli, outnumbered by two to one and threatened with envelopment, decided once more to retreat, and the Republicans occupied the Cursaglia lines on the morning of the 21st without firing a shot. But Colli halted again at Vico, half-way to Mondovì (in order, it is said, to protect the evacuation of a small magazine he had there), and while he was in this unfavourable situation the pursuers came on with true Republican swiftness, lapped round his flanks and crushed him. A few days later (27th April), the armistice of Cherasco put an end to the campaign before the Austrians moved a single battalion to his assistance.

The interest of the campaign being above all Napoleonic, its moral must be found by discovering the "Napoleonic touch" that differentiated it from other Revolutionary campaigns. A great deal is common to all, on both sides. The Austrians and Sardinians worked together at least as effectively as the Austrians, Prussians, British and Dutch in the Netherlands. Revolutionary energy was common to the Army of Italy and to the Army of the North. Why, therefore, when the war dragged on from one campaign to another in the great plains of the Meuse and Rhine countries, did Napoleon bring about so swift a decision in these cramped valleys? The answer is to be found partly in the exigencies of the supply service, but still more in Napoleon's own personality and the strategy born of it. The first, as we have seen, was at the end of its resources when Beaulieu placed himself across the Genoa road. Action of some sort was the plain alternative to starvation, and at this point Napoleon's personality intervened. He would have no quarter-rations on the Riviera, but plenty and to spare beyond the mountains. If there were many thousand soldiers who marched unarmed and shoeless in the ranks, it was towards "the Promised Land" that he led them. He looked always to the end, and met each day as if with full expectation of attaining it before sunset. Strategical conditions and "new French" methods of war did not save Bonaparte in the two crises—the Dego rout and the sullen halt of the army at San Michele—but the personality which made the soldiers, on the way to Montenotte, march barefoot past a wagon-load of new boots.

We have said that Napoleon's strategy was the result of this personal magnetism. Later critics evolved from his success the theory of "interior lines," and then accounted for it by applying the criterion they had evolved. Actually, the form in which the will to conquer found expression was in many important respects old. What, therefore, in the theory or its application was the product of Napoleon's own genius and will-power? A comparison with Souham's campaign of Tourcoing will enable us to answer this question. To begin with, Souham found himself midway between Coburg and Clerfayt almost by accident, and his utilization of the advantages of his position was an expedient for the given case. Napoleon, however, placed himself *deliberately* and by fighting his way thither, in an analogous situation at Carcare and Cairo. Military opinion of the time considered it dangerous, as indeed it was, for no theory can alter the fact that had not Napoleon made his men fight harder and march farther than usual, he would have been destroyed. The effective play of forces on interior lines depends on the two conditions that the outer enemies are not so near together as to give no time for the inner mass to defeat one before the arrival of the other, and that they are not so far apart that before one can be brought to action the other has inflicted serious damage elsewhere.

Neither condition was fully met at any time in the Montenotte campaign. On the 11th Napoleon knew that the attack on Voltri had been made by a part only of the Austrian forces, yet he flung his own masses on Montenotte. On the 13th he thought that Beaulieu's main body was at Dego and Colli's at Millesimo, and on this assumption had to exact the most extraordinary efforts from Augereau's troops at Cossaria. On the 19th and 20th he tried to exclude the risks of the Austrians' intervention, and with this the chances of a victory over them to follow his victory over Colli, by transferring the centre of gravity of his army to Ceva and Garessio, and fighting it out with Colli alone.

It was not, in fact, to gain a position on interior lines—with respect to *two* opponents—that Napoleon pushed his army to Carcare. Before the campaign began he hoped by using the "cannon-road" to destroy the Piedmontese *before the Austrians were in existence at all* as an army. But on the news from Voltri and Monte Legino he swiftly "concentrated

fire, made the breach, and broke the equilibrium" at the spot where the interests and forces of the two Allies converged and diverged. The hypothesis in the first case was that the Austrians were practically non-existent, and the whole object in the second was to breach the now connected front of the Allies ("strategic penetration") and to cause them to break up into two separate systems. More, having made the breach, he had the choice (which he had not before) of attacking *either* the Austrians or the Sardinians, as every critic has pointed out. Indeed the Austrians offered by far the better target. But he neither wanted nor used the new alternative. His purpose was to crush Piedmont. "My enemies saw too much at once," said Napoleon. Singleness of aim and of purpose, the product of clear thinking and of "personality," was the foundation-stone of the new form of strategy.

In the course of subduing the Sardinians, Napoleon found himself placed on interior lines between two hostile masses, and another new idea, that of "relative superiority," reveals itself. Whereas Souham had been in superior force (90,000 against 70,000), Napoleon (40,000 against 50,000) was not, and yet the Army of Italy was always placed in a position of relative superiority (at first about 3 to 2 and ultimately 2 to 1) to the immediate antagonist. "The essence of strategy," said Napoleon in 1797, "is, with a weaker army, always to have more force at the crucial point than the enemy. But this art is taught neither by books nor by practice; it is a matter of tact." In this he expressed the result of his victories on his own mind rather than a preconceived formula which produced those victories. But the idea, though undefined, and the method of practice, though imperfectly worked out, were in his mind from the first. As soon as he had made the breach, he widened it by pushing out Masséna and Laharpe on the one hand and Augereau on the other. This is mere common sense. But immediately afterwards, though preparing to throw all available forces against Colli, he posted Masséna and Laharpe at Dego to guard, not like Vandamme on the Lys against a real and pressing enemy, but against a *possibility*, and he only diminished the strength and altered the position of this containing detachment in proportion as the Austrian danger dwindled. Later in his career he defined this offensive-defensive system as "having all possible strength at the decisive point," and "being nowhere vulnerable," and the art of reconciling these two requirements, in each case as it arose, was always the principal secret of his generalship. At first his precautions (judged by events and not by the probabilities of the moment) were excessive, and the offensive mass small. But the latter was handled by a general untroubled by multiple aims and anxieties, and if such self-confidence was equivalent to 10,000 men on the battlefield, it was legitimate to detach 10,000 men to secure it. These 10,000 were posted 8 m. out on the dangerous flank, not almost back to back with the main body as Vandamme had been,¹ and although this distance was but little compared to those of his later campaigns, when he employed small armies for the same purpose, it sufficed in this difficult mountain country, where the covering force enjoyed the advantage of strong positions. Of course, if Colli had been better concentrated, or if Beaulieu had been more active, the calculated proportions between covering force and main body might have proved fallacious, and the system on which Napoleon's relative superiority rested might have broken down. But the point is that such a system, however rough its first model, had been imagined and put into practice.

This was Napoleon's individual art of war, as raiding bakeries and cutting communications were Beaulieu's speciality. Napoleon made the art into a science, and in our own time, with modern conditions of effective, armament and communications, it is more than possible that Moreaus and Jourdans will prove able to practise it with success. But in the old conditions it required a Napoleon. "Strategy," said Moltke, "is a system of expedients." But it was the intense personal force, as well as the genius, of Napoleon that forged these expedients into a *system*.

CHAPTER VI

THE AUSTRIANS ATTACKED

THE first phase of the campaign satisfactorily settled, Napoleon was free to turn his attention to the "arch-enemy" to whom he was now considerably superior in numbers (35,000 to 25,000). The day after the signature of the armistice of Cherasco he began preparing for a new advance and also for the rôle of arbiter of the destinies of Italy. Many whispers there were, even in his own army, as to the dangers of passing on without "revolutionizing" aristocratic Genoa and monarchical Piedmont, and of bringing Venice, the pope and the Italian princes into the field against the French. But Bonaparte, flush with victory, and better informed than the malcontents of the real condition of Italy,

¹ We have seen that after Tourcoing, taught by experience, Souham posted Vandamme's covering force 14 or 15 m. out. But Napoleon's disposition was in advance of experience.

never hesitated. His first object was to drive out Beaulieu, his second to push through Tirol, and his only serious restriction the chance that the armistice with Piedmont would not result in a definite treaty. Beaulieu had fallen back into Lombardy, and now bordered the Po right and left of Valenza. To achieve further progress, Napoleon had first to cross that river, and the point and method of crossing was the immediate problem, a problem the more difficult as Napoleon had no bridge train and could only make use of such existing bridges as he could seize intact.¹ If he crossed over Valenza, he would be confronted by one river-line after another, on one of which at least Beaulieu would probably stand to fight. But quite apart from the immediate problem, Napoleon's intention was less to beat the Austrians than to dislodge them. He needed a foothold in Lombardy which would make him independent of, and even a menace to, Piedmont. If this were assured, he could for a few weeks entirely ignore his communications with France and strike out against Beaulieu, dethrone the king of Sardinia, or revolutionize Parma, Modena and the papal states according to circumstances.

Milan, therefore, was his objective, and Tortona-Piacenza his route thither. To give himself every chance, he had stipulated with the Piedmontese authorities for the right of passing at Valenza, and he had the satisfaction of seeing Beaulieu fall into the trap and concentrate opposite that part of the river. The French meantime had moved to the region Alessandria-Tortona. Thence on the 6th of May Bonaparte, with a picked body of troops, set out for a forced march on Piacenza, and that night the advanced guard was 30 m. on the way, at Castel San Giovanni, and Laharpe's and the cavalry divisions at Stradella, 10 m. behind them. Augereau was at Broni, Masséna at Sale and Sérurier near Valenza, the whole forming a rapidly extending fan, 50 m. from point to point. If the Piacenza detachment succeeded in crossing, the army was to follow rapidly in its track. If, on the other hand, Beaulieu fell back to oppose the advanced guard, the Valenza divisions would take advantage of his absence to cross there. In either case, be it observed, the Austrians were to be *evaded*, not brought to action.

On the morning of the 7th, the swift advanced guard under general Dallemagne crossed at Piacenza,² and hearing of this, Bonaparte ordered every division except Sérurier's thither with all possible speed. In the exultation of the moment he mocked at Beaulieu's incapacity, but the old Austrian was already on the alert. This game of manœuvres he understood; already one of his divisions had arrived in close proximity to Dallemagne and the others were marching eastward by all available roads. It was not until the 8th that the French, after a series of partial encounters, were securely established on the left bank of the Po, and Beaulieu had given up the idea of forcing their most advanced troops to accept battle at a disadvantage. The success of the French was due less to their plan than to their mobility, which enabled them first to pass the river before the Austrians (who had actually started a day in advance of them) put in an appearance, and afterwards to be in superior numbers at each point of contact. But the episode was destined after all to culminate in a great event, which Napoleon himself indicated as the turning-point of his life. "Vendémiaire and even Montenotte did not make me think myself a superior being. It was after Lodi that the idea came to me. . . . That first kindled the spark of boundless ambition."

The idea of a battle having been given up, Beaulieu retired to the Adda, and most of his troops were safely beyond it before the French arrived near Lodi, but he felt it necessary to leave a strong rearguard on the river opposite that place to cover the reassembly of his columns after their scattered march. On the afternoon of the 10th of May, Bonaparte, with Dallemagne, Masséna and Augereau, came up and seized the town. But 200 yds. of open ground had to be passed from the town gate to the bridge, and the bridge itself was another 250 in length. A few hundred yards beyond it stood the Austrians, 9000 strong with 14 guns. Napoleon brought up all his guns to prevent the enemy from destroying the bridge. Then sending all his cavalry to turn the enemy's right by a ford above the town, he waited two hours, employing the time in cannonading the Austrian lines, resting his advanced infantry and closing up Masséna's and Augereau's divisions. Finally he gave the order to Dallemagne's 4000 grenadiers, who were drawn up under cover of the town wall, to rush the bridge. As the column, not more than thirty men broad, made its appearance, it was met by the concentrated fire of the Austrian guns, and half way across the bridge it checked, but Bonaparte himself and Masséna rushed

¹ The proposed alliance with the Sardinians came to nothing. The kings of Sardinia had always made their alliance with either Austria or France conditional on cessions of conquered territory. But, according to Thiers, the Directory only desired to conquer the Milanese to restore it to Austria in return for the definitive cession of the Austrian Netherlands. If this be so, Napoleon's proclamations of "freedom for Italy" were, if not a mere political expedient, at any rate no more than an expression of his own desires which he was not powerful enough to enforce.

² On entering the territory of the duke of Parma Bonaparte imposed, besides other contributions, the surrender of twenty famous pictures, and thus began a practice which for many years enriched the Louvre and only ceased with the capture of Paris in 1814.

forward, the courage of the soldiers revived, and, while some jumped off the bridge and scrambled forward in the shallow water, the remainder stormed on, passed through the guns and drove back the infantry. This was, in bare outline, the astounding passage of the Bridge of Lodi. It was not till after the battle that Napoleon realized that only a rearguard was in front of him. When he launched his 4000 grenadiers he thought that on the other side there were four or five times that number of the enemy. No wonder, then, that after the event he recognized in himself the flash of genius, the courage to risk everything, and the "tact" which, independent of, and indeed contrary to all reasoned calculations, told him that the moment had come for "breaking the equilibrium." Lodi was a tactical success in the highest sense, in that the principles of his tactics rested on psychology—on the "sublime" part of the art of war as Saxe had called it long ago. The spirit produced the form, and Lodi was the prototype of the Napoleonic battle—contact, manœuvre, preparation, and finally the well-timed, massed and unhesitating assault. The absence of strategical results mattered little. Many months elapsed before this bold assertion of superiority ceased to decide the battles of France and Austria.

Next day, still under the vivid tactical impressions of the Bridge of Lodi, he postponed his occupation of the Milanese and set off in pursuit of Beaulieu, but the latter was now out of reach, and during the next few days the French divisions were installed at various points in the area Pavia-Milan-Pizzighetone, facing outwards in all dangerous directions, with a central reserve at Milan. Thus secured, Bonaparte turned his attention to political and military administration. This took the form of exacting from the neighbouring princes money, supplies and objects of art, and the once famished Army of Italy revelled in its opportunity. Now, however, the Directory, suspicious of the too successful and too sanguine young general, ordered him to turn over the command in Upper Italy to Kellermann, and to take an expeditionary corps himself into the heart of the peninsula, there to preach the Republic and the overthrow of princes. Napoleon absolutely refused, and offered his resignation. In the end (partly by bribery) he prevailed, but the incident reawakened his desire to close with Beaulieu. This indeed he could now do with a free hand, since not only had the Milanese been effectively occupied, but also the treaty with Sardinia had been ratified.

But no sooner had he resumed the advance than it was interrupted by a rising of the peasantry in his rear. The exactions of the French had in a few days generated sparks of discontent which it was easy for the priests and the nobles to fan into open flames. Milan and Pavia as well as the countryside broke into insurrection, and at the latter place the mob forced the French commandant to surrender. Bonaparte acted swiftly and ruthlessly. Bringing back a small portion of the army with him, he punished Milan on the 25th, sacked and burned Binasco on the 26th, and on the evening of the latter day, while his cavalry swept the open country, he broke his way into Pavia with 1500 men and beat down all resistance. Napoleon's cruelty was never purposeless. He deported several scores of hostages to France, executed most of the mob leaders, and shot the French officer who had surrendered. In addition, he gave his 1500 men three hours' leave to pillage. Then, as swiftly as they had come, they returned to the army on the Oglio. From this river Napoleon advanced to the banks of the Mincio, where the remainder of the Italian campaign was fought out, both sides contemptuously disregarding Venetian neutrality.

It centred on the fortress of Mantua, which Beaulieu, too weak to keep the field, and dislodged from the Mincio in the action of Borghetto (May 30), strongly garrisoned before retiring into Tirol. Beaulieu was soon afterwards replaced by Dagobert Siegmund, count von Wurmser (b. 1724), who brought considerable reinforcements from Germany.


At this point, mindful of the narrow escape he had had of losing his command, Bonaparte thought it well to begin the resettlement of Italy. The scheme for co-operating with Moreau on the Danube was indefinitely postponed, and the Army of Italy (now reinforced from the Army of the Alps and counting 42,000 effectives) was again disposed in a protective "zone of manœuvre," with a strong central reserve. Over 8,000 men, however, garrisoned the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, and the effective blockade of Mantua and political expeditions into the heart of the Peninsula soon used up the whole of this reserve.

Moreover, no siege artillery was available until the Austrians in the citadel of Milan capitulated, and thus it was not till the 18th of July that the first parallel was begun. Almost at the same moment Wurmser began his advance from Trent with 55,000 men to relieve Mantua.

The protective system on which his attack would fall in the first instance was now as follows:—Augereau (6000) about Legnago, Despinoy (8000) south-east of Verona, Masséna (13,000) at Verona and Peschiera, with outposts on the Monte Baldo and at La Corona, Sauret (4500) at Salò and Gavardo. Sérurier (12,000) was besieging Mantua, and the only central reserve was the cavalry (2000) under Kilmaine. The main road to Milan passed by Brescia. Sauret's brigade, therefore, was practically a detached post on the line of communication, and on the main defensive front less than 30,000 men were disposed at various points between La Corona and Legnago (30 m. apart), and at a distance of 15 to 20 m. from Mantua. The strength of such a disposition depended on the fighting

power and handiness of the troops, who in each case would be called upon to act as a rear-guard to gain time. Yet the lie of the country scarcely permitted a closer grouping, unless, indeed, Bonaparte fell back on the old-time device of a "circumvallation," and shut himself up, with all the supplies necessary for the calculated duration of the siege, in an impregnable ring of earthworks round Mantua. This, however, he could not have done even if he had wished, for the wave of revolt radiating from Milan had made accumulations of food impossible, and the lakes above and below the fortress, besides being extremely unhealthy, would have extended the perimeter of the circumvallation so greatly that the available forces would not suffice to man it. It was not in this, but in the absence of an important central reserve that Bonaparte's disposition is open to criticism, which indeed could impugn the scheme in its entirety, as overtaxing the available resources, more easily than it could attack its details.

If Bonaparte has occasionally been criticized for his defensive measures, Wurmser's attack procedure has received almost universal condemnation, as to the justice of which



it may be pointed out¹ that the object of the expedition was not to win a battle by falling on the disunited French with a well-concentrated army, but to overpower one, any one, of the corps covering the siege, and to press straight forward to the relief of Mantua, *i.e.* to the destruction of Bonaparte's batteries and the levelling of his trench work. The old principle that a battle was a grave event of doubtful issue was reinforced in the actual case by Beaulieu's late experiences of French *élan*, and as a temporary victory at one point would suffice for the purpose in hand, there was every incentive to multiply the points of contact. The soundness of Wurmser's plan was proved by the event. New ideas and new forces, undiscernible to a man of seventy-two years of age, obliterated his achievement by surpassing it, but such as it was—a limited use of force for a limited object—the venture undeniably succeeded.

The Austrians formed three corps, one (Quasdanovich, 18,000 men) marching round the west side of the Lake of Garda on Gavardo, Salò and the Brescia road, the second (under Wurmser, about 30,000) moving directly down the Adige, and the third (Davidovich, 6000) making a détour by the Brenta valley and heading for Verona by Vicenza.

On the 29th Quasdanovich attacked Sauret at Salò, drove him towards Desenzano,

¹ See C. von B.-K., *Geist und Stoff*, pp. 449-451.

and pushed on to Gavardo and thence into Brescia. Wurmser expelled Masséna's advanced guard from La Corona, and captured in succession the Monte Baldo and Rivoli posts. The Brenta column approached Verona with little or no fighting. News of this column led Napoleon early in the day to close up Despinoy, Masséna and Kilmaine at Castelnovo, and to order Augereau from Legnago to advance on Montebello (19 m. east of Verona) against Davidovich's left rear. But after these orders had been despatched came the news of Sauret's defeat, and this moment was one of the most anxious in Napoleon's career. He could not make up his mind to give up the siege of Mantua, but he hurried Augereau back to the Mincio, and sent order after order to the officers on the lines of communication to send all convoys by the Cremona instead of by the Brescia road. More, he had the baggage, the treasure and the sick set in motion at once for Marcaria, and wrote to Sérurier a despatch which included the words "perhaps we shall recover ourselves . . . but I must take serious measures for a retreat." On the 30th he wrote: "The enemy have broken through our line in three places . . . Sauret has evacuated Salo . . . and the enemy has captured Brescia. You see that our communications with Milan and Verona are cut." The reports that came to him during the morning of the 30th enabled him to place the main body of the enemy opposite Masséna, and this, without in the least alleviating the gravity of the situation, helped to make his course less doubtful. Augereau was ordered to hold the line of the Molinella, in case Davidovich's attack, the least-known factor, should after all prove to be serious; Masséna to reconnoitre a road from Peschiera through Castiglione towards Orzinovi, and to stand fast at Castelnovo opposite Wurmser as long as he could. Sauret and Despinoy were concentrated at Desenzano with orders on the 31st to clear the main line of retreat and to recapture Brescia. The Austrian movements were merely the continuation of those of the 29th. Quasdanovich wheeled inwards, his right finally resting on Montechiaro and his left on Salo. Wurmser drove back Masséna to the west side of the Mincio. Davidovich made a slight advance.

In the late evening Bonaparte held a council of war at Roverbella. The proceedings of this council are unknown, but it at any rate enabled Napoleon to see clearly and to act. Hitherto he had been covering the siege of Mantua with various detachments, the defeat of any one of which might be fatal to the enterprise. Thus, when he had lost his main line of retreat, he could assemble no more than 8000 men at Desenzano to win it back. Now, however, he made up his mind that the siege could not be continued, and bitter as the decision must have been, it gave him freedom. At this moment of crisis the instincts of the great captain came into play, and showed the way to a victory that would more than counterbalance the now inevitable failure. Sérurier was ordered to spike the 140 siege guns that had been so welcome a few days before, and, after sending part of his force to Augereau, to establish himself with the rest at Marcaria on the Cremona road. The field forces were to be used on interior lines. On the 31st Sauret, Despinoy, Augereau and Kilmaine advanced westward against Quasdanovich. The first two found the Austrians at Salo and Lonato and drove them back, while with Augereau and the cavalry Bonaparte himself made a forced march on Brescia, never halting night or day till he reached the town and recovered his depots. Meantime Sérurier had retired (night of July 31), Masséna had gradually drawn in towards Lonato, and Wurmser's advanced guard triumphantly entered the fortress (August 1).

The Austrian general now formed the plan of crushing Bonaparte between Quasdanovich and his own main body. But meantime Quasdanovich had evacuated Brescia under the threat of Bonaparte's advance and was now fighting a long irregular action with Despinoy and Sauret about Gavardo and Salo, and Bonaparte, having missed his expected target, had brought Augereau by another severe march back to Montechiaro on the Chiese. Masséna was now assembled between Lonato and Ponte San Marco, and Sérurier was retiring quietly on Marcaria. Wurmser's main body, weakened by the detachment sent to Mantua, crossed the Mincio about Valeggio and Goito on the 2nd, and penetrated as far as Castiglione, whence Masséna's rearguard was expelled. But a renewed advance of Quasdanovich, ordered by Wurmser, which drove Sauret and Despinoy back on Brescia and Lonato, in the end only placed a strong detachment of the Austrians within striking distance of Masséna, who on the 3rd attacked it, front to front, and by sheer fighting destroyed it, while at the same time Augereau recaptured Castiglione from Wurmser. On the 4th Sauret and Despinoy pressed back Quasdanovich beyond Salo and Gavardo. One of the Austrian columns, finding itself isolated and unable to retreat with the others, turned back to break its way through to Wurmser, and was annihilated by Masséna in the neighbourhood of Lonato. On this day Augereau fought his way towards Solferino, and Wurmser, thinking rightly or wrongly that he could not now retire to the Mincio without a battle, drew up his whole force, close on 30,000 men, in the plain between Solferino and Medole. The finale may be described in very few words. Bonaparte, convinced that no more was to be feared from Quasdanovich, and seeing that Wurmser meant to fight, called in Despinoy's division to the main body and sent orders to Sérurier, then far distant on the Cremona road, to march against the left flank of the Austrians. On the 5th the battle of Castiglione was fought. Closely contested in the first hours of

the frontal attack till Sérurier's arrival decided the day, it ended in the retreat of the Austrians over the Mincio into Tirol whence they had come.

Thus the new way had failed to keep back Wurmser, and the old had failed to crush Napoleon. Each was the result of its own conditions. In former wars a commander, threatened as Napoleon was, would have fallen back at once to the Adda, abandoning the siege in such good time that he would have been able to bring off his siege artillery. Instead of this Bonaparte hesitated long enough to lose it, which, according to accepted canons was a waste, and held his ground, which was, by the same rules, sheer madness. But Revolutionary discipline was not firm enough to stand a retreat. Once it turned back, the army would have streamed away to Milan and perhaps to the Alps (cf. 1799), and the only alternative to complete dissolution therefore was fighting.

As to the manner of this fighting, even the principle of "relative superiority" failed him so long as he was endeavouring to cover the siege and again when his chief care was to protect his new line of retreat and to clear his old. In this period, viz. up to his return from Brescia on the 2nd of August, the only "mass" he collected delivered a blow in the air, while the covering detachments had to fight hard for bare existence. Once released from its trammels, the Napoleonic principle had fair play. He stood between Wurmser and Quasdanovich, ready to fight either or both. The latter was crushed, thanks to local superiority and the resolute leading of Masséna, but at Castiglione Wurmser actually outnumbered his opponent till the last of Napoleon's precautionary dispositions had been given up, and Sérurier brought back from the "alternative line of retreat" to the battlefield. The moral is, again, that it was not the mere fact of being on interior lines that gave Napoleon the victory, but his "tact," his fine appreciation of the chances in his favour, measured in terms of time, space, attacking force and containing power. All these factors were greatly influenced by the ground, which favoured the swarms and columns of the French and deprived the brilliant Austrian cavalry of its power to act. But of far greater importance was the mobility that Napoleon's personal force imparted to the French. Napoleon himself rode five horses to death in three days, and Augereau's division marched from Roverbella to Brescia and back to Montechiaro, a total distance of nearly 50 m., in about thirty-six hours. This indeed was the foundation of his "relative superiority," for every hour saved in the time of marching meant more freedom to destroy one corps before the rest could overwhelm the covering detachments and come to its assistance.

Wurmser's plan for the relief of Mantua, suited to its purpose, succeeded. But when he made his objective the French field army, he had to take his own army as he found it, disposed for an altogether different purpose. A properly combined attack of convergent columns framed *ab initio* by a good staff officer, such as Mack, might indeed have given good results. But the success of such a plan depends principally on the assailant's original possession of the initiative, and not on the chances of his being able to win it over to his own side when operations, as here, are already in progress. When the time came to improvise such a plan, the initiative had passed over to Napoleon, and the plan was foredoomed.

By the end of the second week in August the blockade of Mantua had been resumed, without siege guns. But still under the impression of a great victory gained, Bonaparte was planning a long forward stride. He thought that by advancing past Mantua directly on Trieste and thence onwards to the Semmering he could impose a peace on the emperor. The Directory, however, which had by now focussed its attention on the German campaign, ordered him to pass through Tirol and to co-operate with Moreau, and this plan, Bonaparte, though protesting against an Alpine venture being made so late in the year, prepared to execute, drawing in reinforcements and collecting great quantities of supplies in boats on the Adige and Lake Garda. Wurmser was thought to have posted his main body near Trent, and to have detached one division to Bassano "to cover Trieste." The French advanced northward on the 2nd, in three disconnected columns (precisely as Wurmser had done in the reverse direction at the end of July)—Masséna (13,000) from Rivoli to Ala, Augereau (9000) from Verona by hill roads, keeping on his right rear, Vaubois (11,000) round the Lake of Garda by Riva and Torbole. Sahuguet's division (8000) remained before Mantua. The French divisions successfully combined and drove the enemy before them to Trent.

There, however, they missed their target. Wurmser had already drawn over the bulk of his army (22,000) into the Val Sugana, whence, with the Bassano division as his advanced guard, he intended once more to relieve Mantua, while Davidovich with 13,000 (excluding detachments) was to hold Tirol against any attempt of Bonaparte to join forces with Moreau.

Thus Austria was preparing to hazard a second (as in the event she hazarded a third and a fourth) highly trained and expensive professional army in the struggle for the preservation of a fortress, and we must conclude that there were weighty reasons which actuated so notoriously cautious a body as the Council of War in making this unconditional venture. While Mantua stood, Napoleon, for all his energy and sanguineness, could not press forward into Friuli and Carniola, and immunity from a Republican

visitation was above all else important for the Vienna statesman, governing as they did more or less discontented and heterogeneous populations that had not felt the pressure of war for a century and more. The Austrians, so far as is known, desired no more than to hold their own. They no longer possessed the superiority of *moral* that guarantees victory to one side when both are materially equal. There was therefore nothing to be gained, commensurate with the risk involved, by fighting a battle in the open field. *In Italien siegt nicht die Kavallerie* was an old saying in the Austrian army, and therefore the Austrians could not hope to win a victory of the first magnitude. The only practicable alternative was to strengthen Mantua as opportunities offered themselves, and to prolong the passive resistance as much as possible. Napoleon's own practice in providing for secondary theatres of war was to economize forces and to delay a decision, and the fault of the Austrians, viewed from a purely military standpoint, was that they squandered, instead of economizing, their forces to gain time. If we neglect pure theory, and regard strategy as the handmaiden of statesmanship—which fundamentally it is—we cannot condemn the Vienna authorities unless it be first proved that they grossly exaggerated the possible results of Bonaparte's threatened irruption. And if their capacity for judging the political situation be admitted, it naturally follows that their object was to preserve Mantua *at all costs*—which object Wurmser, though invariably defeated in action, did in fact accomplish.

When Masséna entered Trent on the morning of the 5th of September, Napoleon became aware that the force in his front was a mere detachment, and news soon came in that Wurmser was in the Val Sugana about Primolano and at Bassano. This move he supposed to be intended to cover Trieste, being influenced by his own hopes of advancing in that direction, and underestimating the importance, to the Austrians, of preserving Mantua. He therefore informed the Directory that he could not proceed with the Tirol scheme, and spent one more day in driving Davidovich well away from Trieste. Then, leaving Vaubois to watch him, Napoleon marched Augereau and Masséna, with a rapidity he scarcely ever surpassed, into the Val Sugana. Wurmser's rearguard was attacked and defeated again and again, and Wurmser himself felt compelled to stand and fight, in the hope of checking the pursuit before going forward into the plains. Half his army had already reached Montebello on the Verona road, and with the rear half he posted himself at Bassano, where on the 8th he was attacked and defeated with heavy losses. Then began a strategic pursuit or general chase, and in this the mobility of the French should have finished the work so well begun by their tactics.

But Napoleon directed the pursuers so as to cut off Wurmser from Trieste, not from Mantua. Masséna followed up the Austrians to Vicenza, while Augereau hurried towards Padua, and it was not until late on the 9th that Bonaparte realized that his opponent was heading for Mantua via Legnago. On the 10th Masséna crossed the Adige at Ronco, while Augereau from Padua reached Montagnana. Sahuguet from Mantua and Kilmaine from Verona joined forces at Castellaro on the 11th, with orders to interpose between Wurmser and the fortress. Wurmser meantime had halted for a day at Legnago, to restore order, and had then resumed his march. It was almost too late, for in the evening, after having to push aside the head of Masséna's column at Cerea, he had only reached Nogara, some miles short of Castellaro, and close upon his rear was Augereau, who reached Legnago that night. On the 12th, eluding Sahuguet by a detour to the southward, he reached Mantua, with all the columns of the French, weary as most of them were, in hot pursuit. After an attempt to keep the open field, defeated in a general action on the 15th, the relieving force was merged in the garrison, now some 28,000 in all. So ended the episode of Bassano, the most brilliant feature of which as usual was the marching power of the French infantry. This time it sufficed to redeem even strategical misconceptions and misdirections. Between the 5th and the 11th, besides fighting three actions, Masséna had marched 100 m. and Augereau 114.

Feldzeugmeister Alvinci was now appointed to command a new army of relief. This time the mere distribution of the troops imposed a concentric advance of separate columns, for practically the whole of the fresh forces available were in Carniola, the Military Frontier, &c., while Davidovich was still in Tirol. Alvinci's intention was to assemble his new army (29,000) in Friuli, and to move on Bassano, which was to be occupied on the 4th of November. Meantime Davidovich (18,000) was to capture Trent, and the two columns were to connect by the Val Sugana. All being well, Alvinci and Davidovich, still separate, were then to converge on the Adige between Verona and Legnago. Wurmser was to co-operate by vigorous sorties. At this time Napoleon's protective system was as follows: Kilmaine (9000) investing Mantua, Vaubois (10,000) at Trent, and Masséna (9000) at Bassano and Treviso, Augereau (9000) and Macquard (3000) at Verona and Villafranca constituting, for the first time in these operations, important mobile reserves. Hearing of Alvinci's approach in good time, he meant first to drive back Davidovich, then with Augereau, Masséna, Macquard and 3000 of Vaubois's force to fall upon Alvinci, who, he calculated, would at this stage have reached Bassano, and finally to send back a large force through the Val Sugana to attack Davidovich. This plan practically failed.

Instead of advancing, Vaubois was driven steadily backward. By the 6th, Davidovich

had fought his way almost to Roveredo, and Alvinczi had reached Bassano and was there successfully repelling the attacks of Masséna and Augereau. That night Napoleon drew back to Vicenza. On the 7th Davidovich drove in Vaubois to Corona and Rivoli, and Alvinczi came within 5 m. of Vicenza. Napoleon watched carefully for an opportunity to strike out, and on the 8th massed his troops closely around the central point of Verona. On the 9th, to give himself air, he ordered Masséna to join Vaubois, and to drive back Davidovich at all costs. But before this order was executed, reports came in to the effect that Davidovich had suspended his advance. The 10th and 11th were spent by both sides in relative inaction, the French waiting on events and opportunities, the Austrians resting after their prolonged exertions. Then, on the afternoon of the 11th, being informed that Alvinczi was approaching, Napoleon decided to attack him. On the 12th the advanced guard of Alvinczi's army was furiously assailed in the position of Caldiero. But the troops in rear came up rapidly, and by 4 p.m. the French were defeated all along the line and in retreat on Verona. Napoleon's situation was now indeed precarious. He was on "interior lines," it is true, but he had neither the force nor the space necessary for the delivery of rapid radial blows. Alvinczi was in superior numbers, as the battle of Caldiero had proved, and at any moment Davidovich, who had twice Vaubois's force, might advance to the attack of Rivoli. The reserves had proved insufficient, and Kilmaine had to be called up from Mantua, which was thus for the third time freed from the blockaders. Again the alternatives were retreat, in whatever order was possible to Republican armies, and beating the nearest enemy at any sacrifice. Napoleon chose the latter, though it was not until the evening of the 14th that he actually issued the fateful order.

The Austrians, too, had selected the 15th as the date of their final advance on Verona, Davidovich from the north, Alvinczi via Zevio from the south. But Napoleon was no longer there; leaving Vaubois to hold Davidovich as best he might, and posting only 3000 men in Verona, he had collected the rest of his small army between Albaro and Ronco. His plan seems to have been to cross the Adige well in rear of the Austrians, to march north on to the Verona-Vicenza highway, and there, supplying himself from their convoys, to fight to the last. On the 15th he had written to the Directory, "The weakness and the exhaustion of the army causes me to fear the worst. We are perhaps on the eve of losing Italy." In this extremity of danger the troops passed the Adige in three columns near Ronco and Albaredo, and marched forward along the dikes, with deep marshes and pools on either hand. If Napoleon's intention was to reach the dry open ground of S. Bonifacio in rear of the Austrians, it was not realized, for the Austrian army, instead of being at the gates of Verona, was still between Caldiero and S. Bonifacio, heading, as we know, for Zevio. Thus Alvinczi was able, easily and swiftly, to wheel to the south.

The battle of Arcola almost defies description. The first day passed in a series of resultless encounters between the heads of the columns as they met on the dikes. In the evening Bonaparte withdrew over the Adige, expecting at every moment to be summoned to Vaubois's aid. But Davidovich remained inactive, and on the 16th the French again crossed the river. Masséna from Ronco advanced on Porcile, driving the Austrians along the causeway thither, but on the side of Arcola, Alvinczi had deployed a considerable part of his forces on the edge of the marshes, within musket shot of the causeway by which Bonaparte and Augereau had to pass, along the Austrian front, to reach the bridge of Arcola. In these circumstances the second day's battle was more murderous and no more decisive than the first, and again the French retreated to Ronco. But Davidovich again stood still, and with incredible obstinacy Bonaparte ordered a third assault for the 17th, using indeed more tactical expedients than before, but calculating chiefly on the fighting powers of his men and on the exhaustion of the enemy. Masséna again advanced on Porcile, Robert's brigade on Arcola, but the rest, under Augereau, were to pass the Alpine near its confluence with the Adige, and joining various small bodies which passed the main stream lower down, to storm forward on dry ground to Arcola. The Austrians, however, themselves advanced from Arcola, overwhelmed Robert's brigade on the causeway and almost reached Ronco. This was perhaps the crisis of the battle, for Augereau's force was now on the other side of the stream, and Masséna, with his back to the new danger, was approaching Porcile. But the fire of a deployed regiment stopped the head of the Austrian column; Masséna, turning about, cut into its flank on the dike; and Augereau, gathering force, was approaching Arcola from the south. The bridge and the village were evacuated soon afterwards, and Masséna and Augereau began to extend in the plain beyond. But the Austrians still sullenly resisted. It was at this moment that Bonaparte secured victory by a mere ruse, but a ruse which would have been unprofitable and ridiculous had it not been based on his fine sense of the moral conditions. Both sides were nearly fought out, and he sent a few trumpeters to the rear of the Austrian army to sound the charge. They did so, and in a few minutes the Austrians were streaming back to S. Bonifacio. This ended the drama of Arcola, which more than any other episode of these wars, perhaps of any wars in modern history, centres on the personality of the hero. It is said that the French fought without spirit on the first day, and yet on the second and third Bonaparte had so thoroughly imbued them with his own will to conquer that in the end they prevailed over an enemy nearly twice their own strength.

The climax was reached just in time, for on the 17th Vaubois was completely defeated at Rivoli and withdrew to Peschiera, leaving the Verona and Mantua roads completely open to Davidovich. But on the 19th Napoleon turned upon him, and combining the forces of Vaubois, Masséna and Augereau against him, drove him back to Trent. Meantime Alvinczi returned from Vicenza to San Bonifacio and Caldiero (November 21st), and Bonaparte at once stopped the pursuit of Davidovich. On the return of the French main body to Verona, Alvinczi finally withdrew, Wurmser, who had emerged from Mantua on the 23rd, was driven in again, and this epilogue of the great struggle came to a feeble end because neither side was now capable of prolonging the crisis.

Alvinczi renewed his advance in January 1797 with all the forces that could be assembled for a last attempt to save Mantua. At this time 8000 men under Sérurier blockaded Mantua. Masséna (9000) was at Verona, Joubert (Vaubois's successor) at Rivoli with 10,000, Augereau at Legnago with 9000. In reserve were Rey's division (4000) between Brescia and Montechiaro, and Victor's brigade at Goito and Castelnovo. On the other side, Alvinczi had 9000 men under Provera at Padua, 6000 under Bayalich at Bassano, and he himself with 28,000 men stood in the Tirol about Trent. This time he intended to make his principal effort on the Rivoli side. Provera was to capture Legnago on the 9th of January, and Bayalich Verona on the 12th, while the main army was to deliver its blow against the Rivoli position on the 13th.

The first marches of this scheme were duly carried out, and several days elapsed before Napoleon was able to discern the direction of the real attack. Augereau fell back, skirmishing a little as Provera's and Bayalich's advance developed. On the 11th, when the latter was nearing Verona, Alvinczi's leading troops appeared in front of the Rivoli position. On the 12th Bayalich with a weak force (he had sent reinforcements to Alvinczi by the Val Pantena) made an unsuccessful attack on Verona, Provera, farther south, remaining inactive. On the 13th Napoleon, still in doubt, launched Masséna's division against Bayalich, who was driven back to San Bonifacio; but at the same time definite news came from Joubert that Alvinczi's main army was in front of La Corona. From this point begins the decisive, though by no means the most intense or dramatic, struggle of the campaign. Once he felt sure of the situation Napoleon acted promptly. Joubert was ordered to hold on to Rivoli at all costs. Rey was brought up by a forced march to Castelnovo, where Victor joined him, and ahead of them both Masséna was hurried on to Rivoli. Napoleon himself joined Joubert on the night of the 13th. There he saw the watch-fires of the enemy in a semicircle around him, for Alvinczi, thinking that he had only to deal with one division, had begun a widespread enveloping attack. The horns of this attack were as yet so far distant that Napoleon, instead of extending on an equal front, only spread out a few regiments to gain an hour or two and to keep the ground for Masséna and Rey, and on the morning of January 14th, with 10,000 men in hand against 26,000, he fell upon the central columns of the enemy as they advanced up the steep broken slopes of the foreground. The fighting was severe, but Bonaparte had the advantage. Masséna arrived at 9 A.M., and a little later the column of Quasdanovich, which had moved along the Adige and was now attempting to gain a foothold on the plateau in rear of Joubert, was crushed by the converging fire of Joubert's right brigade and by Masséna's guns, their rout being completed by the charge of a handful of cavalry under Lasalle. The right horn of Alvinczi's attack, when at last it swung in upon Napoleon's rear, was caught between Masséna and the advancing troops of Rey and annihilated, and even before this the dispirited Austrians were in full retreat. A last alarm, caused by the appearance of a French infantry regiment in their rear (this had crossed the lake in boats from Salò), completed their demoralization, and though less than 2000 had been killed and wounded, some 12,000 Austrian prisoners were left in the hands of the victors. Rivoli was indeed a moral triumph. After the ordeal of Arcola, the victory of the French was a foregone conclusion at each point of contact. Napoleon hesitated, or rather refrained from striking, so long as his information was incomplete, but he knew now from experience that his covering detachment, if well led, could not only hold its own without assistance until it had gained the necessary information, but could still give the rest of the army time to act upon it. Then, when the centre of gravity had been ascertained, the French divisions hurried thither, caught the enemy in the act of manœuvring and broke them up. And if that confidence in success which made all this possible needs a special illustration, it may be found in Napoleon's sending Murat's regiment over the lake to place a mere two thousand bayonets across the line of retreat of a whole army. Alvinczi's manœuvre was faulty neither strategically in the first instance nor tactically as regards the project of enveloping Joubert on the 14th. It failed because Joubert and his men were better soldiers than his own, and because a French division could move twice as fast as an Austrian, and from these two factors a new form of war was evolved, the essence of which was that, for a given time and in a given area, a small force of the French should engage and hold a much larger force of the enemy.

The remaining operations can be very briefly summarized. Provera, still advancing on Mantua, joined hands there with Wurmser, and for a time held Sérurier at a disadvantage. But hearing of this, Napoleon sent back Masséna from the field of Rivoli,

and that general, with Augereau and Sérurier, not only forced Wurmser to retire again into the fortress, but compelled Provera to lay down his arms. On the 2nd of February 1797, after a long and honourable defence, Mantua, and with it what was left of Wurmser's army, surrendered.

The campaign of 1797, which ended the war of the First Coalition, was the brilliant sequel of these hard-won victories. Austria had decided to save Mantua at all costs, and had lost her armies in the attempt, a loss which was not compensated by the "strategic" victories of the archduke. Thus the Republican "visitation" of Carinthia and Carniola was one swift march—politically glorious, if dangerous from a purely military standpoint—of Napoleon's army to the Semmering. The archduke, who was called thither from Germany, could do no more than fight a few rearguard actions, and make threats against Napoleon's rear, which the latter, with his usual "tact," ignored. On the Rhine, as in 1795 and 1796, the armies of the Sambre-and-Meuse (Hoche) and the Rhine-and-Moselle (Moreau) were opposed by the armies of the Lower Rhine (Werneck) and of the Upper Rhine (Latour). Moreau crossed the river near Strassburg and fought a series of minor actions. Hoche, like his predecessors, crossed at Düsseldorf and Neuwied and fought his way to the Lahn, where for the last time in the history of these wars, there was an irregular widespread battle. But Hoche, in this his last campaign, displayed the brilliant energy of his first, and delivered the "series of incessant blows" that Carnot had urged upon Jourdan the year before. Werneck was driven with ever-increasing losses from the lower Lahn to Wetzlar and Giessen. Thence, pressed hard by the French left wing under Championnet, he retired on the Nidda, only to find that Hoche's right had swung completely round him. Nothing but the news of the armistice of Leoben saved him from envelopment and surrender. This general armistice was signed by Bonaparte, on his own authority and to the intense chagrin of the Directory and of Hoche, on the 18th of April, and was the basis of the peace of Campo Formio.

NAPOLÉON IN EGYPT

Far more important from its political and personal than from its general military interest, comes the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt and its sequel. A very brief summary must here suffice. Napoleon left Toulon on the 19th of May 1798, at the same time as his army (40,000 strong in 400 transports) embarked secretly at various ports. Nelson's fleet was completely evaded, and, capturing Malta *en route*, the armada reached the coast of Egypt on the 1st of July. The Republicans stormed Alexandria on the 2nd. Between Embabeh and Gizeh, on the left bank of the Nile, 60,000 Mamelukes were defeated and scattered on the 21st (battle of the Pyramids), the French for the most part marching and fighting in the chequer of infantry squares that afterwards became the classical formation for desert warfare. While his lieutenants pursued the more important groups of the enemy, Napoleon entered Cairo in triumph, and proceeded to organize Egypt as a French protectorate. Meantime Nelson, though too late to head off the expedition, had annihilated the squadron of Admiral Brueys. This blow severed the army from the home country, and destroyed all hope of reinforcements. But to eject the French already in Egypt, military invasion of that country was necessary. The first attempts at this were made in September by the Turks as overlords of Egypt. Napoleon—after suppressing a revolt in Cairo—marched into Syria to meet them, and captured El Arish and Jaffa (at the latter place the prisoners, whom he could afford neither to feed, to release, nor to guard, were shot by his order). But he was brought to a standstill (March 17–May 20) before the half-defensible fortifications of Acre, held by a Turkish garrison and animated by the leadership of Sir W. Sidney Smith. In May, though meantime a Turkish relieving army had been severely beaten in the battle of Mount Tabor (April 16, 1799), Napoleon gave up his enterprise, and returned to Egypt, where he won a last victory in annihilating at Aboukir, with 6000 of his own men, a Turkish army 18,000 strong that had landed there (July 25, 1799). With this crowning tactical success to set against the Syrian reverses, he handed over the command to Kléber and returned to France (August 22) to ride the storm in a new *coup d'état*, the "18th Brumaire." Kléber, attacked by the English and Turks, concluded the convention of El Arish (January 27, 1800), whereby he secured free transport for the army back to France. But this convention was disavowed by the British government, and Kléber prepared to hold his ground. On the 20th of March 1800 he thoroughly defeated the Turkish army at Heliopolis and recovered Cairo, and French influence was once more in the ascendant in Egypt, when its director was murdered by a fanatic on the 14th of June, the day of Marengo. Kléber's successor, the incompetent Menou, fell an easy victim to the British expeditionary force under Sir Ralph Abercromby in 1801. The British forced their way ashore at Aboukir on the 8th of March. On the 21st, Abercromby won a decisive battle, and himself fell in the hour of victory. His successor, General Hely Hutchinson, slowly followed up this advantage, and received the surrender of Cairo in July and of Alexandria in August, the débris of the French army being given free passage back to France. Meantime a mixed force of British and native troops from India, under Sir David Baird, had landed at Kosseir and marched across the desert to Cairo.

CHAPTER VII

THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

In the autumn of 1798, while Napoleon's Egyptian expedition was in progress, and the Directory was endeavouring at home to reduce the importance and the predominance of the army and its leaders, the powers of Europe once more allied themselves, not now against the principles of the Republic, but against the treaty of Campo Formio. Russia, Austria, England, Turkey, Portugal, Naples and the Pope formed the Second Coalition. The war began with an advance into the Roman States, by a worthless and ill-behaved Neapolitan army (commanded, much against his will, by Mack), which the French troops under Championnet destroyed with ease. Championnet then revolutionized Naples. After this unimportant prelude the curtain rose on a general European war. The Directory which now had at its command neither numbers nor enthusiasm, prepared as best it could to meet the storm. Four armies, numbering only 160,000, were set on foot, in Holland (Brune, 24,000); on the Upper Rhine (Jourdan, 46,000); in Switzerland, which had been militarily occupied in 1798 (Masséna, 30,000); and in upper Italy (Schérer, 60,000). In addition there was Championnet's army, now commanded by Macdonald, in southern Italy. All these forces the Directory ordered, in January and February 1799, to assume the offensive.

Jourdan, in the Constance and Schaffhausen region, had only 40,000 men against the archduke Charles's 80,000, and was soon brought to a standstill and driven back on Stokach. The archduke had won these preliminary successes with seven-eighths of his army acting as one concentrated mass. But as he had only encountered a portion of Jourdan's army, he became uneasy as to his flanks, checked his bold advance, and ordered a reconnaissance in force. This practically extended his army while Jourdan was closing his, and thus the French began the battle of Stokach (March 25) in superior numbers, and it was not until late in the day that the archduke brought up sufficient strength (60,000) to win a victory. This was a battle of the "strategic" type, a widespread straggling combat in which each side took fifteen hours to inflict a loss of 12% on the other, and which ended in Jourdan accepting defeat and drawing off, unpursued by the magnificent Austrian cavalry, though these counted five times as many sabres as the French.

The French secondary army in Switzerland was in the hands of the bold and active Masséna. The forces of both sides in the Alpine region were, from a military point of view, mere flank guards to the main armies on the Rhine and the Adige. But unrest, amounting to civil war, among the Swiss and Grison peoples tempted both governments to give these flank guards considerable strength.¹

The Austrians in the Vorarlberg and Grisons were under Hotze, who had 13,000 men at Bregenz, and 7000 commanded by Auffenberg around Chur, with, between them, 5000 men at Feldkirch and a post of 1000 in the strong position of the Luziensteig near Mayenfeld. Masséna's available force was about 20,000, and he used almost the whole of it against Auffenberg. The Rhine was crossed by his principal column near Mayenfeld, and the Luziensteig stormed (March 6), while a second column from the Zürich side descended upon Disentis and captured its defenders. In three days, thanks to Masséna's energy and the ardent attacking spirit of his men, Auffenberg's division was broken up, Oudinot meanwhile holding off Hotze by a hard-fought combat at Feldkirch (March 7). But a second attack on Feldkirch made on the 23rd by Masséna with 15,000 men was repulsed and the advance of his left wing came to a standstill.

Behind Auffenberg and Hotze was Bellegarde in Tirol with some 47,000 men. Most of these were stationed north of Innsbruck and Landeck, probably as a sort of strategic reserve to the archduke. The rest, with the assistance of the Tirolese themselves, were to ward off irruptions from Italy. Here the French offensive was entrusted to two columns, one from Masséna's command under Lecourbe, the other from the Army of Italy under Dessolles. Simultaneously with Masséna, Lecourbe marched from Bellinzona with 10,000 men, by the San Bernadino pass into the Splügen valley, and thence over the Julier pass into the upper Engadine. A small Austrian force under Major-General Loudon attacked him near Zernetz, but was after three days of rapid manœuvres and bold tactics driven back to Martinsbrück, with considerable losses, especially in prisoners. But ere long the country people flew to arms, and Lecourbe found himself between two fires, the levies occupying Zernetz and Loudon's regulars Martinsbrück. But though he had only some 5000 of his original force left, he was not disconcerted, and, by driving back the levies into the high valleys whence they had come, and constantly threatening Loudon, he was able to maintain himself and to wait for Dessolles. The latter, moving up the Valtelline,

¹ The assumption by later critics (Clausewitz even included) that the "flank position" held by these forces relatively to the main armies in Italy and Germany was their *raison d'être* is unsupported by contemporary evidence.

by now fought his way to the Stelvio pass, but beyond it the defile of Taufers (S.W. of Glurns) was entrenched by Loudon, who thus occupied a position midway between the two French columns, while his irregulars beset all the passes and ways giving access to the Vintschgau and the lower Engadine. In this situation the French should have been destroyed in detail. But as usual their speed and dash gave them the advantage in every manœuvre and at every point of contact.

On the 25th Lecourbe and Dessolles attacked Loudon at Nauders in the Engadine and Taufers in the Vintschgau respectively. At Nauders the French passed round the flanks of the defence by scrambling along the high mountain crests adjacent, while at Taufers the assailants, only 4500 strong, descended into a deep ravine, debouched unnoticed in the Austrians' rear, and captured 6000 men and 16 guns. The Austrian leader with a couple of companies made his way through Glurns to Nauders, and there, finding himself headed off by Lecourbe, he took to the mountains. His corps, like Auffenberg's, was annihilated.

This ended the French general offensive. Jourdan had been defeated by the archduke and forced or induce to retire over the Rhine. Masséna was at a standstill before the strong position of Feldkirch, and the Austrians of Hotze were still massed at Bregenz, but the Grisons were revolutionized, two strong bodies of Austrians numbering in all about 20,000 men had been destroyed, and Lecourbe and Dessolles had advanced far into Tirol. A pause followed. The Austrians in the mountains needed time to concentrate and to recover from their astonishment. The archduke fell ill, and the Vienna war council forbade his army to advance lest Tirol should be "uncovered," though Bellegarde and Hotze still disposed of numbers equal to those of Masséna and Lecourbe. Masséna succeeded Jourdan in general command on the French side and promptly collected all available forces of both armies in the hilly non-Alpine country between Basel, Zürich and Schaffhausen, thereby directly barring the roads into France (Berne-Neuchâtel-Pontarlier and Basel-Besançon) which the Austrians appeared to desire to conquer. The protection of Alsace and the Vosges was left to the fortresses. There was no suggestion, it would appear, that the Rhine between Basel and Schaffhausen was a flank position sufficient of itself to bar Alsace to the enemy.

It is now time to turn to events in Italy, where the Coalition intended to put forth its principal efforts. At the beginning of March the French had 80,000 men in Upper Italy and some 35,000 in the heart of the Peninsula, the latter engaged chiefly in supporting newly-founded republics. Of the former, 53,000 formed the field army on the Mincio under Schérer. The Austrians, commanded by Kray, numbered in all 84,000, but detachments reduced this figure to 67,000, of whom, moreover, 15,000 had not yet arrived when operations began. They were to be joined by a Russian contingent under the celebrated Suvárov, who was to command the whole on arrival, and whose extraordinary personality gives the campaign its special interest. Kray himself was a resolute soldier, and when the French, obeying the general order to advance, crossed the Adige, he defeated them in a severely fought battle at Magnano near Verona (March 5), the French losing 4000 killed and wounded and 4500 taken, out of 41,000. The Austrians lost some 3800 killed and wounded and 1500 prisoners, out of 46,000 engaged. The war, however, was undertaken not to annihilate, but to evict the French, and, probably under orders from Vienna, Kray allowed the beaten enemy to depart.

Suvárov appeared with 17,000 Russians on the 4th of April. His first step was to set Russian officers to teach the Austrian troops—whose feelings can be imagined—how to attack with the bayonet, his next to order the whole army forward. The Allies broke camp on the 17th, 18th and 19th of April, and on the 20th, after a forced march of close on 30 m., they passed the Chiese. Brescia had a French garrison, but Suvárov soon cowed it into surrender by threats of a massacre, which no one doubted that he would carry into execution. At the same time, dissatisfied with the marching of the Austrian infantry, he sent the following characteristic reproof to their commander: "The march was in the service of the Kaiser. Fair weather is for my lady's chamber, for dandies, for slugs-guards. He who dares to cavil against his high duty (*der Grosssprecher wider den hohen Dienst*) is, as an egoist, instantly to vacate his command. Whoever is in bad health can stay behind. The so-called reasoners (*raisonneurs*) do no army any good, . . ." One day later, under thus unrelenting pressure, the advanced posts of the Allies reached Cremona and the main body the Oglio. The pace became slower in the following days, as many bridges had to be made, and meanwhile Moreau, Schérer's successor, prepared with a mere 20,000 men to defend Lodi, Cassano and Lecco on the Adda. On the 26th the Russian hero attacked him all along the line. The moral supremacy had passed over to the Allies. Melas, under Suvárov's stern orders, flung his battalions regardless of losses against the strong position of Cassano. The story of 1796 repeated itself with the rôles reversed. The passage was carried, and the French rearguard under Sérurier was surrounded and captured by an inferior corps of Austrians. The Austrians (the Russians at Lecco were hardly engaged) lost 6000 men, but they took 7000 prisoners, and in all Moreau's little army lost half its numbers and retreated in many disconnected bodies to the Ticino, and thence to Alessandria. Everywhere the Italians turned against

the French, mindful of the exactions of their commissaries. The strange Cossack cavalry that western Europe had never yet seen entered Milan on the 29th of April, eleven days after passing the Mincio, and next day the city received with enthusiasm the old field marshal, whose exploits against the Turks had long invested him with a halo of romance and legend. Here, for the moment, his offensive culminated. He desired to pass into Switzerland and to unite his own, the archduke's, Hotze's and Bellegarde's armies in one powerful mass. But the emperor would not permit the execution of this scheme until all the fortresses held by the enemy in Upper Italy should have been captured. In any case, Macdonald's army in southern Italy, cut off from France by the rapidity of Suvárov's onslaught, and now returning with all speed to join Moreau by force or evasion, had still to be dealt with.

Suvárov's mobile army, originally 90,000 strong, had now dwindled, by reason of losses and detachments for sieges, to half that number, and serious differences arose between the Vienna government and himself. If he offended the pride of the Austrian army, he was at least respected as a leader who gave it victories, but in Vienna he was regarded as a madman who had to be kept within bounds. But at last, when he was becoming thoroughly exasperated by this treatment, Macdonald came within striking distance and the active campaign recommenced. In the second week of June, Moreau, who had retired into the Apennines about Gavi, advanced with the intention of drawing upon himself troops that would otherwise have been employed against Macdonald. He succeeded, for Suvárov with his usual rapidity collected 40,000 men at Alessandria, only to learn that Macdonald with 35,000 men was coming up on the Parma road. When this news arrived, Macdonald had already engaged an Austrian detachment at Modena and driven it back, and Suvárov found himself between Moreau and Macdonald with barely enough men under his hand to enable him to play the game of "interior lines." But at the crisis the rough energetic warrior who despised "raissoneurs," displayed generalship of the first order, and taking in hand all his scattered detachments, he manœuvred them in the Napoleonic fashion.

On the 14th Macdonald was calculated to be between Modena, Reggio and Carpi, but his destination was uncertain. Would he continue to hug the Apennines to join Moreau, or would he strike out northwards against Kray, who with 20,000 men was besieging Mantua? From Alessandria it is four marches to Piacenza and nine to Mantua, while from Reggio these places are four and two marches respectively. Piacenza, therefore, was the crucial point if Macdonald continued westward, while, in the other case, nothing could save Kray but the energetic conduct of Hohenzollern's detachment, which was posted near Reggio. This latter, however, was soon forced over the Po, and Ott, advancing from Cremona to join it, found himself sharply pressed in turn. The field marshal had hoped that Ott and Hohenzollern together would be able to win him time to assemble at Parma, where he could bring on a battle whichever way the French took. But on receipt of Ott's report he was convinced that Macdonald had chosen the western route, and ordering Ott to delay the French as long as possible by stubborn rearguard actions and to put a garrison into Piacenza under a general who was to hold out "on peril of his life and honour," he collected what forces were ready to move and hurried towards Piacenza, the rest being left to watch Moreau. He arrived just in time. When after three forced marches the main body (only 26,000 strong) reached Castel San Giovanni, Ott had been driven out of Piacenza, but the two joined forces safely. Both Suvárov and Macdonald spent the 17th in closing up and deploying for battle. The respective forces were Allies 30,000, French 35,000. Suvárov believed the enemy to be only 26,000 strong, and chiefly raw Italian regiments, but his temperament would not have allowed him to stand still even had he known his inferiority. He had already issued one of his peculiar battle-orders, which began with the words, "The hostile army will be taken prisoners" and continued with directions to the Cossacks to spare the surrendered enemy. But Macdonald too was full of energy, and believed still that he could annihilate Ott before the field marshal's arrival. Thus the battle of the Trebbia (June 17-19) was fought by both sides in the spirit of the offensive. It was one of the severest struggles in the Republican wars, and it ended in Macdonald's retreat with a loss of 15,000 men—probably 6000 in the battle and 9000 killed and prisoners, when and after the equilibrium was broken—for Suvárov, unlike other generals, had the necessary surplus of energy after all the demands made upon him by a great battle, to order and to direct an effective pursuit. The Allies lost about 7000. Macdonald retreated to Parma and Modena, harassed by the peasantry, and finally recrossed the Apennines and made his way to Genoa. The battle of the Trebbia is one of the most clearly-defined examples in military history of the result of moral force—it was a matter not merely of energetic leading on the battlefield, but far more of educating the troops beforehand to meet the strain, of ingrainings in the soldier the determination to win at all costs. "It was not," says Clausewitz, "a case of losing the key of the position, of turning a flank or breaking a centre, of a mistimed cavalry charge or a lost battery . . . it is a pure trial of strength and expense of force, and victory is the sinking of the balance, if ever so slightly, in favour of one side. And we mean not merely physical, but even more moral forces."

To return now to the Alpine region, where the French offensive had culminated at the end of March. Their defeated left was behind the Rhine in the northern part of Switzerland, the half-victorious centre athwart the Rhine between Mayenfeld and Chur, and their wholly victorious right far within Tirol between Glurns, Nauders and Landeck. But neither the centre nor the right could maintain itself. The forward impulse given by Suvárov spread along the whole Austrian front from left to right. Dessolles' column (now under Loison) was forced back to Chiavenna. Bellegarde drove Lecourbe from position to position towards the Rhine during April. There Lecourbe added to the remnant of his expeditionary column the outlying bodies of Masséna's right wing, but even so he had only 8000 men against Bellegarde's 17,000, and he was now exposed to the attack of Hotze's 25,000 as well. The Luziensteig fell to Hotze and Chur to Bellegarde, but the defenders managed to escape from the converging Austrian columns into the valley of the Reuss. Having thus reconquered all the lost ground and forced the French into the interior of Switzerland, Bellegarde and Hotze parted company, the former marching with the greater part of his forces to join Suvárov, the latter moving to his right to reinforce the archduke. Only a chain of posts was left in the Rhine Valley between Disentis and Feldkirch. The archduke's operations now recommenced.

Charles and Hotze stood, about the 15th of May, at opposite ends of the lake of Constance. The two together numbered about 88,000 men, but both had sent away numerous detachments to the flanks, and the main bodies dwindled to 35,000 for the archduke and 20,000 for Hotze. Masséna, with 45,000 men in all, retired slowly from the Rhine to the Thur. The archduke crossed the Rhine at Stein, Hotze at Balzers, and each then cautiously felt his way towards the other. Their active opponent attempted to take advantage of their separation, and an irregular fight took place in the Thur Valley (May 25), but Masséna, finding Hotze close on his right flank, retired without attempting to force a decision. On the 27th, having joined forces, the Austrians dislodged Masséna from his new position on the Töss without difficulty, and this process was repeated from time to time in the next few days, until at last Masséna halted in the position he had prepared for defence at Zürich. He had still but 25,000 of his 45,000 men in hand, for he maintained numerous small detachments on his right, behind the Zürcher See and the Wallen See, and on his left towards Basel. These 25,000 occupied an entrenched position 5 m. in length; against which the Austrians, detaching as usual many posts to protect their flanks and rear, deployed only 42,000 men, of whom 8000 were sent on a wide turning movement and 8000 held in reserve 4 m. in rear of the battlefield. Thus the frontal attack was made with forces not much greater than those of the defence and it failed accordingly (June 4). But Masséna, fearing perhaps to strain the loyalty of the Swiss to their French-made constitution by exposing their town to assault and sack, retired on the 5th.

He did not fall back far, for his outposts still bordered the Limmat and the Linth, while his main body stood in the valley of the Aar between Baden and Lucerne. The archduke pressed Masséna as little as he had pressed Jourdan after Stokach (though in this case he had less to gain by pursuit), and awaited the arrival of a second Russian army, 30,000 strong, under Korsákov, before resuming the advance, meantime throwing out covering detachments towards Basel, where Masséna had a division. Thus for two months operations, elsewhere than in Italy, were at a standstill, while Masséna drew in reinforcements and organized the fractions of his forces in Alsace as a skeleton army, and the Austrians distributed arms to the peasantry of South Germany.

In the end, under pressure from Paris, it was Masséna who resumed active movements. Towards the middle of August, Lecourbe, who formed a loose right wing of the French army in the Reuss valley, was reinforced to a strength of 25,000 men, and pounced upon the extended left wing of the enemy, which had stretched itself, to keep pace with Suvárov, as far westward as the St. Gothard. The movement began on the 14th, and in two days the Austrians were driven back from the St Gothard and the Furka to the line of the Linth, with the loss of 8000 men and many guns. At the same time an attempt to take advantage of Masséna's momentary weakness by forcing the Aar at Döttingen near its mouth failed completely (August 16-17). Only 200 men guarded the point of passage, but the Austrian engineers had neglected to make a proper examination of the river, and unlike the French, the Austrian generals had no authority to waste their expensive battalions in forcing the passage in boats. No one regarded this war as a struggle for existence, and no one but Suvárov possessed the iron strength of character to send thousands of men to death for the realization of a diplomatic success—for ordinary men, the object of the Coalition was to upset the treaty of Campo Formio. This was the end of the archduke's campaign in Switzerland. Though he would have preferred to continue it, the Vienna government desired him to return to Germany. An Anglo-Russian expedition was about to land in Holland, and the French were assembling fresh forces on the Rhine, and, with the double object of preventing an invasion of South Germany and of inducing the French to augment their forces in Alsace at the expense of those in Holland, the archduke left affairs in Switzerland to Hotze and Korsákov, and marched away with 35,000 men to join the detachment of Sztarray (20,000) that he had placed in the Black Forest before entering Switzerland. His new campaign never rose above the level of a war of posts and of manœuvres

about Mannheim and Philippsburg. In the latter stage of it Lecourbe commanded the French and obtained a slight advantage.

Suvárov's last exploit in Italy coincided in time, but in no other respect, with the skirmish at Döttingen. Returning swiftly from the battlefield of the Trebbia, he began to drive back Moreau to the Riviera. At this point Joubert succeeded to the command on the French side, and, against the advice of his generals, gave battle. Equally against the advice of his own subordinates, the field marshal accepted it, and won his last great victory at Novi on the 13th of August, Joubert being killed. This was followed by another rapid march against a new French "Army of the Alps" (Championnet) which had entered Italy by way of the Mont Cenis. But immediately after this he left all further operations in Italy to Melas with 60,000 men and himself with the Russians and an Austrian corps marched away, via Varese, for the St Gothard to combine operations against Masséna with Hotze and Korsákov. It was with a heavy heart that he left the scene of his battles, in which the force of his personality had carried the old-fashioned "linear" armies for the last time to complete victory. In the early summer he had himself suggested, eagerly and almost angrily, the concentration of his own and the archduke's armies in Switzerland with a view, not to conquering that country, but to forcing Jourdan and Masséna into a grand decisive battle. But, as we have seen, the Vienna government would not release him until the last Italian fortress had been reoccupied, and when finally he received the order that a little while before he had so ardently desired, it was too late. The archduke had already left Switzerland, and he was committed to a resultless warfare in the high mountains, with an army which was a mere detachment and in the hope of co-operating with two other detachments far away on the other side of Switzerland. As for the reasons which led to the issue of such an order, it can only be said that the bad feeling known to exist between the Austrians and Russians induced England to recommend, as the first essential of further operations, the separate concentration of the troops of each nationality under their own generals. Still stranger was the reason which induced the tsar to give his consent. It was alleged that the Russians would be healthier in Switzerland than the men of the southern plains! From such premises as these the Allied diplomats evolved a new plan of campaign, by which the Anglo-Russians under the duke of York were to reconquer Holland and Belgium, the archduke Charles to operate on the Middle Rhine, Suvárov in Switzerland and Melas in Piedmont—a plan destitute of any merit but that of simplicity.

It is often said that it is the duty of a commander to resign rather than undertake an operation which he believes to be faulty. So, however, Suvárov did not understand it. In the simplicity of his loyalty to the formal order of his sovereign he prepared to carry out his instructions to the letter. Masséna's command (77,000 men) was distributed at the beginning of September, along an enormous S, from the Simplon, through the St Gothard and Glarus, and along the Linth, the Züricher See and the Limmat to Basel. Opposite the lower point of this S, Suvárov (28,000) was about to advance. Hotze's corps (25,000 Austrians), extending from Uznach by Chur to Disentis, formed a thin line roughly parallel to the lower curve of the S, Korsákov's Russians (30,000) were opposite the centre at Zürich, while Nauendorff with a small Austrian corps at Waldshut faced the extreme upper point. Thus the only completely safe way in which Suvárov could reach the Zürich region was by skirting the lower curve of the S, under protection of Hotze. But this detour would be long and painful, and the ardent old man preferred to cross the mountains once for all at the St Gothard, and to follow the valley of the Reuss to Altdorf and Schwyz—i.e. to strike vertically upward to the centre of the S—and to force his way through the French cordon to Zürich, and if events, so far as concerned his own corps, belied his optimism, they at any rate justified his choice of the shortest route. For, aware of the danger gathering in his rear, Masséna gathered up all his forces within reach towards his centre, leaving Lecourbe to defend the St Gothard and the Reuss valley and Soult on the Linth. On the 24th he forced the passage of the Limmat at Dietikon. On the 25th, in the second battle of Zürich, he completely routed Korsákov, who lost 8000 killed and wounded, large numbers of prisoners and 100 guns. All along the line the Allies fell back, one corps after another, at the moment when Suvárov was approaching the foot of the St Gothard.

On the 21st the field marshal's headquarters were at Bellinzona, where he made the final preparations. Expecting to be four days *en route* before he could reach the nearest friendly magazine, he took his trains with him, which inevitably augmented the difficulties of the expedition. On the 24th Airole was taken, but when the far greater task of storming the pass itself presented itself before them, even the stolid Russians were terrified, and only the passionate protests of the old man, who reproached his "children" with deserting their father in his extremity, induced them to face the danger. At last after twelve hours' fighting, the summit was reached. The same evening Suvárov pushed on to Hospenthal, while a flanking column from Disentis made its way towards Amsteg over the Crispalt. Lecourbe was threatened in rear and pressed in front, and his engineers, to hold off the Disentis column, had broken the Devil's Bridge. Discovering this, he left the road, threw his guns into the river and made his way by fords and water-meadows to Göschenen, where by a furious attack he cleared the Disentis troops off his line of retreat. His rear-

guard meantime held the ruined Devil's Bridge. This point and the tunnel leading to it, called the Urner Loch, the Russians attempted to force, with the most terrible losses, battalion after battalion crowding into the tunnel and pushing the foremost ranks into the chasm left by the broken bridge. But at last a ford was discovered and the bridge, cleared by a turning movement, was repaired. More broken bridges lay beyond, but at last Suvárov joined the Disentis column near Göschenen. When Altdorf was reached, however, Suvárov found not only Lecourbe in a threatening position, but an entire absence of boats on the Lake of the Four Cantons. It was impossible (in those days the Axenstrasse did not exist) to take an army along the precipitous eastern shore, and thus passing through one trial after another, each more severe than the last, the Russians, men and horses and pack animals in an interminable single file, ventured on the path leading over the Kinzig pass into the Muotta Thal. The passage lasted three days, the leading troops losing men and horses over the precipices, the rearguard from the fire of the enemy now in pursuit. And at last, on arrival in the Muotta Thal, the field marshal received definite information that Korsákov's army was no longer in existence. Yet even so it was long before he could make up his mind to retreat, and the pursuers gathered on all sides. Fighting, sometimes severe, and never altogether ceasing, went on day after day as the Allied column, now reduced to 15,000 men, struggled on over one pass after another, but at last it reached Ilanz on the Vorder Rhine (October 8). The Archduke Charles meanwhile had, on hearing of the disaster of Zürich, brought over a corps from the Neckar, and for some time negotiations were made for a fresh combined operation against Masséna. But these came to nothing, for the archduke and Suvárov could not agree, either as to their own relations or as to the plan to be pursued. Practically, Suvárov's retreat from Altdorf to Ilanz closed the campaign. It was his last active service, and formed a gloomy but grand climax to the career of the greatest soldier who ever wore the Russian uniform.

CHAPTER VIII

MARENGO AND HOHENLINDEN

THE disasters of 1799 sealed the fate of the Directory, and placed Bonaparte, who returned from Egypt with the prestige of a recent victory, in his natural place as civil and military head of France. In the course of the campaign the field strength of the French had been gradually augmented, and in spite of losses now numbered 227,000 at the front. These were divided into the Army of Bavaria, Brune (25,000), the Army of the Rhine, Moreau (146,000), the Army of Italy, Masséna (56,000), and, in addition, there were some 100,000 in garrisons and depots in France.

Most of these field armies were in a miserable condition owing to the losses and fatigues of the last campaign. The treasury was empty and credit exhausted, and worse still—for spirit and enthusiasm, as in 1794, would have remedied material deficiencies—the conscripts obtained under Marshal Jourdan's law of 1798 came to their regiments most unwillingly. Most of them, indeed, deserted on the way to join the colours. A large draft sent to the Army of Italy arrived with 310 men instead of 10,250, and after a few such experiences, the First Consul decided that the untrained men were to be assembled in the fortresses of the interior and afterwards sent to the active battalions in numerous small drafts, which they could more easily assimilate. Besides accomplishing the immense task of reorganizing existing forces, he created new ones, including the Consular Guard, and carried out at this moment of crisis two such far-reaching reforms as the replacement of the civilian drivers of the artillery by soldiers, and of the hired teams by horses belonging to the state, and the permanent grouping of divisions in army corps.

As early as the 25th of January 1800 the First Consul provided for the assembly of all available forces in the interior in an "Army of Reserve." He reserved to himself the command of this army,¹ which gradually came into being as the pacification of Vendée and the return of some of Brune's troops from Holland set free the necessary nucleus troops. The conscription law was stringently re-enforced, and impassioned calls were made for volunteers (the latter, be it said, did not produce five hundred useful men). The district of Dijon, partly as being central with respect to the Rhine and Italian Armies, partly as being convenient for supply purposes, was selected as the zone of assembly. Chabran's division was formed from some depleted corps of the Army of Italy and from the depots of those in Egypt. Chambarlhac's, chiefly of young soldiers, lost 5% of its numbers on the way to Dijon from desertion—a loss which appeared slight and even satisfactory after the wholesale *débandade* of the winter months. Lechi's Italian legion was newly formed from Italian refugees. Boudet's division was originally assembled

¹ He afterwards appointed Berthier to command the Army of Reserve, but himself accompanied it and directed it, using Berthier as chief of staff.

from some of the southern garrison towns, but the units composing it were frequently changed up to the beginning of May. The cavalry was deficient in saddles, and many of its units were new formations. The Consular Guard of course was a *corps d'élite*, and this and two and a half infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade coming from the veteran "Army of the West" formed the real backbone of the army. Most of the newer units were not even armed till they had left Dijon for the front.

Such was the first constitution of the Army of Reserve. We can scarcely imagine one which required more accurate and detailed staff work to assemble it—correspondence with the district commanders, with the adjutant-generals of the various armies, and orders to the civil authorities on the lines of march, to the troops themselves and to the arsenals and magazines. No one but Napoleon, even aided by a Berthier, could have achieved so great a task in six weeks, and the great captain, himself doing the work that

nowadays is apportioned amongst a crowd of administrative staff officers, still found time to administer France's affairs at home and abroad, and to think out a general plan of campaign that embraced Moreau's, Masséna's and his own armies.

The Army of the Rhine, by far the strongest and best equipped, lay on the upper Rhine. The small and worn-out Army of Italy was watching the Alps and the Apennines from Mont Blanc to Genoa. Between them Switzerland, secured by the victory of Zürich, offered a starting-point for a turning movement on either side—this year the advantage of the flank position was recognized and acted upon. The Army of Reserve was assembling around Dijon, within 200 m. of either theatre of war. The general plan was that the Army of Reserve should march through Switzerland to close on the right wing of the Army of the Rhine. Thus supported to whatever degree might prove to be necessary, Moreau was to force the passage of the Rhine about Schaffhausen, to push back the Austrians rapidly beyond the Lech, and then, if they took the offensive in turn, to hold them in check for ten or twelve days. During this period of guaranteed freedom the decisive movement was to be made. The Army of Reserve, augmented by one large corps of the Army of the Rhine, was to descend by the Splügen (alternatively by the St Gothard and even by Tirol) into the plains of Lombardy. Magazines were to be established at Zürich and Lucerne (not at Chur, lest the plan should become obvious from the beginning), and all likely routes reconnoitred in advance. The Army of Italy was at first to maintain a strict defensive, then to occupy the Austrians until the entry of the Reserve Army into Italy was assured, and finally to manœuvre to join it.

Moreau, however, owing to want of horses for his pontoon train and also because of the character of the Rhine above Basel, preferred to cross below that place, especially as in Alsace there were considerably greater supply facilities than in a country which had already been fought over and stripped bare. With the greatest reluctance Bonaparte



let him have his way, and giving up the idea of using the Splügen and the St Gothard¹ began to turn his attention to the more westerly passes, the St Bernard and the Simplon. It was not merely Moreau's scruples that led to this essential modification in the scheme. At the beginning of April the enemy took the offensive against Masséna. On the 8th Melas's right wing dislodged the French from the Mont Cenis, and most of the troops that had then reached Dijon were shifted southward to be ready for emergencies. By the 25th Berthier reported that Masséna was seriously attacked and that he might have to be supported by the shortest route. Bonaparte's resolution was already taken. He waited no longer for Moreau (who indeed so far from volunteering assistance, actually demanded it for himself). Convinced from the paucity of news that Masséna's army was closely pressed and probably severed from France, and feeling also that the Austrians were deeply committed to their struggle with the Army of Italy, he told Berthier to march with 40,000 men at once by way of the St Bernard unless otherwise advised. Berthier protested that he had only 25,000 effectives, and the equipment and armament was still far from complete—as indeed it remained to the end—but the troops marched, though their very means of existence were precarious from the time of leaving Geneva to the time of reaching Milan, for nothing could extort supplies and money from the sullen Swiss.

At the beginning of May the First Consul learned of the serious plight of the Army of Italy. Masséna with his right wing was shut up in Genoa, Suchet with the left wing driven back to the Var. Meanwhile Moreau had won a preliminary victory at Stokach, and the Army of Reserve had begun its movement to Geneva. With these data the plan of campaign took a clear shape at last—Masséna to resist as long as possible; Suchet to resume the offensive, if he could do so, towards Turin; the Army of Reserve to pass the Alps and to debouch into Piedmont by Aosta; the Army of the Rhine to send a strong force into Italy by the St Gothard. The First Consul left Paris on the 6th of May. Berthier went forward to Geneva, and still farther on the route magazines were established at Villeneuve and St-Pierre. Gradually, and with immense efforts, the leading troops of the long column¹ were passed over the St Bernard, drawing their artillery on sledges, on the 15th and succeeding days. Driving away small posts of the Austrian army, the advance guard entered Aosta on the 16th and Châtillon on the 18th and the alarm was given. Melas, committed as he was to his Riviera campaign, began to look to his right rear, but he was far from suspecting the seriousness of his opponent's purpose.

Infinitely more dangerous for the French than the small detachment that Melas opposed to them, or even the actual crossing of the pass, was the unexpected stopping power of the little fort of Bard. The advanced guard of the French appeared before it on the 19th, and after three wasted days the infantry managed to find a difficult mountain by-way and to pass round the obstacle. Ivrea was occupied on the 23rd, and Napoleon hoped to assemble the whole army there by the 27th. But except for a few guns that with infinite precautions were smuggled one by one through the streets of Bard, the whole of the artillery, as well as a detachment (under Chabran) to besiege the fort, had to be left behind. Bard surrendered on the 2nd of June, having delayed the infantry of the French army for four days and the artillery for a fortnight.

The military situation in the last week of May, as it presented itself to the First Consul at Ivrea, was this. The Army of Italy under Masséna was closely besieged in Genoa, where provisions were running short, and the population so hostile that the French general placed his field artillery to sweep the streets. But Masséna was no ordinary general, and the First Consul knew that while Masséna lived the garrison would resist to the last extremity. Suchet was defending Nice and the Var by vigorous minor operations. The Army of Reserve, the centre of which had reached at Ivrea the edge of the Italian plains, consisted of four weak army corps under Victor, Duhesme, Lannes and Murat. There were still to be added to this small army of 34,000 effectives, Turreau's division, which had passed over the Mont Cenis, and was now in the valley of the Dora Riparia, Moncey's corps of the Army of the Rhine, which had at last been extorted from Moreau and was due to pass the St Gothard before the end of May, Chabran's division left to besiege Bard, and a small force under Béthencourt, which was to cross the Simplon and to descend by Arona (this place proved in the event a second Bard and immobilized Béthencourt until after the decisive battle). Thus it was only the simplest part of Napoleon's task to concentrate half of his army at Ivrea, and he had yet to bring in the rest. The problem was to reconcile the necessity for time, which he wanted to ensure the maximum force being brought over the Alps, with the necessity for haste, in view of the impending fall of Genoa and the probability that once this conquest was achieved, Melas would bring back his 100,000 men into the Milanese to deal with the Army of Reserve. As early as the 14th of May he had informed Moncey that from Ivrea the Army of Reserve would move on Milan. On the 25th of May, in response to Berthier's request for guidance, the First Consul ordered Lannes (advanced guard) to push out on the Turin road, "in order to deceive the enemy and to obtain news of Turreau," and Duhesme's and Murat's corps to proceed along the Milan road. On the 27th, after Lannes had on the 26th

¹ Only one division of the main body used the Little St Bernard.

defeated an Austrian column near Chivasso, the main body was already advancing on Vercelli.

Very few of Napoleon's acts of generalship have been more criticized than this resolution to March on Milan, which abandoned Genoa to its fate and gave Melas a week's leisure to assemble his scattered forces. The account of his motives he dictated at St Helena (*Nap. Correspondence*, v. 30, pp. 375-377), in itself an unconvincing appeal to the rules of strategy as laid down by the theorists—which rules his own practice throughout transcended—gives, when closely examined, some at least of the necessary clues. He says in effect that by advancing directly on Turin he would have "risked a battle against equal forces without an assured line of retreat, Bard being still uncaptured." It is indeed strange to find Napoleon shrinking before *equal* forces of the enemy, even if we admit without comment that it was more difficult to pass Bard the second time than the first. The only incentive to go towards Turin was the chance of partial victories over the disconnected Austrian corps that would be met in that direction, and this he deliberately set aside. Having done so, for reasons that will appear in the sequel, he could only defend it by saying in effect that he might have been defeated—which was true, but not the Napoleonic principle of war. Of the alternatives, one was to hasten to Genoa; this in Napoleon's eyes would have been playing the enemy's game, for they would have concentrated at Alessandria, facing west "in their natural position." It is equally obvious that thus the enemy would have played *his* game, supposing that this was to relieve Genoa, and the implication is that it was not. The third course, which Napoleon took, and in this memorandum defended, gave his army the enemy's depots at Milan, of which it unquestionably stood in sore need, and the reinforcement of Moncey's 15,000 men from the Rhine, while at the same time Moncey's route offered an "assured line of retreat" by the Simplon¹ and the St Gothard. He would in fact make for himself there a "natural position" without forfeiting the advantage of being in Melas's rear. Once possessed of Milan, Napoleon says, he could have engaged Melas with a light heart and with confidence in the greatest possible results of a victory, whether the Austrians sought to force their way back to the east by the right or the left bank of the Po, and he adds that if the French passed on and concentrated south of the Po there would be no danger to the Milan-St Gothard line of retreat, as this was secured by the rivers Ticino and Sesia. In this last, as we shall see, he is shielding an undeniable mistake, but considering for the moment only the movement to Milan, we are justified in assuming that his object was not the relief of Genoa, but the most thorough defeat of Melas's field army, to which end, putting all sentiment aside, he treated the hard-pressed Masséna as a "containing force" to keep Melas occupied during the strategical deployment of the Army of Reserve. In the beginning he had told Masséna that he would "disengage" him, even if he had to go as far east as Trent to find a way into Italy. From the first, then, no direct relief was intended, and when, on hearing bad news from the Riviera, he altered his route to the more westerly passes, it was probably because he felt that Masséna's containing power was almost exhausted, and that the passage and reassembly of the Reserve Army must be brought about in the minimum time and by the shortest way. But the object was still the defeat of Melas, and for this, as the Austrians possessed an enormous numerical superiority, the assembly of all forces, including Moncey's, was indispensable. One essential condition of this was that the points of passage used should be out of reach of the enemy. The more westerly the passes chosen, the more dangerous was the whole operation—in fact the Mont Cenis column never reached him at all—and though his expressed objections to the St Bernard line seem, as we have said, to be written after the event, to disarm his critics, there is no doubt that at the time he disliked it. It was a *pis aller* forced upon him by Moreau's delay and Masséna's extremity, and from the moment at which he arrived at Milan he did, as a fact, abandon it altogether in favour of the St Gothard. Lastly, so strongly was he impressed with the necessity of completing the development of all his forces, that though he found the Austrians on the Turin side much scattered and could justifiably expect a series of rapid partial victories, Napoleon let them go, and devoted his whole energy to creating for himself a "natural" position about Milan. If he sinned, at any rate he sinned handsomely, and except that he went to Vercelli instead of by Lausanne and Domodossola² (on the safe side of the mountains), his march is logistically beyond cavil.

Napoleon's immediate purpose, then, was to reassemble the Army of Reserve in a zone of manœuvre about Milan. This was carried out in the first days of June. Lannes at Chivasso stood ready to ward off a flank attack until the main army had filed past on the

¹ When he made his decision he was unaware that Béhencourt had been held up at Arona.

² This may be accounted for by the fact that Napoleon's mind was not yet definitely made up when his advanced guard had already begun to climb the St Bernard (12th). Napoleon's instructions for Moncey were written on the 14th. The magazines, too, had to be provided and placed before it was known whether Moreau's detachment would be forthcoming.

Vercelli road, then leaving a small force to combine with Turreau (whose column had not been able to advance into the plain) in demonstrations towards Turin, he moved off, still acting as right flank guard to the army, in the direction of Pavia. The main body meanwhile, headed by Murat, advanced on Milan by way of Vercelli and Magenta, forcing the passage of the Ticino on the 31st of May at Turbigo and Buffalora. On the same day the other divisions closed up to the Ticino,¹ and faithful to his principles Napoleon had an examination made of the little fortress of Novara, intending to occupy it as a *place du moment* to help in securing his zone of manœuvre. On the morning of the 2nd of June Murat occupied Milan, and in the evening of the same day the headquarters entered the great city, the Austrian detachment under Vukassovich (the flying right wing of Melas's general cordon system in Piedmont) retiring to the Adda. Duhesme's corps forced that river at Lodi, and pressed on with orders to organize Crema and if possible Orzinovi as temporary fortresses. Lechi's Italians were sent towards Bergamo and Brescia. Lannes meantime had passed Vercelli, and on the evening of the 2nd his cavalry reached Pavia, where, as at Milan, immense stores of food, equipment and warlike stores were seized.

Napoleon was now safe in his "natural" position, and barred one of the two main lines of retreat open to the Austrians. But his ambitions went further, and he intended to cross the Po and to establish himself on the other likewise, thus establishing across the plain a complete barrage between Melas and Mantua. Here his end outranged his means, as we shall see. But he gave himself every chance that rapidity could afford him, and the moment that some sort of a "zone of manœuvre" had been secured between the Ticino and the Oglio, he pushed on his main body—or rather what was left after the protective system had been provided for—to the Po. He would not wait even for his guns, which had at last emerged from the Bard defile and were ordered to come to Milan by a safe and circuitous route along the foot of the Alps.

At this point the action of the enemy began to make itself felt. Melas had not gained the successes that he had expected in Piedmont and on the Riviera, thanks to Masséna's obstinacy and to Suchet's brilliant defence of the Var. These operations had led him very far afield, and the protection of his over-long line of communications had caused him to weaken his large army by throwing off many detachments to watch the Alpine valleys on his right rear. One of these successfully opposed Turreau in the valley of the Dora Riparia, but another had been severely handled by Lannes at Chivasso, and a third (Vukassovich) found itself as we know, directly in the path of the French as they moved from Ivrea to Milan, and was driven far to the eastward. He was further handicapped by the necessity of supporting Ott before Genoa and Elsnitz on the Var, and hearing of Lannes's bold advance on Chivasso and of the presence of a French column with artillery (Turreau) west of Turin, he assumed that the latter represented the main body of the Army of Reserve—in so far indeed as he believed in the existence of that army at all.² Next, when Lannes moved away towards Pavia, Melas thought for a moment that fate had delivered his enemy into his hands, and began to collect such troops as were at hand at Turin with a view to cutting off the retreat of the French an Ivrea while Vukassovich held them in front. It was only when news came of Moncey's arrival in Italy and of Vukassovich's fighting retreat on Brescia that the magnitude and purpose of the French column that had penetrated by Ivrea became evident. Melas promptly decided to give up his western enterprises, and to concentrate at Alessandria, preparatory to breaking his way through the network of small columns—as the disseminated Army of Reserve still appeared to be—which threatened to bar his retreat. But orders circulated so slowly that he had to wait in Turin till the 8th of June for Elsnitz, whose retreat was, moreover, sharply followed up and made exceedingly costly by the enterprising Suchet. Ott, too, in spite of orders to give up the siege of Genoa at once and to march with all speed to hold the Alessandria-Piacenza road, waited two days to secure the prize, and agreed (June 4) to allow Masséna's army to go free and to join Suchet. And lastly, the cavalry of O'Reilly, sent on ahead from Alessandria to the Stradella defile, reached that point only to encounter the French. The barrage was complete, and it remained for Melas to break it with the mass that he was assembling, with all these misfortunes and delays, about Alessandria. His chances of doing so were anything but desperate.

On the 5th of June Murat, with his own corps and part of Duhesme's, had moved on Piacenza, and stormed the bridge-head there. Duhesme with one of his divisions pushed out on Crema and Orzinovi and also towards Pizzighetone. Moncey's leading regiments approached Milan, and Berthier thereupon sent on Victor's corps to support Murat and Lannes. Meantime the half abandoned line of operations, Ivrea-Vercelli, was briskly

¹ Six guns had by now passed Fort Bard and four of these were with Murat and Duhesme, two with Lannes.

² It is supposed that the foreign spies at Dijon sent word to their various employers that the army was a bogey. In fact a great part of it never entered Dijon at all, and the troops reviewed there by Bonaparte were only conscripts and details. By the time that the veteran divisions from the west and Paris arrived, either the spies had been ejected or their news was sent off too late to be of use.

attacked by the Austrians, who had still detachments on the side of Turin, waiting for Elsnitz to rejoin, and the French artillery train was once more checked. On the 6th Lannes from Pavia, crossing the Po at San Cipriano, encountered and defeated a large force, (O'Reilly's column), and barred the Alessandria-Parma main road. Opposite Piacenza Murat had to spend the day in gathering material for his passage, as the pontoon bridge had been cut by the retreating garrison of the bridge-head. On the eastern border of the "zone of manœuvre" Duhesme's various columns moved out towards Brescia and Cremona pushing back Vukassovich. Meantime the last divisions of the Army of Reserve (two of Moncey's excepted) were hurried towards Lannes's point of passage, as Murat had not yet secured Piacenza. On the 7th, while Duhesme continued to push back Vukassovich and seized Cremona, Murat at last captured Piacenza, finding there immense magazines. Meantime the army, division by division, passed over, slowly owing to a sudden flood, near Belgiojoso, and Lannes's advanced guard was ordered to open communication with Murat along the main road Stradella-Piacenza. "Moments are precious," said the First Consul. He was aware that Elsnitz was retreating before Suchet, that Melas had left Turin for Alessandria, and that heavy forces of the enemy were at or east of Tortona. He knew, too, that Murat had been engaged with certain regiments recently before Genoa and (wrongly) assumed O'Reilly's column, beaten by Lannes at San Cipriano, to have come from the same quarter. Whether this meant the deliverance or the surrender of Genoa he did not yet know, but it was certain that Masséna's holding action was over, and that Melas was gathering up his forces to recover his communications. Hence Napoleon's great object was concentration. "Twenty thousand men at Stradella," in his own words, was the goal of his efforts, and with the accomplishment of this purpose the campaign enters on a new phase.

On the 8th of June, Lannes's corps was across, Victor following as quickly as the flood would allow. Murat was at Piacenza, but the road between Lannes and Murat was not known to be clear, and the First Consul made the establishment of the connexion, and the construction of a third point of passage midway between the other two, the principal objects of the day's work. The army now being disseminated between the Alps, the Apennines, the Ticino and the Chiese, it was of vital importance to connect up the various parts into a well-balanced system. But the Napoleon of 1800 solved the problem that lay at the root of his strategy, "concentrate, but be vulnerable nowhere," in a way that compares unfavourably indeed with the methods of the Napoleon of 1806. Duhesme was still absent at Cremona. Lechi was far away in the Brescia country, Béchencourt detained at Arona. Moncey with about 15,000 men had to cover an area of 40 m. square around Milan, which constituted the original zone of manœuvre, and if Melas chose to break through the flimsy cordon of outposts on this side (the risk of which was the motive for detaching Moncey at all) instead of at the Stradella, it would take Moncey two days to concentrate his force on any battlefield within the area named, and even then he would be outnumbered by two to one. As for the main body at the Stradella, its position was wisely chosen, for the ground was too cramped for the deployment of the superior force that Melas might bring up, but the strategy that set before itself as an object 20,000 men at the decisive point out of 50,000 available, is, to say the least, imperfect. The most serious feature in all this was the injudicious order to Lannes to send forward his advanced guard, and to attack whatever enemy he met with on the road to Voghera. The First Consul, in fact, calculated that Melas could not assemble 20,000 men at Alessandria before the 12th of June, and he told Lannes that if he met the Austrians towards Voghera, they could not be more than 10,000 strong. A later order betrays some anxiety as to the exactitude of these assumptions, warns Lannes not to let himself be surprised, indicates his line of retreat, and, instead of ordering him to advance on Voghera, authorizes him to attack any corps that presented itself at Stradella. But all this came too late. Acting on the earlier order Lannes fought the battle of Montebello on the 9th. This was a very severe running fight, beginning east of Casteggio and ending at Montebello, in which the French drove the Austrians from several successive positions, and which culminated in a savage fight at close quarters about Montebello itself. The singular feature of the battle is the disproportion between the losses on either side—French, 500 out of 12,000 engaged; Austrians, 2100 killed and wounded and 2100 prisoners out of 14,000. These figures are most conclusive evidence of the intensity of the French military spirit in those days. One of the two divisions (Watrin's) was indeed a veteran organization, but the other, Chambarlhac's, was formed of young troops and was the same that, in the march to Dijon, had congratulated itself that only 5% of its men had deserted. On the other side the soldiers fought for "the honour of their arms"—not even with the courage of despair, for they were ignorant of the "strategic barrage" set in front of them by Napoleon, and the loss of their communications had not as yet lessened their daily rations by an ounce.


Meanwhile, Napoleon had issued orders for the main body to stand fast, and for the detachments to take up their definitive covering positions. Duhesme's corps was directed, from its eastern foray, to Piacenza, to join the main body. Moncey was to provide for the defence of the Ticino line, Lechi to form a "flying camp" in the region of Orzinovi-Brescia and Cremona, and another mixed brigade was to control the Austrians in Piz-

zighetone and in the citadel of Piacenza. On the other side of the Po, between Piacenza and Montebello, was the main body (Lannes, Murat and part of Victor's and Duhesme's corps), and a flank guard was stationed near Pavia, with orders to keep on the right of the army as it advanced (this is the first and only hint of any intention to go westward) and to fall back fighting should Melas come on by the left bank. One division was to be always a day's march behind the army on the right bank, and a flotilla was to ascend the Po, to facilitate the speedy reinforcement of the flank guard. Farther to the north was a small column on the road Milan-Vercelli. All the protective troops, except the division of the main body detailed as an eventual support for the flank guard, was to be found by Moncey's corps (which had besides to watch the Austrians in the citadel of Milan) and Chabran's and Lechi's weak commands. On this same day Bonaparte tells the Minister of War, Carnot, that Moncey has only brought half the expected reinforcements and that half of these are unreliable. As to the result of the impending contest Napoleon counts greatly upon the union of 18,000 men under Masséna and Suchet to crush Melas against the "strategic barrage" of the Army of Reserve, by one or other bank of the Po, and he seems equally confident of the result in either case. If Genoa had held out three days more, he says, it would have been easy to count the number of Melas's men who escaped. The exact significance of this last notion is difficult to establish, and all that could be written about it would be merely conjectural. But it is interesting to note that, without admitting it, Napoleon felt that his "barrage" might not stand before the flood. The details of the orders of the 9th to the main body (written before the news of Montebello arrived at headquarters) tend to the closest possible concentration of the main body towards Casteggio, in view of a decisive battle on the 12th or 13th.

But another idea had begun to form itself in his mind. Still believing that Melas would attack him on

the Stradella side, and hastening his preparations to meet this, he began to allow for the contingency of Melas giving up or failing in his attempt to re-establish his communication with the Mantovese, and retiring on Genoa, which was now in his hands and could be provisioned and reinforced by sea. On the 10th Napoleon ordered reserve ammunition to be sent from Pavia, giving Serravalle, which is south of Novi, as its probable destination. But this was surmise, and of the facts he knew nothing. Would the enemy move east on the Stradella, north-east on the Ticino or south on Genoa? Such reports as were available indicated no important movements whatever, which happened to be true, but could hardly appear so to the French headquarters. On the 11th, though he thereby forfeited the reinforcements coming up from Duhesme's corps at Cremona, Napoleon ordered the main body to advance to the Scrivia. Lapoype's division (the right flank guard), which was observing the Austrian posts towards Casale, was called to the south bank of the Po, the zone around Milan was stripped so bare of troops that there was no escort for the prisoners taken at Montebello, while information sent by Chabran (now moving up from Ivrea) as to the construction of bridges at Casale (this was a feint made by Melas on the 10th) passed unheeded. The crisis was at hand, and, clutching at the reports collected by Lapoype as to the quietude of the Austrians toward Valenza and Casale, Bonaparte and Berthier strained every nerve to bring up more men to the Voghera side in the hope of preventing the prey from slipping away to Genoa.


On the 12th, consequently, the army (the *ordre de bataille* of which had been considerably modified on the 11th) moved to the Scrivia, Lannes halting at Castlenuevo, Desaix (who had just joined the army from Egypt) at Pontecurone, Victor at Tortona with Murat's



cavalry in front towards Alessandria. Lapoype's division, from the left bank of the Po, was marching in all haste to join Desaix. Moncey, Duhesme, Lechi and Chabran were absent. The latter represented almost exactly half of Berthier's command (30,000 out of 58,000), and even the concentration of 28,000 men on the Scrivia had only been obtained by practically giving up the "barrage" on the left bank of the Po. Even now the enemy showed nothing but a rearguard, and the old questions reappeared in a new and acute form. Was Melas still in Alessandria? Was he marching on Valenza and Casale to cross the Po? or to Acqui against Suchet, or to Genoa to base himself on the British fleet? As to the first, why had he given up his chances of fighting on one of the few cavalry battlegrounds in north Italy—the plain of Marengo—since he could not stay in Alessandria for any indefinite time? The second question had been answered in the negative by Lapoype, but his latest information was thirty-six hours old. As for the other questions, no answer whatever was forthcoming, and the only course open was to postpone decisive measures and to send forward the cavalry, supported by infantry, to gain information.

On the 13th, therefore, Murat, Lannes and Victor advanced into the plain of Marengo, traversed it without difficulty and carrying the villages held by the Austrian rearguard, established themselves for the night within a mile of the fortress. But meanwhile Napoleon, informed we may suppose of their progress, had taken a step that was fraught with the gravest consequences. He had, as we know, no intention of forcing on a decision until his reconnaissance produced the information on which to base it, and he had there-

fore kept back three divisions under Desaix at Pontecurone. But as the day wore on without incident, he began to fear that the reconnaissance would be profitless, and unwilling to give Melas any further start, he sent out these divisions right and left to find and to hold the enemy, whichever way the latter had gone. At noon Desaix with one division was despatched southward to Rivalta to head off Melas from Genoa and at 9 a.m. on the 14th,¹ Lapoype was sent back over the



Po to hold the Austrians should they be advancing from Valenza towards the Ticino. Thus there remained in hand only 21,000 men when at last, in the forenoon of the 14th the whole of Melas's army, more than 40,000 strong, moved out of Alessandria, not southward nor northward, but due west into the plain of Marengo.

The French army, in ignorance of its opponent's position, had advanced westward from the Scrivia towards Alessandria on the 12th, and its outposts had reached the Bormida on the evening of the 13th. But contact with the main Austrian army was not obtained, and on the assumption that it was moving towards either Valenza or Genoa Napoleon weakened his army by considerable detachments sent out right and left to find the enemy and to delay his progress. Unknown, however, to Napoleon Melas's army was still at Alessandria, and on the morning of the 14th of June it filed out of the fortress and began its advance into the great plain of Marengo, one of the few favourable cavalry battle-grounds in north Italy.

The dispersion of the French army allowed only a fragmentary, though most energetic, resistance to be offered to the Austrian onset. The latter, considerably delayed at first by the crossing of the river Bormida, broke up into two columns,² which advanced, the right by the main road on Marengo, the left on Castel Ceriolo. The former, personally

¹ On the strength of a report, false as it turned out, that the Austrian rearguard had broken the bridges of the Bormida.

² A third column was sent out to the extreme right (3000 under O'Reilly). This destroyed a small French detachment on the extreme left, but took little or no part in the main battle.

commanded by Melas, was 20,000 strong, and General Victor, its immediate opponent, about 10,000, or including some 5000 of Lannes' corps who fought on his right, about 15,000 strong; the Austrians were, moreover, greatly superior in guns and cavalry. The French disputed every yard of ground, holding their first line until they had by fire and counter-attack forced practically the whole of the Austrian right to deploy, and two hours passed before the Austrians managed to reach the Fontanone brook. But Victor's troops, being disorganized and short of ammunition, had then to retire more rapidly across the plain. The retreat was orderly, according to Victor's report, and made in echelon from the centre, and it is certain that at any rate the regiments held together, for the 6000 Austrian sabres found no opportunity to charge home. Many guns and wagons were however, abandoned.

On the French right, opposed to the column of Lieut.-Field-Marshal Ott, was Lannes, with some 4000 men (excluding Watrin's division which was with Victor) against 7500. He too was after a time forced to retire, with heavy losses. Thus, about 11 a.m. the First Consul, who was at some distance from the field, was at last convinced that he had to deal with Melas's army. At once he sent out his staff officers to bring back his detachments, and pushed forward his only reserve, Monnier's division, to support Lannes and Victor. But before this help arrived Lannes had been driven out of Castel Ceriolo, and Victor and Watrin forced back almost to San Giuliano. A little after 2 p.m. Monnier's division (3500) came into action, and its impetuous advance drove the Austrians out of Castel Ceriolo. But after an hour it was forced back in its turn, and by 3 p.m., therefore, the 20,000 French troops, disordered and exhausted, and in one line without reserves,¹ held a ragged line of battle to the right and left of San Giuliano. The best that could be expected was a prolongation of the struggle till nightfall and a fairly orderly retreat. The Austrian general, believing that the battle was won, returned to Alessandria, leaving a younger man, his chief of staff Zach, to organize the pursuit.

Then followed one of the most dramatic events in military history. Of the two detachments sent away by Napoleon in search of the enemy, one only received its orders of recall. This was Boudet's division of Desaix's corps, away to the south at Rivalta and at noon heading for Pozzolo-Formigaro on the Alessandria-Genoa road. At 1 p.m. a brief message, "Revenez, au nom de Dieu!" altered the direction of the column, and between 4 and 5, after a forced march, the division, headed by Desaix, came on to the battle-field. It was deployed as a unit and moved forward at the word of command along the main road Alessandria-Tortona, the sight of their closed line giving fresh courage to the men of Lannes and Victor. Then, while on the other side Zach was arraying a deep column of troops to pursue along the main road, Napoleon and Desaix, themselves under fire, hastily framed a plan of attack. All arms were combined. First, Marmont with eight of Boudet's guns and ten others (the rest had been abandoned in the retirement) came into action on the right of the road, replying to the fire of the Austrian guns and checking their advanced infantry: close in rear of the artillery was Desaix's infantry with the remnants of Lannes' and Victor's troops rallying on its right and left; on Lannes' right, still facing Ott's column, was Monnier, supported by the Consular Guard of horse and foot; lastly 400 sabres of Kellermann's cavalry brigade, which had already been engaged several times and had lost heavily, formed up on the right of Desaix. About 5 p.m. Desaix advanced against the head of the Austrian main column formed by Zach. He himself fell in the attack, but the onset of his intact troops drove back the leading Austrians upon their supports, and at the critical moment when the attack of Boudet's single weak division had almost spent its force, Kellermann with his 400 sabres sallied out of the French line. Marmont had brought up two guns to assist the infantry, and as he fired his last round of case-shot the cavalry raced past him to the front, wheeled inwards against the flank of the great column, and rode through and through it. Zach was taken prisoner with more than 2000 men, and Kellermann, rallying some of his troopers, flung himself upon the astonished Austrian cavalry and with the assistance of the Consular Guard cavalry defeated it. The "will to conquer" spread along the whole French line, while the surprise of the Austrians suddenly and strangely became mere panic. Lannes, Victor and Monnier advanced afresh, pushing the Austrians back on Marengo. A few Austrian battalions made a gallant stand at that place, while Melas himself, as night came on, rallied the fugitives beyond. Next day the completely exhausted, but victorious, French army extorted from the dazed Austrians a convention by which all Italy up to the Mincio was evacuated by them. The respective losses were: French about 4000, Austrians 9500.

One more blow, however, was required before the Second Coalition collapsed, and it was delivered by Moreau. We have seen that he had crossed the upper Rhine and defeated Kray at Stokach. This was followed by other partial victories, and Kray then retired to Ulm, where he reassembled his forces, hitherto scattered in a long weak line from the Neckar to Schaffhausen. Moreau continued his advance, extending his forces

¹ The Austrians, too, fighting in "linear" formation had few reserves. About one third only of the imperial forces in Italy was actually engaged in the battle.

up to and over the Danube below Ulm, and winning several combats, of which the most important was that of Höchstett, fought on the famous battlegrounds of 1703 and 1704, and memorable for the death of La Tour d'Auvergne, the "First Grenadier of France" (June 19). Finding himself in danger of envelopment, Kray now retired, swiftly and skilfully, across the front of the advancing French, and reached Ingolstadt in safety. Thence he retreated over the Inn, Moreau following him to the edge of that river, and an armistice put an end for the moment to further operations.

This not resulting in a treaty of peace, the war was resumed both in Italy and in Germany. The Army of Reserve and the Army of Italy, after being fused into one, under Masséna's command, were divided again into a fighting army under Brune, who opposed the Austrians (Bellegarde) on the Mincio, and a political army under Murat, which re-established French influence in the Peninsula. The former, extending on a wide front as usual, won a few strategical successes without tactical victory, the only incidents of which worth recording are the gallant fight of Dupont's division, which had become isolated during a manœuvre, at Pozzolo on the Mincio (December 25) and the descent of a corps under Macdonald from the Grisons by way of the Splügen, an achievement far surpassing Napoleon's and even Suvárov's exploits, in that it was made after the winter snows had set in.

In Germany the war for a moment reached the sublime. Kray had been displaced in command by the young archduke John, who ordered the denunciation of the armistice and a general advance. His plan, or that of his advisers, was to cross the lower Inn, out of reach of Moreau's principal mass, and then to swing round the French flank until a complete chain was drawn across their rear. But during the development of the manœuvre, Moreau also moved, and by rapid marching made good the time he had lost in concentrating his over-dispersed forces. The weather was appalling, snow and rain succeeding one another until the roads were almost impassable. On the 2nd of December the Austrians were brought to a standstill, but the inherent mobility of the Revolutionary armies enabled them to surmount all difficulties, and thanks to the respite afforded him by the archduke's halt, Moreau was able to see clearly into the enemy's plans and dispositions. On the 3rd of December, while the Austrians in many disconnected columns, were struggling through the dark and muddy forest paths about Hohenlinden, Moreau struck the decisive blow. While Ney and Grouchy held fast the head of the Austrian main column at Hohenlinden, Richepanse's corps was directed on its left flank. In the forest Richepanse unexpectedly met a subsidiary Austrian column which actually cut his column in two. But profiting by the momentary confusion he drew off that part of his forces which had passed beyond the point of contact and continued his march, striking the flank of the archduke's main column, most of which had not succeeded in deploying opposite Ney, at the village of Mattempost. First the baggage train and then the artillery park fell into his hands, and lastly he reached the rear of the troops engaged opposite Hohenlinden, whereupon the Austrian main body practically dissolved. The rear of Richepanse's corps, after disengaging itself from the Austrian column it had met in the earlier part of the day, arrived at Mattempost in time to head off thousands of fugitives who had escaped from the carnage at Hohenlinden. The other columns of the unfortunate army were first checked and then driven back by the French divisions they met, which, moving more swiftly and fighting better in the broken ground and the woods, were able to combine two brigades against one wherever a fight developed. On this disastrous day the Austrians lost 20,000 men, 12,000 of them being prisoners, and 90 guns.

Marengo and Hohenlinden decided the war of the Second Coalition as Rivoli had decided that of the First, and the Revolutionary Wars came to an end with the armistice of Steyer (December 25, 1800) and the treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801). But only the first act of the great drama was accomplished. After a short respite Europe entered upon the Napoleonic Wars.

CHAPTER IX

NAVAL OPERATIONS

THE naval side of the wars arising out of the French Revolution was marked by unity and even by simplicity. France had but one serious enemy, Great Britain, and Great Britain had but one purpose, to beat down France. Other states were drawn into the strife, but it was as the allies, the enemies and at times the victims, of the two dominating powers. The field of battle was the whole expanse of the ocean and the landlocked seas. The weapons, the methods and the results were the same. When a general survey of the whole struggle is taken, its unity is manifest. The Revolution produced a profound alteration in the government of France, but none in the final purposes of its policy. To secure for France its so-called "natural limits"—the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees and the ocean; to protect both flanks by reducing Holland on the north and Spain on the south to submis-

sion; to confirm the mighty power thus constituted, by the subjugation of Great Britain, were the objects of the Republic and of Napoleon, as they had been of Louis XIV. The naval war, like the war on land, is here considered in the first of its two phases—the Revolutionary (1792-99).

The Revolutionary war began in April 1792. In the September of that year Admiral Truguet sailed from Toulon to co-operate with the French troops operating against the Austrians and their allies in northern Italy. In December Latouche Tréville was sent with another squadron to cow the Bourbon rulers of Naples. The extreme feebleness of their opponents alone saved the French from disaster. Mutinies, which began within ten days of the storming of the Bastille (14th of July 1789), had disorganized their navy and the effects of these disorders continued to be felt so long as the war lasted. In February 1793 war broke out with Great Britain and Holland. In March Spain was added to the list of the powers against which France declared war. Her resources at sea were wholly inadequate to meet the coalition she had provoked. The Convention did indeed order that fifty-two ships of the line should be commissioned in the Channel, but it was not able in fact to do more than send out a few diminutive and ill-appointed squadrons, manned by mutinous crews, which kept close to the coast. The British navy was in excellent order, but the many calls made on it for the protection of world-wide commerce and colonial possessions caused the operations in the Channel to be somewhat languid. Lord Howe cruised in search of the enemy without being able to bring them to action. The severe blockade which in the later stages of the war kept the British fleet permanently outside of Brest was not enforced in the earlier stages. Lord Howe preferred to save his fleet from the wear and tear of perpetual cruising by maintaining his headquarters at St Helens, and keeping watch on the French ports by frigates. The French thus secured a freedom of movement which in the course of 1794 enabled them to cover the arrival of a great convoy laden with food from America, though at the cost of six battleships captured by Lord Howe and one sunk. Its internal defects compelled the French fleet in the Channel to play a very poor part till the last days of 1796. Squadrons were indeed sent a short way to sea, but their inefficiency was conspicuously displayed when, on the 17th of June 1795, a much superior number of their line of battle ships failed to do any harm to the small force of Cornwallis, and when on the 22nd of the same month they fled in disorder before Lord Bridport at the Isle de Groix.

Operations of a more decisive character had in the meantime taken place both in the Mediterranean and in the West Indies. In April 1793 the first detachment of a British fleet, which was finally raised to a strength of 21 sail of the line, under the command of Lord Hood, sailed for the Mediterranean. By August the admiral was off Toulon, acting in combination with a Spanish naval force. France was torn by the contentions of Jacobins and Girondins, and its dissensions led to the surrender of the great arsenal to the British admiral and his Spanish colleague Don Juan de Langara, on the 27th of August. The allies were joined later by a contingent from Naples. But the military forces were insufficient to hold the land defences against the army collected to expel them. High ground commanding the anchorage was occupied by the besieging force, and on the 18th of December 1793 the allies retired. They carried away or destroyed thirty-three French vessels, of which thirteen were of the line. But partly through the inefficiency and partly through the ill-will of the Spaniards, who were indisposed to cripple the French, whom they considered as their only possible allies against Great Britain, the destruction was not so complete as had been intended. Twenty-five ships, of which eighteen were of the line, were left to serve as the nucleus of an active fleet in later years. Fourteen thousand of the inhabitants fled with the allies to escape the vengeance of the victorious Jacobins. Their sufferings, and the ferocious massacre perpetrated on those who remained behind by the conquerors, form one of the blackest pages of the French Revolution. The Spanish fleet took no further part in the war. Lord Hood now turned to the occupation of Corsica, where the intervention of the British fleet was invited by the patriotic party headed by Pascual Paoli. The French ships left at Toulon were refitted and came to sea in the spring of 1794, but Admiral Martin who commanded them did not feel justified in giving battle, and his sorties were mere demonstrations. From the 25th of January 1794 till November 1796 the British fleet in the Mediterranean was mainly occupied in and about Corsica, securing the island, watching Toulon and co-operating with the allied Austrians and Piedmontese in northern Italy. It did much to hamper the coastwise communications of the French. But neither Lord Hood, who went home at the end of 1794, nor his indolent successor Hotham, was able to deliver an effective blow at the Toulon squadron. The second of these officers fought two confused actions with Admiral Martin in the Gulf of Lyons on the 16th of March and the 12th of July 1795, but though three French ships were cut off and captured, the baffling winds and the placid disposition of Hotham united to prevent decisive results. A new spirit was introduced into the command of the British fleet when Sir John Jervis, afterwards Earl Saint Vincent, succeeded Hotham in November 1795.

Jervis came to the Mediterranean with a high reputation, which had been much enhanced by his recent command in the West Indies. In every war with France it was the natural

policy of the British government to seize on its enemy's colonial possessions, not only because of their intrinsic value, but because they were the headquarters of active privateers. The occupation of the little fishing stations of St Pierre and Miquelon (14th May 1793) and of Pondicherry in the East Indies (23rd Aug. 1793) were almost formal measures taken at the beginning of every war. But the French West Indian islands possessed intrinsic strength which rendered their occupation a service of difficulty and hazard. In 1793 they were torn by dissensions, the result of the revolution in the mother country. Tobago was occupied in April, and the French part of the great island of San Domingo was partially thrown into British hands by the Creoles, who were threatened by their insurgent slaves. During 1794 a lively series of operations, in which there were some-marked alterations of fortune, took place in and about Martinique and Guadaloupe. The British squadron, and the contingent of troops it carried, after a first repulse, occupied them both in March and April, together with Santa Lucia. A vigorous counter-attack was carried out by the Terrorist Victor Hugues with ability and ferocity. Guadaloupe and Santa Lucia were recovered in August. Yet on the whole the British government was successful in its policy of destroying the French naval power in distant seas. The seaborne commerce of the Republic was destroyed.

The naval supremacy of Great Britain was limited, and was for a time menaced, in consequence of the advance of the French armies on land. The invasion of Holland in 1794 led to the downfall of the house of Orange, and the establishment of the Batavian Republic. War with Great Britain under French dictation followed in January 1795. In that year a British expedition under the command of Admiral Keith Elphinstone (afterwards Lord Keith) occupied the Dutch colony at the Cape (August-September) and their trading station in Malacca. The British colonial empire was again extended, and the command of the sea by its fleet confirmed. But the necessity to maintain a blockading force in the German Ocean imposed a fresh strain on its naval resources, and the hostility of Holland closed a most important route to British commerce in Europe. In 1795 Spain made peace with France at Basel, and in September 1796 re-entered the war as her ally. The Spanish navy was most inefficient, but it required to be watched and therefore increased the heavy strain on the British fleet. At the same time the rapid advance of the French arms in Italy began to close the ports of the peninsula to Great Britain. Its ships were for a time withdrawn from the Mediterranean. Poor as it was in quality, the Spanish fleet was numerous. It was able to facilitate the movements of French squadrons sent to harass British commerce in the Atlantic, and a concentration of forces became necessary.

It was the more important because the cherished French scheme for an attack on the heart of the British empire began to take shape. While Spain occupied one part of the British fleet to the south, and Holland another in the north, a French expedition, which was to have been aided by a Dutch expedition from the Texel, was prepared at Brest. The Dutch were confined to harbour by the vigilant blockade of Admiral Duncan, afterwards Lord Camperdown. But in December 1796 a French fleet commanded by Admiral Morard de Galle, carrying 13,000 troops under General Hoche, was allowed to sail from Brest for Ireland, by the slack management of the blockade under Admiral Colpoys. Being ill-fitted, ill-manned and exposed to constant bad weather the French ships were scattered. Some reached their destination, Bantry Bay, only to be driven out again by north-easterly gales. The expedition finally returned after much suffering, and in fragments, to Brest. Yet the year 1797 was one of extreme trial to Great Britain.

In the course of 1796 the Spanish government had made the disastrous alliance with the French republic, which reduced its country to the level of a pawn in the game against England. The Spanish fleet, which was in a complete state of neglect, was forced to sea. It consisted of 27 sail of the line under the command of Don José de Córdoba—fine ships, but manned in haste by drafts of soldiers, and of landsmen forced on board by the press. Even the flagships had only about eighty sailors each in their crews. Don José de Córdoba, who had gone out with no definite plan, was in reality drifting about with his unmanageable ships in two confused divisions separated from one another, in light winds from the W. and W.S.W., at a distance of from 25 to 30 m. S.W. of the Cape. While in this position he was sighted by Sir John Jervis, of whose nearness to himself he was ignorant, and who had sailed from Lisbon to attack him with only 15 sail of the line. Jervis knew the inefficient condition of the Spaniards, and was aware that the general condition of the war called for vigorous exertions. He did not hesitate to give battle in spite of the numerical superiority of his opponent. Six of the Spanish ships were to the south of him, separated by a long interval from the others which were to the south-west. The British squadron was formed into a single line ahead, and was steered to pass between the two divisions of the Spaniards. The six vessels were thus cut off. A feeble attempt was made by them to molest the British, but being now to leeward as Jervis passed to the west of them, and being unable to face the rapid and well directed fire to which they were exposed, they sheered off. One only ran down the British line, and passing to the stern of the last ship succeeded in joining the bulk of her fleet to windward. As the British line passed through the gap between the Spanish divisions the ships were tacked in succes-

sion to meet the windward portion of the enemy. If this movement had been carried out fully, all the British ships would have gone through the gap and the Spaniards to windward would have been able to steer unimpeded to the north, and perhaps to avoid being brought to a close general action. Their chance of escape was baffled by the independence and promptitude of Nelson. His ship, the "Captain" (74), was the third from the end of the British line. Without waiting for orders he made a sweep to the west, threw himself across the bows of the Spaniards. His movement was seen and approved by Jervis, who then ordered the other ships in his rear to follow Nelson's example. The British force was thrown bodily on the enemy. As the Spanish crews were too utterly unpractised to handle their ships, and could not carry out the orders of their officers which they did not understand, their ships were soon driven into a herd, and fell on board of one another. Their incompetence as gunners enabled the "Captain" to assail their flagship, the huge "Santisima Trinidad" (130), with comparative impunity. The "San Josef" (112), and the "San Nicolas" (80), which fell aboard of one another, were both carried by boarding by the "Captain." Four Spanish ships, the "Salvador del Mundo" and "San Josef" (112), the "San Nicolas" (80), and the "San Isidro" (74), were taken. The "Santisima Trinidad" is said to have struck, but she was not taken possession of. By about half-past three the Spaniards were fairly beaten. More prizes might have been taken, but Sir John Jervis put a stop to the action to secure the four which had surrendered. The Spaniards were allowed to retreat to Cadiz. Sir John Jervis was made Earl St Vincent for his victory. The battle, which revealed the worthlessness of the Spanish navy, relieved the British government from a load of anxiety, and may be said to have marked the complete predominance of its fleet on the sea.

In the autumn of the year the Dutch, having put to sea, were defeated at Camperdown by Admiral Duncan on the 11th of October. Admiral Duncan had the more numerous force, sixteen ships to fifteen, and they were on the average heavier. Attacking from windward he broke through the enemy's line and concentrated on his rear and centre. Eight line of battleships and two frigates were taken, but the good gunnery and steady resistance of the Dutch made the victory costly. Between these two battles the British fleet was for a time menaced in its very existence by a succession of mutinies, the result of much neglect of the undoubted grievances of the sailors. The victory of Camperdown, completing what the victory of Cape Saint Vincent had begun, seemed to put Great Britain beyond fear of invasion. But the government of the Republic was intent on renewing the attempt. The successes of Napoleon at the head of the army of Italy had reduced Austria to sign the peace of Campo Formio, on the 17th of October 1797. It left France without an opponent in arms on the continent. War with Great Britain still continued, and for a time the Directory appeared to be intent on its schemes for an invasion of Ireland. Napoleon, fresh from his Italian victories, was appointed to command, and he made a round of inspection of Brest and the Channel ports. But all this show of activity was designed to cover the preparations for an attack on Great Britain "from behind"—in India and by way of Egypt. The French naval forces at Toulon were got ready slowly in spite of Napoleon's urging and with the defects inevitable in the impoverished state of the arsenal. Thirty-six thousand soldiers, including the best of the army of Italy, were to be embarked from the southern French ports, from Italy and from Corsica. Information that a great offensive movement was about to be made by the French reached both Earl St Vincent, the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, and the British government. Since Spain had entered into alliances with France in 1796, the British fleet had not cruised in the Mediterranean but had been occupied in blocking the Spanish ships at Cadiz. On the 2nd of May 1798 St Vincent detached Nelson, then the junior rear-admiral, with his flag into the Mediterranean, with three sail of the line and frigates to make a reconnaissance at Toulon. On the 17th of May a small French corvette was captured near Cape Sicié, and from the crew Nelson learnt that the French were still in the harbour. He could gain no information as to the aim of the armament. Napoleon enforced strict secrecy by not letting even the most important officers of the dockyard know whither he was bound. On the 2nd of May the British government had written to St Vincent stating their wish that a part of his fleet should be sent into the Mediterranean. The first lord of the admiralty, Lord Spencer, told him that he might either go himself or send a subordinate. If the latter course was followed Nelson was indicated as the officer to be chosen. Reinforcements were sent to him to enable him to provide both for the cruise in the Mediterranean and for the blockade of Cadiz. St Vincent had already selected Nelson, and when the reinforcements arrived he despatched Captain Troubridge with the inshore squadron engaged in watching Cadiz—"the choice fellows," as he described them, of his fleet—to join Nelson at Toulon. The ships were replaced by others similarly painted, so that the Spaniards might see no difference and therefore be unable to send news to their ally. Troubridge left on the 24th of May with as many vessels as would bring Nelson's whole command up to thirteen 74's and one 50-gun ship.

While these measures were being taken to intercept him, Napoleon had put to sea on the 19th of May with fifteen sail of the line, twelve frigates and some two hundred

transports. He sailed down the eastern side of Corsica and Sardinia to pick up the detachments which were to join him from the first-named island and from Civita Vecchia. On the evening of the 20th a gale from the N.W. brought some confusion on his flock of ships, but it also drove Nelson to the S.W. His flagship the "Vanguard" (74) was dismasted and compelled to anchor at San Pietro to refit. His frigates were separated from him by the weather, and the captains made for Gibraltar, concluding that the admiral would go there to refit. The departure of his frigates left Nelson without vessels for scouting and had a material influence on the campaign. The "Vanguard" was made ready by the 27th of May, and resumed her station off Toulon. On the 7th of June Nelson was joined by Troubridge. Calms hampered his pursuit of the French, whom he now knew to be at sea, but on the 14th he was off Civita Vecchia; on the 17th he was at Naples, where he heard that the French had been seen going south, and made arrangements to obtain water and stores in the Neapolitan ports. On the 20th he was at Messina, where he first got definite information of the movements of the enemy. The French had appeared off Malta on the 9th and had occupied the island, which was surrendered to them on the 12th by the treachery of the French and Italian members of the order. Pushing on in the hope of finding them on the coast of the island, Nelson was off Cape Passaro on the 22nd, and there learnt that the French had sailed from the island. His instructions directed him to guard against possible French attacks on Sicily, or even an attempt to pass the Straits of Gibraltar and sail for Ireland. But Nelson knew that the Neapolitan government had no fears for Sicily and that the westerly winds would prevent the French from going to Gibraltar. On a view of all the circumstances, and after consultation with those of his captains in whose judgment he had the most confidence, he came to the just conclusion that they were bound for Egypt. He therefore sailed for Alexandria on the most direct route eastward along the coast of Africa. The information given him at Cape Passaro was that the French had left Malta on the 16th; the actual date was the 19th. Napoleon, whose frigates had sighted the British squadron, and who knew that he might be pursued, did not take the direct route, but steered to the north-east along the south shore of Crete. Thus it happened that on the night of the 22nd of June the fleets crossed one another's tracks. Want of look-out vessels prevented Nelson from detecting the neighbourhood of his enemy. The French with their convoy going more slowly on the longer route to the north, and the active British squadron on the direct route to the south, both headed for Egypt, with barely 60 m. of sea between them, but neither aware of the position of the other.

On the 28th of June Nelson reached Alexandria to find the port occupied only by a few Turkish ships. It was from Nelson that the Turkish authorities gained their first knowledge of the impending invasion. Nelson, misled by the false date given him at Cape Passaro, and being unable to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, came to the erroneous conclusion that he was mistaken in supposing that the French were on the way to Egypt, and that they must be bound for some other part of the eastern Mediterranean. On the 29th of June he sailed from Alexandria, standing to the north-east. His topsails were still in sight to the north-east when the French appeared coming from the north-west. They sighted the coast on the 29th to the west of Alexandria, and on the 1st of July they occupied the anchorage and town. While Nelson was ranging along the coast of Asia Minor, seeking for news of them and finding none, on his way back to Sicily, the French were landing their army. The British squadron reached Syracuse on the 19th of July. Here Nelson was able to obtain water and stores and clear indications that the French had gone to Egypt. On the 24th he sailed, and on the 1st of August was again off Alexandria. The battle of the Pyramids had been fought on the 21st, and Napoleon was master of Egypt. The fear of the British admiral was that the French fleet had left the coast in the interval of his absence. Brueys, the French admiral, had had a choice of three courses open to him—to enter the old harbour of Alexandria, to sail for Corfu then occupied by the French or to take a strong anchorage on the coast and prepare to repel attack. To enter the harbour was difficult for large ships and to leave it by its one narrow entrance in the presence of even an inferior force would have been impossible. Brueys therefore decided against that course. He did not sail for Corfu, partly because some of the army stores were still in his ships and partly because his squadron, ill fitted from the first, was short of provisions, and no more could as yet be obtained from the shore. He therefore stationed himself with thirteen of his ships of the line in the roadstead of Aboukir, some 15 m. north-east of Alexandria, between the island of Aboukir and the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. Here he was found on the evening of the 1st of August when the British fleet came in sight. The French line of thirteen ships was anchored to the east of Aboukir, now called Nelson's Island, in a curve stretching to the south-east. It consisted of the "Guerrier" (74), the "Conquérant" (74), the "Spartiate" (74), the "Aquila" (74), "Souverain Peuple" (74), "Franklin" (80), "Orient" (120), Admiral Bruey's flagship "Tonnant" (80), "Heureux" (74), "Timoléon" (74), "Guillaume Tell" (80), "Mercure" (74) and "Généreux" (74), counting from the west end. The French ships had begun the voyage short-handed and many men were absent on shore filling the water-casks. They fought with a half to two-thirds of their complements,

which suffered from the bad training and inexperience of the French republican navy. A council of flag officers and captains was being held in the "Orient" when the British squadron appeared.

When the enemy was sighted Nelson at once gave the order to attack. All the possibilities of battle had been fully discussed between him and his captains. Much controversy of a rather idle character has taken place as to assigning the credit for the actual course adopted; it was almost dictated to men so experienced and capable as the British captains and their admiral by the position of the enemy. If the French had been anchored so near the shore that it was not possible to pass between them and it, the British ships coming from the west with a westerly wind, would have passed outside of them, endeavouring to anchor one on the bow and the next on the quarter of each French ship in succession. Those in the van might have been crushed before the ships in the rear and to leeward could come to their assistance. As it was, the French were so placed that there was room for the British ships to pass between them and the land. Therefore it was possible for the first comers of the British squadron to pass inside the French ships, to anchor there, and to allow the next comers to anchor outside so as to put the enemy's van between two fires. This disposition was not without its drawbacks, for it entailed the risk that the British ships might fire into one another while directing their guns on an object between them. The risk was the greater because the battle began at sundown and was continued in the dark. Yet it had the advantage that it produced an intense concentration of fire. In the circumstances it had the peculiar advantage, of which, however, the British captains may not have been aware, that as the French were very short-handed they were unable to work both broadsides to the full. It is to this fact that we must attribute the comparatively small loss suffered by the British ships in an attack which, if made against a well-appointed enemy, must have been extremely costly. Whether by previous arrangement with Nelson, or because he acted on the facts before him, the first British captain to come into action, Captain Foley of the "Goliath" (74), passed inside the French, and anchored abreast of the second of them, the "Conquérant." The "Zealous" (74), under Captain Hood, anchored on the bow of the first Frenchman, the "Guerrier." The "Audacious" (74), under Captain Davidge Gould, anchored between the "Zealous" and "Goliath." The "Theseus" (74), under Captain Miller, anchored inside of the third French ship, the "Spartiate." The "Orion" (74), under Captain Saumarez, anchored abreast of the fifth French vessel, the "Souverain Peuple." Then Nelson, in his flagship the "Vanguard" (74), the sixth British ship to come into action, anchored on the outside of the French line abreast of the "Spartiate" already engaged with the "Theseus." The "Minotaur" (74), under Captain Thomas Louis, and the "Defence" (74), under Captain Peyton, anchored next to the "Vanguard" and opposite the fourth French ship, and "Aquilon," and the "Souverain Peuple," already engaged with the "Orion." Thus eight British 74's which had only to fight one broadside at a time were thrown on five undermanned French 74's, which had to fight both and were speedily crushed. One British vessel, the "Culloden" (74) under Captain Troubridge, grounded on the shoal at Aboukir, and could not get into action. She served as a beacon to the vessels coming behind her. As the French van was silenced, and the fresh vessels came up from the British rear, the attack was carried down the French line. About 9.30 p.m. the "Orient" was seen to be in flames, and at 10 p.m. she blew up. The explosion imposed a brief suspension of battle, but the fire was soon renewed. By midnight the battle was over. In the course of the next day the "Guillaume Tell," the "Généreux" and two frigates succeeded in escaping, but they were the only survivors of the fleet attacked in the roadstead of Aboukir.

The destruction of the French fleet, which isolated Napoleon in Egypt, had profound political influence in Europe. The total loss of the British squadron was 218 killed and 678 wounded. The loss of the French was never exactly ascertained, but it was certainly very much greater. Admiral Brueys was killed on the quarter-deck of his flagship, and Nelson received a wound in the head from a langridge shot which disabled him.

The British fleet re-entered the Mediterranean to pursue and baffle Napoleon. The destruction of the French squadron at the anchorage of Aboukir on the 1st of August gave it the complete command of the sea. A second invasion of Ireland on a smaller scale was attempted and to some extent carried out, while the great attack by Egypt was in progress. One French squadron of four frigates, carrying 1150 soldiers under General Humbert succeeded in sailing from Rochefort on the 6th of August. On the 22nd Humbert was lanced at Killala Bay, but after making a vigorous raid he was compelled to surrender at Ballinamuck on the 8th of September. Eight days after his surrender, another French squadron of one sail of the line and eight frigates carrying 3000 troops, sailed from Brest under Commodore Bompert to support Humbert. It was watched and pursued by frigates, and on the 12th of October was overtaken and destroyed by a superior British force commanded by Sir John Borlase Warren, near Tory Island.

From the close of 1798 till the *coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire (9th November) 1799, which established Napoleon as First Consul and master of France, the French navy had only one object—to reinforce and relieve the army cut off in Egypt by the battle of the

Nile. The relief of the French garrison in Malta was a subordinate part of the main purpose. But the supremacy of the British navy was by this time so firmly founded that neither Egypt nor Malta could be reached except by small ships which ran the blockade. On the 25th of April, Admiral Bruix did indeed leave Brest, after baffling the blockading fleet of Lord Bridport, which was sent on a wild-goose chase to the south of Ireland by means of a despatch sent out to be captured and to deceive. Admiral Bruix succeeded in reaching Toulon, and his presence in the Mediterranean caused some disturbance. But, though his twenty-five sail of the line formed the best-manned fleet which the French had sent to sea during the war, and though he escaped being brought to battle, he did not venture to steer for the eastern Mediterranean. On the 13th of August he was back at Brest, bringing with him a Spanish squadron carried off as a hostage for the fidelity of the government at Madrid to its disastrous alliance with France. On the day on which Bruix re-entered Brest, the 13th of August 1799, a combined Russian and British expedition sailed from the Downs to attack the French army of occupation in the Batavian Republic. The military operations were unsuccessful, and terminated in the withdrawal of the allies. But the naval part was well executed. Vice-admiral Mitchell forced the entrance to the Texel, and on the 30th of August received the surrender of the remainder of the Dutch fleet—thirteen vessels in the Nieuwe Diep—the sailors having refused to fight for the republic. In spite of the failure on land, the expedition did much to confirm the naval supremacy of Great Britain by the entire suppression of the most seamanlike of the forces opposed to it.

NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS

THE era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars falls into two main divisions, the first of which (1792-1801) has been dealt with under the heading FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS. In the present section are described the campaigns in central and eastern Europe, directed by Napoleon—no longer one amongst many French generals, nor even a simple *primus inter pares*, but “Emperor” in the fullest sense—between the years 1805 and 1814. Napoleon’s short Spanish Campaign of 1809 is dealt with under PENINSULAR WAR, and the final drama of Waterloo in WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

The Military Character of Napoleon.—No military career has been examined more often and more freely than that of Napoleon. Yet even so the want of complete documentary evidence upon which to base conclusions has vitiated all but the most recent of the countless monographs and histories that have appeared on the subject. Fortunately the industry and ability of the military history section of the French General Staff have rendered available, by the publication of the original orders issued during the course of his campaigns, a mass of information which, taken in conjunction with his own voluminous correspondence, renders it possible to trace the growth of his military genius with a reasonable approach to accuracy. Formerly we could only watch the evolution of his powers of organization and the purely psychic gifts of resolution and command. The actual working of his mind towards that strategic and tactical ascendancy that rendered his presence on the battlefield, according to the testimony of his opponents, equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men was entirely undiscernible.

The history of his youth reveals no special predilection for the military service—the bent of his mind was political far more than military, but unlike the politicians of his epoch he consistently applied scientific and mathematical methods to his theories, and desired above all things a knowledge of facts in their true relation to one another. His early military education was the best and most practical then attainable, primarily because he had the good fortune to come under the influence of men of exceptional ability—Baron du Keile, Bois Roger and others. From them he derived a sound knowledge of artillery and fortification, and particularly of mountain warfare, which latter was destined to prove of inestimable service to him in his first campaigns of 1794-95 and 1796. In these, as well as in his most dramatic success of Marengo in 1800, we can discern no trace of strategic innovation. He was simply a master of the methods of his time. Ceaseless industry, energy and conspicuous personal gallantry were the principal factors of his brilliant victories, and even in 1805 at Ulm and Austerlitz it was still the excellence of the tactical instrument, the army, which the Revolution had bequeathed to him that essentially produced the results.

Meanwhile the mathematical mind, with its craving for accurate data on which to found its plans (the most difficult of all to obtain under the conditions of warfare), had been searching for expedients which might serve him to better purpose, and in 1805 he had recourse to the cavalry screen in the hope of such results. This proved a palliation of his difficulty, but not a solution. Cavalry can only observe, it cannot hold. The facts as to the position of an opponent accurately observed and correctly reported at a given moment, afford no reliable guarantee of his position 48 hours later, when the orders based on this information entered upon execution. This can only be calculated on the ground of reasonable probability as to what it may be to the best interest of the adversary to attempt. But what may seem to a Napoleon

the best course is not necessarily the one that suggests itself to a mediocre mind, and the greater the gulf which separates the two minds the greater the uncertainty which must prevail on the side of the abler commander.

It was in 1806 that an improved solution was first devised. The general advanced guard of all arms now followed immediately behind the cavalry screen and held the enemy in position, while the remainder of the army followed at a day's march in a "bataillon carrée" ready to manœuvre in any required direction. The full reach of this discovery seems as yet scarcely to have impressed itself upon the emperor with complete conviction, for in the succeeding campaign in Poland we find that he twice departed from this form—at Pultusk and Heilsberg—and each time his enemy succeeded in escaping him. At Friedland, however, his success was complete, and henceforth the method recurs on practically every battlefield. When it fails it is because its inventor himself hesitates to push his own conception to its full development (Eckmühl 1809, Borodino 1812). Yet it would seem that this invention of Napoleon's was intuitive rather than reasoned; he never communicated it in its entirety to his marshals, and seems to have been only capable of exercising it either when in full possession of his health or under the excitement of action. Thus we find him after the battle of Dresden—itsself a splendid example of its efficacy—suddenly reverting to the terminology of the school in which he had been brought up, which he himself had destroyed, only to revive again in the next few days and handle his forces strategically with all his accustomed brilliancy.

In 1814 and in 1815 in the presence of the enemy he again rises supremely to each occasion, only to lapse in the intervals even below the level of his old opponents; and that this was not the consequence of temporary depression naturally resulting from the accumulated load of his misfortunes, is sufficiently shown by the downright puerility of the arguments by which he seeks to justify his own successes in the St Helena memoirs, which one may search in vain for any indication that Napoleon was himself aware of the magnitude of his own discovery. One is forced to the conclusion that there existed in Napoleon's brain a dual capacity—one the normal and reasoning one, developing only the ideas and conceptions of his contemporaries, the other intuitive, and capable only of work under abnormal pressure. At such moments of crisis it almost excelled human comprehension; the mind seems to have gathered to itself and summed up the balance of all human passions arranged for and against him, and to have calculated with unerring exactitude the consequences of each decision.

A partial explanation of this phenomenon may perhaps be found in the economy of nervous energy his strategical method ensured to him. Marching always ready to fight wherever his enemy might stand or move to meet him, his mind was relieved from all the hesitations which necessarily arise in men less confident in the security of their designs. Hence, when on the battlefield the changing course of events left his antagonists mentally exhausted, he was able to face them with will power neither bound nor broken. But this only explains a portion of the mystery that surrounds him, and which will make the study of his career the most fascinating to the military student of all times.

Amongst all the great captains of history Cromwell alone can be compared to him. Both, in their powers of organization and the mastery of the tactical potentialities of the weapons of their day, were immeasurably ahead of their times, and both also understood to the full the strategic art of binding and restraining the independent will power of their opponents, an art of which Marlborough and Frederick, Wellington, Lee and Moltke do not seem ever even to have grasped the fringe.

CHAPTER I

THE AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1805

The Campaign of 1805 may be regarded as a measure of self-defence forced upon Napoleon by the alliance of Russia (April 11th), Austria (August 9th) and other powers with Great Britain. The possibility had long been before the emperor, and his intention in that event to march straight on Vienna by the valley of the Danube is clearly indicated in his reply (November 27th, 1803) to a Prussian proposal for the neutralization of the South German states. In this he says, "It is on the road from Strassburg to Vienna that the French must force peace on Austria, and it is this road which you wish us to renounce." When, therefore, on the 25th of August 1805, he learnt definitely that Villeneuve had failed in his purpose of securing the command of the Channel, which was the necessary preliminary to the invasion of England, it was but the affair of a few hours to dictate the dispositions necessary to transfer his whole army to the Rhine frontier as the first step in his march to the Danube. On this date the army actually lay in the following positions:—

I.	Corps Bernadotte	Hanover (Göttingen)
II.	" Marmont	Holland
III.	" Davout	} Camp of Boulogne and other points on the English Channel
IV.	" Soult	
V.	" Lannes	
VI.	" Ney	
VII.	" Augereau	} Paris.
Guard	Bessières	

The corps were, however, by no means fit for immediate service. Bernadotte's corps in Hanover was almost in the position of a beleaguered garrison, and the marshal could only obtain his transport by giving out that he was ordered to withdraw to France. Marmont and Davout were deficient in horses for cavalry and artillery, and the troops in Boulogne, having been drawn together for the invasion of England, had hardly any transport at all, as it was considered this want could be readily supplied on landing. The composition of the army, however, was excellent. The generals were in the prime of life, had not yet learnt to distrust one another, and were accustomed to work under the emperor and with one another. The regimental officers had all acquired their rank before the enemy and knew how to manage their men, and of the men themselves nearly two-thirds had seen active service. The strength of the army lay in its infantry, for both cavalry and artillery were short of horses, and the latter had not yet acquired mobility and skill in manœuvring. Napoleon's determination to undertake the invasion of England has often been disputed, but it is hard to imagine what other operation he contemplated, for the outbreak of hostilities with his continental enemies found him ill-supplied with intelligence as to the resources of the country he had then to traverse. To remedy this, Murat and other general officers as well as minor agents were sent ahead and instructed to travel through South Germany in plain clothes with a view to collecting information and mastering the topography. The emperor was, moreover, imperfectly acquainted with the degree of preparation of his adversaries' designs, and when he dictated his preliminary orders he was still unaware of the direction that the allies' advance would assume. That he foresaw the march of events which ultimately drew Mack to Ulm is inconceivable. On the 26th of August, however, he learnt that 100,000 Russians were about to enter Bohemia thence to unite with an Austrian army of 80,000 near the junction of the Inn and Danube, and this information compelled him to alter the general direction of his advance so as to traverse the defiles of the Black Forest north of the Neckar, cavalry only observing the passes to the south.

Austrian Army.—The Austrians after the defeats of 1800 had endeavoured to reorganize their forces on the French model, but they were soon to learn that in matters of organization the spirit is everything, the letter very little. They had copied the organization of the French corps, but could find no corps commanders fit to assume the responsibility for these commands. As always in such conditions, the actual control of the smallest movements was still centralized in the hands of the army commanders, and thus the rate of marching was incredibly slow. They had decided that in future their troops in the field should live by requisition, and had handed over to the artillery, which needed them badly, a large number of horses thus set free from the transport service, but they had not realized that men accustomed to a regular distribution of rations cannot be transformed into successful marauders and pillagers by a stroke of the pen; and they had sent away the bulk of their army, 120,000 under their best general, the archduke Charles, into Italy, leaving Lieut. Field Marshal Mack von Leiberich in Germany, nominally as chief of the staff to the young prince Ferdinand, but virtually in command, to meet the onset of Napoleon at the head of his veterans. Mack was a man of unusual attainments. He had risen from the ranks in the most caste-ridden army in Europe, and against untold opposition had carried through army reforms which were correct in principle, and needed only time to develop. It was his fate to be made the scapegoat for the disasters which followed, though they need no further explanation than that, at the head of 80,000 men and exercising only restricted powers of command, he was pitted against the greatest strategist of all ages who was responsible to no overlord and commanded, in the fullest sense of the term, an army considerably more than twice as strong.

The March on Ulm.—The outbreak of the campaign was hastened by the desire of the Austrian government to feed their own army and leave a bare country for Napoleon by securing the resources of Bavaria. It was also hoped that the Bavarians with their army of 25,000 men would join the allies. In the latter hope they were deceived, and the Bavarians under General Wrede slipped away to Bamberg in time. In the former, however, they were successful, and the destitution they left in their wake almost wrecked Napoleon's subsequent combinations. Mack's march to Ulm was therefore a necessity of the situation, and his continuance in this exposed position, if foolhardy against such an adversary, was at any rate the outcome of the high resolve that even if beaten he would inflict crippling losses upon the enemy. Mack knew that the Russians would be late at the rendezvous on the Inn. By constructing an entrenched camp at Ulm and concen-

trating all the available food within it, he expected to compel Napoleon to invest and besiege him, and he anticipated that in the devastated country his adversary would be compelled to separate and thus fall an easy prey to the Russians. For that blow he had determined to make his own army the anvil. But these views obviously could not be published in army orders, hence the discontent and opposition he was destined to encounter.

Movements of the French.—It was on the 21st that Napoleon learnt of Mack's presence in Ulm. On that date his army had crossed the Rhine and was entering the defiles of the Black Forest. It was already beginning to suffer. Boots were worn out, greatcoats deficient, transport almost unattainable and, according to modern ideas, the army would have been considered incapable of action.

	Sept. 28.	Oct. 6.	Oct. 9.	Oct. 16.
Bernadotte.	Würzburg	Anspach	Nürnberg	Regensburg
Marmont	Würzburg	Anspach	Nürnberg	Regensburg
Davout	Mannheim	Mergentheim	Anspach	Dietfurt
Ney	Selz	Crailsheim	Weissenburg	Ingolstadt
Lannes	Strassburg	Gmünd	Nördlingen	Neuburg
Soult	Landau	Aalen	Donauwörth	

On the 26th of September, its deployment beyond the mountains was complete, and as Napoleon did not know of Mack's intention to stay at Ulm and had learned that the Russian advance had been delayed, he directed his columns by the following roads on the Danube, between Donauwörth and Ingolstadt, so as to be in a position to intervene between the Austrians and the Russians and beat both in detail. On the 7th of October this movement was completed—the Austrians abandoned the Danube bridges after a show of resistance, retreating westward—and Napoleon, leaving Murat in command of the V. and VI. corps and cavalry to observe the Austrians, pressed on to Augsburg with the others so as to be ready to deal with the Russians. Learning, however, that these were still beyond striking radius, he determined to deal with Mack's army first, having formed the fixed conviction that a threat at the latter's communications would compel him to endeavour to retreat southwards towards Tirol. Bernadotte in his turn became an army of observation, and Napoleon joining Murat with the main body marched rapidly westward from the Lech towards the Iller.


Austrian Plans.—Mack's intentions were not what Napoleon supposed. He had meanwhile received (false) information of a British landing at Boulogne, and he was seriously deceived as to the numbers of Napoleon's forces. He was also aware that the exactions of the French had produced deep indignation throughout Germany and especially in Prussia (whose neutrality had been violated by Napoleon. All this, and the almost mutinous discontent of his generals and his enemies of the court circle shook his resolution of acting as anvil for the Russians, of whose delay also he was aware, and about the 8th of October he determined to march out north-eastward across the French lines of communication and save his sovereign's army by taking refuge if necessary in Saxony. Believing implicitly in the rumours of a descent on Boulogne and of risings in France which also reached him, and knowing the destitution he had left behind him in his movement to Ulm, when he heard of the westward march of French columns from the Lech he told his army, apparently in all good faith, that the French were in full march for their own country.

Actually the French at this moment were suffering the most terrible distress—up to the Danube they had still found sufficient food for existence, but south of it, in the track of the Austrians, they found nothing. All march discipline disappeared, the men dissolved into hordes of marauders and even the sternest of the marshals wrote piteous appeals to the emperor for supplies, and for permission to shoot some of their stragglers. But to all these Berthier in the emperor's name sent the stereotyped reply—"The emperor has ordered you to carry four days' provisions, therefore you can expect nothing further—you know the emperor's method of conducting war."

Action of Albeck or Haslach.—Meanwhile Murat, before the emperor joined him, had given Mack the desired opening. The VI. corps (Ney) should have remained on the left bank of the Danube to close the Austrian exit on that side, but by mistake only Dupont's division had been left at Albeck, the rest being brought over the river. Mack on the 8th had determined to commence his withdrawal, but fortune now favoured the French. The weather during the whole of October had been unusually wet, the swollen Danube overflowed the low ground and the roads had become quagmires. On the south bank, owing to better natural drainage and a drier subsoil, movement was fairly easy, but the Austrians found it almost impossible. On the 11th of October, when they began their march, the road along the Danube was swept into the river, carrying with it several guns and teams, and hours were consumed in passing the shortest distances. At length in the afternoon they suddenly fell upon Dupont's isolated division at Albeck, which was completely surprised and severely handled. The road now lay completely open, but the Austrian columns had so opened out owing to the state of the roads that the leading troops could not pursue

their advantage—Dupont rallied and the Austrians had actually to fall back towards Ulm to procure food.

Elchingen.—For three more days Mack struggled with an unwilling staff and despondent men to arrange a further advance. During these very three days, through a succession of staff blunders, the French failed to close the gap, and on the morning of the 14th of October both armies, each renewing their advance, came in contact at the bridge of Elchingen. This bridge, all but a few road-bearers, had been destroyed, but now the French gave an example of that individual gallantry which was characteristic of the old revolutionary armies. Running along the beams under a close fire a few gallant men forced their way across. The floor of the bridge was rapidly relaid, and presently the whole of the VI. corps was deploying with unexampled rapidity on the farther side. The Austrians, still in their quagmire, could not push up reinforcements fast enough, and though Mack subsequently alleged deliberate obstruction and disobedience on the part



of his subordinates, the state of the roads alone suffices to explain their defeat. Only the right column of the Austrians was, however, involved; the left under General Werneck, to whom some cavalry and the archduke Ferdinand attached themselves, did indeed succeed in getting away, but without trains or supplies. They continued their march, famished but unmolested, until near Heidenheim they suddenly found themselves confronted by what from the diversity of uniforms they took to be an overwhelming force; at the same time the French cavalry sent in pursuit appeared in their rear. Utterly exhausted by fatigue, Werneck with his infantry, some 8000 strong, surrendered to what was really a force of dismounted dragoons and foot-sore stragglers improvised by the commanding officer on the spot to protect the French treasure chests, which at that moment lay actually in the path of the Austrians. The young archduke with some cavalry escaped.

Mack surrounded.—The defeat at Elchingen on the 14th of October sealed the fate of the Austrians, though Mack was still determined to endure a siege. As the French columns coming up from the south and west gradually surrounded him, he drew in his troops under shelter of the fortress and its improvised entrenched camp, and on the 15th

he found himself completely surrounded. On the 16th the French field-guns fired into the town, and Mack realized that his troops were no longer under sufficient control to endure a siege. When, therefore, next morning, negotiations were opened by the French, Mack, still feeling certain that the Russians were at hand, agreed to an armistice and undertook to lay down his arms if within the next twenty-one days no relief should arrive. To this Napoleon consented, but hardly had the agreement been signed than he succeeded in introducing a number of individual French soldiers into the fortress, who began rioting with the Austrian soldiery. Then, sending in armed parties to restore order and protect the inhabitants, he caused the guards at the gates to be overpowered, and Mack was thus forced into an unconditional surrender.

On the 22nd of October, the day after Trafalgar, the remnant of the Austrian army, 23,000 strong, laid down its arms. About 5000 men under Jellachich had escaped to Tirol, 2000 cuirassiers with Prince Ferdinand to Eger in Bohemia, and about 10,000 men under Werneck, had surrendered at Heidenheim. The losses in battle having been insignificant, there remain some 30,000 to account for—most of whom probably escaped individually by the help of the inhabitants, who were bitterly hostile to the French.

Napoleon's Advance to Vienna.—Napoleon now hastened to rejoin the group of corps he had left under Bernadotte in observation towards the Russians, for the latter were nearer at hand than even Mack had assumed. But hearing of his misfortune they retreated before Napoleon's advance along the right bank of the Danube to Krems, where they crossed the river and withdrew to an entrenched camp near Olmütz to pick up fresh Austrian reinforcements. The severe actions of Dürrenstein (near Krems) on the 11th, and of Hollabrunn on the 16th of November, in which Napoleon's marshals learned the tenacity of their new opponents, and the surprise of the Vienna bridge (November 14) by the French, were the chief incidents of this period in the campaign.


Campaign of Austerlitz.—Napoleon continued down the right bank to Vienna, where he was compelled by the condition of his troops to call a halt to refit his army. After this was done he continued his movement to Brünn. Thither he succeeded in bringing only 55,000 men. He was again forced to give his army rest and shelter, under cover of Murat's cavalry. The allies now confronted him with upwards of 86,000 men, including 16,000 cavalry. About the 20th of November this force commenced its advance, and Napoleon concentrated in such a manner that within three days he could bring over 80,000 French troops into action around Brünn, besides 17,000 or more Bavarians under Wrede. On the 28th Murat was driven in by the allied columns. That night orders were despatched for a concentration on Brünn in expectation of a collision on the following day; but hearing that the whole allied force was moving towards him he decided to concentrate south-east of Brünn, covering his front by cavalry on the Pratzen heights. Meanwhile he had also prepared a fresh line of retreat towards Bohemia, and, certain now of having his men in hand for the coming battle, he quietly awaited events.

The great battle in which the French under Napoleon I. defeated the Austrians and Russians on the 2nd of December 1805 was fought in the country to the west of Austerlitz, the position of Napoleon's left wing being almost equi-distant from Brünn and from Austerlitz. The wooded hills to the northward throw out to the south and south-west long spurs, between which are the low valleys of several rivers and brooks. The scene of the most important fighting was the Pratzen plateau. The famous "lakes" in the southern part of the field were artificial ponds, which have long since been drained. On the west or Brünn side of the Goldbach is another and lower ridge, which formed in the battle the first position of the French right and centre. On the other wing is the mass of hills from which the spurs and streams descend: here the Olmütz-Brünn road passes. The road from Brünn to Vienna, Napoleon's presumed line of retreat, runs in a southerly direction, and near the village of Raigern (3 m. west of Mönitz) is very close to the extreme right of the French position, a fact which had a great influence on the course of the battle. Napoleon, falling back before the advance of the allied Austrians and Russians from Olmütz, bivouacked west of the Goldbach, whilst the allies, holding, near Austerlitz, the junction of the roads from Olmütz and from Hungary, formed up in the valleys east of the Pratzen heights. The cavalry of both sides remained inactive, Napoleon's by express order, the enemy's seemingly from mere negligence, since they had 177 squadrons at their disposal. Napoleon, having determined to fight, as usual called up every available battalion; the splendid III. corps of Davout only arrived upon the field after a heavy march, late on the night of December 1st. The plan of the allies was to attack Napoleon's right, and to cut him off from Vienna, and their advanced guard began, before dark on the 1st of December, to skirmish towards Telnitz. At that moment Napoleon was in the midst of his troops, thousands of whom had made their bivouac-straw into torches in his honour. The glare of these seemed to the allies to betoken the familiar device of lighting fires previous to a retreat, and thus confirmed them in the impression which Napoleon's calculated timidity had given. Thus encouraged, those who desired an immediate battle soon gained the upper hand in the councils of the tsar and the emperor Francis. The attack orders for the 2nd of December (drawn up by the Austrian general Weyrother, and explained by him to a council of superior officers, of whom some were hostile, the greater part in-

different, and the chief Russian member, General Kutusov, asleep) gave the five columns and the reserve, into which the Austro-Russian army was organized, the following tasks : the first and second (Russians) to move south-westward behind the Pratzen ridge towards Telnitz and Sokolnitz ; the third (Russian) to cross the southern end of the plateau, and come into line on the right of the first two ; the fourth (Austrians and Russians under Kolowrat) on the right of the third to advance towards Kobelnitz. An Austrian advanced guard preceded the 1st and 2nd columns. Farther still on the right the 5th column (cavalry under Prince John of Liechtenstein) was to hold the northern part of the plateau, south of the Brunn-Olmütz road ; across the road itself was the corps of Prince Bagration, and in rear of Liechtenstein's corps was the reserve (Russians under the grand-duc Constantine). Thus, the farther the four main columns penetrated into the French right wing, the wider would the gap become between Bagration and Kolowrat, and Liechtenstein's squadrons could not form a serious obstacle to a heavy attack of Napoleon's centre. The whole plan was based upon defective information and preconceived ideas ; it has gone down to history as a classical example of bad generalship, and its author Weyrother, who was perhaps nothing worse than a pedant, as a charlatan.

Napoleon, on the other hand, with the exact knowledge of the powers of his men, which was the secret of his generalship, entrusted nearly half of his line of battle to a division (Legrand's) of Soult's corps, which was to be supported by Davout, some of whose brigades had marched, from Vienna, 90 m. in forty-eight hours. But the ground which this thin line was to hold against three columns of the enemy was marshy and densely intersected by obstacles, and the III. corps was the best in the *Grande Armée*, while its leader was perhaps the ablest of all Napoleon's marshals. The rest of the army formed in the centre and left. "Whilst they march to turn my right," said Napoleon in the inspiring proclamation which he issued on the eve of the battle, "they present me their flank," and the great counterstroke was to be delivered against the Pratzen heights by the French centre. This was composed of Soult's corps, with Bernadotte's in second line. On the left, around the hill called by the French the *Santon* (which was fortified) was Lannes' corps, supported by the cavalry reserve under Murat. The general reserve consisted of the Guard and Oudinot's grenadiers.

The attack of the allies was begun by the first three columns, which moved down from their bivouacs behind the Pratzen plateau before dawn on the 2nd, towards Telnitz and Sokolnitz. The Austrian advanced guard engaged at daybreak, and the French in Telnitz made a vigorous defence ; both parties were reinforced, and Legrand drew upon himself, in fulfilling his mission, the whole weight of the allied attack. The contest was long and doubtful, but the Russians gradually drove back Legrand and a part of Davout's corps ; numerous attacks both of infantry and cavalry were made, and by the successive arrival of reinforcements each side in turn received fresh impetus. Finally, at about 10 A.M., the allies were in possession of the villages on the Goldbach from Sokolnitz southwards, and Davout's line of battle had reformed more than a mile to rearward, still, however, maintaining touch with the French centre on the Goldbach at Kobelnitz. Between the two lines the fighting continued almost to the close of the battle. With 12,500 men of all arms the Marshal held in front of him over 40,000 of the enemy.



In the centre, the defective arrangements of the allied staff had delayed the 4th column (Kolowrat), the line of march of which was crossed by Liechtenstein's cavalry moving in the opposite direction. The objective of this column was Kobelnitz, and the two emperors and Kutusov accompanied it. The delay had, however, opened a gap between Kolowrat and the 3rd column on his left; and towards this gap, and the denuded Pratzen plateau, Napoleon sent forward St Hilaire's division of Soult's corps for the decisive attack. Kutusov was pursuing this march to the south-west when he was surprised by the swift advance of Soult's men on the plateau itself. Napoleon had here double the force of the allies; Kutusov, however, displayed great energy, changed front to his right and called up his reserves. The French did not win the plateau without a severe struggle. St Hilaire's (the right centre) division was fiercely engaged by Kolowrat's column, General Miloradovich opposed the left centre attack under Vandamme, but the French leaders were two of the best fighting generals in their army. The rearmost troops of the Russian 2nd column, not yet committed to the fight on the Goldbach, made a bold counter stroke against St Hilaire's right flank, but were repulsed, and Soult now turned to relieve the pressure on Davout by attacking Sokolnitz. The Russians in Sokolnitz surrendered, an opportune cavalry charge further discomfited the allied left, and the Pratzen plateau was now in full possession of the French. Even the Russian Guard failed to shake Vandamme's hold. In the meanwhile Lannes and Murat had been engaged in the defence of the Santon. Here the allied leaders displayed the greatest vigour, but they were unable to drive back the French. The cavalry charges in this quarter are celebrated in the history of the mounted arm; and Kellermann, the hero of Marengo, won fresh laurels against the cavalry of Liechtenstein's command. The French not only held their ground, but steadily advanced and eventually forced back the allies on Austerlitz, thereby barring their retreat on Olmütz. The last serious attempt of the allies in the centre led to some of the hardest fighting of the day; the Russian Imperial Guard under the grand-duke Constantine pressed closely upon St Hilaire and Vandamme on the plateau, and only gave way when the French Guard and the Grenadiers came into action. After the "Chevalier Guards" had been routed by Marshal Bessières and the Guard cavalry, the allies had no more hope of victory; orders had already been sent to Buxhöwden, who commanded the three columns engaged against Davout, to retreat on Austerlitz. No further attempt was made on the plateau, which was held by the French from Pratzen to the Olmütz road. The allied army was cut in two, and the last confused struggle of the three Russian columns on the Goldbach was one for liberty only. The fighting in Telnitz was perhaps the hardest of the whole battle, but the inevitable retreat, every part of which was now under the fire of the French on the plateau, was terribly costly. Soult now barred the way to Austerlitz, and the allies turned southward towards Satschan. As they retreated, the ice of the Satschan pond was broken up by the French artillery, and many of the fugitives were drowned. In the twelve hours from 7 A.M. to nightfall, the 65,000 French troops had lost 6800 men, or about 10%; the allies (82,500 engaged) had 12,200 killed and wounded, and left in the enemy's hands 15,000 prisoners (many wounded) and 133 guns.

CHAPTER II

THE CONQUEST OF PRUSSIA

Jena, 1806.—Around the Prussian army, and particularly the cavalry, the prestige of Frederick the Great's glory still lingered; but the younger generation had little experience of actual warfare, and the higher commanders were quite unable to grasp the changes in tactics and in the conduct of operations which had grown out of the necessities of the French Revolution. The individual officers of the executive staff were the most highly trained in Europe, but there was no great leader to co-ordinate their energies. The total number of men assigned to the field army was 110,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were organized in corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in name, for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative. Ill-judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of the Prussian army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of the cavalry were allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months in the year. The men were unprovided with greatcoats. Most of the muskets had actually seen service in the Seven Years' War, and their barrels had worn so thin with constant polishing that the use of full charges at target practice had been forbidden. Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch with the civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition and law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines of the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments only, and formed no part of the business of the "honest citizen." In this idea they were supported by the law itself, which protected the civilian against the soldier, and forbade even in war-time the requisitioning of horses, provisions and transport, without payment. Up to the night of the battle of Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst of plenty, whilst the French

everywhere took what they wanted. This alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.

Outbreak of the War.—During the campaign of Austerlitz Prussia, furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach, had mobilized, and had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to Napoleon's headquarters. He arrived on the 30th of November, and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his official reception till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the ultimatum was never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well knowing the man he had to deal with, had determined to force a quarrel upon Prussia at the earliest convenient opportunity. His troops therefore, when withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned in south Germany in such a way that, whilst suspicion was not aroused in minds unacquainted with Napoleonic methods, they could be concentrated by a few marches behind the Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. Here the Grand Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its recruits, and it is characteristic of the man and his methods that he did not trouble his corps commanders with a single order during the whole of the spring and summer.

As the diplomatic crisis approached, spies were sent into Prussia, and simultaneously with the orders for preliminary concentration the marshals received private instructions, the pith of which cannot be better expressed than in the following two quotations from Napoleon's correspondence:—

"Mon intention est de concentrer toutes mes forces sur l'extrémité de ma droite en laissant tout l'espace entre le Rhin et Bamberg entièrement dégarni, de manière à avoir près de 200,000 hommes réunis sur un même champ de bataille; mes premières marches menacent le cœur, de la monarchie prussienne" (No. 10,920). "Avec cette immense supériorité de forces réunis sur un espace si étroit, vous sentez que je suis dans la volonté de ne rien hasarder et d'attaquer l'ennemi partout où il voudra tenir. Vous pensez bien que ce serait une belle affaire que de se porter sur cette place (Dresden) en un bataillon carré de 200,000 hommes" (Soult, No. 10,941).

Advance of the Grande Armée.—On the 7th of October the *Grande Armée* lay in three parallel columns along the roads leading over the mountains to Hof, Schleiz and Kronach; on the right lay the IV. Corps (Soult) about Bayreuth; with his cavalry in rear, and behind these the VI. Corps (Ney) at Pegnitz; in the centre, Bernadotte's corps from Nordhalben, with the III. Corps (Davout), Lichtenfels; Guard and headquarters, Bamberg. The left column was composed of the V. (Lannes) at Hemmendorf, with the VII. (Augereau) extending south to the Main at Burgebrach.

Napoleon's object being surprise, all the cavalry except a few vedettes were kept back behind the leading infantry columns and these latter were ordered to advance, on the signal being given, in "masses of manœuvre," so as to crush at once any outpost resistance which was calculated upon the time required for the deployment of ordinary marching columns. This order has never since found an imitator, but deserves attentive study as a masterpiece.


To meet the impending blow the Prussians had been extended in a cordon along the great road leading from Mainz to Dresden, Blücher was at Erfurt, Rüchel at Gotha, Hohenlohe at Weimar, Saxons in Dresden, with outposts along the frontier. An offensive move into Franconia was under discussion, and for this purpose the Prussian staff had commenced a lateral concentration about Weimar, Jena and Naumburg when the storm burst upon them. The emperor gathered little from the confused reports of their purposeless manœuvres, but secure, in the midst of his "battalion square" of 200,000 men, he remained quite indifferent, well knowing that an advance straight on Berlin must force his enemy to concentrate and fight, and as they would bring at most 127,000 men on to the battlefield the result could hardly be doubtful. On the 9th of October the cloud burst. Out of the forests which clothe the northern slopes of the Thuringer Wald the French streamed forth, easily overpowering the resistance of the Prussian outposts on the upper Saale,¹ and once the open country was reached the cavalry under Murat trotted to the front, closely followed by Bernadotte's corps as "general advance guard." The result of the cavalry scouting was however unsatisfactory. On the night of the 10th, the emperor was still unaware of the position of his principal foe, and Murat with Bernadotte behind him was directed on Gera for the 11th, the remainder of the army continuing along the roads previously assigned to them.

In the meanwhile, however, the Saxons had been moving from Naumburg through Gera on Jena, Hohenlohe was near Weimar, and all the other divisions of the army had closed in a march eastwards, the idea of an offensive to the southward which Napoleon had himself attributed to them having already disappeared.

Reaching Gera at 9 A.M. Murat reported the movement of the Saxons on the previous day, but omitted to send a strong detachment in pursuit. The traces of the Saxons were lost, and Napoleon, little satisfied with his cavalry, authorized Lasalle to offer up to 6000 frs. reward for information of the Prussian point of concentration. At 1 A.M. of the 12th

¹ At the action of Saalfeld on the 10th, the young and gallant Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia was killed.

Prussian Movements.—In the meantime the Prussians were effecting their concentration. Rüchel, who with 15,000 men had been sent into the mountains as an advanced guard for the projected offensive, was recalled to Weimar, which he reached on the 13th. The main body were between Weimar and Apolda during the 12th, and the Saxons duly effected their junction with Hohenlohe in the vicinity of Vierzehnheiligen, whilst the latter had withdrawn all his troops but some outposts from Jena to the plateau about



The Prussian headquarters, however, spent the 12th and 13th in idle discussion, whilst the troop commanders exerted themselves to obtain some alleviation for the suffering and starving men. The defeats undergone by their outpost detachment had profoundly affected the nerves of the troops, and on the afternoon of the 11th, on the false alarm of a French approach, a panic broke out in the streets of Jena, and it took all the energy of Hohenlohe and his staff to restore order. On the morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers approached Hohenlohe with a statement of the famishing condition of

their men, and threatened to withdraw them again to Saxony. Hohenlohe pointed out that the Prussians were equally badly off, but promised to do his best to help his allies. Urgent messages were sent off to the Commissary von Goethe (the poet), at Weimar for permission to requisition food and firewood. These requests, however, remained unanswered, and the Prussians and Saxons spent the night before the battle shivering in miserable bivouacs.

The 13th of October.—During the early morning of the 13th reports brought to Napoleon at Gera partially cleared up the situation, though the real truth was very different from what he supposed. However, it was evident that the bulk of the Prussian lay to his left, and instructions were at once despatched to Davout to turn westward from Naumburg towards Kosen and to bring Bernadotte with him if the two were still together. The letter, however, ended with the words "but I hope he is already on his way to Dornburg." Now Bernadotte had neglected to keep the emperor informed as to his whereabouts. He was still with Davout, but, concluding that he had missed an order directing him to Dornburg, he thought to conceal his error by assuming the receipt of the order evidently alluded to in the last words, and as a result he marched towards Dornburg, and his whole corps was lost to the emperor at the crisis of the next day's battle.

On the road from Gera to Jena Napoleon was met by intelligence from Lannes announcing his occupation of Jena and the discovery of Prussian troops to the northward. Knowing the emperor's methods, he wisely restrained the ardour of his subordinates and asked for instructions whether to attack or wait. The emperor rode forward rapidly, reached Jena about 3 P.M., and with Lannes proceeded to the Landgrafenberg to reconnoitre. From this point his view was, however, restricted to the immediate foreground, and he only saw the camps of Hohenlohe's left wing. At this moment the Prussians were actually on parade and ready to move off to attack, but just then the "evil genius" of the Prussian army, von Massenbach, an officer of the Headquarter Staff, rode up and claiming to speak with the authority of the king and commander-in-chief, induced Hohenlohe to order his troops back to camp. Of all this Napoleon saw nothing, but from all reports he came to the conclusion that the whole Prussian army was actually in front of him, and at once issued orders for his whole army to concentrate towards Jena, marching all night if need be. Six hours earlier his conclusion would have been correct, but early that morning the Prussian headquarters, alarmed for the safety of their line of retreat on Berlin by the presence of the French in Naumburg, decided to leave Hohenlohe and Rüchel to act as rear-guard, and with the main body to commence their retreat towards the river Unstrutt and the Eckardtsberge where Massenbach had previously reconnoitred an "ideal" battlefield. This belief in positions was the cardinal principle of Prussian strategy in those days. The troops had accordingly commenced their march on the morning of the 13th, and now at 3 P.M. were settling down to bivouac; they were still but a short march from the decisive field.

Battle of Jena.—On the French side, Lannes's men were working their hardest, under Napoleon's personal supervision, to make a practicable road up to the Landgrafenberg, and all night long the remaining corps struggled through darkness towards the rendezvous. By daybreak on the 14th, the anniversary of Elchingen, upwards of 60,000 men stood densely packed on the narrow plateau of the mountain, whilst below, in the ravines on either flank, Soult on the right, and Augereau on the left, were getting into position. Fortunately a dense fog hid the helpless masses on the Landgrafenberg from the sight of the Prussian gunners. Hohenlohe had determined to drive the French into the ravine at daybreak, but had no idea as to the numbers in front of him. For want of room, only a few Prussian battalions were sent forward, and these, delaying their advance till the fog had sufficiently lifted, were met by French skirmishers, and small columns, who rapidly overlapped their flanks and drove them back in confusion. Hohenlohe now brought up the remainder of his command, but in the meanwhile the French had poured across the neck between the Landgrafenberg and the main plateau, and the troops of Soult and Augereau were working up the ravines on either hand. In view of these troops the Prussian line, which had advanced faultlessly as if on parade, halted to prepare its bayonet attack by fire, and, once halted, it was found impossible to get them to go on again. The French who had thrown themselves into houses, copses, &c., picked off the officers, and the flanks of the long Prussian lines swayed and got into confusion. The rival artilleries held each other too thoroughly to be able to spare attention to the infantry, whilst the Prussian cavalry, which had forgotten how to charge in masses of eighty or more squadrons frittered away their strength in isolated efforts. By 10 A.M. the fourteen battalions which had initiated this attack were outnumbered by three to one, and drifted away from the battlefield. Their places were taken by a fresh body, but this was soon outnumbered and outflanked in its turn. By 2 P.M. the psychic moment had come, and Napoleon launched his guards and the cavalry to complete the victory and initiate the pursuit. Rüchel's division now arrived and made a most gallant effort to cover the retreat, but their order being broken by the torrent of fugitives, they were soon overwhelmed by the tide of the French victory and all organized resistance had ceased by 4 P.M.

Briefly summarized, the battle came to this—in four successive efforts the Prussians

failed because they were locally outnumbered. This was the fault of their leaders solely, for, except for the last attack, local superiority was in each case attainable. Organization and tactics did not affect the issue directly, for the conduct of the men and their junior officers gave abundant proof that in the hands of a competent leader the "linear" principle of delivering one shattering blow would have proved superior to that of a gradual attrition of the enemy here, as on the battlefields of the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and this in spite of other defects in the training of the Prussian infantry which simultaneously caused its defeat on the neighbouring field of Auerstädt.


Battle of Auerstädt.—Here the superiority of French mobility, a consequence of their training and not necessarily of their system, showed its value most conclusively. Davout in obedience to his orders of the previous morning was marching over the Saale at Kösen, when his advanced guard came in contact with that of the Prussian main army. The latter with at least 50,000 men was marching in two columns, and ought therefore to have delivered its men into line of battle twice as fast as the French, who had to deploy from a single issue, and whose columns had opened out in the passage of the Kösen defile and the long ascent of the plateau above. But the Prussians attacked at the old regulation speed of seventy-five paces to the minute, and the French manœuvred at the quick or double of 120 or 150. The consequence was that the French always succeeded in reinforcing

their fighting line in time to avert disaster. Nevertheless by mid-day their strength was well-nigh exhausted, whilst the Prussian reserve, eighteen battalions of guards under Kalckreuth, stood intact and ready to engage. But at the critical moment the duke of Brunswick fell mortally wounded, and Scharnhorst, his chief of the staff, was at the time absent on another part of the field. Meanwhile rumours from the battle-field at Jena, magnified as usual, began to reach the staff, and these may possibly have influenced Kalckreuth, for when appealed to to attack with his eighteen battalions and win the day, he declined to move without the direct order of the commander-in-chief to do so, alleging that it was the duty of a reserve to cover the retreat and he considered himself personally responsible to the king for the guards entrusted to his care. Even then the day might have been saved had Blücher been able to find even twenty squadrons accustomed to gallop together, but the Prussian cavalry had been dispersed amongst the infantry commands, and at the critical moment it proved impossible for them to deliver a united and decisive attack.

Seeing further efforts hopeless, Scharnhorst in the duke's name initiated the retreat and the troops withdrew N.W. towards Buttelstedt, almost unmolested by the French, who this day had put forth all that was in them, and withstood victoriously the highest average punishment any troops of the new age of warfare had as yet endured. So desperate had been their resistance that the Prussians unanimously stated Davout's strength at double the actual figure. Probably no man but Davout could have got so much out of his men, but why was he left unsupported?

Bernadotte, we have seen, had marched to Dornburg, or rather to a point overlooking the ford across the Saale at the village of that name, and reached there in ample time to intervene on either field. But with the struggle raging before him he remained undecided, until at Jena the decision had clearly fallen, and then he crossed the river and arrived with fresh troops too late for their services to be required.

Prussian Retreat.—During the night the Prussians continued their retreat, the bulk of the main body to Sömmerda, Hohenlohe's corps towards Nordhausen. The troops had got much mixed up, but as the French did not immediately press the pursuit home, order was soon re-established and a combined retreat was begun towards the mouth of the Elbe and Lübeck. Here help was expected to arrive from England, and the tide



might yet have turned, for the Russian armies were gathering in the east. It was now that the results of a divorce of the army from the nation began to be felt. Instead of seizing all provisions and burning what they could not remove, the Prussian generals enforced on their men the utmost forbearance towards the inhabitants, and the fact that they were obeyed, in spite of the inhumanity the people showed to their sick and wounded countrymen, proves that discipline was by no means so far gone as has generally been believed. The French marching in pursuit were received with open arms, the people even turning their own wounded out of doors to make room for their French guests. Their servility awakened the bitterest contempt of their conquerors and forms the best excuse for the unparalleled severity of the French yoke. On the 26th of October Davout reached Berlin, having marched 166 m. in twelve days including two sharp rearguard actions



Bernadotte with his fresh troops having fallen behind. The inhabitants of Berlin, headed by their mayor, came out to meet him, and the newspapers lavished adulation on the victors and abuse on the beaten army. On the 28th Murat's cavalry overtook the remnant of Prince Hohenlohe's army near Prenzlau (N. of Berlin) and invited its capitulation. Unfortunately the prince sent Massenbach to discuss the situation, and the latter completely lost his head. Murat boasted that he had 100,000 men behind

him, and on his return Massenbach implored his chief to submit to an unconditional surrender, advice which the prince accepted, though as a fact Murat's horses were completely exhausted and he had no infantry whatever within call. Only Blücher now remained in the field, and he too was driven at length into Lübeck with his back to the sea.

CHAPTER III

THE POLISH CAMPAIGN

HITHERTO the French had been operating in a rich country, untouched for half a century past by the ravages of war, but as the necessity for a campaign against the Russians confronted the emperor, he realized that his whole supply and transport service must be put on a different footing. After the wants of the cavalry and artillery had been provided for, there remained but little material for transport work. Exhaustive orders to organize the necessary trains were duly issued, but the emperor seems to have had no conception of the difficulties the tracks—there were no metalled roads—of Poland were about to present to him. Moreover, it was one thing to issue orders, but quite another to ensure that they were obeyed, for they entailed a complete transformation in the mental attitude of the French soldier towards all that he had been taught to consider his duties in the field. Experience only can teach the art of packing wagons and the care of draught animals, and throughout the campaign the small ponies of Poland and East Prussia broke down by thousands from overloading and unskilful packing.

The Russian Army formed the most complete contrast to the French that it is possible to imagine. Though clad, armed and organized in European fashion, the soldiers retained in a marked degree the traditions of their Mongolian forerunners their transport wagons were in type the survival of ages of experience and their care for their animals equally the result of hereditary habit. The intelligence of the men and regimental officers was very low, but on the other hand service was practically for life, and the regiment the only home the great majority had ever known. Hence obedience was instinctive and initiative almost undreamt of. Moreover, they were essentially a war-trained army, for even in

peace time their long marches to and fro within the empire had most thoroughly inured them to hardship and privation. Napoleon might have remembered his own saying, "La misère est l'école du bon soldat." In cavalry they were weak, for the Russian does not take kindly to equitation and the horses were not equal to the accepted European standard of weight, while the Cossack was only formidable to stragglers and wounded. Their artillery was numerous and for the most part of heavy calibre—18- and 24-pounders were common—but the strength of the army lay in its infantry, with its incomparable tenacity in defence and its blind confidence in the bayonet in attack. The traditions of Suvárov and his victories in Italy were still fresh, but there was no longer a Suvárov to lead them.

Advance to the Vistula.—Napoleon had from the first been aware of the secret alliance between Prussia and Russia, sworn by their respective sovereigns over the grave of Frederick the Great, and this knowledge had been his principal reason for precipitating hostilities with the former. He remained, however, in complete ignorance of the degree of preparation attained on the Russian side, and since the seizure of Warsaw together with the control of the resources of Poland in men and material its occupation would afford, was the chief factor in his calculation, he turned at once to the eastward as soon as all further organized resistance in Prussia was ended by the surrender of Prenzlau and Lübeck. Scarcely leaving his troops time to restore their worn-out footgear, or for the cavalry to replace their jaded horses from captured Prussian resources, he set Davout in motion towards Warsaw on the 2nd of November, and the remainder of the army followed in successive échelons as rapidly as they could be despatched.

The cavalry, moving well in advance, dispersed the Prussian dépôts and captured their horses, as far as the line of the Vistula, where at last they encountered organized resistance from the outposts of Lestocq's little corps of 15,000 men—all that was left of Frederick the Great's army. These, however, gave way before the threat of the advancing French and after a few trifling skirmishes. Davout entered Warsaw on the 30th of November, being followed by the V., IV. and Guard corps during the succeeding fortnight, whilst the VI. and VII. were écheloned to their left, and the VIII. (Mortier) and IX. (Jerome Napoleon) and X. (Lefebvre), all new formations since the outbreak of the war, followed some marches in the rear. Jerome's corps was composed of the Bavarians, Württembergers and Badensers.

Behind these all Prussia was overrun by newly formed units. (3rd and 4th battalions) raised from depot companies, conscripts for 1807, and old soldiers rejoining after sickness or wounds. Napoleon caused these to be despatched to the front immediately after their formation. He had much territory to occupy, and in the long march of on an average 85 days, he considered that they could be organized, equipped and drilled *en route*.

Pultusk.—The Russians meanwhile had been moving slowly forward in two bodies, one under Bennigsen (50,000), the other under Buxhowden (25,000), and the French being at this time in Warsaw, they took up threatening positions about Pultusk. Plock and Prassnitz. From this triangle they harried the French communications with Berlin, and to secure a winter's rest for his men Napoleon determined to bring them to action. On the 23rd of December operations were commenced, but the difficulties of securing information and maintaining communication between the respective columns, so unlike what any of the French had previously encountered, led to a very partial success. The idea had been to induce the Russians to concentrate about Pultusk and, turning their position from its left, ultimately to cut them off from Russia, and if possible to surround them. But in this new and difficult country the emperor found it impossible to time his marches. The troops arrived late at their appointed positions, and after a stubborn rearguard action at Pultusk itself and undecisive fighting elsewhere (Soldau-Golymin) the Russians succeeded in retreating beyond the jaws of the French attack, and Napoleon for the first time found that he had exceeded the limit of endurance of his men. Indeed, the rank and file bluntly told him as much as he rode with the marching columns. Yielding to the inevitable, but not forgetting to announce a brilliant victory in a bulletin, he sent his troops into winter quarters along the Passarge and down the Baltic, enjoining on his corps commanders most strictly to do nothing to disturb their adversary.


Campaign of Eylau.—Bennigsen, now commanding the whole Russian army which with Lestocq's Prussians amounted to 100,000, also moved into winter quarters in the triangle Deutsch-Eylau-Osterode-Allenstein, and had every intention of remaining there, or a fresh army was already gathering in Russia, the 1st corps of which had reached Nur about 50 m. distant from the French right.

Unfortunately, Ney with his VI. corps about Gilgenberg had received the most poverty-stricken district in the whole region, and to secure some alleviation for the sufferings of his men he incautiously extended his cantonments till they came in contact with the Russian outposts. Apparently seeing in this movement a recommencement of hostilities, Bennigsen concentrated his troops towards his right and commenced an advance westwards towards Danzig, which was still in Prussian hands. Before his advance both Ney and Bernadotte (the latter, between Ney and the Baltic, covering the siege of Danzig)

were compelled to fall back. It then became necessary to disturb the repose of the whole army to counter the enemy's intentions. The latter by this movement, however, uncovered his own communication with Russia, and the emperor was quick to seize his opportunity. He received the information on the 28th of January. His orders were at once issued and complied with with such celerity that by the 31st he stood prepared to advance with the corps of Soult, Ney, Davout and Augereau, the Guard and the reserve cavalry (80,000 men on a front of 60 m.) from Myszienec through Wollenberg to Gilgenberg; whilst Lannes on his right towards Ostrolenka and Lefebvre (X.) at Thorn covered his outer flanks.

Bernadotte, however, was missing, and this time through no fault of his own. His orders and the despatch conveying Napoleon's instructions fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and just in time Bennigsen's eyes were opened. Rapidly renouncing his previous intentions, he issued orders to concentrate on Allenstein; but this point was chosen too far in advance and he was anticipated by Murat and Soult at that place on the 2nd of February. He then determined to unite his forces at Joukendorf, but again he was too late. Soult and Murat attacked his rearguard on the 3rd, and learning from his Cossacks that the French corps were being directed so as to swing round and enclose him,

he withdrew by a night march and ultimately succeeded in getting his whole army, with the exception of von Lestocq's Prussians, together in the strong position along the Alle, the centre of which is marked by Preussisch-Eylau. The opportunity for this concentration he owed to the time gained for him by his rearguard at Joukendorf, for this had stood just long enough to induce the French columns to swing in to surround him, and the next day was thus lost to the emperor as his corps had to extend again to their manœuvring intervals. The truth is that the days were too short and the roads too bad for Napoleon to carry out the full purpose his "general advanced guard" was intended to fulfil. It




was designed to hold the enemy in position by the vigour of its attack, thus neutralizing his independent will power and compelling him to expend his reserves in the effort to rescue the troops engaged. But in forests and snowdrifts the French made such slow progress that no sufficient deployment could be made until darkness put a stop to the fighting. Thus, when late on the 7th of February 1807 Murat and Soult overtook the enemy near Eylau the fighting was severe but not prolonged.

The head of Napoleon's column (cavalry and infantry), advancing from the south-west, found itself opposed at the outlet of the Grünhöfchen defile by a strong Russian rearguard which held the (frozen) lakes on either side of the Eylau road, and attacked at once, dislodging the enemy after a sharp conflict. The French turned both wings of the enemy, and Bagration, who commanded the Russian rearguard, retired through Eylau to the main army, which was now arrayed for battle east of Eylau. Barclay de Tolly made a strenuous resistance in Eylau itself, and in the churchyard, and these localities changed hands several times before remaining finally in possession of the French. It is very doubtful whether Napoleon actually ordered this attack upon Eylau, and it is suggested that the French soldiers were encouraged to a premature assault by the hope of obtaining quarters in the village. There is, however, no reason to suppose that this attack was prejudicial to Napoleon's chance of success, for his own army was intended to pin the enemy in front, while the outlying "masses of manœuvre" closed upon his

flanks and rear. In this case the vigour of the "general advanced guard" was superfluous, for Bennigsen stood to fight of his own free will.

The foremost line of the French bivouacs extended from Rothenen to Freiheit, but a large proportion of the army spent the night in quarters farther back. The Russian army on the other hand spent the night bivouacked in order of battle, the right at Schloditten and the left at Serpallen. The cold was extreme 2° F. being registered in the early morning, and food was scarce in both armies. The ground was covered at the time of battle with deep snow, and all the lakes and marshes were frozen, so that troops of all arms could pass everywhere, so far as the snow permitted. Two of Napoleon's corps (Davout and Ney) were still absent, and Ney did not receive his orders until the morning of the 8th. His task was to descend upon the Russian right, and also to prevent a Prussian corps under Lestocq from coming on to the battlefield. Davout's corps advancing from the south-east on Mollwitten was destined for the attack of Bennigsen's left wing about Serpallen and Klein Sausgarten. In the meantime Napoleon with his forces at and about Eylau made the preparations for the frontal attack. His infantry extended from the windmill, through Eylau, to Rothenen, and the artillery was deployed along the whole front; behind each infantry corps and on the wings stood the cavalry. The Guard was in second line south of Eylau, and an army reserve stood near the Waschkeiten lake. Bennigsen's army was drawn up in line from Schloditten to Klein Sausgarten, the front likewise covered by guns, in which arm he was numerically much superior. A detachment occupied Serpallen.

The battle opened in a dense snowstorm. About 8 A.M. Bennigsen's guns opened fire on Eylau, and after a fierce but undecided artillery fight the French delivered an infantry attack from Eylau. This was repulsed with heavy losses, and the Russians advanced towards the windmill in force. Thereupon Napoleon ordered his centre, the VII. corps of Augereau, to move forward from the church against the Russian front, the division of St Hilaire on Augereau's right participating in the attack. If we conceive of this first stage of the battle as the action of the "general advanced guard," Augereau must be held to have overdone his part. The VII. corps advanced in dense masses, but in the fierce snowstorm lost its direction. St Hilaire attacked directly and unsupported; Augereau's corps was still less fortunate. Crossing obliquely the front of the Russian line, as if making for Schloditten, it came under a *feu d'enfer* and was practically annihilated. In the confusion the Russian cavalry charged with the utmost fury downhill and with the wind behind them. Three thousand men only out of about fourteen thousand appeared at the evening parade of the corps. The rest were killed, wounded, prisoners or dispersed. The marshal and every senior officer was amongst the killed and wounded, and one regiment, the 14th of the Line, cut off in the midst of the Russians and refusing to surrender, fell almost to a man. The Russian counterstroke penetrated into Eylau itself and Napoleon himself was in serious danger. With the utmost coolness, however, he judged the pace of the Russian advance and ordered up a battalion of the Guard at the exact moment required. In the streets of Eylau the Guard had the Russians at their mercy, and few escaped. Still the situation for the French was desperate and the battle had to be maintained at all costs. Napoleon now sent forward the cavalry along the whole line. In the centre the charge was led by Murat and Bessières, and the Russian horsemen



were swept off the field. The Cuirassiers under D'Hautpoul charged through the Russian guns, broke through the first line of infantry and then through the second, penetrating to the woods of Anklappen.

The shock of a second wave of cavalry broke the lines again, and though in the final retirement the exhausted troopers lost terribly, they had achieved their object. The wreck of Augereau's and other divisions had been reformed, the Guard brought up into first line, and, above all, Davout's leading troops had occupied Serpallen. Thence, with his left in touch with Napoleon's right (St Hilaire), and his right extending gradually towards Klein Sausgarten, the marshal pressed steadily upon the Russian left, rolling it up before him, until his right had reached Kutschitten and his centre Anklappen. By that time the troops under Napoleon's immediate command, pivoting their left on Eylau church, had wheeled gradually inward until the general line extended from the church to Kutschitten. The Russian army was being driven westward, when the advance of Lestocq gave them fresh steadiness. The Prussian corps had been fighting a continuous flank-guard action against Marshal Ney to the north-west of Althof, and Lestocq had finally succeeded in disengaging his main body, Ney being held up at Althof by a small rear-guard, while the Prussians, gathering as they went the fugitives of the Russian army hastened to oppose Davout. The impetus of these fresh troops led by Lestocq and his staff-officer Scharnhorst was such as to check even the famous divisions of Davout's corps which had won the battle of Auerstädt single-handed. The French were now gradually forced back until their right was again at Sausgarten and their centre on the Kreege Berg.

Both sides were now utterly exhausted, for the Prussians also had been marching and fighting all day against Ney. The battle died away at nightfall, Ney's corps being unable effectively to intervene owing to the steadiness of the Prussian detachment left to oppose him, and the extreme difficulty of the roads. A severe conflict between the Russian extreme right and Ney's corps which at last appeared on the field at Schloditten ended the battle. Bennigsen retreated during the night through Schmodditten, Lestocq through Kutschitten. The numbers engaged in the first stage of the battle may be taken as—Napoleon, 50,000, Bennigsen, 67,000, to which later were added on the one side Ney and Davout, 29,000, on the other Lestocq, 7000. The losses were roughly 15,000 men to the French, 18,000 to the allies, or 21 and 27% respectively of the troops actually engaged. The French lost 5 eagles and 7 other colours, the Russians 16 colours and 24 guns.

Again the emperor had to admit that his troops could do no more, and bowing to necessity, he distributed them into winter quarters, where, however, the enterprise of the Cossacks, who were no strangers to snow and to forests, left the outposts but little repose. A protracted period of rest followed, during which the emperor exerted himself unremittingly to re-equip, reinforce and supply his troops. Hitherto he had been based on the entrenched camp of Warsaw, but he had already taken steps to organize a new line of supply and retreat via Thorn, and this was now completed. At the same time Lefebvre was ordered to press the siege of Danzig with all vigour, and on the 5th of May, after a most gallant resistance, Kalkreuth, who redeemed here his failure of Auerstädt, surrendered. English assistance came too late. By the beginning of June the French had more than made good their losses and 210,000 men were available for field service.

Heilsberg and Friedland.—Meanwhile Bennigsen had prepared for a fresh undertaking, and leaving Lestocq with 20,000 Prussians and Russians to contain Bernadotte, who lay between Braunsberg and Spandau on the Passarge, he moved southwards on the 2nd, and on the 3rd and 4th of June he fell upon Ney, driving him back towards Guttstadt, whilst with the bulk of his force he moved towards Heilsberg, where he threw up an entrenched position. It was not till the 5th that Napoleon received tidings of his advance, and for the moment these were so vague that he contented himself by warning the remainder of his forces to be prepared to move on the 6th. Next day, however, all doubts were set at rest, and as the Russians advanced south of Heilsberg, he decided to wheel his whole force to the right, pivoting on the III. corps, and cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg and the sea. On the 8th the VI., III., VIII. and Guard corps, together with a new cavalry reserve corps under Lannes, in all 147,000, stood ready for the operation, and with Murat and Soult as general advanced guard the whole moved forward, driving the Russian outposts before them. Bernadotte, who was to have attacked Lestocq, again failed to receive his orders and took no part in the following operations.

Murat attacked the Russians, who had halted in their entrenched position, on the 11th and drove in their outposts, but did not discover the entrenchments. Meanwhile Soult had followed with his infantry in close support, and the emperor himself arriving, ordered him to attack at once. Now the Russians uncovered their entrenchments, and in the absence of artillery preparation Soult's leading troops received most severe punishment. Fresh troops arriving were sent in to his support, but these also proved insufficient, and darkness alone put an end to the struggle, which cost the French 12,000 killed and wounded.

Bennigsen, however, learning that his right was threatened by the III. corps, and not having as yet completed his concentration, retreated in the night to Bartenstein, and the following day turned sharp to right towards Schippenbeil. The emperor now pressed on

towards Friedland, where he would completely control the Russian communications with Königsberg, their immediate base of supply, but for once the Russians outmarched him and covered their movement so successfully that for the next three days he seems to have completely lost all knowledge of his enemy's whereabouts. Lestocq in the meantime had been forced northwards towards Königsberg, and Soult with Murat was in hot pursuit. The III., VI., VIII. and Guard corps followed the main road towards Königsberg, and the former had reached Muhlhausen, the remainder were about Preussische-Eylau, when Latour Maubourg's dragoons sent in intelligence which pointed to the presence of Bennigsen about Friedland. This was indeed the case. The Russians after passing Schippenbeil had suddenly turned northwards, and on the evening of the 13th were taking up a strong position on the river Alle with Friedland as a centre.

What follows presents perhaps the finest instance of the Napoleonic method. The enemy lay direct to his right, and Murat, the IV. and III. corps had well overshot the mark. Lannes's reserve corps (cavalry), to whom Latour Maubourg reported, lay at Domnau some 10 m. to the right. The latter at once assumed the rôle of advanced guard cavalry and was ordered to observe the enemy at Friedland, Ney following in close support. Davout was turned about and directed on the enemy's right, and the VIII. corps (Mortier), the Guards and the reserve cavalry followed as main body.

The Russians had on the 13th driven the French cavalry outposts from Friedland to the westward, and Bennigsen's main body began to occupy the town in the night. The army of Napoleon was set in motion for Friedland, but it was still dispersed on its various march routes, and the first stage of the engagement was thus, as usual, a pure "encounter - battle." The corps of Marshal Lannes as "general advanced guard" was first engaged, in the Sortlack Wood and in front of Postthenen (2.30-3 A.M. on the 14th). Both sides now used their cavalry freely to cover the formation of lines of battle, and a race between



the rival squadrons for the possession of Heinrichsdorf resulted in favour of the French under Grouchy. Lannes in the meantime was fighting hard to hold Bennigsen, for Napoleon feared that the Russians meant to evade him again. Actually, by 6 A.M. Bennigsen had nearly 50,000 men across the river and forming up west of Friedland. His infantry, in two lines, with artillery, extended between the Heinrichsdorf-Friedland road and the upper bends of the river. Beyond the right of the infantry, cavalry and Cossacks extended the line to the wood N.E. of Heinrichsdorf, and small bodies of Cossacks penetrated even to Schwonau. The left wing also had some cavalry and, beyond the Alle, batteries were brought into action to cover it. A heavy and indecisive fire-fight raged in the Sortlack Wood between the Russian skirmishers and some of Lannes's troops. The head of Mortier's (French and Polish) corps appeared at Heinrichsdorf and the Cossacks were driven out of Schwonau. Lannes held his own, and by noon, when Napoleon arrived, 40,000 French troops were on the scene of action. His orders were brief: Ney's corps was to take the line between Postthenen and the Sortlack Wood, Lannes closing on his left, to form the centre, Mortier at Heinrichsdorf the left wing. Victor and the Guard were placed in reserve behind Postthenen. Cavalry masses were collected at Heinrichsdorf. The main attack was to be delivered against the Russian left, which Napoleon saw at once to be

cramped in the narrow tongue of land between the river and the Posthenen mill-stream. Three cavalry divisions were added to the general reserve. The course of the previous operations had been such that both armies had still large detachments out towards Königsberg. The afternoon was spent by the emperor in forming up the newly arrived masses, the deployment being covered by an artillery bombardment. At 5 o'clock all was ready, and Ney, preceded by a heavy artillery fire, rapidly carried the Sortlack Wood. The attack was pushed on towards the Alle. One of Ney's divisions (Marchand) drove part of the Russian left into the river at Sortlack. A furious charge of cavalry against Marchand's left was repulsed by the dragoon division of Latour-Maubourg. Soon the Russians were huddled together in the bends of the Alle, an easy target for the guns of Ney and of the reserve. Ney's attack indeed came eventually to a standstill; Bennigsen's reserve cavalry charged with great effect and drove him back in disorder. As at Eylau, the approach of night seemed to preclude a decisive success, but in June and on firm ground the old mobility of the French reasserted its value. The infantry division of Dupont advanced rapidly from Posthenen, the cavalry divisions drove back the Russian squadrons into the now congested masses of foot on the river bank, and finally the artillery general Sémarmont advanced a mass of guns to case-shot range. It was the first example of the terrible artillery preparations of modern warfare, and the Russian defence collapsed in a few minutes. Ney's exhausted infantry were able to pursue the broken regiments of Bennigsen's left into the streets of Friedland. Lannes and Mortier had all this time held the Russian centre and right on its ground, and their artillery had inflicted severe losses. When Friedland itself was seen to be on fire, the two marshals launched their infantry attack. Fresh French troops approached the battlefield. Dupont distinguished himself for the second time by fording the mill-stream and assailing the left flank of the Russian centre. This offered a stubborn resistance, but the French steadily forced the line backwards, and the battle was soon over. The losses incurred by the Russians in retreating over the river at Friedland were very heavy, many soldiers being drowned. Farther north the still unbroken troops of the right wing drew off by the Allenburg road; the French cavalry of the left wing, though ordered to pursue, remaining, for some reason, inactive. The losses of the victors were reckoned at 12,100 out of 86,000, or 14%, those of the Russians at 10,000 out of 46,000, or 21%.

Lestocq was, meanwhile, driven through Königsberg (which surrendered on the 15th) on Tilsit, and now that he was no longer supported by the Russians, the Prussian commander gave up the struggle.

CHAPTER IV

THE AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1809

EVER since Austerlitz the Austrian officers had been labouring to reconstitute and reform their army. The archduke Charles was the foremost amongst many workers who had realized that numbers were absolutely needed to confront the new French methods. With these numbers it was impossible to attain the high degree of individual efficiency required for the old line tactics, hence they were compelled to adopt the French methods of skirmishers and columns, but as yet they had hardly realized the increased density necessary to be given to a line of battle to enable it to endure the prolonged nervous strain the new system of tactics entailed. Where formerly 15,000 men to the mile of front had been considered ample for the occupation of a position or the execution of an attack, double that number now often proved insufficient, and their front was broken before reinforcements could arrive. Much had been done to create an efficient staff, but though the idea of the army corps command was now no new thing, the senior generals entrusted with these commands were far from having acquired the independence and initiative of their French opponents. Hence the extraordinary slowness of their manoeuvres, not because the Austrian infantry were bad marchers, but because the preparation and circulation of orders was still far behind the French standard. The light cavalry had been much improved and the heavy cavalry on the whole proved a fair match for their opponents.

The French Army.—After the peace of Tilsit the Grand Army was gradually withdrawn behind the Rhine, leaving only three commands, totalling 63,000 men, under Davout in Prussia, Oudinot in west central Germany, and Lefebvre in Bavaria, to assist the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the French law of conscription, which was rigorously insisted on in all the States comprised in this new federation.

In exchange for the subsistence of the French troops of occupation, a corresponding number of these new levies were moved to the south of France, where they commenced to arrive at the moment when the situation in Spain became acute. The Peninsular War called for large forces of the old *Grande Armée* and for a brief period Napoleon directed operations in person; and the Austrians took advantage of the dissemination and weakness

of the French forces in Germany to push forward their own preparations with renewed energy.

But they reckoned without the resourcefulness of Napoleon. The moment news of their activity reached him, whilst still in pursuit of Sir John Moore, he despatched letters to all the members of the Confederation warning them that their contingents might soon be required, and at the same time issued a series of decrees to General Clarke, his war minister, authorizing him to call up the contingent of 1810 in advance, and directing him in detail to proceed with the formation of 4th and 5th battalions for all the regiments across the Rhine. By these means Davout's, Oudinot's and Lefebvre's commands were augmented whilst in February and March new corps were formed and rapidly pushed towards the front.

On his return from Spain, seeing war imminent, he issued a series of march orders (which deserve the closest study in detail) by which on the 15th of April his whole army was to be concentrated for manœuvres between Regensburg, Landshut, Augsburg and Donauwörth, and sending on the Guard in wagons to Strassburg, he despatched Berthier to act as commander-in-chief until his own arrival.

Austrian Offensive.—The position of assembly was excellently chosen, but unfortunately the Austrians took the initiative. On the 9th of April their main body of six corps crossed the Inn between Braunau and Passau, and simultaneously two additional corps moved from Pilsen in Bohemia on Regensburg. At this moment Davout was entering Regensburg with his leading troops, the remainder still some marches in rear, and it was evident that the whole concentration could no longer be carried out before the Austrians would be in a position to intervene. Berthier received the news while still on his way to the front, and quite failed to grasp the situation. Reaching Donauwörth at 8 P.M. on the 13th of April, he ordered Davout and Oudinot to remain at Regensburg, whilst Lefebvre and Wrede (Bavarians) who had fallen back before the Austrians were directed to re-occupy Landshut. This was in direct contradiction with the instructions Napoleon had given him on the 28th of March in view of this very emergency. Davout obeyed, but remonstrated. On the 16th Berthier went on to Augsburg, where he learnt that Lefebvre's advanced troops had been driven out of Landshut, thus opening a great gap seventy-six miles wide between the two wings of the French army. Meanwhile Napoleon, who had left Paris at 4 A.M. on the 13th of April, was hastening towards the front, but remained still in ignorance of Berthier's doings until on the 16th at Stuttgart he received a letter from the Marshal dated the 13th, which threw him into consternation. In reply he immediately wrote: "You do not inform me what has rendered necessary such an extraordinary measure which weakens and divides my troops"—and—"I cannot quite grasp the meaning of your letter yet, I should have preferred to see my army concentrated between Ingolstadt and Augsburg, the Bavarians in the first line, with the duke of Danzig in his old position, until we know what the enemy is going to do. Everything would be excellent if the duke of Auerstädt had been at Ingolstadt and the duke of Rivoli with the Württembergers and Oudinot's corps at Augsburg, . . . so that just the opposite of what should have been done has been done" (C. N. to Berthier, Ludwigsburg, 16th April).

Napoleon takes command.—Having despatched this severe reprimand he hastened on to Donauwörth, where he arrived at 4 A.M. on the 17th, hoping to find Berthier, but the latter was at Augsburg. Nevertheless at 10 A.M. he ordered Davout and Oudinot to withdraw at once to Ingolstadt; and Lefebvre and Wrede on the right to support the movement. About noon Berthier returned and after hearing his explanation Massena received orders to move from Augsburg towards Ingolstadt. "To-morrow will be a day of preparation spent in drawing closer together, and I expect to be able by Wednesday to manœuvre against the enemy's columns according to circumstances."


Meanwhile the Austrians had approached so near that by a single day's march it would have been possible to fall upon and crush by superior numbers either wing of the French army, but though the Austrian light cavalry successfully covered the operations of the following troops they had not yet risen to a conception of their reconnoitring mission, and the archduke, in ignorance of his opportunity and possessed, moreover, with the preconceived idea of uniting at Regensburg with the two corps coming from Bohemia, moved the bulk of his forces in that direction, leaving only a covering body against Davout, altogether insufficient to retain him. Davout, however, had left a garrison of 1800 men in Regensburg, who delayed the junction of the Austrian wings until the 20th inst., and on the same day the emperor, having now reunited his whole right wing and centre, overwhelmed the covering detachments facing him in a long series of disconnected engagements lasting forty-eight hours, and the archduke now found himself in danger of being forced back into the Danube. But with the Bohemian reinforcements he had still four corps in hand, and Napoleon, whose intelligence service in the difficult and intersected country had lamentably failed him, had weakened his army by detaching a portion of his force in pursuit of the beaten right wing, and against the archduke's communications.

Eckmühl.—When, therefore, the latter, on the 22nd, marched southward to reopen his communications by the defeat of the enemy's army, always the surest means of solving

this difficulty, he actually reached the neighbourhood of Eckmühl with a sufficient numerical superiority had he only been prompt enough to seize his opportunity. But the French had been beforehand with him. Napoleon, who had personally taken part in the fighting of the previous day, and followed the pursuit as far as Landshut, whence he had despatched Masséna to follow the retreating Austrians along the Isar, seems to have realized about 3 A.M. in the morning that it was not the main body of the enemy he had had before him, but only its left wing, and that the main body itself must still be northward towards Regensburg. Issuing orders to Davout, Oudinot and his cavalry to concentrate with all speed towards Eckmühl, he himself rode back along the Regensburg road and reached the battle-field just as the engagement between the advance troops had commenced. Had the Austrians possessed mobility equal to that of the French the latter should have been overwhelmed in detail, but whilst the French covered 17 and 19 m. the Austrians only marched 10, and, owing to the defect in their tactical training alluded to above, the troops actually on the ground could not hold out long enough for their reserves to arrive. The retreat of the front lines involved the following ones in confusion, and presently the whole mass was driven back in considerable disorder. It seemed as if nothing could save the Austrians from complete disaster, but at the critical moment the emperor, yielding to the protestations of his corps commanders, who represented the excessive

fatigue of their troops, stopped the pursuit, and the archduke made the most of his opportunity to restore order amongst his demoralized men, and crossed to the north bank of the Danube during the night.

Austrian Retreat.—On the following morning the French reached Regensburg, and at once proceeded to assault its medieval walls, but the Austrian garrison bravely defended it till the last of the stragglers was safely



across on the north bank. It was here that for the only time in his career Napoleon was slightly wounded. Then, leaving Davout to observe the archduke's retreat, the emperor himself rode after Masséna, who with the major portion of the French army was following the Austrian weaker wing under Hiller. The latter was not so shaken as Napoleon believed, and turning to bay inflicted a severe check on its pursuers, who at Ebelsberg lost 4000 men in three fruitless assaults. Thus covered by his rearguard Hiller gained space and time to pass his troops over to the north bank of the Danube and remove all boats on the river. This left the direct road to Vienna open, and Napoleon, hoping to find peace in the enemy's capital, pushed the whole of his army down the right bank, and with Murat's cavalry entered the city on the 12th of May, after somewhat severe resistance lasting three days. Meanwhile the archduke and Hiller, both now unmolested, effected their junction in the vicinity of Wagram, picketing the whole line of the Danube with their outposts and collecting all the boats.

Aspern.—The reconnaissance of the river was at once taken in hand by the French upon their arrival in Vienna, and a point opposite the island of Lobau selected for the crossing. Thanks to the Austrian precautions it took four days to collect the necessary material to span the main branch of the river, here some 2000 yds. across, and though Napoleon personally spurred on all to activity nearly four days more were required for its construction. It was not till the night of the 19th of May that orders for the passage were finally issued, and during the night the troops commenced to occupy the island of Lobau. Surprise, of course, was out of the question, but the Austrians did not attempt to dispute the passage, their object being to allow as many French as they felt they could deal with to pass over and then to fall on them. Thus on the 21st of May the battle of Aspern or Essling began. By the evening of the 20th great masses of men had been collected there and the last arm of the Danube, between Lobau and the left bank, bridged. Masséna's corps at once crossed to the left banks and dislodged the Austrian outposts. Undeterred by the news of heavy attacks on his rear from Tirol and from Bohemia, Napoleon hurried

all available troops to the bridges, and by daybreak on the 21st, 40,000 men were collected on the Marchfeld, the broad open plain of the left bank, which was also to be the scene of the battle of Wagram. The archduke did not resist the passage; it was his intention, as soon as a large enough force had crossed, to attack it before the rest of the French army could come to its assistance. Napoleon had, of course, accepted the risk of such an attack, but he sought at the same time to minimize it by summoning every available battalion to the scene. His forces on the Marchfeld were drawn up in front of the bridges facing north, with their left in the village of Aspern (Gross-Aspern) and their right in Essling (or Esslingen). Both places lay close to the Danube and could not therefore be turned; Aspern, indeed, is actually on the bank of one of the river channels. But the French had to fill the gap between the villages, and also to move forward to give room for the supports to form up. Whilst they were thus engaged the archduke moved to the attack with his whole army in five columns. Three under Hiller, Bellegarde and Hohenzollern were to converge upon Aspern, the other two, under Rosenberg, to attack Essling. The Austrian cavalry was in the centre, ready to move out against any French cavalry which should attack the heads of the columns. During the 21st the bridges became more and more unsafe, owing to the violence of the current, but the French crossed without intermission all day and during the night.


The battle began at Aspern; Hiller carried the village at the first rush, but Masséna recaptured it, and held his ground with the same tenacity as he had shown at Genoa in 1800. The French infantry, indeed, fought on this day with the old stubborn bravery which it had failed to show in the earlier battles of the year. The three Austrian columns fighting their hardest through the day were unable to capture more than half the village; the rest was still held by Masséna when night fell. In the meanwhile nearly all the French infantry posted between the two villages and in front of the bridges had been drawn into the fight on either flank. Napoleon therefore, to create a diversion, sent forward his centre, now consisting only of cavalry, to charge the enemy's artillery, which was deployed in a long line and firing into Aspern. The first charge of the French was repulsed, but the second attempt, made by heavy masses of cuirassiers, was more serious. The French horsemen, gallantly led, drove off the guns, rode round Hohenzollern's infantry squares, and routed the cavalry of Liechtenstein, but they were unable to do more, and in the end they retired to their old position. In the meanwhile Essling had been the scene of fighting almost as desperate as that of Aspern. The French cuirassiers made repeated charges on the flank of Rosenberg's force, and for long delayed the assault, and in the villages Lannes with a single division made a heroic and successful resistance, till night ended the battle. The two armies bivouacked on their ground, and in Aspern the French and Austrians lay within pistol shot of each other. The latter had fought fully as hard as their opponents, and Napoleon realized that they were no longer the professional soldiers of former campaigns. The spirit of the nation was in them and they fought to kill, not for the honour of their arms. The emperor was not discouraged, but on the contrary renewed his efforts to bring up every available man. All through the night more and more French troops were put across.

At the earliest dawn of the 22nd the battle was resumed. Masséna swiftly cleared Aspern of the enemy, but at the same time Rosenberg stormed Essling at last. Lannes, however, resisted desperately, and reinforced by St. Hilaire's division, drove Rosenberg out. In Aspern Masséna had been less fortunate, the counter-attack of Hiller and Bellegarde being as completely successful as that of Lannes and St. Hilaire. Meantime Napoleon had launched a great attack on the Austrian centre. The whole of the French centre, with Lannes on the right and the cavalry in reserve, moved forward. The Austrian line was broken through, between Rosenberg's right and Hohenzollern's left, and the French squadrons poured into the gap. Victory was almost won when the archduke brought up his last reserve, himself leading on his soldiers with a colour in his hand. Masséna was checked, and with his repulse the impetus of the attack died out all along the line. Aspern had been lost, and graver news reached Napoleon at the critical moment. The Danube bridges, which had broken down once already, had at last been cut by heavy barges, which had been set adrift down stream for the purpose by the Austrians. Napoleon at once suspended the attack. Essling now fell to another assault of Rosenberg, and though again the French, this time part of the Guard, drove him out, the Austrian general then directed his efforts on the flank of the French centre, slowly retiring on the bridges. The retirement was terribly costly, and but for the steadiness of Lannes the French must have been driven into the Danube, for the archduke's last effort to break down their resistance was made with the utmost fury. Only the complete exhaustion of both sides put an end to the fighting. The French lost 44,000 out of 90,000 successively engaged, and amongst the killed were Lannes and St. Hilaire. The Austrians, 75,000 strong, lost 23,360. Even this, the first great defeat of Napoleon, did not shake his resolution. The beaten forces were at last withdrawn safely into the island. On the night of the 22nd the great bridge was repaired, and the army awaited the arrival of reinforcements, not in Vienna, but in Lobau.

By nightfall upwards of 100,000 men, encumbered with at least 20,000 wounded,

were crowded together on the little island scarcely a mile square, short of provisions and entirely destitute of course of all hospital accessories. The question then arose whether the retreat was to be continued across the main stream or not, and for the second time in his career Napoleon assembled his generals to take their opinion. They counselled retreat, but having heard them all he replied, in substance: "If we leave here at all we may as well retire to Strassburg, for unless the enemy is held by the threat of further operations he will be free to strike at our communications and has a shorter distance to go. We must remain here and renew operations as soon as possible."

Wagram.—Immediate orders were despatched to summon every available body of troops to concentrate for the decisive stroke. Practically the lines of communication along the Danube were denuded of combatants, even Bernadotte being called up from Passau, and the viceroy of Italy, who driving the archduke Johann before him (action of Raab) had brought up 56,000 men through Tirol, was disposed towards Pressburg within easy call. The arsenal of Vienna was ransacked for guns, stores and appliances,



and preparations in the island pushed on as fast as possible. For several days previous to the great battle the French had sent across small detachments, and hence when, on the afternoon of the 4th of July, an advanced guard was put over near Gross Enzersdorf, the attention of the Austrians was not particularly attracted and they did not interfere. The emperor, however, had now men available for the battle, and under cover of this detachment his pontoniers made the seven bridges. Long before daylight on the 6th the troops began to stream across, and about 9 A.M. the three corps destined for the first line (Davout, Oudinot and Masséna) had completed their deployment on a front of some 6000 yds. and were moving forward to make way for the second line (Eugene and Bernadotte) and the third line (Bessières and the Guard). About noon the general advance began, the French opening outwards like a fan to obtain space for manœuvre, Davout direct on Markgrafneusiedl and the Austrian left, Masséna (slightly refused to cover the French left) by Breitenlee on Süssenbrunn.

The Austrians held a strong position along the line of the Russbach from Deutsch-Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl with their left, whilst their right was held ready for a

counter-attack intended to roll up the French attack from left to right when the proper moment should come. The movements of the great French masses in the confined space were slow, and the attack on the line of the Russbach did not declare itself till 8 P.M. ; the corps did not attack simultaneously, and failed altogether to make any serious impression on the Austrian position. Masséna on the left was scarcely engaged.

But, hearing of the success of his left wing on the Russbach, the archduke determined to anticipate the French next morning on that side, and four corps were directed upon Masséna, who had bivouacked his troops overnight on the line Leopoldsau-Süssenbrunn-Aderklaa, the latter, a strongly built village, forming, as it were, a bridge-head to the passages of the Russbach at Deutsch-Wagram. Another corps with a strong cavalry force was also directed to pivot round Markgrafneusiedl and to attack Davout on his right ; on this flank also the arrival of the archduke Johann was expected later in the day.

The Austrian movements were somewhat ill-connected ; nevertheless, by 11 A.M. Masséna's left had been driven back almost to Aspern, and his right, though aided by Bernadotte, had failed to recapture Aderklaa, from which the Austrians had driven his advanced posts early in the morning. The situation for the French looked very serious, for their troops were not fighting with the dash and spirit of former years. But Napoleon was a master in the psychology of the battlefield, and knew that on the other side things were much the same. He therefore sent orders along the whole line for a gigantic counter-stroke. Davout on the right was to attack Markgrafneusiedl again. Masséna was to move against the troops immediately to his front ; Bernadotte and Marmont to advance respectively against Breitenlee and Aderklaa, whilst in the gap which would thus open between them marched the 5th corps (Macdonald) on Süssenbrunn, covered by a battery of 104 guns and followed by the guard and reserve cavalry.

Macdonald formed his 30,000 men in a gigantic hollow square—on a front of one battalion, fourteen battalions deployed at six paces distance leading, whilst the remainder of the infantry marched in column of sections on either flank, and cavalry closed the rear. The idea was to compel even the weakest to go on, on pain of being trampled to death under the feet of the following men and horses, but the terror caused by the Austrian round-shot tearing huge gaps through the mass proved enough to counteract even this danger, and the men in the advance threw themselves down wholesale. It is admitted by French authors (Ardant du Picq) that of the 30,000 only 3000 actually delivered the attack, about 3000 were killed or wounded, but 24,000 evaded their duty somehow, and the trail of the column appeared one mass of dead and dying, creating a terrible impression on all who saw it. Nevertheless, Macdonald reached his destination, for the guns had literally torn a gap in the opposing line, and the Guards and cavalry then followed intact. At the same time Davout also had made progress, and, learning that the archduke Johann could not be counted on for that day, the archduke Charles issued orders for a retreat. The whole Austrian army was gradually withdrawn, unbeaten and still available for a renewed offensive if necessary the following day.

The French, however, were in no condition to follow up their advantage. They had seen more of the slaughter than their adversaries, and except the emperor and Davout all seem to have been completely shaken. Even in Davout's command, always the steadiest in danger, the limit of endurance had been passed, for when about 5 P.M. the advanced patrols of the archduke Johann's force appeared on their flank, panic on a scale hitherto unknown in the *Grande Armée* seized the whole right wing, and Napoleon had to confess that no further advance was possible with these men for several days.

Berndt (*Zahl im Kriege*) gives the following figures. French, 181,700 (including 29,000 cavalry) and 450 guns engaged, of whom 23,000 men were killed and wounded, 7000 missing (16%) ; 11 guns and 12 eagles and colours were lost. Austrians, 128,600 (including 14,600 cavalry) men and 410 guns engaged ; losses, 19,110 killed and wounded, and 6740 missing (20%) ; 9 guns and one colour were lost. The casualties in general officers were unusually severe, 21 French and 15 Austrians being killed and wounded. The only other event which occurred before peace was made was an unimportant action at Znaim on the 11th of July.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN WAR OF 1812

AWARE of the growing feeling against war in France, Napoleon had determined to make his allies not only bear the expenses of the coming campaign, but find the men as well, and he was so far master of Europe that of the 363,000 who on the 24th of June crossed the Niemen no less than two-thirds were Germans, Austrians, Poles or Italians. But though the battlefield discipline of the men was better, the discipline in camp and on the march was worse, for the troops were no longer eager to reach the battlefield, and marched because they were compelled, not of their own goodwill.

The Strategic Deployment.—By the middle of June 1812 the emperor had assembled his army along the line of the Niemen. On the extreme right stood the Austrian contingent under Schwarzenberg (34,000 men). Next, centring about Warsaw, a group of three corps (19,000 men) under the chief command of Napoleon's brother Jerome. Then the main army under Napoleon in person (220,000 men; with 80,000 more under the viceroy of Italy on his right rear); and on the extreme left at Tilsit a flanking corps, comprising the Prussian auxiliary corps and other Germans (in all 40,000 strong). The whole army was particularly strong in cavalry; out of the 450,000, 80,000 belonged to that arm, and Napoleon, mindful of the lessons of 1807, had issued the most minute and detailed orders for the supply service in all its branches, and the forwarding of reinforcements, no less than 100,000 men being destined for that purpose in due course of time.

Information about the Russians was very indifferent; it was only known that Prince Bagration with about 33,000 men lay grouped about Wolkowysk; Barclay de Tolly with 40,000 about Vilna; and on the Austrian frontier lay a small corps under Tormassov in process of formation, while far away on the Turkish frontiers hostilities with the sultan retained Tschitschagov with 50,000 more.

Opening of the Campaign.—On the 24th of June the passage of the Niemen began in torrid heat which lasted for a few days. The main army, with the emperor in person, covered by Murat and the cavalry, moved on Vilna, whilst Jerome on his right rear at once threatened Bagration and covered the emperor's outer flank. From the very first, however, the inherent weakness of the vast army, and the vicious choice of time for the beginning of the advance, began to make itself felt. The crops being still green, and nothing else available as forage for the horses, an epidemic of colic broke out amongst them, and in ten days the mounted arms had lost upwards of one-third of their strength; men died of sunstroke in numbers, and serious straggling began. Still everything pointed to the concentration of the Russians at Vilna, and Jerome, who on the 5th of July had reached Grodno, was ordered to push on. But Jerome proved quite inadequate to his position, listening to the complaints of his subordinates as to want of supplies, and even of pay; he spent four whole days in absolute inertia, notwithstanding the emperor's reprimands. Meanwhile the Russians made good their retreat—Barclay towards the entrenched camp of Drissa on the Dvina, Bagration towards Mohilev.

The emperor's first great *coup* thus failed. Jerome was replaced by Davout, and the army resumed its march, this time in the hope of surrounding and overwhelming Barclay, whilst Davout dealt with Bagration. The want of mobility, particularly in the cavalry, now began to tell against the French. With horses only just recovering from an epidemic, they proved quite unequal to the task of catching the Cossacks, who swarmed round them in every direction, never accepting an engagement but compelling a constant watchfulness for which nothing in their previous experience had sufficiently prepared the French.


Before their advance, however, the Russian armies steadily retired, Barclay from Vilna via Drissa to Vitebsk, Bagration from Wolkowysk to Mohilev. Again arrangements were made for a Napoleonic battle; behind Murat's cavalry came the "general advanced guard" to attack and hold the enemy, whilst the main body and Davout were held available to swing in on his rear. Napoleon, however, failed to allow for the psychology of his opponents, who, utterly indifferent to the sacrifice of life, refused to be drawn into engagements to support an advance or to extricate a rearguard, and steadily withdrew from every position when the French gained touch with them.

Thus the manœuvre against Vitebsk again miscarried, and Napoleon found himself in a far worse position, numerically and materially, than at the outset of the campaign. Then he had stood with 420,000 men on a front of 160 m., now he had only 229,000 men on a front of 135; he had missed three great opportunities of destroying his enemy in detail, and in five weeks, during which time he had only traversed 200 m., he had seen his troops reduced numerically at least one-third, and, worse still, his army was now far from being the fighting machine it had been at the outset.

Smolensk.—Meanwhile the Russians had not lost a single gun and the *moral* of their

men had been improved by the result of the many minor encounters with the enemy; further, the junction of Bagration and Barclay was now assured in the vicinity of Smolensk. Towards this place the French advance was now resumed, and the Russian generals at the head of a united force of 130,000 men marched forward to meet them. Here, however, the inefficiency of the Russian staff actually saved them from the disaster which must certainly have overtaken them had they realized their intention of fighting the French. The Russians marched in two columns, which lost touch of one another, and as it was quite impossible for either to engage the French single-handed, they both retired again towards Smolensk, where with an advanced guard in the town itself—which possessed an old-fashioned brick *enceinte* not to be breached by field artillery alone—the two columns reunited and deployed for action behind the unfordable Dnieper.

Murat and Ney as "general advanced guard" attacked the town in the morning of the 16th of August, and whilst they fought the main body was swung round to attack the Russian left and rear. The whole of the 17th was required to complete the movement, and as soon as its purpose was sufficiently revealed to the Russians the latter determined to retreat under cover of night. Their manœuvre was carried out with complete success, and then began a series of rearguard actions and nocturnal retreats which completely accomplished their purpose of wearing down the French army. The Russian government, however, failed to see the matter in its true light, and Marshal Kutusov was sent to the front to assume the chief command. His intention was to occupy a strong position and fight



one general action for the possession of Moscow, and to this end he selected the line of the Kalatscha where the stream intersects the great Moscow road.

Borodino.—Here he was overtaken by Murat and Ney, but the French columns had straggled so badly that four whole days elapsed before the emperor was able to concentrate his army for battle and then could only oppose 128,000 men to the Russians' 110,000. After preliminary fighting on the 5th of September both sides prepared for battle on the 6th, Napoleon holding back in the hope of confirming the enemy in his resolution to fight a decisive battle. For the same reason the French right wing, which could have manœuvred the Russians from their position, was designedly weakened. The Russian right, bent back at an angle and strongly posted, was also neglected, for Napoleon intended to make a direct frontal attack. The enemy's right centre near the village of Borodino was to be attacked by the viceroy of Italy, Eugene, who was afterwards to roll up the Russian line towards its centre, the so-called "great redoubt," which was to be attacked directly from the front by Ney and Junot. Farther to the French right, Davout was to attack frontally a group of field works on which the Russian left centre was formed; and the extreme right of the French army was composed of the weak corps of Poniatowski. The cavalry corps were assigned to the various leaders named, and the Guard was held in reserve. The whole line was not more than about 2 m. long, giving an average of over 20 men per yard. When the Russians closed on their centre they were even more densely massed, and their reserves were subjected to an effective fire from the French field guns.

At 6 A.M. on the 7th of September the French attack began. By 8 A.M. the Russian centre was driven in, and though a furious counter-attack enabled Prince Bagration's troops to win back their original line, fresh French troops under Davout and Ney drove them back again. But the Russians, though they lost ground elsewhere, still clung to the great redoubt, and for a time the advance of the French was suspended by Napoleon's order, owing to a cavalry attack by the Russians on Eugene's extreme left. When this alarm was ended the advance was resumed. Napoleon had now collected a sufficient target for his guns. A terrific bombardment by the artillery was followed by the decisive charge of the battle, made by great masses of cavalry. The horsemen, followed by the infantry, charged at speed, broke the Russian line in two, and the French squadrons entered the gorge of the great redoubt just as Eugene's infantry climbed up its faces. In a fearful *mêlée* the Russian garrison of the redoubt was almost annihilated. The defenders were now dislodged from their main line and the battle was practically at an end. Napoleon was suffering from one of those attacks of illness and depression which henceforth became such an important factor in his fate. Till about midday he followed the course of the action with his usual alertness; then he appears to have been overcome by a kind of stupor and allowed his marshals to fight by themselves. There was no final decisive effort as at Wagram and the Guard was not even called on to move. Napoleon has been criticized for not using the Guard, which was intact, to complete the victory. There is, however, no evidence that any further expenditure of men would have had good results. Napoleon had imposed his will on the enemy so far that they ceded possession of Moscow without further resistance. That the defeat and losses of the Russian field army did not end the war was due to the national spirit of the Russians, not to military miscalculations of Napoleon. Had it not been for this spirit, Borodino would have been decisive of the war without the final blow of the Guard. As it was, the Russians lost about 42,000 men out of 121,000; Napoleon's army (of which one-half consisted of the contingents of subject allies—Germany, Poland, Switzerland, Holland, &c.) 32,000 out of 130,000 (Berndt, *Zahl im Kriege*). On the side of the French 31 general officers were killed, wounded or taken, and amongst the killed were General Montbrun, who fell at the head of his cavalry corps, and Auguste Caulaincourt, who took Montbrun's place and fell in the *mêlée* in the redoubt. The Russians lost 22 generals, amongst them Prince Bagration, who died of his wounds after the battle, and to whose memory a monument was erected on the battle-field by the tsar Nicholas I.

Moscow.—Kutusov continued his retreat, and Murat with his now exhausted horsemen followed as best he might. Sebastiani, commanding the advanced guard, overtook the Russians in the act of evacuating Moscow, and agreed with the latter to observe a seven hours' armistice to allow the Russians to clear the town, for experience had shown the French that street fighting in wooden Russian townships always meant fire and the consequent destruction of much-needed shelter and provisions. Towards nightfall Napoleon reached the scene, and the Russians being now clear the troops began to enter, but already fires were observed in the farther part of the city. Napoleon passed the night in a house in the western suburb and next morning rode to the Kremlin, the troops moving to the quarters assigned to them, but in the afternoon a great fire began, and, continuing for two days, drove the French out into the country again.

The emperor was now in the direst perplexity. Kutusov was hovering on the outskirts of the city, his main body at Kaluga, some marches to the S.W., where he was in full communication with the richest portion of the empire; and now news arrived that St Cyr, who had relieved Macdonald on his extreme left, had only 17,000 men left under arms against upwards of 40,000 Russians under Witgenstein; and to the south Tschitschagov's army, being no longer detained on the Turkish frontier, peace having been made, was marching to join Tormassov about Brest-Litewski with forces which would bring the total of the two well over 100,000 men. Meanwhile Schwarzenberg's force opposing these had dwindled to a bare 30,000.

The French army was thus disposed almost in an equilateral triangle with sides of about 570 m., with 95,000 men at the apex at Moscow opposed to 120,000, 30,000 about Brest opposite 100,000, and 17,000 about Drissa confronted by 40,000, whilst in the centre of the base at Smolensk lay Victor's corps, about 30,000. From Moscow the Niemen was 550 m. In view of this situation Napoleon on the 4th of October sent General Lauriston to the Russian headquarters to treat. Whilst waiting his return Murat was enjoined to skirmish with Kutusov, and the emperor himself worked out a scheme to assume the offensive with his whole army towards St Petersburg, calling in Victor and St Cyr on the way. This project was persisted with, until on the 18th Murat was himself attacked and severely handled (action of Tarutino or Vinkovo). On the morning of the 19th the whole army moved out to accept this challenge, and the French were thoroughly worsted on the 24th in the battle of Maloyaroslavetz.

The Retreat from Moscow.—Then began the celebrated retreat. It has generally been forgotten that the utter want of march discipline in the French, and not the climatic conditions, was responsible for the appalling disasters which ensued. Actually the frost came later than usual that year, the 27th of October, and the weather was dry and bracing;

not till the 8th of November did the cold at night become sharp. Even when the Beresina was reached on the 26th November, the cold was far from severe, for the slow and sluggish stream was not frozen over, as is proved by the fact that Eblé's pioneers worked in the water all through that terrible day. But the French army was already completely out of hand, and the degree to which the panic of a crowd can master even the strongest instinct of the individual is shown by the conduct of the fugitives who crowded over the bridges, treading hundreds under foot, whilst all the time the river was easily fordable and mounted men rode backwards and forwards across it.

To return to the actual sequence of events. Kutusov had been very slow in exploiting his success of the 24th and indeed had begun the pursuit in a false direction; but about the 2nd of November, headquarters of the French being at Vyazma, the Cossacks became so threatening that the emperor ordered the army to march (as in Egypt) in hollow square. This order, however, appears only to have been obeyed by the Guards, with whom henceforward the emperor marched.

Kutusov had now overtaken the French, but fortunately for them he made no effort to close with them, but hung on their flank, molesting them with Cossacks and picking up stragglers. Thus the wreck of the *Grande Armée*, now not more than fifty thousand strong, reached Smolensk on the 9th and there rested till the 14th. The march was then resumed, the Guard leading and Ney commanding the rearguard. Near Krasnoi on the 16th the Russian advanced guard tried to head the column off. Napoleon halted a whole day to let the army close up; and then attacked with his old vigour and succeeded in clearing the road, but only at the cost of leaving Ney and the rearguard to its fate. By a night march of unexampled daring and difficulty Ney succeeded in breaking through the Russian cordon, but when he regained touch with the main body at Orcha only 800 of his 6000 men were still with him (21st).

The Beresina.—From here Napoleon despatched orders to Victor to join him at Borisov on the Beresina. The cold now gave way and thaw set in, leaving the country a morass, and information came that Tschitschagov from the south had reached Borisov. He now selected Viesselovo as the point of passage and at 1 A.M. on the 23rd sent orders to Oudinot to march thither and construct bridges. In the execution of these orders Oudinot encountered the Russian advanced guard near Borisov and drove the latter back in confusion, though not before they had destroyed the existing bridge there. This sudden re-assumption of the offensive threw Tschitschagov into confusion. Thus time was gained for Victor also to come up and for Oudinot to construct the bridges at Studienka near the above-mentioned place, but a spot in many respects better suited for the purpose. Thither therefore Napoleon sent his pontonniers under General Eblé, but on their arrival they found that no preparations had been made and much time was lost. Meanwhile Victor, in doubt as to the real point of passage, had left the road to Studienka open to Wittgenstein, who had followed hard on his heels.

By 4 P.M. on the 26th the bridges were finished and the passage began, but not without resistance by the Russians, who were gradually closing in. The crossing continued all night, though interrupted from time to time by failures of the bridges. All day during the 27th stragglers continued to cross, covered by such combatants as remained under sufficient discipline to be employed. At 8 A.M. on the 28th, however, Tschitschagov and Wittgenstein moved forward on both flanks of the river to the attack, but were held off by the splendid self-sacrifice of a few remaining troops under Ney, Oudinot and Victor, until about 1 P.M. the last body of regular troops passed over the bridges, and only a few thousand stragglers remained beyond the river.

The number of troops engaged by the French that day cannot be given exactly. Oudinot's and Victor's men were relatively fresh and may have totalled 20,000, whilst Ney can hardly have had more than 6000 of all corps fighting under him. How many were killed can never be known, but three days later the total number of men reported fit for duty had fallen to 8800 only.

Final Operations.—Henceforward the retreat of the army became practically a headlong flight, and on the 5th of December, having reached Smorgoni and seeing that nothing further could be done by him at the front, the emperor handed over the command of what remained to Murat, and left for Paris to organize a fresh army for the following year. Travelling at the fullest speed, he reached the Tuileries on the 18th, after a journey of 312 hours.

After the emperor's departure the cold set in with increased severity, the thermometer falling to 23°. On the 8th of December Murat reached Vilna, whilst Ney with about 400 men and Wrede with 2000 Bavarians still formed the rearguard; but it was quite impossible to carry out Napoleon's instructions to go into winter quarters about the town, so that the retreat was resumed on the 10th and ultimately Königsberg was attained on the 19th of December by Murat with 400 Guards and 600 Guard cavalry dismounted.

Meanwhile on the extreme French right Schwarzenberg and his Austrians had drifted away towards their own frontier, and the Prussian contingent, which under Yorck formed part of Macdonald's command about Riga, had entered into a convention with the Russians at Tauroggen (December 30) which deprived the French of their last support upon their

left. Königsberg thus became untenable, and Murat fell back to Posen, where on the 10th of January he handed over his command to Eugène Beauharnais and returned to Paris.

The Russian pursuit practically ceased at the line of the Niemen, for their troops also had suffered terrible hardships and a period of rest had become an absolute necessity.

CHAPTER VI

THE WAR OF LIBERATION

THE Convention of Tauroggen became the starting point of Prussia's regeneration. As the news of the destruction of the *Grande Armée* spread, and the appearance of countless stragglers convinced the Prussian people of the reality of the disaster, the spirits generated by years of French domination burst out. For the moment the king and his ministers were placed in a position of the greatest anxiety, for they knew the resources of France and the boundless versatility of their arch-enemy far too well to imagine that the end of their sufferings was yet in sight. To disavow the acts and desires of the army and of the secret societies for defence with which all north Germany was honeycombed would be to imperil the very existence of the monarchy, whilst an attack on the wreck of the Grand Army meant the certainty of a terrible retribution from the new armies now rapidly forming on the Rhine.

But the Russians and the soldiers were resolved to continue the campaign, and working in collusion they put pressure on the unwilling representatives of the civil power to facilitate the supply and equipment of such troops as were still in the field; they could not refuse food and shelter to their starving countrymen or their loyal allies, and thus by degrees the French garrisons scattered about the country either found themselves surrounded or were compelled to retire to avoid that fate. Thus it happened that the viceroy of Italy felt himself compelled to depart from the positive injunctions of the emperor to hold on at all costs to his advanced post at Posen, where about 14,000 men had gradually rallied around him, and to withdraw step by step to Magdeburg, where he met reinforcements and commanded the whole course of the lower Elbe.

Napoleon's Preparations.—Meanwhile the emperor in Paris had been organizing a fresh army for the reconquest of Prussia. Thanks to his having compelled his allies to fight his battles for him, he had not as yet drawn very heavily on the fighting resources of France, the actual percentage of men taken by the conscriptions during the years since 1806 being actually lower than that in force in continental armies of to-day. He had also created in 1811-1812 a new National Guard, organized in "cohorts" to distinguish it from the regular army, and for home defence *only*, and these by a skilful appeal to their patriotism and judicious pressure applied through the prefects, became a useful reservoir of half-trained men for new battalions of the active army. Levies were also made with rigorous severity in the states of the Rhine Confederation, and even Italy was called on for fresh sacrifices. In this manner by the end of March upwards of 200,000 men were moving towards the Elbe,¹ and in the first fortnight of April they were duly concentrated in the angle formed by the Elbe and Saale, threatening on the one hand Berlin, on the other Dresden and the east.

Spring Campaign of 1813.—The allies, aware of the gradual strengthening of their enemy's forces but themselves as yet unable to put more than 200,000 in the field, had left a small corps of observation opposite Magdeburg and along the Elbe to give timely notice of an advance towards Berlin; and with the bulk of their forces had taken up a position about Dresden, whence they had determined to march down the course of the Elbe and roll up the French from right to left. Both armies were very indifferently supplied with information, as both were without any reliable regular cavalry capable of piercing the screen of outposts with which each endeavoured to conceal his disposition, and Napoleon, operating in a most unfriendly country, suffered more in this respect than his adversaries.

On the 25th of April Napoleon reached Erfurt and assumed the chief command. On this day his troops stood in the following positions. Eugene, with Lauriston's, Macdonald's and Regnier's corps, on the lower Saale, Ney in front of Weimar, holding the defile of Kosen; the Guard at Erfurt, Marmont at Gotha, Bertrand at Saalfeld, and Oudinot at Coburg, and during the next few days the whole were set in motion towards Merseberg and Leipzig, in the now stereotyped Napoleonic order, a strong advanced guard of all arms leading, the remainder—about two-thirds of the whole—following as "*masse de manœuvre*," this time, owing to the cover afforded by the Elbe on the left, to the right rear of the advanced guard.

Meanwhile the Russians and Prussians had concentrated all available men and were moving on an almost parallel line, but somewhat to the south of the direction taken by the

¹ Napoleon always gave them out as 300,000, but this number was never attained.

French. On the 1st of May Napoleon and the advanced guard entered Lützen. Wittgenstein, who now commanded the allies in place of Kutusov, hearing of his approach, had decided to attack the French advanced guard, which he took to be their whole force, on its right flank, and during the morning had drawn together the bulk of his forces on his right in the vicinity of Gross-Görschen and Kaya.

Battle of Lützen.—About 9 A.M. on May 2nd he began an attack on the French advance guard in Lützen, whilst the remainder of his army was directed against Napoleon's right and rear. Just as the latter were moving off the heads of the French main body suddenly appeared, and at 11 A.M. Napoleon, then standing near the Gustavus Adolphus monument on the field of Lützen, heard the roar of a heavy cannonade to his right rear. He realized the situation in a moment, galloped to the new scene of action, and at once grouped his forces for decisive action—the gift in which he was supreme. Leaving the leading troops to repulse as best they might the furious attack of both Russians and Prussians, and caring little whether they lost ground, he rapidly organized for his own control a battle-reserve. At length when both sides were exhausted by their efforts he sent forward nearly a hundred guns which tore asunder by their case-shot fire the enemy's line and marched his reserve right through the gap. Had he possessed an adequate cavalry force the victory would have been decisive. As it was, the allies made good their retreat and the French were too exhausted for infantry pursuit.

Perhaps no battle better exemplifies the inherent strength of the emperor's strategy, and in none was his grasp of the battlefield more brilliantly displayed, for, as he fully recognized, "These Prussians have at last learnt something—they are no longer the wooden toys of Frederick the Great," and, on the other hand, the relative inferiority of his own men as compared with his veterans of Austerlitz called for far more individual effort than on any previous day. He was everywhere, encouraging and compelling his men—it is a legend in the French army that the persuasion even of the imperial boot was used upon some of his reluctant conscripts, and in the result his system was fully justified, as it triumphed even against a great tactical surprise.

Bautzen.—As soon as possible the army pressed on in pursuit, Ney being sent across the Elbe to turn the position of the allies at Dresden. This threat forced the latter to evacuate the town and retire over the Elbe, after blowing up the stone bridge across the river. Napoleon entered the town hard on their heels, but the broken bridge caused a delay of four days, there being no pontoon trains with the army. Ultimately on the 18th of May the march was renewed, but the allies had continued their retreat in leisurely fashion, picking up reinforcements by the way. Arrived at the line of the Spree, they took up and fortified a very formidable position about Bautzen. Here, on the 20th, they were attacked, and after a two days' battle dislodged by Napoleon.

The position chosen by the allies as that in which to receive the attack of Napoleon ran S.W. to N.E. from Bautzen on the left to the village of Gleina on the right. Bautzen itself was held as an advanced post of the left wing (Russians), the main body of which lay 2 m. to the rear (E.) near Jenkowitz. On the heights of Burk, 2½ m. N.E. of Bautzen, was Kleist's Prussian corps, with Yorck's in support. On Kleist's right at Pliskowitz (3 m. N.E. of Burk) lay Blücher's corps, and on Blücher's right, formed at an angle to him, and refused towards Gleina (7 m. N.E. by E. of Bautzen), were the Russians of Barclay de Tolly. The country on which the battle was fought abounded in strong defensive positions, some of which were famous as battlegrounds of the Seven Years' War. The whole line was covered by the river Spree, which served as an immediate defence for the left and centre, and an obstacle to any force moving to attack the right; moreover the interval between the river and the position on this side was covered with a network of ponds and watercourses. Napoleon's right and centre approached (on a broad front owing to the want of cavalry) from Dresden by Bischofswerda and Kamenz; the left under Ney, which was separated by nearly 40 m. from the left of the main body at Luckau, was ordered to march via Hoyerswerda, Weissig and Klix to strike the allies' right. At noon on the 20th, Napoleon, after a prolonged reconnaissance, advanced the main army against Bautzen and Burk, leaving the enemy's right to be dealt with by Ney on the morrow. He equally neglected the extreme left of the allies in the mountains, judging it impossible to move his artillery and cavalry in the broken ground there. Oudinot's (XII.) corps, the extreme right wing, was to work round by the hilly country to Jenkowitz in rear of Bautzen, Macdonald's (XI.) corps was to assault Bautzen, and Marmont, with the VI. corps, to cross the Spree and attack the Prussians posted about Burk. These three corps were directed by Soult. Farther to the left, Bertrand's (IV.) corps was held back to connect with Ney, who had then reached Weissig with the head of his column. The Guard and other general reserves were in rear of Macdonald and Marmont. Bautzen was taken without difficulty; Oudinot and Marmont easily passed the Spree on either side, and were formed up on the other bank of the river by about 4 P.M. A heavy and indecisive combat took place in the evening between Oudinot and the Russian left directed by the tsar in person, in which Oudinot's men made a little progress towards Jenkowitz. Marmont's battle was more serious. The Prussians were not experienced troops but were full of ardour and hatred of the French. Kleist made a most stubborn resistance on the Burk

ridge, and Bertrand's corps was called up by Napoleon to join in the battle; but part of Blücher's corps fiercely engaged Bertrand, and Burk was not taken till 7 P.M. The French attack was much impeded by the ground and want of room to deploy between the river and the enemy. But Napoleon's object in thus forcing the fighting in the centre was achieved. The allies, feeling there the weight of the French attack, gradually drew upon the reserves of their left and right to sustain the shock. At nightfall Bautzen and Burk were in possession of the French, and the allied line now stretched from Jenkwitz northward to Pliskowitz, Blücher and Barclay maintaining their original positions at Pliskowitz and Gleina. The night of the 20th-21st was spent by both armies on the battlefield. Napoleon cared little that the French centre was almost fought out; it had fulfilled its mission, and on the 21st the decisive point was to be Barclay's position. Soon after daybreak fighting was renewed along the whole line; but Napoleon lay down to sleep until the time appointed for Ney's attack. To a heavy counter-stroke against Oudinot, which completely drove that marshal from the ground won on the 20th, the emperor paid no more heed than to order Macdonald to support the XII. corps. For in this second position of the allies, which was far more formidable than the original line, the decisive result could be brought about only by Ney. That commander had his own (III.) corps, the corps of Victor and of Lauriston and the Saxons under Reynier, a total force of 60,000 men. Lauriston, at the head of the column, had been sharply engaged on the 19th, but had spent the 20th in calculated inaction. Early on the 21st the flank attack opened; Ney and Lauriston moving direct upon Gleina, while Reynier and Victor operated by a wide turning movement against Barclay's right rear. The advance was carried out with precision; the Russians were quickly dislodged, and Ney was now closing upon the rear of Blücher's corps at the village of Preititz. Napoleon at once ordered Soult's four corps to renew their attacks in order to prevent the allies from reinforcing their right. But at the critical moment Ney halted; his orders were to be in Preititz at 11 A.M., and he reached that place an hour earlier. The respite of an hour enabled the allies to organize a fierce counter-attack; Ney was checked until the flanking columns of Victor and Reynier could come upon the scene. At 1 P.M., when Ney resumed his advance, it was too late to cut off the retreat of the allies. Napoleon now made his final stroke. The Imperial Guard and all other troops in the centre, 80,000 strong and covered by a great mass of artillery, moved forward to the attack; and shortly the allied centre, depleted of its reserves, which had been sent to oppose Ney, was broken through and driven off the field. Blücher, now almost surrounded, called back the troops opposing Ney to make head against Soult, and Ney's four corps then carried all before them. Preparations had been made by the allies, ever since Ney's appearance, to break off the engagement, and now the tsar ordered a general retreat eastwards, himself with the utmost skill and bravery directing the rear-guard. Thus the allies drew off unharmed, leaving no trophies in the hands of Napoleon, whose success, tactically unquestionable, was, for a variety of reasons, and above all owing to the want of cavalry, a *coup manqué* strategically. The troops engaged were, on the French side 163,000 men, on that of the allies about 100,000; and the losses respectively about 20,000 and 13,500 killed and wounded.

The allies, having broken off the action at their own time, retired in such good order that the emperor failed to capture a single trophy as proof of his victory. The enemy's escape annoyed him greatly, the absence of captured guns and prisoners reminded him too much of his Russian experiences, and he redoubled his demands on his corps commanders for greater vigour in the pursuit. This led the latter to push on without due regard to tactical precautions, and Blücher took advantage of their carelessness when at Haynau (May 26), with some twenty squadrons of Landwehr cavalry, he surprised, rode over and almost destroyed Maison's division. The material loss inflicted on the French was not very great, but its effect in raising the *moral* of the raw Prussian cavalry and increasing their confidence in their old commander was enormous.

Still the allies continued their retreat and the French were unable to bring them into action. In view of the doubtful attitude of Austria, Napoleon became alarmed at the gradual lengthening of his lines of communication and opened negotiations. The enemy, having everything to gain and nothing to lose thereby, agreed finally to a six weeks' suspension of arms. This was perhaps the gravest military error of Napoleon's whole career, and his excuse for it, "want of adequate cavalry," is the strongest testimony as to the value of that arm.

The Autumn Campaign.—As soon as a suspension of arms (to 15th of August) had been agreed to, Napoleon hastened to withdraw his troops from the dangerous position they occupied with reference to the passes leading over the mountains from Bohemia, for he entertained no doubt now that Austria was also to be considered as an enemy. Finally he decided to group his corps round Görlitz and Bautzen whence they could either meet the enemy advancing from Breslau or fall on his flank over the mountains if they attempted to force their way into Saxony by the valley of the Elbe. This latter manœuvre depended, however, on his maintenance of Dresden, and to this end he sent the I. Corps up the Elbe to Pirna and Königstein to cover the fortifications of Dresden itself. His instructions on this point deserve the closest study, for he foresaw the inevitable

attraction which a complete entrenched camp would exercise even upon himself, and, therefore, limited his engineers to the construction of a strong bridge head on the right bank and a continuous enceinte, broken only by gaps for counter attack, around the town itself.

Then he turned his attention to the plan for the coming campaign. Seeing clearly that his want of an efficient cavalry precluded all ideas of a resolute offensive in his old style, he determined to limit himself to a defence of the line of the Elbe, making only dashes of a few days' duration at any target the enemy might present.

Reinforcements had been coming up without ceasing and at the beginning of August he calculated that he would have 300,000 men available about Bautzen and 100,000 along the Elbe from Hamburg via Magdeburg to Torgau. With the latter he determined to strike the first blow, by a concentric advance on Berlin (which he calculated he would reach on the 4th or 5th day), the movement being continued thence to extricate the French garrisons in Küstrin, Stettin and Danzig. The moral effect, he promised himself, would be prodigious, and there was neither room nor food for these 100,000 elsewhere.

Towards the close of the armistice he learned the general situation of the allies. The crown prince of Sweden (Bernadotte), with his Swedes and various Prussian levies, 135,000 in all, lay in and around Berlin and Stettin; and knowing his former marshal well, Napoleon considered Oudinot a match for him. Blücher with about 95,000 Russians and Prussians was about Breslau, and Schwarzenberg, with nearly 180,000 Austrians and Russians, lay in Bohemia. In his position at Bautzen he felt himself equal to all his enemy's combinations.

Dresden.—The advance towards Berlin began punctually with the expiration of the armistice, but with the main army he himself waited to see more clearly his adversaries' plans. At length becoming impatient he advanced a portion of his army towards Blücher, who fell back to draw him into a trap. Then the news reached him that Schwarzenberg was pressing down the valley of the Elbe, and, leaving Macdonald to observe Blücher, he hurried back to Bautzen to dispose his troops to cross the Bohemian mountains in the general direction of Königstein, a blow which must have had decisive results. But the news from Dresden was so alarming that at the last moment he changed his mind, and sending Vandamme alone over the mountains, he hurried with his whole army to the threatened point. This march remains one of the most extraordinary in history, for the bulk of his forces moved, mainly in mass and across country, 90 m. in 72 hours, entering Dresden on the morning of the 27th, only a few hours before the attack of the allies commenced.


The battle of August 26th began late in the afternoon, for Schwarzenberg waited as long as possible for the corps of Klenau, which formed his extreme left wing on the Freiberg road. At last, about 6 P.M. he decided to wait no longer, and six heavy columns of attack advanced against the suburbs defended by St Cyr and now also by the leading troops of the main army. Three hundred guns covered the assault, and Dresden was set on fire in places by the cannonade, while the French columns marched unceasingly over the bridges and through the Altstadt. On the right the Russians under Wittgenstein advanced from Striesen, the Prussians under Kleist through the Grosser Garten, whilst Prussians under Prince Augustus and Austrians under Colloredo moved upon the Moczinski redoubt, which was the scene of the most desperate fighting, and was repeatedly taken and retaken. The attack to the westward was carried out by the other Austrian corps; Klenau, however, was still far distant. In the end, the French defences remained unshaken. Ney led a counter-attack against the allies' left, the Moczinski redoubt was definitely recaptured from Colloredo, and the Prussians were driven out of the Grosser Garten. The *coup* of the allies had failed, for every hour saw the arrival of fresh forces on the side of Napoleon, and at length the Austrian leader drew off his men to the heights again. He was prepared to fight another battle on the morrow—indeed he could scarcely have avoided it had he wished to do so, for behind him lay the mountain defiles, towards which Vandamme was marching with all speed.

Napoleon's plan for the 27th was, as usual, simple in its outline. As at Friedland, a ravine separated a part of the hostile line of battle from the rest. The villages west of the Plauen ravine and even Löbda were occupied in the early morning by General Metzko with the leading division of Klenau's corps from Freiberg, and upon Metzko Napoleon intended first to throw the weight of his attack, giving to Victor's infantry and the cavalry of Murat, king of Naples, the task of overwhelming the isolated Austrians. The centre, aided by the defences of the Dresden suburbs, could hold its own, as the events of the 26th had shown, the left, now under Ney, with whom served Kellermann's cavalry and the Young Guard, was to attack Wittgenstein's Russians on the Pirna road. Thus, for once, Napoleon decided to attack both flanks of the enemy. His motives in so doing have been much discussed by the critics; Vandamme's movements, it may be suggested, contributed to the French emperor's plan, which if carried out would open the Pirna road. Still, the left attack may have had a purely tactical object, for in that quarter was the main body of the Prussians and Russians, and Napoleon's method was always to concentrate the fury of the attack on the heaviest masses of the enemy, *i.e.* the best target for his

own artillery. A very heavy rainstorm during the night seriously affected the movements of troops on the following day, but all to Napoleon's advantage, for his more mobile artillery, reinforced by every horse available in and about Dresden, was still able to move where the allied guns sank in mud. Further, if the cavalry had to walk, or at most trot, through the fields the opposing infantry was almost always unable to fire their muskets. "You cannot fire; surrender," said Murat to an Austrian battalion in the battle. "Never," they replied; "you cannot charge us." On the appearance of Murat's horse artillery, however, they had to surrender at once. Under such conditions, Metzko, unsupported either by Klenau or the main army beyond the ravine, was an easy victim. Victor from Löbda drove in the advanced posts and assaulted the line of villages Wolfnitz-Töltschen; Metzko had to retire to the higher ground S.W. of the first line, and Murat, with an overwhelming cavalry force from Cotta and Burgstädt, outflanked his left, broke up whole battalions, and finally, with the assistance of the renewed frontal attack of Victor's infantry, annihilated the division. The Austrian corps of Gyulai arrived too late to save it. A few formed bodies escaped across the ravine, but Metzko and three-fourths of his men were killed or taken prisoners.

Meanwhile Ney on the other flank, with his left on the Pillnitz road and his right on the Grosser Garten, had opened his attack. The Russians offered a strenuous resistance,

defending Seidnitz, Gross Döbritz and Reick with their usual steadiness, and Ney was so far advanced that several generals at the allied headquarters suggested a counter attack on the centre by way of Strehlen, so as to cut off the French left from Dresden. This plan was adopted, but, owing to various misunderstandings, failed of execution. Thus the allied centre remained inactive all day, cannonaded by the Dresden redoubts. One incident only, but that of great importance, took place here. The tsar, the king of Prussia, Schwarzenberg and a very large headquarter staff watched the fighting from a hill near Räcknitz and offered an easy mark to the




French guns. In default of formed bodies to fire at, the latter had for a moment ceased fire; Napoleon, riding by, half carelessly told them to reopen, and one of their first shots, directed at 2000 yards' range against the mass of officers on the sky-line, mortally wounded General Moreau, who was standing by the emperor Alexander. A council of war followed. The allied sovereigns were for continuing the fight; Schwarzenberg, however, knowing the exhaustion of his troops decided to retreat. As at Bautzen, the French cavalry was unable to make any effective pursuit.

The forces engaged were 96,000 French, Saxons, &c., and 200,000 Austrians, Russians and Prussians. The French losses were about 10,000, or a little over 10%, those of the Allies 38,000 killed, wounded and prisoners (the latter 23,000) or 19%. They lost also 15 colours and 26 guns.

Dresden was the last great victory of the First Empire. By noon on the 27th August the Austrians and Russians were completely beaten and in full retreat, but meanwhile Napoleon himself again succumbed to one of his unaccountable attacks of apparent intellectual paralysis. He seemed unaware of the vital importance of the moment, crouching shivering over a bivouac fire, and finally rode back to Dresden, leaving no specific orders for the further pursuit.

French Defeats.—The allies, however, continued to retreat, but unfortunately, Vandamme, with his single corps and unsupported, issued out of the mountains on their



flank, threw himself across their line of retreat near Kulm, and was completely overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers (29th). In spite of this misfortune, Napoleon could claim a brilliant success for himself, but almost at the same moment news reached him that Oudinot at Grossbeeren near Berlin, and Macdonald on the Katzbach opposed to Blücher, had both been severely defeated.

Napoleon's Movements.—During the next two days the emperor examined his situation and dictated a series of notes which have been a puzzle to every strategical thinker ever since. In these he seems suddenly to have cut adrift from every principle the truth of which he had himself so brilliantly demonstrated, and we find him discussing plans based on hypothesis, not knowledge, and on the importance of geographical points without reference to the enemy's field army. From these reveries he was at length awakened by news which indicated that the consequences of Macdonald's defeat had been far more serious to the *moral* of that command than he had imagined. He immediately rode over to establish order, and his manner and violence were so improper that Caulaincourt had the greatest difficulty in concealing the scandal. Blücher, however, hearing of his arrival, at once retreated and the emperor followed, thus uncovering the passes over the Bohemian mountains, a fact of which Schwarzenberg was quick to take advantage. Learning of his approach, Napoleon, again withdrew to Bautzen. Then hearing that the Austrians had counter-marched and were again moving towards Dresden, he hastened back there, concentrated as many men as could conveniently be handled, and advanced beyond Pirna and Königstein to meet him. But the Austrians had no intention of attacking him, for time was now working on their side and, leaving his men to starve in the exhausted district, the emperor again returned to Dresden, where for the rest of the month he remained in an extraordinary state of vacillation. On the 4th of October he again drew up a review of the situation, in which he apparently contemplated giving up his communications with France and wintering in and around Dresden, though at the same time he is aware of the distress amongst his men for want of food.

Campaign of Leipzig.—In the meanwhile Blücher, Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte were working round his flanks. Ney, who had joined Oudinot after Grossbeeren, had been defeated at Dennewitz (6th Sept.), the victory, won by Prussian troops solely, giving the greatest encouragement to the enemy. Suddenly Napoleon's plans are again reviewed and completely changed. Calling up St Cyr, whom he had already warned to remain at Dresden with his command, he decides to fall back towards Erfurt, and go into winter quarters between that place and Magdeburg, pointing out that Dresden was of no use to him as a base and that if he does have a battle, he had much better have St Cyr and his men with him than at Dresden. He then on the 7th of October drew up a final plan, in which one again recognizes the old commander, and this he immediately proceeded to put into execution, for he was now quite aware of the danger threatening his line of retreat from both Blücher and Schwarzenberg and the North Army; yet only a few hours afterwards the portion of the order relating to St Cyr and Lobau was cancelled and the two were finally left behind at Dresden. From the 10th to the 13th Napoleon lay at Dübén, again a prey to the most extraordinary irresolution, but on that day he thought he saw his opportunity. Blücher was reported near Wittenberg, and Schwarzenberg was moving slowly round to the south of Leipzig. The North Army under Bernadotte, unknown to Napoleon, lay on Blücher's left around Halle. The emperor decided to throw the bulk of his force on Blücher, and, having routed him, turn south on Schwarzenberg and sever his communications with Bohemia. His concentration was effected with his usual sureness and celerity, but whilst the French moved on Wittenberg, Blücher was marching to his right, indifferent to his communications as all Prussia lay behind him.

This move on the 14th brought him into touch with Bernadotte, and now a single march forward of all three armies would have absolutely isolated Napoleon from France; but Bernadotte's nerve failed him, for on hearing of Napoleon's threat against Wittenberg he decided to retreat northward, and not all the persuasions of Blücher and Gneisenau could move him. Thus if the French movement momentarily ended in a blow in the air, it was indirectly the cause of their ultimate salvation.

The "Battle of the Nations."—On the 15th Napoleon concentrated his forces to the east of Leipzig, with only a weak detachment to the west, and in the evening the allies were prepared to attack him. Schwarzenberg, with 180,000 men available at once and 60,000 on the following day; Blücher had about 60,000, but Bernadotte now could not arrive before the 18th.

Napoleon prepared to throw the bulk of his force upon Schwarzenberg and massed his troops south-east of the town, whilst Schwarzenberg marched concentrically against him down the valley of the Elster and Plesse, the mass of his troops on the right bank of the latter and a strong column under Giulay on the left working round to join Blücher on the north. The fighting which followed was most obstinate, but the Austrians failed to make any impression on the French positions, and indeed Giulay felt himself compelled to withdraw to his former position. On the other hand, Blücher carried the village of Möckern and came within a mile of the gates of the town. During the 17th there was only indecisive skirmishing, Schwarzenberg waiting for his reinforcements

coming up by the Dresden road, Blücher for Bernadotte to come in on his left, and by some extraordinary oversight Giulay was brought closer in to the Austrian centre, thus opening for the French their line of retreat towards Erfurt, and no information of this movement appears to have been conveyed to Blücher. The emperor when he became aware of the movement, sent the IV. Corps to Lindenau to keep the road open.

On the 18th the fighting was resumed and by about noon Bernadotte came up and closed the gap to the N.E. of the town between Blücher and the Austrians. At 2 P.M. the Saxons, who had remained faithful to Napoleon longer than his other German allies, went over to the enemy. All hope of saving the battle had now to be given up, but the French covered their retreat obstinately and by daybreak next morning one-half of the army was already filing out along the road to Erfurt which had so fortunately been left for them.

Retreat of the French and Battle of Hanau.—It took Blücher time to extricate his troops from the confusion into which the battle had thrown them, and the garrison of Leipzig and the troops left on the right bank of the Elster still resisted obstinately—hence no direct pursuit could be initiated and the French, still upwards of 100,000 strong, marching rapidly, soon gained distance enough to be reformed. Blücher followed by parallel and inferior roads on their northern flank, but Schwarzenberg knowing that the Bavarians also had forsaken the emperor and were marching under Wrede, 50,000 strong, to intercept his retreat, followed in a most leisurely fashion. Blücher did not succeed in overtaking the French, but the latter, near Hanau, found their way barred by Wrede with 50,000 men and over 100 guns in a strong position.

To this fresh emergency Napoleon and his army responded in most brilliant fashion. As at Krasnoi in 1812, they went straight for their enemy and after one of the most brilliant series of artillery movements in history, directed by General Drouot, they marched right over their enemy, practically destroying his whole force. Henceforward their march was unmolested, and they reached Mainz on the 5th of November.

The Defensive Campaign.—When the last of the French troops had crossed to the western bank of the Rhine, divided counsels made their appearance at the headquarters of the allies. Every one was weary of the war, and many felt that it would be unwise to push Napoleon and the French nation to extremes. Hence a prolonged halt arose, utilized by the troops in renewing their equipment and so forth, but ultimately the Young German party, led by Blücher and the principal fighting men of the army, triumphed, and on the 1st of January, 1814 the Silesian army (50,000) began its passage of the Rhine at Kaub. They were to be supported by Schwarzenberg with 200,000 men, who was to advance by Basel and Neu Breisach to the south, and Bernadotte with the Northern army, about 120,000, was to move in support on the right flank through the Netherlands and Laon; this force was not yet ready and did not, in fact, reach the latter place till March.

To meet these forces the emperor could not collect 200,000 men in all, of whom upwards of 100,000 were held by Wellington on the Spanish frontier, and 20,000 more were required to watch the debouches from the Alps. Hence less than 80,000 remained available for the east and north-eastern frontier. If, however, he was weak in numbers, he was now again operating in a friendly country, able to find food almost everywhere and practically indifferent as to his communications.

On the 25th of January, Blücher entered Nancy, and, moving rapidly up the valley of the Moselle, was in communication with the Austrian advanced guard near La Rothière on the afternoon of the 28th. Here his headquarters were surprised and he himself nearly captured by a sudden rush of French troops, and he learnt at the same time that the emperor in person was at hand. He accordingly fell back a few miles next morning to a strong position covering the exits from the Bar-sur-Aube defile. There he was joined by the Austrian advance guard, and together they decided to accept battle—indeed they had no alternative, as the roads in rear were so choked with traffic that retreat was out of the question. About noon the 2nd of February Napoleon attacked them, but the weather was terrible, and the ground so heavy that his favourite artillery, the mainstay of his whole system of warfare, was useless and in the drifts of snow which at intervals swept across the field, the columns lost their direction and many were severely handled by the Cossacks. At nightfall the fighting ceased and the emperor retired to Lesmont, and thence to Troyes, Marmont being left to observe the enemy.


Montmirail.—Owing to the state of the roads, more perhaps to the extraordinary lethargy which always characterized Schwarzenberg's headquarters, no pursuit was attempted. But on the 4th of February Blücher, chafing at this inaction, obtained the permission of his own sovereign to transfer his line of operations to the valley of the Marne; Pahlen's corps of Cossacks were assigned to him to cover his left and maintain communications with the Austrians.

Believing himself secure behind this screen, he advanced from Vitry along the roads leading down the valley of the Marne, with his columns widely separated for convenience of subsistence and shelter—the latter being almost essential in the terrible weather prevailing. Blücher himself on the night of the 7th was at Sézanne, on the exposed flank so as to be nearer to his sources of intelligence, and the rest of his army were distributed

in four small corps at or near Épernay, Montmirail and Étoges; reinforcements also were on their way to join him and were then about Vitry.

In the night his headquarters were again surprised, and he learnt that Napoleon himself with his main body was in full march to fall on his scattered detachments. At the same time he heard that Pahlen's Cossacks had been withdrawn forty-eight hours previously, thus completely exposing his flank. He himself retreated towards Étoges endeavouring to rally his scattered detachments, but Napoleon was too quick for him and in three successive days he defeated Sacken at Montmirail, York at Champ Aubert and Blücher and his main body at Étoges, pursuing the latter towards Vertus. These disasters compelled the retreat of the whole Silesian army, and Napoleon, leaving Mortier and Marmont to deal with them, hurried back to Troyes with his main body to strike the flank of Schwarzenberg's army, which had meanwhile begun its leisurely advance, and again at Mormant on the 17th of February, Montereau the 18th and Méry the 21st, he inflicted such heavy punishment upon his adversaries that they fell back precipitately to Bar-sur-Aube.

Laon.—In the meantime Blücher had rallied his scattered forces and was driving Marmont and Mortier before him. Napoleon, as soon as he had disembarrassed himself of Schwarzenberg, counter-marched his main body and moving again by Sézanne, fell upon Blücher's left and drove him back upon Soissons. This place had been held by a French garrison, but had capitulated only twenty-four hours beforehand, a fact of which Napoleon was naturally unaware. The Silesian army was thus able to escape, and



marching northwards combined with Bernadotte at Laon—this reinforcement bringing the forces at Blücher's disposal up to over 100,000 men.

On the 7th of March Napoleon fell upon the advance guard of this force at Craonne and drove it back upon Laon, where a battle took place on the 9th. Napoleon was here defeated, and with only 30,000 men at his back he was compelled to renounce all ideas of a further offensive, and he retired to rest his troops to Reims. Here he remained unmolested for a few days, for Blücher was struck down by sickness, and in his absence nothing was done. On the 14th of March, however, Schwarzenberg, becoming aware of Napoleon's withdrawal to Reims, again began his advance and had reached Arcis-sur-Aube when the news of Napoleon's approach again induced him to retreat to Brienne.

The Allies March on Paris.—Thus after six weeks' fighting the allies were hardly more advanced than at the beginning. Now, however, they began to realize the weakness of their opponent, and perhaps actuated by the fear that Wellington from Toulouse might, after all, reach Paris first, they determined to march to Paris (then an open city), and let Napoleon do his worst to their communications. Actually this was exactly what he was preparing to do. He had determined to move eastward to St Dizier, rally what garrisons he could find, and raise the whole country against the invaders, and had actually started



NELSON.

HORATIO, VISCOUNT NELSON, born 1758, died at Trafalgar in 1805. His brilliant naval victories and his romantic attachment to the beautiful Lady Hamilton have secured him equal renown in the history of his country and the chronicle of famous lovers.

on the execution of this plan when his instructions fell into the enemy's hands and his projects were exposed. Regardless of the threat, the allies marched straight for the capital. Marmont and Mortier with what troops they could rally took up a position on Montmartre heights to oppose them, but seeing further resistance to be hopeless they gave way on the 31st of March, just as Napoleon, with the wreck of the Guards and a mere handful of other detachments, was hurrying across the rear of the Austrians towards Fontainebleau to join them.

CHAPTER VII

NAVAL OPERATIONS

THE French navy came under the direct and exclusive control of Napoleon after the 18th Brumaire. At the close of 1799 he had three purposes to serve by the help of his fleet: the relief of the French garrison besieged by the British forces in Malta; the reinforcement of the army he had left in Egypt; and the distraction of Great Britain by the threat of invasion of England across the Channel, or of Ireland. The deficiencies both in number and in quality of his naval resources doomed him to fail in all three. Though he had control of what remained of the navies of Holland and Spain, as well as of the French, he was outnumbered at every point, while the efficiency of the British fleet gave it a mobility which doubled its material superiority. All Napoleon's efforts to support his troops in Malta and Egypt were necessarily made under the hampering obligation to evade the British forces barring the road. The inevitable result was that only an occasional blockade-runner could succeed in escaping detection and attack. The relief thus brought to Malta and Egypt was not sufficient. In February 1800, the "*Généreux*" (74), one of the few ships which escaped from the Nile, sailed from Toulon with three corvettes, under Rear-Admiral Perrée, to relieve Malta. On the 18th she was sighted by the blockading squadron, surrounded and captured. Three other survivors of the Nile were at anchor in Malta—the "*Guillaume Tell*" (80), and two frigates, the "*Diane*" and the "*Justice*." On the 29th of July the "*Guillaume Tell*" endeavoured to slip out in the night. She was sighted, pursued and overpowered, after a singularly gallant resistance. The frigates made an attempt to get off on the 24th of August, but only the "*Justice*," a solitary survivor of the squadron which fought at the Nile, reached Toulon. Malta, starved out by the British fleet, surrendered on the 5th of September 1800. Very similar was the fate of the efforts to reach and reinforce the army of Egypt. The British squadrons either stopped the relieving forces at their point of departure, or baffled, when they did not take, them at their landfall. A squadron of seven sail of the line, under Admiral Ganteaume, succeeded in slipping out of Brest, when a gale had driven the British blockading force off the coast. Ganteaume met with some measure of success in capturing isolated British men-of-war, one of them being a 74, the "*Swiftsure*." But he failed to give effectual help to the Egyptian army. He sailed on the 23rd of January 1801, entered the Mediterranean and, his squadron being in a bad condition, steered for Toulon, which he reached on the 18th of February. On the 19th of March he sailed again for Egypt, but was again driven back by the same causes on the 5th of April. On the 25th he was ordered out once more. Three of his ships had to be sent back as unfit to keep the sea. With the other four he reached the coast of Egypt, on the 7th of May, only to sight a powerful British force, and to be compelled to escape to Toulon, which he did not reach till the 22nd of July. The French in Egypt were in fact beaten before he reached the coast. At the beginning of 1801, a British naval force, commanded by Lord Keith, had sailed from Gibraltar, escorting an army of 18,000 men under General Abercromby. It reached Marmora Bay, in Asia Minor, on the 31st of January, to arrange a co-operation with the Turks, and after some delay the army was transported and landed in Egypt, on the 7th and 8th of March. Before the end of September the French army was reduced to capitulate. In the interval another effort to carry help to it was made from Toulon. On the 13th of June 1801 Rear-admiral Linois left Toulon with three sail of the line, to join a Spanish squadron at Cadiz and go on to Egypt. In the Straits he was sighted by the British squadron under Sir J. Saumarez, and driven to seek the protection of the Spanish batteries in Algeciras. On the 6th of July he beat off a British attack, capturing the "*Hannibal*," 74. On the 9th a Spanish squadron came to his assistance, and the combined force steered for Cadiz. During the night of the 12th–13th of July they were attacked by Sir J. Saumarez. Two Spanish three-deckers blew up, and a 74-gun ship was taken. The others were blockaded in Cadiz. The invasion scheme was vigorously pushed after the 3rd of March 1801. Flat-bottomed boats were gradually collected at Boulogne. Two attempts to destroy them at anchor, though directed by Nelson himself, were repulsed on the 4th and 16th of August. But the invasion was so far little more than a threat made for diplomatic purposes.

Meanwhile a British fleet had been despatched to the Baltic on the 12th of March 1801.

It consisted of fifty-three sail in all, of which eighteen were of the line. Prussia possessed no fleet. The nominal strength of the Russian fleet was eighty-three sail of the line, of the Danish twenty-three, and of the Swedish eighteen. But this force was for the most part only on paper. Some of the Russian ships were at Archangel, others in the Mediterranean. Of those actually in the Baltic and fit to go to sea, twelve were at Reval shut in by the ice, and the others were at Kronstadt. The Swedes could equip only eleven of the line for sea, and Denmark only seven or eight. It is highly doubtful whether the three powers could have collected more than forty ships of the line—and they would have been hastily manned, destitute of experience, and without confidence. A rapid British attack would in any case forestall the concentration of these heterogeneous squadrons. The superior quality of the veteran British crews was more than enough to counterbalance a mere superiority in numbers. The command of the British fleet was given to Sir Hyde Parker, an amiable man of no energy and little ability. He had Nelson with him as second in command—then a junior admiral but without rival in capacity and in his hold on the confidence of the fleet. Parker's orders were to give Denmark twenty-four hours in which to withdraw from the coalition, and on her refusal to destroy or neutralize her strength and then proceed against the Russians before the breaking up of the ice allowed the ships at Reval to join the squadron at Kronstadt.

On the 21st of March the British fleet, after a somewhat stormy passage, was at the entrance to the Sound. Nicholas Vansittart, afterwards Lord Bexley, the British diplomatic agent entrusted with the message to the Danish government, was landed, and left for Copenhagen. On the 23rd he returned with the refusal of the Danes. The British fleet then passed the Danish fort at Cronenburg, unhurt by its distant fire, and without being molested by the forts on the Swedish shore. Nelson urged immediate attack, and recommended, as an alternative, that part of the British fleet should watch the Danes while the remainder advanced up the Baltic to prevent the junction of the Russian Reval squadron with the ships in Kronstadt. Sir Hyde Parker was, however, unwilling to go up the Baltic with the Danes unsubdued behind him, or to divide his force. It was therefore resolved that an attack should be made on the Danish capital with the whole fleet in two divisions. Copenhagen lies on the east side of the island of Zealand; opposite it is the shoal known as the Middle Ground. To the east of the Middle Ground is another shoal known as Saltholm Flat, and there is a passage available for large ships between them. The main fortification of Copenhagen was the powerful Trekroner (Three Crown) battery at the northern end of the sea-front. Here the Danes had placed their strongest ships. The southern part of the city front was covered by hulks and gun-vessels or bomb-vessels. There were in all eighteen hulks or ships of the line in the Danish defence. To have made the attack from the northern end would in Nelson's words have been "to take the bull by the horns." He therefore proposed that he should be detached with ten sail of the line, and the frigates and small craft, to pass between the Middle Ground and Saltholm Flat, and assail the Danish line at the southern end while the remainder of the fleet engaged the Trekroner battery from the north. Sir Hyde Parker accepted his offer, and added two ships of the line to the ten asked for by Nelson.

During the nights of the 30th and 31st of March the channel between the Middle Ground and Saltholm Flat was sounded by the boats of the British fleet, the Danes making no attempt to interfere with them. On the 1st of April Nelson brought his ships through. He had transferred his flag from his own ship the "St George" (98) to the "Elephant" (74), commanded by Captain Foley, because the water was too shallow for a three-decker. On the morning of the 2nd of April the wind was fair from the south-east, and at 9.30 A.M. the British squadron weighed anchor, led by the "Amazon" frigate, commanded by Captain Riou, and began to pass along the front of the Danish line. The Danes could bring into action 375 guns in all. Their hulks and bomb-vessels were supported by batteries on Zealand; but, as the water is shallow for a long distance from the shore, these defences were too far off to render them effectual aid on the south end of their line. Nelson disposed of a greater number of guns, 1058 in all, but some did not come into action. The "Agamemnon" (64), commanded by Captain Fancourt, was unable to round the south point of the Middle Ground. The "Bellona" (74), commanded by Captain Thompson, and the "Russel" (74), commanded by Captain Cuming, ran ashore on the Middle Ground, but within range though at too great a distance for fully effective fire. Captain Thompson lost his leg in the battle. The other ships passed between the "Bellona" and "Russel" and the Danes. The leading British ship, the "Defiance" (74), carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Graves, anchored just south of the Trekroner. As the wind was from the south-east Sir Hyde Parker was unable to make the proposed attack from the north. The place opposite the Danish fort which was to have been taken by him was occupied by Captain Riou and the frigates. The "Elephant" anchored almost in the middle of the line. Fire was opened about 10 A.M., and at 11.30 the action was at its height.

Until 1 o'clock there was no diminution of the Danish fire. Sir Hyde Parker, who saw the danger of Nelson's position, became anxious, and sent his second, Captain Robert Waller Ottway, to him with a message authorizing him to retire if he thought fit. Before Ottway, who had to go in a row-boat, reached the "Elephant," Sir Hyde Parker had

reflected that it would be more magnanimous in him to take the responsibility of ordering the retreat. He therefore hoisted the signal of recall. It was a well-meant but ill-judged order. Nelson could only have retreated before the south-easterly wind by going past the Trekroner fort, where the passage is narrow, and the navigation difficult. He therefore disregarded the signal, and amused himself and the few officers about him by putting his glass to his blind eye and saying that he could not see it. The frigates opposite the Trekroner did retreat, Captain Riou being slain as they drew off.

At about 2.30 the fire from the Danish hulks had been much beaten down, but as their crews fell, fresh men were sent from the shore and the fire was resumed. Nelson astutely and legitimately seized the opportunity to open negotiations with the Danes. He sent a flag of truce carried by Sir F. Thesiger ashore to the crown prince of Denmark (then regent of the kingdom), to say that unless he was allowed to take possession of the hulks which had surrendered he would be compelled to burn them, a course which he deprecated on the ground of humanity and his tenderness of "the brothers of the English the Danes." The crown prince, who was shaken by the spectacle of the battle, allowed himself to be drawn into a reply, and to be referred to Sir Hyde Parker. Fire was suspended by the Danes to allow of time to receive Sir Hyde Parker's answer. Nelson with intelligent promptitude availed himself of the interval to withdraw his squadron past the Trekroner. The difficulty found in getting the ships out—one of them grounded—showed how disastrous an attempt to draw off under fire of the forts must have been.

The Danish government, which had entered the coalition largely from fear of Russia, was not prepared to make very great sacrifices, and now entered into negotiations for an armistice. It was the more ready to do so because it received news of the assassination of the tsar Paul, which had happened on the 24th of March. An armistice was made for fourteen weeks, which left the British fleet free to proceed up the Baltic. On the 12th of April, after lightening the three-deckers of their guns, the fleet passed over the shallows. But its presence had now lost all military significance. Sir Hyde Parker was assured by the Russian minister at Copenhagen that the new tsar Alexander I. would not continue the policy of hostility with England and alliance with France which had proved fatal to his father. The Swedes, who like the Danes had entered the coalition under pressure from Russia, did not send their ships to sea. The government of the new tsar was prepared for an arrangement with England. The date of the final settlement was in all probability delayed by the activity of Nelson, and his belief that a British fleet was the best negotiator in Europe. The British government learnt of the tsar's death on the 15th of April. On the 17th it instructed Sir Hyde Parker to agree to a suspension of hostilities, and not to take active measures against Russia so long as the Reval squadron did not put to sea. On the 21st of April, having now received a full account of the battle at Copenhagen, it recalled Sir Hyde Parker, whose vacillating conduct and want of enterprise had become manifest. He received the news of his recall on the 5th of May. Nelson, to whom the command passed, at once put to sea, and hastened with a part of his fleet to Reval, which he reached on the 12th of May. The Russian squadron had, however, cut a passage through the ice in the harbour on the 3rd, and had sailed for Kronstadt. Nelson was received with formal civility by the Russian officers, with whom he exchanged visits. He wrote a letter to Mr Garlike, secretary of the British embassy at St Petersburg, saying that he had come with a small squadron as the best way of paying "the very highest compliment" to the tsar.

The Russian government, which not unnaturally wished to avoid any appearance of acting under dictation, and was now in no anxiety for the Reval squadron, treated his presence as a menace. On the 13th of May Count Pahlen answered in a most peremptory letter informing Nelson that negotiations would be suspended while he remained at Reval. This retort caused Nelson annoyance which he did not attempt to conceal, but he justly concluded that he had nothing further to do at Reval, and therefore returned down the Baltic. Nelson remained with the fleet till he was relieved at his own request, and was able to sail for England on the 18th of June. He gave a proof of his regard for the service of the country by taking his passage home in a small brig rather than withdraw a line of battle ship from the squadron, which his rank entitled him to do, and as other admirals of the time generally did. The British sailors and ships embargoed in Russia were released on the 17th of May. Great Britain released her prisoners on the 4th of June, and on the 17th of June was signed the convention which terminated the Baltic campaign.

The Peace of Amiens, signed in London on the 1st of October 1801, proved to be only an uneasy truce, and it was succeeded by open war, on the 18th of May 1803. From that date till about the middle of August 1805, a space of some two years and two months, the war took the form of a most determined attempt on the part of Napoleon to carry out an invasion of Great Britain, met by the counter measures of the British government. The scheme of invasion was based on the Boulogne flotilla, a device inherited from the old French royal government, through the Republic. Its object was to throw a great army ashore on the coast between Dover and Hastings. The preparations were made on an unprecedented scale. The Republic had collected some two hundred and forty vessels. Under the direction of Napoleon ten times as many were equipped. They were divided

into: *prames*, ship-rigged, of 35 metres long and 8 wide, carrying 12 guns; *chaloupes canonnières*, of 24 metres long and 5 wide, carrying 5 guns and brig-rigged; *bateaux canoniers*, of 19 metres long by 1·56 wide, carrying 2 guns and mere boats. All were built to be rowed, were flat-bottomed, and of shallow draft so as to be able to navigate close to the shore, and to take the ground without hurt. They were built in France and the Low Countries, in the coast towns and the rivers—even in Paris—and were collected gradually, shore batteries both fixed and mobile being largely employed to cover the passage. A vast sum of money and the labour of thousands of men were employed to clear harbours for them, at and near Boulogne. The shallow water on the coast made it impossible for the British line-of-battle ships, or even large frigates, to press the attack on them home. Smaller vessels they were able to beat off and so, in spite of the activity of the British cruisers and of many sharp encounters, the concentration was effected at Boulogne, where an army of 130,000 was encamped and was incessantly practised in embarking and disembarking. Before the invasion was taken in hand as a serious policy, there had been at least a profession of a belief that the flotilla could push across the Channel during a calm. Experience soon showed that when the needful allowance was made for the time required to bring them out of harbour (two tides) and for the influence which the Channel currents must have upon their speed, it would be extremely rash to rely on a calm of sufficient length. Napoleon therefore came early to the conclusion that he must bring about a concentration of his seagoing fleet in the Channel, which would give him a temporary command of its waters.

He had a squadron at Brest, ships at L'Orient and Rochefort, some of his vessels had taken refuge at Ferrol on their way back from San Domingo when war broke out, one was at Cadiz, and he had a squadron at Toulon. All these forces were watched by British blockading squadrons. The problem was to bring them together before the British fleet could be concentrated to meet them. Napoleon's solution grew, as time went on and circumstances changed, in scope and complexity. In July 1804 he ordered his admiral commanding at Toulon, Latouche Tréville, to seize an opportunity when Nelson, who was in command of the blockade, was driven off by a northerly gale, to put to sea, with 10 sail of the line, pick up the French ship in Cadiz, join Villeneuve who was in the Aix roads, and then effect a junction with Ganteaume and the 21 sail of the line at Brest. He hoped that if the British ships in the North Sea concentrated with the squadron in the Channel, he would be able to make use of Dutch vessels from the Texel. The death of Latouche Tréville, 20th of August 1804, supplied an excuse for delay. He was succeeded by Villeneuve. Napoleon now modified the simple plan prepared for Latouche Tréville, and began laying elaborate plans by which French vessels were to slip out and sail for distant seas, to draw the British fleet after them, and then return to concentrate in the Channel. A further modification was introduced by the end of 1804. Spain, which was bound by treaty to join Napoleon, was allowed to preserve a show of neutrality by paying a monthly subvention. The British government, treating this as a hostile action—as it was—seized the Spanish treasure ships on their way from America, near Cape Santa Maria, on the 5th of October 1804, and Spain declared war on the 12th of December. New plans were now made including the co-operation of the Spanish fleet. Amid all the variation in their details, and the apparent confusion introduced by Napoleon's habit of suggesting alternatives and discussing probabilities, and in spite of the preparations ostensibly made for an expedition to Ireland, which was to have sailed from Brest and to have carried 30,000 troops commanded by Augereau, the real purpose of Napoleon was neither altered nor concealed. He worked to produce doubt and confusion in the mind of the British government by threats and attacks on its distant possessions, which should lead it to scatter its forces. One of these ventures was actually carried out, without, however, securing the co-operation, or effecting the purpose he had in view. On the 11th of January 1805 Admiral Missiessy left Rochefort with 5 sail of the line, undetected by the British forces on the coast. Missiessy carried out a successful voyage of commerce-destroying, and returned safely to Rochefort on the 20th of May, from the West Indies. But the force sent in pursuit of him was small, and the British government was not deceived into weakening its hold on the Channel. It was, in fact, well supplied with information by means of the spy service directed by an exiled French royalist, the count d'Antraigues, who was established at Dresden as a Russian diplomatic agent. Through his correspondents in Paris, some of whom had access to Napoleon's papers, the British government was able to learn the emperor's real intentions. The blockade of Brest was so strictly maintained that Ganteaume was allowed no opportunity to get to sea. Villeneuve, who was to have co-operated with Missiessy, did indeed leave Toulon, at a moment when Nelson, whose policy it was to encourage him to come out by not staying too near the port, was absent, on the 17th of January 1805. The British admiral, when informed that the French were at sea, justified Napoleon's estimate of his probable course in such a contingency, by making a useless cruise to Egypt. But Villeneuve's ill-appointed ships, manned by raw crews, suffered loss of spars in a gale, and he returned to Toulon on the 21st. His last start came when he sailed, unseen by Nelson, on the 30th of March. Aided by lucky changes of wind, he reached Cadiz, was joined by 1 French and 6 Spanish ships under

Admiral Gravina, which, added to the 11 he had with him, gave him a force of 18 sail. He left Cadiz on the night of the 9th-10th of April, and reached Fort de France in Martinique on the 14th of May. Here he was to have remained till joined by Ganteaume from Brest. On the 1st of June he was joined by a frigate and two line-of-battle ships sent with orders from Rochefort, and was told to remain in the West Indies till the 5th of July, and if not joined by Ganteaume to steer for Ferrol, pick up the French and Spanish ships in the port, and come on to the Channel. Villeneuve learnt on the 8th of June that Nelson had reached Barbadoes in pursuit of him on the 4th. The British admiral, delayed by contrary winds, had not been able to start from the entry to the Straits of Gibraltar till the 11th of May. An action in the West Indies would have ruined the emperor's plan of concentration, and Villeneuve decided to sail at once for Ferrol. Nelson, misled by false information, ranged the West Indies as far south as the Gulf of Paria, in search of his opponent whom he supposed to be engaged in attacks on British possessions. By the 13th of June he had learnt the truth, and sailed for Gibraltar under the erroneous impression that the French admiral would return to Toulon. He sent a brig home with despatches; on the 19th of June, in lat. $33^{\circ} 12' N.$ and long. $58^{\circ} W.$, the French were seen by this vessel heading for the Bay of Biscay. Captain Bettesworth who commanded the brig hurried home, and the information he brought was at once acted on by Lord Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, who took measures to station a force to intercept Villeneuve outside Ferrol. On the 22nd of July, 35 leagues N.W. of Finisterre, Villeneuve was met by the British admiral sent to intercept him, Sir Robert Calder. A confused action in a fog ended in the capture of two Spanish line-of-battle ships. But Sir R. Calder, who had only 15 ships to his opponent's 20 and was nervous lest he should be overpowered, did not act with energy. He retreated to join the blockading fleet off Brest. Villeneuve was now able to join the vessels at Ferrol. Nelson, who reached Gibraltar on the very day the action off Ferrol was fought, was too far away to interfere with him. But Villeneuve, who was deeply impressed by the inefficiency of the ships of his fleet and especially of the Spaniards, and who was convinced that an overwhelming British force would be united against him in the Channel, lost heart, and on the 15th of August sailed south to Cadiz. By this movement he ruined the Emperor's elaborate scheme. Napoleon at once broke up the camp at Boulogne and marched to Germany.

When Villeneuve gave up in despair the attempt to enter the Channel, he steered for Cadiz, and anchored in that port on the 20th of August 1805. He found three British ships of the line, under the command of Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, on the watch. Collingwood, resolved that the allies should not drive him through the Straits of Gibraltar without being compelled to follow, retired slowly, and at a short distance ahead of the ships sent to pursue him. They, not being willing to be drawn into the Mediterranean, gave up the pursuit. The British officer then resumed his watch off Cadiz. On the 22nd of August he was joined by Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton with four ships of the line, and on the 30th by Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder with 18. The allied fleet, consisting of 29 sail of the line which had come with Villeneuve, and five already at Cadiz, 34 in all, remained quiescent. The use to be made of it, or the measures to be taken for its destruction, were matters of urgent consideration to Napoleon and to the British government. On the 14th of September Napoleon gave orders that the French and Spanish ships at Cadiz should put to sea at the first favourable opportunity, join seven Spanish ships of the line then at Cartagena, go to Naples, and land the soldiers they carried to reinforce his troops then in that kingdom, and should fight a decisive action if they met a British fleet of inferior numbers. Two Spanish ships of the line were to be counted as equal to one French. Their final destination was to be Toulon. On the 15th he decided that Villeneuve, whose "excessive pusillanimity" rendered him incapable of vigorous action, must be replaced by Admiral Rosily. Rosily received his orders on the 17th and left for Cadiz. The British government, determined to confine the allies to Cadiz, or beat them if they came out, sent Nelson to take command and prepared to despatch reinforcements. Nelson left Portsmouth on the 15th of September, and reached Cadiz on the 28th, bringing three ships of the line with him. He gave orders that no salute should be fired for him lest the enemy should learn that reinforcements had arrived. The bulk of the fleet—23 sail—was kept well out at sea, and five ships of the line under Rear-Admiral Louis were appointed to cruise close to Cadiz as an inshore squadron. On the 5th of October Louis was sent to Gibraltar to renew his provisions and water, and the watch was left to two frigates. Between the 7th and the 13th of October Nelson was joined by six ships of the line, making a total of 34. But Admiral Calder, having been summoned home to stand a court-martial, took his flagship with him on the 14th, and on the 17th another line-of-battle ship had to be detached to renew her stores. As Admiral Louis could not return before the battle of the 21st, Nelson had at his disposal 27 ships of the line in all. Napoleon's order of the 14th of September reached Villeneuve on the 28th. He learnt also that Rosily was coming, but not that he himself was to be superseded. On the 5th of October he held a council of war of French and Spanish officers. They decided that the condition of their ships did not justify them in hoping for victory over the British fleet, but Napoleon's orders were peremptory, and they agreed that a sortie must be made.

Easterly winds were needed to facilitate the sailing of a large and awkward fleet from Cadiz, and till the 14th the wind was hard from the west. Even when it fell the allies lingered. On the 18th of October Villeneuve heard that Rosily had reached Madrid, and of his own supersession. Stung by the prospect of being disgraced before the fleet, he resolved to go to sea before his successor could reach Cadiz.

The allies, aided by a light land breeze which blew from the east, though the wind at sea was westerly, began to leave Cadiz Bay on the 19th. Their movements were at once known to the British look-out frigates, and were transmitted by signal to Nelson, who was cruising some thirty miles to the west. During the period of blockade he had instructed his captains as to how he meant to fight the approaching battle. The memorandum in which his instructions were embodied was dated the 9th of October. It was drawn up in view of the circumstances which did not arise—that the enemy would come to sea with a strong easterly wind which would give him the weather gauge; that he might be reinforced to a strength of over 50 ships of the line from Brest, Rochefort and Cartagena; that the British fleet might be raised by reinforcements to 40 ships. But the governing principles of the memorandum were independent of such details. They were that the order of sailing in which the fleet was when the enemy was seen was to be the order of battle; that no time was to be wasted in forming a precise line; that the attack was to be made in two bodies, of which one, to be led by the second in command, Collingwood, was to be thrown on the rear of the enemy, while the other, led by Nelson himself, was to take care that the centre and van should not come to the assistance of the ships cut off. Nelson was careful to point out that "Something must be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others"; and he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short the execution was to be as circumstances should dictate, subject to the guiding rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and a concentration of superior force on an inferior sought for.

The uncertainties of naval warfare in the days of sailing ships were fully shown at Trafalgar. The allies, having left Cadiz on the 20th of October, were 33 sail of the line strong, one of the fleet having been left behind. They sailed in five squadrons. Three were nearer the land than the other two. The leading squadron of the three was commanded by the Spanish admiral, Alava; Villeneuve followed; and the French admiral, Dumanoir, commanded the rear. The other two squadrons of six ships of the line each, commanded by the Spanish admiral, Gravina, and the French admiral, Magon, were parallel with, and outside of the three. All headed for the Straits of Gibraltar in the westerly breezes, which had become very light. The British fleet of 27 sail in two divisions also headed for the Mediterranean. During the night of the 20th–21st of October several movements were made to gain position, and there was an inevitable tendency to straggle among vessels which did not all sail equally well and were moving in light winds. On the early morning of the 21st the allies were some twelve miles off Cape Trafalgar. The British fleet was some ten or twelve miles out at sea to the west of them. Seeing that a battle would now be forced on him, Villeneuve ordered his whole fleet to turn so as to bring their heads on Cadiz. He was painfully aware that the incomparable more expert British fleet would not be content to attack him in the old-fashioned way, coming down in a parallel line and engaging from van to rear. He knew that they would endeavour to concentrate on a part of his line. But Villeneuve was too conscious of the inexperience of his officers and men to think it possible to make counter movements with them. It has been said that the French and Spanish ships which had taken part in the late cruise to the West Indies and back must be considered as trained in the same sense as the British. But apart from the fact that these vessels formed little more than a half of the allied fleet, the comparison is childish. It could only have occurred to writers who, wishing to exalt the glory of Trafalgar, forget that the superior quality of the British fleet, the fruit of foresight, of good sense, and the strenuous work of a people, was itself the best of all claims to honour. A hasty cruise across the Atlantic and back was no equivalent for years of training. The blockades maintained by the British fleet had made it difficult for the allies to obtain stores and their ships were ill fitted. Their crews contained a minute proportion of men bred to the sea, and as they had to be taught the elements of seamanship on the few occasions when they got to sea, their gunnery was neglected. There was valour in the allied fleet, but there was neither skill nor confidence. Moreover, the very light wind then blowing rendered manœuvring all but impossible for the most expert crews. Villeneuve could do nothing more than order his fleet to turn so as to bring the ships' heads on Cadiz, to form the line, and await the enemy's attack. He, however, left his captains free to act for the best when the battle had begun, by telling them that whoever was not under fire was not at his post. The movement of conversion ordered at 6 o'clock A.M. was not executed till about 10 o'clock, and it was ill done. The three squadrons nearest the shore turned first, the rear beginning, to leave room for the others. Thus Dumanoir now led the van and Alava followed Villeneuve. The two squadrons of Gravina and Magon, which had been outside, fell in behind Alava. No accurate line was formed. The allies drifted rather than sailed into a curve of some five miles long, stretching from north to south,

concave on the west side, and more pronounced at the southern than at the northern end. Their ships did not follow one another, but were in many cases two, and in some cases three, abreast in groups. To some extent this was to their advantage, as the effective range of fire of the artillery of the day was barely 1200 yds., and as the power of concentrating the fire of guns out of ports was limited, the danger to an assailant bearing down was not great during his approach. The peril was that he would be engaged with two or three enemies when he had broken into the line, and this risk was increased by the accidental group formation of the allies.

The confidence and promptitude of the British fleet presented a marked contrast to the passivity of the allies. When in the early morning the enemy was seen to the east, Nelson's fleet was in two divisions, somewhat scattered—his own of 12 sail of the line being to the westward and windward in the light breeze from W.N.W.; Collingwood's of 15 sail being to leeward and east. At 6.40 the signal was made to form the order of sailing and prepare for battle. The enemy's movement of conversion was already seen, and it was obvious that unless he were rapidly stopped he might reach Cadiz Bay in safety. A few minutes before 7 o'clock the signal to bear up, No. 76, was made by Nelson. Much discussion has arisen as to whether this was an order to bear up together, or in succession; the first if exactly executed would have caused the British ships to approach the enemy in a line abreast (side by side) since all would have turned at once; the second would have caused them to approach in a line ahead (one after the other) since they would have turned successively. The discussion is in reality futile, because the want of wind rendered it impossible to arrange exact formations, because it had been decided that no time should be wasted in dressing the line, and because Nelson's flagship, the "Victory" (100), and Collingwood's flagship, the "Royal Sovereign" (100), were quick-sailing vessels, and both admirals moved at the best attainable speed. The slow ships could not keep up with them. The two squadrons went down heading to north of east, Collingwood to the right and leeward, Nelson to the north and windward, in two bodies without exact formation, according to the speed of the ships. Collingwood headed for the centre, and the pronounced curve at the south end of the allied line caused the ships of his division to come into action in a close approach to a parallel with the enemy. The "Royal Sovereign" was the first British ship to break into the enemy's line, which she did about midday and astern of Alava's flagship the "Santa Anna." She was alone for a few minutes, but the ships of Collingwood's division, as they sailed into the curve, were mostly able, by steering to the right, to get into action very soon after their admiral. Nelson's division was headed by himself to cut through the enemy between his van and centre, and to bar his road to Cadiz. It was certainly in a nearer approach to a line ahead than Collingwood's. After making a demonstration at the allied van, he broke into their line astern of the "Bucentaure" (100) the flagship of Villeneuve.

The exact movements of all the ships engaged could only be given in a very detailed account of the battle, but the main lines of the action are already indicated. To the allies it appeared that the British fleet assailed them in two lines converging on their centre, and that it then carried out a concentration on this part of their line. Though this is too simple—or too bald—a statement of the case, it does not go far from the truth. The allied formation was broken in two, and though the rear part was kept well in play by Collingwood's division, the severest blows fell on the central sections.

The battle, which began at midday, was terminated about five. Eighteen of the allies were taken. Their van, after long remaining quiescent, made a futile demonstration, and then sailed away. The four van ships which escaped with Admiral Dumanoir were met and captured off Cape Ortegal on the 4th of November by a British squadron of five ships under Sir Richard Strachan. The stormy weather which followed the battle gave the enemy an opportunity to retake some of the prizes, and others were lost. Four only were carried into Gibraltar by the British fleet—three French and one Spanish. Only eleven of the allied fleet succeeded in finding safety in Cadiz. The fragment of the French squadron remained there under Admiral Rosily till he was forced to surrender to the Spaniards in 1808 on the breaking out of the Peninsular War. The loss of life of the allies cannot be stated with precision. In the British fleet the reported loss in killed and wounded was 1690, of whom 1452 belonged to 14 out of the 27 ships of the line present—the inequality of loss being mainly due to the fact that it was as a rule these vessels which came earliest into action. The circumstances of Nelson's death need no repetition.

With the collapse of the invasion scheme, the naval war between Napoleon and Great Britain entered on a new phase. It lost at once the unity given to it by the efforts of the emperor to effect, and of the British government to baffle, the passage of the Channel by an army. In place of the movements of great fleets to a single end, we have a nine years' story (1805–1814) of cruising for the protection of commerce, of convoy, of colonial expeditions to capture French, Dutch or Spanish possessions and of combined naval and military operations in which the British navy was engaged in carrying troops to various countries, and in supporting them on shore. Napoleon continued to build line-of-battle ships in numbers from Venice to Hamburg, but only in order to force the British government to maintain costly and wearing blockades. He never allowed his fleets to go to sea to seek

battle. The operations of the British fleet were therefore divided between the work of patrolling the ocean roads and ancillary services to diplomacy, or to the armies serving in Italy, Denmark and, after 1808, in Spain. The remaining colonial possessions of France, and of Holland, then wholly dependent on her, were conquered by degrees, and the ports in which privateers were fitted out to cruise against British commerce in distant seas were gradually rendered harmless. Though privateering was carried on by the French with daring and a considerable measure of success, it did not put an appreciable check on the growth of British merchant shipping. The function of the British navy in the long conflict with Napoleon was of the first importance, and its services were rendered in every sea, but their very number, extent and complexity render it impossible here to record them in detail.

THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808-14

CHAPTER I

CAMPAIGNS OF 1808-9

THIS important war, the conduct and result of which greatly enhanced the prestige of British arms, had for its main object the freedom of the Peninsula of Spain and Portugal from the domination of Napoleon; and hence it derives its name, though it terminated upon the soil of France.

Nelson having destroyed the French fleet at Trafalgar, Napoleon feared the possibility of a British army being landed on the Peninsular coasts, whence in conjunction with Portuguese and Spanish forces it might attack France from the south. He therefore called upon Portugal, in August 1807, to comply with his Berlin decree of the 21st of November 1806, under which continental nations were to close their ports to British subjects, and have no communication with Great Britain. At the same time he persuaded the weak king of Spain (Charles IV.) and his corrupt minister Godoy to permit a French army to pass through Spain towards Portugal; while under a secret treaty signed at Fontainebleau on the 27th of October 1807 Spanish troops were to support the French. Portugal was to be subsequently divided between Spain and France, and a new principality of the Algarve was to be carved out for Godoy. Portugal remonstrated against Napoleon's demands, and a French corps (30,000) under General Junot was instantly despatched to Lisbon. Upon its approach the prince regent fled, and the country was occupied by Junot, most of the Portuguese troops being disbanded or sent abroad. Napoleon induced the king of Spain to allow French troops to occupy the country and to send the flower of the Spanish forces (15,000) under the marquis of Romana¹ to assist the French on the Baltic. Then Dupont de l'Étang (25,000) was ordered to cross the Bidassoa on the 22nd of November 1807; and by the 8th of January 1808 he had reached Burgos and Valladolid. Marshal Moncey with a corps occupied Biscay and Navarre; Duhesme with a division entered Catalonia; and a little later Bessières with another corps had been brought up. There were now about 100,000 French soldiers in Spain, and Murat, grand duke of Berg, as "lieutenant for the emperor," entered Madrid. During February and March 1808 the frontier fortresses of Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Barcelona and Figueras were treacherously occupied and Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon. The Spanish people, in an outburst of fury against the king and Godoy, forced the former to abdicate in favour of his son Ferdinand; but the inhabitants of Madrid having (May 2, 1808) risen against the French, Napoleon refused to recognize Ferdinand; both he and the king were compelled to renounce their rights to the throne, and a mercenary council of regency having been induced to desire the French emperor to make his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, king, he acceded to their request.²

The mask was now completely thrown off, and Spain and Portugal rose against the French. Provincial "juntas" (committees of government) were organized; appeals for assistance made to the British government, which granted arms, money and supplies, and it was resolved to despatch a British force to the Peninsula. Before it landed, the French under Dupont, Moncey and Marshal Bessières (75,000) had occupied parts of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon and the Castiles, holding Madrid and

¹ They subsequently escaped from Jutland, on British vessels, and reached Santander in October 1808.

² The king, the queen and Godoy were eventually removed to Rome, and Ferdinand to Valençay in France.

Toledo, while General Duhesme (14,000) was in Catalonia. Moncey (7000) had marched towards the city of Valencia, but been repulsed in attempting to storm it (June 28); Bessières had defeated the Spanish general Joachim Blake at Medina de Rio Seco (June 14, 1808) and Dupont (13,000) had been detached (May 24) from Madrid to reduce Seville and Cadiz in Andalusia. Spanish levies, numbering nearly 100,000 regulars and militia, brave and enthusiastic, but without organization, sufficient training or a commander-in-chief, had collected together; 30,000 being in Andalusia, a similar number in Galicia, and others in Valencia and Estremadura, but few in the central portion of Spain.

At this juncture Dupont, moving upon Cadiz, met with a reverse which greatly influenced the course of the Peninsular War. On the 7th of June 1808 he had sacked Cordova; but while he was laden with its spoils the Spanish general Castaños with the army of Andalusia (30,000), and also a large body of armed peasantry, approached. Falling back to Andujar, where he was reinforced to 22,000 strong, Dupont detached a force to hold the mountain passes in his rear, whereupon the Spaniards interposed between the detachment and the main body and seized Baylen. Failing to dislodge them, and surrounded by hostile troops and an infuriated peasantry, Dupont capitulated with over 20,000 men. This victory, together with the intrepid defence of Saragossa by the Spanish general José Palafox (June 15 to August 13, 1808), temporarily paralysed the French and created unbounded enthusiasm in Spain. Duhesme, having failed to take Gerona, was blockaded in Barcelona, Joseph fled from Madrid (Aug. 1, 1808), and the French forces closed to their rear to defend their communications with France. The British troops were directed towards Lisbon and Cadiz, in order to secure these harbours, to prevent the subjugation of Andalusia, and to operate up the basins of the Guadiana, Tagus and Douro into Spain. The British force consisted of 9000 men from Cork, under Sir Arthur Wellesley—at first in chief command; 5000 from Gibraltar, under General (Sir Brent) Spencer; and 10,000 under Sir John Moore coming from Sweden; Wellesley and Moore being directed towards Portugal, and Spencer to Cadiz. On the 1st of August 1808 Wellesley began to land his troops, unopposed, near Figueira da Foz at the mouth of the Mondego; and the Spanish victory of Baylen having relieved Cadiz from danger, Spencer now joined him, and, without waiting for Moore the army, under 15,000 in all (which included some Portuguese)¹ with 18 guns, advanced towards Lisbon.

Campaign in Portugal, 1808.—The first skirmish took place at Obidos on the 15th of August 1808, against Delaborde's division (5000 men with 5 guns), which fell back to Roleia (Roriça or Roliça). A battle took place here (Aug. 17) in which Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked and drove him from two successive positions. The allied loss was about 500: the French 600 and three guns.² On the 20th of August the allies, strengthened by the arrival of two more brigades (4000 men), occupied some heights north of Vimiera (Vimeira or Vimeiro) where the roads branch off to Torres Vedras and Mafra. Wellesley meant to turn the defile of Torres Vedras by Mafra at once if possible; but on this night Sir Harry Burrard, his senior, arrived off Vimiera, and though he did not land, gave instructions to wait for Sir John Moore. On the 21st of August the allies were attacked by Junot at Vimiera, who, leaving a force at Lisbon, had come up to reinforce Delaborde. In this battle the allies numbered about 18,000 with 18 guns, French nearly 14,000, with 20 guns. Junot, believing the allied left to be weakly held, attacked it without reconnoitring, but Wellesley's regiments, marched thither behind the heights, sprang up in line; and under their volleys and bayonet charge, supported by artillery fire, Junot's deep columns were driven off the direct road to Lisbon. The losses were: Allies about 800, French 2000 and 13 guns. It was now again Wellesley's wish to advance and seize Torres Vedras; but Sir Hew Dalrymple, having at this moment assumed command, decided otherwise. On the 2nd of August Junot, knowing of the approach of Moore with reinforcements, and afraid of a revolt in Lisbon, opened negotiations, which resulted in the Convention of Cintra³ (Aug. 30, 1808), under which the French evacuated Portugal, on condition that they were sent with their artillery and arms to France. Thus this campaign had been rapidly brought to a satisfactory conclusion; and Sir Arthur Wellesley had already given proof of his exceptional gifts as a leader. In England, however, a cry was raised that Junot should have been forced to an absolutely unconditional surrender; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard³ were brought before a court of enquiry in London. This acquitted them of blame, and Sir John Moore in the meantime after the departure of Dalrymple (Oct. 6, 1808) had assumed command of the allied army in Portugal, now about 32,000 strong.

¹ In this account of the war the losses and numbers engaged in different battles are given approximately only; and the former include killed, wounded and missing. Historians differ much on these matters.

² It was not, however, signed at Cintra, but at Lisbon, and was mainly negotiated near Torres Vedras.

³ The two latter were recalled from the Peninsula; Sir Arthur Wellesley had proceeded to London upon leave, and had only signed the armistice with Junot, not the convention itself.

Moore's Campaign in Spain, 1808-9.—The British government notified to Sir John Moore that some 10,000 men were to be sent to Corunna under Sir David Baird; that he, with 20,000, was to join him, and then both act in concert with the Spanish armies. As the conduct of this campaign was largely influenced by the operations of the Spanish forces, it is necessary to mention their positions, and also the fact that greater reliance had been placed, both in England and Spain, upon them than future events justified. On the 26th of October 1808, when Moore's troops had left Lisbon to join Baird, the French still held a defensive position behind the Ebro; Bessières being in the basin of Vitoria, Marshal Ney north-west of Logroño, and Monecy covering Pampeluna, and near Sangüessa. With the garrisons of Biscay, Navarre, and a reserve at Bayonne, their strength was about 75,000 men. Palafox (20,000) was near Saragossa and observing Sangüessa; Castaños with the victors of Baylen (34,000) west and south of Tudela and near Logroño; Blake (32,000) east of Reynosa, having captured Bilbao; Count de Belvedere (11,000) near Burgos; reserves (57,000) were assembling about Segovia, Talavera and Cordova; Catalonia was held by 23,000, and Madrid had been reoccupied.

Moore had to decide whether to join Baird by sea or land. To do so by sea at this season was to risk delay, while in moving by land he would have the Spanish armies between him and the French. For these reasons he marched by land; and as the roads north of the Tagus were deemed impassable for guns, while transport and supplies for a large force were also difficult to procure, he sent Sir John Hope, with the artillery, cavalry and reserve ammunition column, south of the river, through Badajoz to Almaraz, to move thence through Talavera, Madrid and the Escorial Pass, involving a considerable détour; while he himself with the infantry, marching by successive divisions, took the shorter roads north of the Tagus through Coimbra and Almeida, and also by Alcantara and Coria to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. Baird was to move south through Galicia to meet him, and the army was to concentrate at Valladolid, Burgos, or whatever point might seem later on to be best. But as Moore was moving forward, the whole situation in Spain changed. Napoleon's forces, now increased to some 200,000 men present and more following, were assuming the offensive, and he himself on the 30th of October—had left Paris to place himself at their head. Before them the Spaniards were routed in every direction: Castaños was defeated near Logroño (Oct. 27); Castaños and Palafox at Tudela (Nov. 23); Blake at Zorzoza (Oct. 29), Espinosa (Nov. 11) and Reynosa (Nov. 13); and Belvedere at Gamonal, near Burgos (Nov. 10). Thus when Moore reached Salamanca (Nov. 28) Baird was at Astorga; Hope at the Escorial Pass; Napoleon himself at Aranda; and French troops at Valladolid, Arevalo and Segovia; so that the French were nearer than either Baird or Hope to Moore at Salamanca. Moore was ignorant of their exact position and strength, but he knew that Valladolid had been occupied, and so his first orders were that Baird should fall back to Galicia and Hope to Portugal. But these were soon changed, and he now took the important resolution of striking a blow for Spain, and for the defenders of Madrid, by attacking Napoleon's communications with France. Hope having joined him through Avila, and magazines having been formed at Benavente, Astorga and Lugo, in case of retreat in that direction, he moved forward, and on the 13th of December approached the Douro, at and near Rueda east of Toro. Here he learnt that Madrid had fallen to Napoleon (Dec. 3) after he had by a brilliant charge of the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the Guard forced the Somosierra Pass (Nov. 30) and in another action stormed the Retiro commanding Madrid itself (Dec. 3); that the French were pressing on towards Lisbon and Andalusia; that Napoleon was unaware of his vicinity, and that Soult's corps, isolated on the Carrion River, had been ordered towards Benavente. He then finally decided to attack Soult (intending subsequently to fall back through Galicia) and ordered up transports from Lisbon to Corunna and Vigo; thus changing his base from Portugal to the north-west of Spain; Blake's Spanish army, now rallying under the marquis de la Romana near Leon, was to co-operate, but was able to give little effective aid.

On the 20th of December Baird joined Moore near Mayorga, and a brilliant cavalry combat now took place at Sahagun, in which the British hussar brigade distinguished itself. But on the 23rd of December, when Moore was at Sahagun and about to attack Soult, he learnt that overwhelming French forces were hastening towards him, so withdrew across the Esla, near Benevente (Dec. 28), destroying the bridge there. Napoleon, directly he realized Moore's proximity, had ordered Soult to Astorga to cut him off from Galicia; recalled his other troops from their march towards Lisbon and Andalusia and, with 50,000 men and 150 guns, had left Madrid himself (Dec. 22). He traversed over 100 m. in less than five days across the snow-covered Escorial Pass, reaching Tordesillas on the Douro on the 26th of December. Hence he wrote to Soult, "If the English pass to-day in their position (which he believed to be Sahagun) they are lost." But Moore had passed Astorga by the 31st of December, where Napoleon arrived on the 1st of January 1809. Thence he turned back, with a large portion of his army towards France, leaving Soult with over 40,000 men to follow Moore.

On the "Retreat to Corunna" fatigue, wet and bitter cold, combined with the sense of an enforced retreat, shook the discipline of Moore's army; but he reached Corunna on

the 11th of January 1809, where he took up a position across the road from Lugo, with his left on the river Mero. On the 14th of January the transports arrived; and on the 16th Soult attacked. In this battle the French numbered about 20,000 with 40 guns; the British 15,000 with nine very light guns. Soult failed to dislodge the British, and Moore was about to deliver a counter-attack when he himself fell mortally wounded. Baird was also wounded, and as night was approaching, Hope suspended the advance, and subsequently embarked the army, with scarcely any further loss. The British casualties were about 1000, the French 2000. When the troops landed in England, half clothed and half shod, their leader's conduct of the campaign was at first blamed, but his reputation as a general rests solidly upon these facts, that when Napoleon in person, having nearly 300,000 men in Spain, had stretched forth his hand to seize Portugal and Andalusia, Moore with 30,000, forced him to withdraw it, and follow him to Corunna, escaping at the same time from his grasp. Certainly a notable achievement.

Campaign in Portugal and Spain, 1809.—On the 22nd of April 1809 Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Lisbon. By this time, French armies, to a great extent controlled by Napoleon from a distance, had advanced—Soult from Galicia to capture Oporto and Lisbon (with General Lapisse from Salamanca moving on his left towards Abrantes) and Marshal Victor, still farther to the left, with a siege train to take Badajoz, Merida and subsequently Cadiz. Soult (over 20,000), leaving Ney in Galicia, had taken and sacked Oporto (March 29, 1809); but the Portuguese having closed upon his rear and occupied Vigo, he halted, detaching a force to Amarante to keep open the road to Braganza and asked for reinforcements. Victor had crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta at Medellin (March 28, 1809); but, surrounded by insurgents, he also had halted; Lapisse had joined him, and together they were near Merida, 30,000 strong. On the allied side the British (25,000), including some German auxiliaries, were about Leiria: the Portuguese regular troops (16,000) near Thomar; and some thousands of Portuguese militia were observing Soult in the north of Portugal, a body under Silveira being at Amarante, which Soult was now approaching. Much progress had been made in the organization and training of the Portuguese levies; Major-General William Carr Beresford, with the rank of marshal, was placed at their head. Of the Spaniards, Palafox, after his defeat at Tudela, had most gallantly defended Saragossa a second time (Dec. 20, 1808–Feb. 20, 1809); the Catalonians, after reverses at Molins de Rey (Dec. 21, 1808) and at Valls (Feb. 25, 1809) had taken refuge in Tarragona; and Rosas had fallen (Dec. 5, 1808) to the French general Gouvion St-Cyr who, having relieved Barcelona, was besieging Gerona. Romaña's force was now near Orense in Galicia. A supreme junta had been formed which could nominally assemble about 100,000 men, but jealousy among its members was rife, and they still declined to appoint any commander-in-chief.

On the 5th of May 1809, Wellesley moved towards the river Douro, having detached Beresford to seize Amarante, from which the French had now driven Silveira. Soult expected the passage of the Douro to be attempted near its mouth, with fishing craft; but Wellesley, by a daring surprise, crossed (May 12) close above Oporto, and also by a ford higher up. After some fighting Oporto was taken, and Soult driven back. The Portuguese being in his rear, and Wellesley closing with him, the only good road of retreat available lay through Amarante, but he now learned that Beresford had taken this important point from Silveira; so he was then compelled, abandoning his guns and much baggage, to escape, with a loss of some 5000 men, over the mountains of the Sierra Catalina to Salomonde, and thence to Orense.

During the above operations, Victor, with Lapisse, had forced the passage of the Tagus at Alcantara but, on Wellesley returning to Abrantes, he retired. News having been received that Napoleon had suffered a serious check at the battle of Aspern, near Vienna (May 22, 1809) Wellesley next determined—leaving Beresford (20,000) near Ciudad Rodrigo—to move with 22,000 men, in conjunction with Cuesta's Spanish army (40,000) towards Madrid against Victor, who, with 25,000, supported by King Joseph (50,000) covering the capital, was near Talavera. Sir Robert Wilson with 4000 Portuguese from Salamanca, and a Spanish force under Venegas (25,000) from Carolina, were to co-operate and occupy Joseph, by closing upon Madrid. Cuesta, during the advance up the valley of the Tagus, was to occupy the pass of Baños on the left flank; the Spanish authorities were to supply provisions, and Venegas was to be at Arganda, near Madrid, by the 22nd or 23rd of July; but none of these arrangements were duly carried out, and it was on this that the remainder of the campaign turned. Writing to Soult from Austria, Napoleon had placed the corps of Ney and Mortier under his orders, and said: "Wellesley will most likely advance by the Tagus against Madrid; in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear and crush him."

By the 20th of July Cuesta had joined Wellesley at Oropesa; and both then moved forward to Talavera, Victor falling back before them: but Cuesta, irritable and jealous, would not work cordially with Wellesley; Venegas—counter-ordered it is said by the Spanish junta—did not go to Arganda, and Wilson, though he advanced close to Madrid, was forced to retire, so that Joseph joined Victor, and the united force attacked the allies at Talavera de la Reina on the Tagus. Wellesley's line, facing due east, ran north from

the right bank of the river to a ridge running parallel to the Tagus, beyond which ridge, also parallel to the river, lay the Sierra de Montalbán. Cuesta's men with their right flank resting on the river held Talavera itself and the close country to the northward of it; Wellesley's right connected with Cuesta's left, and his line stretched away northwards to the ridge mentioned above. The Sierra was not, on the first day, occupied, and even on the inner ridge itself the division of General (afterwards Lord) Hill was from some misunderstanding very late in taking up its position. The whole front was covered by a rivulet running from the ridge to the Tagus. The battle was begun by the attack of two French divisions on the British advanced guard, which retired into the main position with severe loss and in some disorder. Marshal Victor's forces followed them up sharply, and soon came upon Wellesley's line of battle. For some time the possession of the ridge (owing to the delay of Hill's division) was doubtful, and Rufane Donkin's brigade had a severe struggle, but in the end the arrival of Hill's troops secured this all-important point for the allied left. Meanwhile the Spaniards (though there was at first a temporary panic amongst them) and the right divisions of the British repulsed an attack in the plain, and the day closed with the armies facing each other along the rivulet and on the ridge. The losses had been heavy on both sides. Early on the 28th the battle was renewed by a furious attack on Hill's troops, whose left was now prolonged to the Sierra by the allied cavalry and a division borrowed from Cuesta. King Joseph Bonaparte and Jourdan his chief of staff, who were present, were averse from fighting on this present ground, wishing to wait for Soult, whom they expected to come in on Wellesley's rear, and it was only after long discussion that the king gave a reluctant assent to Victor's plan of attack. That marshal's divisions once more tried to oust Hill from the ridge, and once more failed before the steady volleys of the British line and the charge of the cavalry posted in this quarter (though, owing perhaps to defective ground-scouting, this nearly ended in disaster). At the same time General Sebastiani's 4th corps, after a heavy bombardment, assaulted the allied centre in the plain. Here the British and Spanish battalions held their own firmly, and a counter attack by General Mackenzie's division hurled back the French in disorder. Yet another attack followed these failures, and came very near to achieving a great success. This time Lapisse's division of Victor's corps attacked the allies' left centre, composed of the British Guards. The French columns were again checked by the British line, but here the counter-stroke, unlike Mackenzie's, was carried too far, and the troops in the ardour of incautious pursuit were very severely handled and pushed back to the position by the French reserves; when Wellesley decided the day by a counter attack with the 48th regiment, made with great intrepidity and steadiness. The Guards, with splendid discipline, resumed their positions, and eventually the French, with their leader Lapisse mortally wounded, fell back. Failure all along the line and heavy losses left King Joseph no alternative but to retire towards Madrid. The French lost 7268 men out of 46,138 present, the British 5363 out of 20,641; the Spanish losses were officially returned at 1201 out of some 36,000 present.

Owing to want of supplies, the British had fought in a half-starved condition; and Wellesley now learnt to his surprise that Soult had passed the mountains and was in his rear. Having turned about, he was on the march to attack him, when he heard (Aug. 23) that not Soult's corps alone, but three French corps. had come through the pass of Baños without opposition; that Soult himself was at Naval Moral, between him and the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus, and that Cuesta was retreating from Talavera. Wellesley's force was now in a dangerous position: but by withdrawing at once across the Tagus at Arzobispo, he reached Jaraicejo and Almaraz (by the south bank) blowing up the bridge at Almaraz, and thence moved, through Merida, northwards to the banks of the Agueda, commencing to fortify the country around Lisbon.

Elsewhere in the Peninsula during this year, Blake, now in Catalonia, after routing Suchet at Alcaniz (May 23, 1809), was defeated by him at Maria (June 15) and at Belchite (June 18); Venegas, by King Joseph and Sébastiani, at Almonacid on the 11th of August; Del Parque (20,000), after a previous victory near Salamanca (Oct. 18), was overthrown at Alba de Tormes by General Marchand (Nov. 28); the old forces of Venegas and Cuesta (50,000), now united under Areizaga, were decisively routed by King Joseph at Ocaña (Nov. 19); and Gerona after a gallant defence, had surrendered to Augereau (Dec. 10).

Sir Arthur Wellesley was for this campaign created Baron Douro and Viscount Wellington. He was made captain-general by Spain, and marshal-general by Portugal. But his experience after Talavera had been akin to that of Moore: his expectations from the Spaniards had not been realized; he had been almost intercepted by the French, and he had narrowly escaped from a critical position. Henceforth he resisted all proposals for joint operations, on any large scale, with Spanish armies not under his own direct command.

CHAPTER II

CAMPAIGNS OF 1810-12

Campaign in Portugal, 1810.—Napoleon, having avenged Aspern by the victory of Wagram (July 6, 1809), despatched to Spain large reinforcements destined to increase his army there to about 370,000 men. Marshal Masséna with 120,000, including the corps of Ney, Junot, Reynier and some of the Imperial Guard, was to operate from Salamanca against Portugal; but first Soult, appointed major-general of the army in Spain (equivalent to chief of the staff), was, with the corps of Victor, Mortier and Sébastiani (70,000), to reduce Andalusia. Soult (Jan. 31, 1810) occupied Seville and escaping thence to Cadiz, the Supreme Junta resigned its powers to a regency of five members (Feb. 2, 1810). Cadiz was invested by Victor's corps (Feb. 4), and then Soult halted, waiting for Masséna, who arrived at Valladolid on the 15th of May.

In England a party in parliament were urging the withdrawal of the British troops, and any reverse to the allied arms would have strengthened its hands. Wellington's policy was thus cautious and defensive, and he had already commenced the since famous lines of Torres Vedras round Lisbon. In June 1810 his headquarters were at Celorico. With about 35,000 British, 30,000 Portuguese regular troops and 30,000 Portuguese militia, he watched the roads leading into Portugal past Ciudad Rodrigo to the north, and Badajoz to the south of the Tagus, as also the line of the Douro and the country between the Elga and the Ponsul.

Soult having been instructed to co-operate by taking Badajoz and Elvas, Masséna, early in June 1810, moved forward, and Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered to him (June 10). Next pushing back a British force under Craufurd, he invested Almeida, taking it on the 27th of August. Then calling up Reynier, who during this had moved on his left towards Alcantara, he marched down the right bank of the Mondego, and entered Viseu (Sept. 21). Wellington fell back before him down the left bank, ordering up Rowland Hill's force from the Badajoz road, the peasantry having been previously called upon to destroy their crops and retire within the lines of Torres Vedras. A little north of Coimbra, the road which Masséna followed crossed the Sierra de Bussaco (Busaco), a very strong position where Wellington resolved to offer him battle. Masséna, superior in numbers and over-confident, made a direct attack upon the heights on the 27th of September 1810: his strength being about 60,000, while that of the allies was about 50,000, of whom nearly half were Portuguese. After a stern conflict the French were repulsed, the loss being five generals and nearly 5000 men, while the allies lost about 1300. The next day Masséna turned the Sierra by the Boyalva Pass and Sardao, which latter place, owing to an error, had not been occupied by the Portuguese, and Wellington then retreated by Coimbra and Leiria to the lines, which he entered on the 11th of October, having within them fully 100,000 able-bodied men.

The celebrated "Lines of Torres Vedras" were defensive works designed to resist any army which Napoleon could send against them. They consisted of three great lines, strengthened by about 150 redoubts, and earthworks of various descriptions, mounting some 600 cannon; the outer line, nearly 30 m. long, stretching over heights north of Lisbon, from the Tagus to the sea. As Masséna advanced, the Portuguese closing upon his rear retook Coimbra (Oct. 7), and when he neared the lines, astounded at their strength, he sent General Foy to the emperor to ask for reinforcements. After an effort, defeated by Hill, to cross the Tagus, he withdrew (Nov. 15) to Santarem. This practically closed Wellington's operations for the year 1810, his policy now being not to lose men in battle, but to reduce Masséna by hunger and distress.

In other parts of Spain, Augereau had taken Hostalrich (May 10); captured Lerida (May 14); Mequinenza (June 8); and invested Tortosa (Dec. 15). The Spanish levies had been unable to contribute much aid to the allies; the French having subdued almost all Spain, and being now in possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. On the other hand Wellington still held Lisbon with parts of Portugal, Elvas and Badajoz, for Soult had not felt disposed to attempt the capture of the last two fortresses.

Campaign of 1811.—Napoleon, whose attention was now directed towards Russia, refused to reinforce Masséna, but enjoined Soult to aid him by moving against Badajoz. Soult, therefore, leaving Victor before Cadiz, invested Badajoz (Jan. 26, 1811) and took it from the Spaniards (March 10). With the hope of raising the blockade of Cadiz, a force under Sir Thomas Graham (afterwards Lord Lynedoch) left that harbour by sea, and joining with Spanish troops near Tarifa, advanced by land against Victor's blockading force, a Spanish general, La Peña, being in chief command. As they neared Barrosa, Victor attacked them, the allies numbering in the battle about 13,000 with 24 guns, 4000 being British; the French 9000, actually engaged, with 14 guns; but with 5000 more a few miles off and others in the French lines. Hard fighting, chiefly between the French

and British, now ensued, and at one time the Barrosa ridge, the key of the position left by La Peña's orders, practically undefended, fell into the French hands; but Graham by a resolute counter-attack regained it, and Victor was in the end driven back. La Peña, who had in the battle itself failed to give proper support to Graham, would not pursue, and Graham declining to carry on further operations with him, re-entered Cadiz. The French afterwards resumed the blockade, so that although Barrosa was an allied victory, its object was not attained. The British loss was about 1200; the French 2000, 6 guns and an eagle.

On the day of the above battle Masséna, having destroyed what guns he could not horse, and skilfully gained time by a feint against Abrantes, began his retreat from before the lines, through Coimbra and Espinhal. His army was in serious distress; he was in want of food and supplies; most of his horses were dead, and his men were deserting. Wellington followed, directing the Portuguese to remove all boats from the Mondego and Douro, and to break up roads north of the former river. Beresford was detached to succour Badajoz, but was soon recalled, as it had fallen to Soult. Ney, commanding Masséna's rearguard, conducted the retreat with great ability. In the pursuit, Wellington adhered to his policy of husbanding his troops for future offensive operations, and let sickness and hunger do the work of the sword. This they effectually did. Nothing could well exceed the horrors of Masséna's retreat. Rearguard actions were fought at Pombal (March 10), Redinha (March 12) and Condeixa (March 13). Here Ney was directed to make a firm stand; but, ascertaining that the Portuguese were at Coimbra and the bridge there broken, and fearing to be cut off also from Murcella, he burnt Condeixa, and marched to Cazal Nova. An action took place here (March 14) and at Foz d'Arouce (March 15). Wellington now sent off Beresford with a force to retake Badajoz; and Masséna, sacrificing much of his baggage and ammunition, reached Celorico and Guarda (March 21). Here he was attacked by Wellington (March 29) and, after a further engagement at Sabugal (April 3, 1811), he fell back through Ciudad to Salamanca, having lost in Portugal nearly 30,000 men, chiefly from want and disease, and 6000 in the retreat alone.

The key to the remaining operations of 1811 lies in the importance attached by both allies and French to the possession of the fortresses which guarded the two great roads from Portugal into Spain—Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo on the northern, and Badajoz and Elvas on the southern road; all these except Elvas were in French hands. Wellington, on the 9th of April 1811, directed General Spencer to invest Almeida; he then set off himself to join Beresford before Badajoz, but after reconnoitring the fortress with his lieutenant he had at once to return north on the news that Masséna was moving to relieve Almeida. On the 3rd of May Loison attacked him at Fuentes d'Onor near Almeida, and Masséna coming up himself made a more serious attack on the 5th of May. The allies numbered about 33,000, with 42 guns; the French 45,000 with 30 guns. The battle is chiefly notable for the steadiness with which the allied right, covered by the Light Division in squares, changed position in presence of the French cavalry; and for the extraordinary feat of arms of Captain Norman Ramsay, R.H.A., in charging through the French cavalry with his guns. Masséna failed to dislodge the allies, and on the 8th of May withdrew to Salamanca, Almeida falling to Wellington on the 11th of May 1811. The allied loss in the fighting on both days at Fuentes d'Onor was about 1500: the French 3000.

In the meantime Soult (with 23,000 men and 50 guns), advancing to relieve Badajoz, compelled Beresford to suspend the siege, and to take up a position with about 30,000 men (of whom 7000 were British) and 38 guns behind the river Albuhera (or Albuera). Here Soult attacked him on the 16th of May. An unusually bloody battle ensued, in which the French efforts were chiefly directed against the allied right, held by the Spaniards. At one time the right appeared to be broken, and six guns were lost, when a gallant advance of Sir Lowry Cole's division restored the day, Soult then falling back towards Seville. The allied loss was about 7000 (including about half the British force); the French about 8000.

After this Wellington from Almeida rejoined Beresford and the siege of Badajoz was continued; but now Marshal Marmont, having succeeded Masséna, was marching southwards to join Soult, and, two allied assaults of Badajoz having failed, Wellington withdrew. Subsequently, leaving Hill in the Alentejo, he returned towards Almeida, and with 40,000 men commenced a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, his headquarters being at Fuente Guinaldo. Soult and Marmont now fell back, the former to Seville, the latter to the valley of the Tagus, south of the pass of Baños.

In September, Marmont joined with the army of the north under General Dorsenne, coming from Salamanca—their total force being 60,000, with 100 guns—and succeeded (Sept. 25) in introducing a convoy of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo. Before so superior a force, Wellington had not attempted to maintain the blockade; but on Marmont afterwards advancing towards him, he fought a rearguard action with him at El Bodon (Sept. 25), notable, as was Fuentes d'Onor, for the coolness with which the allied squares retired amidst the enemy's horsemen; and again at Fuente Guinaldo (Sept. 25 and 26) he maintained for 30 hours, with 15,000 men, a bold front against Marmont's army of 60,000,

in order to save the Light Division from being cut off. At Aldea de Ponte there was a further sharp engagement (Sept. 27), but Wellington taking up a strong position near Sabugal, Marmont and Dorsenne withdrew once more to the valley of the Tagus and Salamanca respectively, and Wellington again blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo.

Thus terminated the main operations of this year. On the 28th of October 1811, Hill, by a very skilful surprise, captured Arroyo de los Molinos (between Badajoz and Trujillo), almost annihilating a French corps under Gérard; and in December 1811 the French were repulsed in their efforts to capture Tarifa near Cadiz. In the east of Spain Suchet took Tortosa (Jan. 1, 1811); Tarragona (June 28); and Murviedro (Oct. 26), defeating Blake's relieving force, which then took refuge in Valencia. Macdonald also retook Figueras which the Spaniards had taken on the 9th of April 1811 (Aug. 19). Portugal had now been freed from the French, but they still held Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the two main gates into Spain.

Campaign in Spain, 1812.—The campaign of 1812 marks an important stage in the war. Napoleon, with the Russian War in prospect, had early in the year withdrawn 30,000 men from Spain; and Wellington had begun to carry on what he termed a war of "magazines." Based on rivers (the navigation of which greatly improved) and the sea, he formed depots or magazines of provisions at many points, which enabled him always to take and keep the field. The French, on the other hand, had great difficulty in establishing any such reserves of food, owing to their practice of depending for sustenance entirely upon the country in which they were quartered. Wellington assumed the offensive, and by various movements and feints, aided the guerilla bands by forcing the French corps to assemble in their districts, which not only greatly harassed them but also materially hindered the combination of their corps for concerted action. Having secretly got a battering train into Almeida and directed Hill, as a blind, to engage Soult by threatening Badajoz, he suddenly (Jan. 8, 1812) besieged Ciudad Rodrigo.

The French, still numbering nearly 200,000, now held the following positions: the Army of the North—Dorsenne (48,000)—was about the Pisuerga, in the Asturias, and along the northern coast; the Army of Portugal—Marmont (50,000)—mainly in the valley of the Tagus, but ordered to Salamanca; the Army of the South—Soult (55,000)—in Andalusia; the Army of the Centre—Joseph (19,000)—about Madrid.

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was calculated in the ordinary course to require twenty-four days: but on it becoming known that Marmont was moving northward, the assault was delivered after twelve days only (Jan. 19). The gallantry of the troops made it successful, though with the loss of Generals Craufurd and McKinnon, and 1300 men, and Marmont's battering train of 150 guns here fell into the allied hands. Then, after a feint of passing on into Spain, Wellington rapidly marched south and, with 22,000 men, laid siege to Badajoz (March 17, 1812), Hill with 30,000 covering the siege near Merida. Wellington was hampered by want of time, and had to assault prematurely. Soult and Marmont having begun to move on to relieve the garrison, the assault was delivered on the night of the 7th of April, and though the assailants failed at the breaches, the carnage at which was terrible, a very daring escalade of one of the bastions and of the castle succeeded, and Badajoz fell, Soult's pontoon train being taken in it. After the assault, some deplorable excesses were committed by the victorious troops. The allied loss was 3600 in the assault alone and 5000 in the entire siege.

The allies had now got possession of the two great gates into Spain: and Hill, by an enterprise most skilfully carried out, destroyed (May 19) the Tagus bridge at Almaraz, by which Soult to the south of the river chiefly communicated with Marmont to the north. Wellington then, ostentatiously making preparations to enter Spain by the Badajoz line, once more turned northward, crossed the Tormes (June 17, 1812) and advanced to the Douro, behind which the French were drawn up. Marmont had erected at Salamanca some strong forts, the reduction of which occupied Wellington ten days, and cost him 600 men. The allies and French now faced each other along the Douro to the Pisuerga. The river was high, and Wellington hoped that want of supplies would compel Marmont to retire, but in this he was disappointed.

On the 15th of July 1812, Marmont, after a feint against Wellington's left, suddenly by a forced march, turned his right, and made rapidly towards the fords of Huerta and Alba on the Tormes. Some interesting manœuvres now took place, Wellington moving parallel and close to Marmont, but more to the north, making for the fords of Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta on the Tormes nearer to Salamanca, and being under the belief that the Spaniards held the castle and ford at Alba on that river. But Marmont's manœuvring and marching power had been underestimated, and on the 21st of July while Wellington's position covered Salamanca, and but indirectly his line of communications through Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont had reached a point from which he hoped to interpose between Wellington and Portugal, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. This he endeavoured to do on the 22nd of July 1812, which brought on the important battle of Salamanca.


The allied army under Wellington (about 46,000 with 60 guns) was drawn up south of Salamanca, the left resting on the river Tormes at Santa Marta, with a division under Pakenham and some cavalry on the north bank at Cabrerizos; the right near the village

of Arapiles and two hills of that name. Wellington's object was to cover Salamanca and guard his communications through Ciudad Rodrigo with Portugal. The French under Marshal Marmont (about 42,000 with 70 guns) were collecting towards Wellington's right, stretching southwards from Calvariza de Ariba. The country generally is undulating, but crossed by some marked ridges and streams.

Until the morning of the battle it had been uncertain whether Marmont wished to reach Salamanca by the right or left bank of the Tormes, or to gain the Ciudad Rodrigo road, but Wellington now felt that the latter was his real objective. At daylight there was a rush by both armies for the two commanding hills of the Arapiles; the allies gained the northern (since termed the "English"), and the French the southern (since termed the "French") Arapiles. While Marmont was closing up his forces, a complete change of position was carried out by Wellington. Pakenham was directed to march through Salamanca, crossing the Tormes, and move under cover to a wood near Aldea Tejada, while Wellington, holding the village of Arapiles and the northern hill, took up a line with four infantry divisions, a Portuguese brigade (Brasford), a strong force of cavalry, and Don Carlos's Spanish brigade, under cover of a ridge between Arapiles and Aldea Tejada. By noon his old right had become his left, and he was nearer to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, flanking Marmont should he move towards it.

It was not Wellington's wish (*Despatches*, July 21, 1812) to fight a battle "unless under very advantageous circumstances." He knew that large reinforcements were nearing the French, and, having determined to fall back towards Portugal, he began to pass his baggage along the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Marmont, about 2 P.M., seeing the dust of his baggage column, ignorant of his true position, and anxious to intercept his retreat, ordered two divisions under Maucune, the leading one of which became afterwards Thomières, to push westward, while he himself attacked Arapiles. Maucune moved off, flanked by some cavalry and fifty guns, leaving a gap between him and the rest of the French. Wellington instantly took advantage of this. Directing Pakenham to attack the head of the leading French division, and a Portuguese brigade (Pack) to occupy the enemy by assaulting the south (or French) Arapiles, he prepared to bear down in strength upon Maucune's right flank. The French attack upon Arapiles was after hard fighting repulsed; and, at about 5 P.M., Maucune's force, when in confusion from the fierce attack of Pakenham and Wellington in front and flank and suffering severely, was suddenly trampled down "with a terrific clamour and disturbance" (Napier) by an irresistible charge of Le Marchant's and Anson's cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton. This counter-stroke decided the battle, Marmont's left wing being completely broken. The French made a gallant but fruitless effort to retrieve the day, and repulsed Pack's attack upon the French Arapiles; but, as the light waned, Clausel, Marmont being wounded, drew off the French army towards Alba de Tormes and retired to Valladolid and thence to Burgos. Both armies lost heavily, the Allies about 6000, the French some 15,000 men, 12 guns, two eagles and several standards. The rout would have been even more thorough had not the castle and ford at Alba de Tormes been evacuated by its Spanish garrison without Wellington's knowledge.

Wellington entered Valladolid (July 30), and thence marched against Joseph, who (July 21) had reached Blasco Sancho with reinforcements for Marmont. Joseph retired before him, and Wellington entered Madrid (Aug. 12, 1812), where, in the Retiro, 1700



Redrawn from Maj.-Gen. C. W. Robinson's *Wellington's Campaigns*, by permission of Hugh Rees, Ltd.

men, 180 cannon, two eagles, and a quantity of stores were captured. Soult now raised the siege of Cadiz (Aug. 26), and evacuating Andalusia joined Suchet with some 55,000 men. Wellington then brought up Hill to Madrid.

On the 1st of September 1812, the French armies having begun once more to collect together, Wellington marched against the Army of the North, now under General Clausel, and laid siege to the castle of Burgos (Sept. 19) to secure the road towards Santander on the coast. But the strength of the castle had been underrated; Wellington had insufficient siege equipment and transport for heavy guns; five assaults failed, and Soult (having left Suchet in Valencia) and also the Army of Portugal were both approaching, so Wellington withdrew on the night of the 21st of October, and, directing the evacuation of Madrid, commenced the "Retreat from Burgos." In this retreat, although military operations were skilfully conducted, the Allies lost 7000 men, and discipline, as in that to Corunna, became much relaxed.

By November 1812, Hill having joined him at Salamanca, Wellington once more had gone into cantonments near Ciudad Rodrigo, and the French armies had again scattered for convenience of supply. In spite of the failure before Burgos, the successes of the campaign had been brilliant. In addition to the decisive victory of Salamanca, Madrid had been occupied, the siege of Cadiz raised, Andalusia freed, and Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz stormed. Early in January also the French had abandoned the siege of Tarifa, though Valencia had surrendered to them (Jan. 9). One important result of the campaign was that the Spanish Cortes nominated Wellington (Sept. 22, 1812) to the unfettered command of the Spanish armies. For the operations of this campaign Wellington was created earl, and subsequently marquess of Wellington; duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by Spain, and marquis of Torres Vedras by Portugal.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGNS OF 1813-14

Campaign in Spain and the South of France, 1813.—At the opening of 1813, Suchet, with 63,000 men, had been left to hold Valencia, Aragon and Catalonia; and the remainder of the French (about 137,000) occupied Leon, the central provinces and Biscay, guarding also the communications with France. Of these about 60,000 under Joseph were more immediately opposed to Wellington, and posted, in scattered detachments, from Toledo and Madrid behind the Tormes to the Douro, and along that river to the Esla. Wellington had further organized the Spanish forces—Castaños (40,000) with the guerilla bands of Mina, Longa and others, was in Galicia, the Asturias and northern Spain; Copons (10,000) in Catalonia; Elio (20,000) in Murcia; Del Parque (12,000) in the Sierra Morena, and O'Donell (15,000) in Andalusia. More Portuguese troops had been raised, and reinforcements received from England, so that the Allies, without the Spaniards above alluded to, now numbered some 75,000 men, and from near the Coa watched the Douro and Tormes, their line stretching from their left near Lamego to the pass of Baños, Hill being on the right. The district of the Trasos-Montes, north of the Douro, about the Tamega, Tua and Sabor, was so rugged that Wellington was convinced that Joseph would expect him to advance by the south of the river. He therefore, moving by the south bank himself with Hill, to confirm Joseph in this expectation, crossed the Tormes near and above Salamanca, having previously—which was to be the decisive movement—detached Graham, with 40,000 men, to make his way, through the difficult district above mentioned, towards Braganza, and then joining with the Spaniards, to turn Joseph's right. Graham, crossing the Douro near Lamego, carried out his laborious march with great energy, and Joseph retired precipitately from the Douro, behind the Pisuerga. The allied army, raised by the junction of the Spanish troops in Galicia to 90,000, now concentrated near Toro, and moved towards the Pisuerga, when Joseph, blowing up the castle of Burgos, fell back behind the Ebro. Once more Wellington turned his right, by a sweeping movement through Rocamunde and Puente Arenas near the source of the Ebro, when he retreated behind the Zadorra near the town of Vitoria.

Santander was now evacuated by the French, and the allied line of communications was changed to that port. On the 20th of June Wellington encamped along the river Bayas, and the next day attacked Joseph.

On June 21st, 1813, the French army in Spain (about 65,000 men with 150 guns), under King Joseph Bonaparte, held an extended position in the basin of Vitoria, south (with the exception of the extreme right) of the river Zadorra. The left rested on the heights of Puebla, north of the Puebla Pass, and Puebla de Arganzon, through which ran the Miranda-Vitoria-Bayonne road, Joseph's line of communication with France. Thence the line stretched to the ridge of Margarita, the troops so far being under General Gazan, with a second supporting line under D'Erlon between Arinez and Hermandad and a reserve behind Arinez. The right under Reille guarded the Bilbao-Vitoria road, occupying heights

on the north bank of the Zadorra, and also the villages and bridges of Abechuco and Gamarra Mayor, as well as a ridge near Ariaga on the south bank.

There were no troops between Hermandad and Ariaga, except a mass of cavalry near Ali. The Zadorra, fordable in certain spots only, was spanned by bridges at Puebla de Arganzon, Nanclares, Villodas, Tres Puentes, Mendoza, Abechuco and Gamarra Mayor, which French guns commanded; but, for some reason, none of these had been destroyed. The faults of the French position and their occupation of it were its extension; that it was in prolongation of and (on the right especially) very close to their line of retreat, so that if the right were driven back this line could be at once seized; that the centre was not strongly held; and that all bridges were left intact.

The allies (nearly 80,000 with 90 guns), under Wellington, had moved from the river Bayas at daylight to attack Joseph, in four columns, the right being under Hill (20,000, including Morillos's Spaniards), the right centre and left centre under Wellington (30,000) and the left under Graham (20,000, including Longa's Spaniards). As the columns marched across the intersected country between the Bayas and Zadorra, extending from near Puebla de Arganzon to the Bilbao-Vitoria road, they kept touch with each other; and as they neared the Zadorra the battle opened all along the line soon after 10 A.M. Wellington's instructions were to undertake no manœuvre which would separate his column from those on the right; but, with this proviso, to seize the Vitoria-Bayonne road if the enemy appeared decidedly in retreat.

Hill after a sharp contest gained the Puebla heights, too weakly held; and pushing through the pass carried the village of Subijana de Alava. The right centre column having reached Villodas, was waiting for Hill to gain further ground, when the bridge at Tres Puentes was observed to be unguarded, probably because it was



Redrawn from Major-General C. W. Robinson's *Wellington's Campaigns*, by permission of Hugh Rees, Ltd.

commanded from the south bank; and, the French attention being now turned towards their flanks, it was surprised and rushed by Wellington with the Light division, supported quickly by cavalry and other troops, who maintained themselves on the south bank. Joseph's centre was partially forced, while his left was hard pressed by Hill; and, fearing that Gazan and D'Erlon might be cut off from Reille, he ordered them to withdraw to a ridge farther back, which they did, holding Arinez in front. Here there was no hard fighting; but, as Wellington had now passed three divisions, many guns and the cavalry (which, however, from the nature of the ground could be but little used) across the Zadorra, Margarita, Hermandad and Arinez soon fell to the allies.

On the left, Graham, having turned the heights north of Zadorra with Longa's Spaniards, seized Gamarra Menor close to the Bayonne road. He also with heavy loss carried Gamarra Mayor and Abechuco, but the bridges south of these villages, though more than once taken, were always recaptured by Reille. At length, when a brigade from the allied centre had been pushed up from Hermandad against Reille's flank, he withdrew from the obstinately defended bridges, and before this Gazan and D'Erlon had also fallen back, fighting, to a third position on a ridge between Armentia and Ali west of Vitoria. Here, at about 6 P.M., they made a last stand, being compelled in the end to yield; and as Graham having now crossed the bridges was close to the Bayonne road, the main body of Joseph's army fled by a bad cross road towards Pampeluna, abandoning artillery, vehicles and baggage (of which an enormous quantity was parked near Vitoria), Reille afterwards joining it through

Betonia. The allies then occupied Vitoria and pursued the French until nightfall. All Joseph's equipages, ammunition and stores, 143 guns, a million sterling in money, and various trophies fell into Wellington's hands, the French loss in men being nearly 7000, that of the allies over 5000, of whom 1600 were Portuguese and Spaniards. This decisive victory practically freed Spain from French domination.

Within a few days Madrid was evacuated, and all the French forces, with the exception of the garrisons of San Sebastian (3000), Pampeluna (3000), Santona (1500), and the troops under Suchet holding posts in Catalonia and Valencia, had retired across the Pyrenees into France. The Spanish peninsula was, to all intents and purposes, free from foreign domination, although the war was yet far from concluded. The French struggled gallantly to the close: but now a long succession of their leaders—Junot, Soult, Victor, Masséna, Marmont, Joseph—had been in turn forced to recoil before Wellington; and while their troops fought henceforward under the depressing memory of many defeats, the allies did so under the inspiring influence of great successes, and with that absolute confidence in their chief which doubled their fighting power.

For this decisive campaign Wellington was made a field marshal in the British army, and created duke of Victory¹ by the Portuguese government in Brazil. He now, with about 80,000 men, took up a position with his left (the Spaniards) on the Bidassoa near San Sebastian. Thence his line stretched along the Pyrenees by the passes of Vera, Echallar, Maya and Roncesvalles, to Altobiscar; his immediate object now being to reduce the fortresses of San Sebastian and Pampeluna. Not having sufficient *matériel* for two sieges, he laid siege to San Sebastian only, and blockaded Pampeluna. Sir Thomas Graham commenced the active siege of San Sebastian on the 10th of July 1813, but as Soult was approaching to its relief, the assault was ordered for daylight on the 24th. Unfortunately a conflagration breaking out near the breaches caused it to be postponed until nightfall, when, the breaches in the interval having been strengthened, it was delivered unsuccessfully and with heavy loss. Wellington then suspended the siege in order to meet Soult, who endeavoured (July 25) to turn the allied right, and reach Pampeluna. Attacking the passes of Maya and Roncesvalles, he obliged their defenders to retire, after sharp fighting, to a position close to Sorauren, which, with 25,000 men, he attempted to carry (July 28). By this time Wellington had reached it from the allied left; reinforcements were pressing up on both sides, and about 12,000 allied troops faced the French. A struggle, described by Wellington as "bludgeon work," now ensued, but all efforts to dislodge the Allies having failed, Soult, withdrawing, manœuvred to his right towards San Sebastian. Wellington now assumed the offensive, and, in a series of engagements, drove the French back (Aug. 2) beyond the Pyrenees. These included Roncesvalles and Maya (July 25); Sorauren (July 28 and 30); Yanzi (Aug. 1); and Echallar and Ivantelly (Aug. 2), the total losses in them being about—Allies under 7000, French 10,000. After this, Wellington renewing the siege of San Sebastian carried the place, excepting the castle, after a heavy expenditure of life (Aug. 31). Upon the day of its fall Soult attempted to relieve it, but in the combats of Vera and St Marcial was repulsed. The castle surrendered on the 9th of September, the losses in the entire siege having been about—Allies 4000, French 2000. Wellington next determined to throw his left across the river Bidassoa to strengthen his own position and secure the port of Fuenterrabia.

Now commenced a series of celebrated river passages, which had to be effected prior to the further invasion of France. At daylight on the 7th of October 1813 he crossed the Bidassoa in seven columns, and attacked the entire French position, which stretched in two heavily entrenched lines from north of the Irun-Bayonne road, along mountain spurs to the great Rhune, 2800 ft. high. The decisive movement was a passage in strength near Fuenterrabia, to the astonishment of the enemy, who in view of the width of the river and the shifting sands, had thought the crossing impossible at that point. The French right was then rolled back, and Soult was unable to reinforce his right in time to retrieve the day. His works fell in succession after hard fighting, and he withdrew towards the river Nivelle. The loss was about—Allies, 1600; French, 1400. The passage of the Bidassoa "was a general's not a soldiers' battle" (Napier).

On the 31st of October Pampeluna surrendered, and Wellington was now anxious to drive Suchet from Catalonia before further invading France. The British government however, in the interests of the continental powers, urged an immediate advance, so on the night of the 9th of November 1813 he brought up his right from the Pyrenean passes to the northward of Maya and towards Nivelle. Soult's army (about 79,000), in three entrenched lines, stretched from the sea in front of St Jean de Luz along commanding ground to Amotz and thence, behind the river, to Mont Mondarin near the Nive. Each army had with it about 100 guns; and, during a heavy cannonade, Wellington on the 10th of November 1813 attacked this extended position of 16 m. in five columns, these being so directed that after carrying Soult's advanced works a mass of about 50,000 men converged

¹ *Duque da Victoria*, often incorrectly duke of Vitoria. The coincidence of the title with the place-name of the battle which had not yet been fought when the title was conferred is curious, but accidental.

towards the French centre near Amotz, where, after hard fighting, it swept away the 18,000 of the second line there opposed to it, cutting Soult's army in two. The French right then fell back to St Jean de Luz, the left towards points on the Nive. It was now late and the allies, after moving a few miles down both banks of the Nivelle, bivouacked, while Soult, taking advantage of the respite, withdrew in the night to Bayonne. The allied loss was about 2700; that of the French 4000, 51 guns, and all their magazines. The next day Wellington closed in upon Bayonne from the sea to the left bank of the Nive.

After this there was a period of comparative inaction, though during it the French were driven from the bridges at Urdains and Cambo. The weather had become bad, and the Nive unfordable; but there were additional and serious causes of delay. The Portuguese and Spanish authorities were neglecting the payment and supply of their troops. Wellington had also difficulties of a similar kind with his own government, and also the Spanish soldiers, in revenge for many French outrages, had become guilty of grave excesses in France, so that Wellington took the extreme step of sending 25,000 of them back to Spain and resigning the command of their army, though his resignation was subsequently withdrawn. So great was the tension at this crisis that a rupture with Spain seemed possible. These matters, however, having been at length adjusted, Wellington, who in his cramped position between the sea and the Nive could not use his cavalry or artillery effectively, or interfere with the French supplies coming through St Jean Pied de Port, determined to occupy the right as well as the left bank of the Nive. He could not pass to that bank with his whole force while Soult held Bayonne, without exposing his own communications through Irun. Therefore, on the 9th of December 1813, after making a demonstration elsewhere, he effected the passage with a portion of his force only under Hill and Beresford, near Ustaritz and Cambo, his loss being slight, and thence pushed down the river towards Villefranque, where Soult barred his way across the road to Bayonne. The allied army was now divided into two portions by the Nive; and Soult from Bayonne at once took advantage of his central position to attack it with all his available force, first on the left bank and then on the right. On the morning of the 10th of December he fell, with 60,000 men and 40 guns, upon Hope, who with 30,000 men and 24 guns held a position from the sea, 3 m. south of Biarritz on a ridge behind two lakes (or tanks) through Arcangues towards the Nive. Desperate fighting now ensued, but fortunately, owing to the intersected ground, Soult was compelled to advance slowly, and in the end, Wellington coming up with Beresford from the right bank, the French retired baffled. On the 11th and 12th of December there were engagements of a less severe character, and finally on the 13th of December Soult with 35,000 men made a vehement attack up the right bank of the Nive against Hill, who with about 14,000 men occupied some heights from Villefranque past St Pierre (Lostenia) to Vieux Moguerre. The conflict about St Pierre (Lostenia) was one of the most bloody of the war; but for hours Hill maintained his ground, and finally repulsed the French before Wellington, delayed by his pontoon bridge over the Nive having been swept away, arrived to his aid. The losses in the four days' fighting in the battles before Bayonne (or battles of the Nive) were—Allies about 5000, French about 7000. Both the British and Portuguese artillery, as well as infantry, greatly distinguished themselves in these battles.

In eastern Spain Suchet (April 11, 1813) had defeated Elio's Murcians at Yecla and Villena, but was subsequently routed by Sir John Murray¹ near Castalla (April 13), who then besieged Tarragona. The siege was abandoned after a time, but was later on renewed by Lord W. Bentinck. Suchet, after the battle of Vitoria, evacuated Tarragona (Aug. 17) but defeated Bentinck in the combat of Ordal (Sept. 13).

Campaign in the South of France, 1814.—When operations recommenced in February 1814 the French line extended from Bayonne up the north bank of the Adour to the Pau, thence bending south along the Bidouze to St Palais, with advanced posts on the Joyeuse and at St Jean Pied de Port. Wellington's left, under Hope, watched Bayonne, while Beresford, with Hill, observed the Adour and the Joyeuse, the right trending back till it reached Urcuray on the St Jean Pied de Port road. Exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other places, the available field force of Soult numbered about 41,000, while that of the Allies, deducting Hope's force observing Bayonne, was of much the same strength. It had now become Wellington's object to draw Soult away from Bayonne, in order that the allied army might, with less loss, cross the Adour and lay siege to the place on both banks of the river.

At its mouth the Adour was about 500 yds. wide, and its entrance from the sea by small vessels, except in the finest weather, was a perilous undertaking, owing to the shifting sands and a dangerous bar. On the other hand, the deep sandy soil near its banks made the transport of bridging *matériel* by land laborious, and almost certain of discovery. Wellington, convinced that no effort to bridge below Bayonne would be expected, decided to attempt it there, and collected at St Jean Pied de Port and Passages a large number of country vessels (termed *chasse-marées*). Then, leaving Hope with 30,000 men to watch

¹ Commander of a British expedition from the Mediterranean islands.

Bayonne, he began an enveloping movement round Soult's left. Hill on the 14th and 15th of February, after a combat at Garris, drove the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; and Wellington then pressed these troops back over the Bidouze and Gave¹ de Mauleon to the Gave d'Oleron. Wellington's object in this was at once attained, for Soult, leaving only 10,000 men in Bayonne, came out and concentrated at Orthes on the Pau. Then Wellington (Feb. 19) proceeded to St Jean de Luz to superintend the despatch of boats to the Adour. Unfavourable weather, however, compelled him to leave this to Sir John Hope and Admiral Penrose, so returning to the Gave d'Oleron he crossed it, and faced Soult on the Pau (Feb. 25). Hope in the meantime, after feints higher up the Adour, succeeded (Feb. 22 and 23) in passing 600 men across the river in boats. The nature of the ground, and there being no suspicion of an attempt at this point, led to the French coming out very tardily to oppose them; and when they did, some Congreve rockets (then a novelty) threw them into confusion, so that the right bank was held until, on the morning of the 24th, the flotilla of *chasse-marées* appeared from St Jean de Luz, preceded by men-of-war boats. Several men and vessels were lost in crossing the bar; but by noon on the 26th of February the bridge of 26 vessels had been thrown and secured; batteries and a boom placed to protect it, 8000 troops passed over, and the enemy's gunboats driven up the river. Bayonne was then invested on both banks as a preliminary to the siege.

On the 27th of February Wellington, having with little loss effected the passage of the Pau below Orthes, attacked Soult. In this battle the allies and French were of about equal strength (37,000); the former having 48 guns, the latter 40. Soult held a strong position behind Orthes on heights commanding the roads to Dax and St Sever. Beresford was directed to turn his right, if possible cutting him off from Dax, and Hill his left towards the St Sever road. Beresford's attack, after hard fighting over difficult ground, was repulsed, when Wellington, perceiving that the pursuing French had left a central part of the heights unoccupied, thrust up the Light Division into it, between Soult's right and centre. At the same time Hill, having found a ford above Orthes, was turning the French left, when Soult retreated just in time to save being cut off, withdrawing towards St Sever, which he reached on the 28th of February. The allied loss was about 2000; the French 4000 and 6 guns.

From St Sever Soult turned eastwards to Aire, where he covered the roads to Bordeaux and Toulouse. Beresford, with 12,000 men, was now sent to Bordeaux, which opened its gates as promised to the Allies. Driven by Hill from Aire on the 2nd of March 1814, Soult retired by Vic Bigorre, where there was a combat (March 19), and Tarbes, where there was a severe action (March 20), to Toulouse behind the Garonne. He endeavoured also to rouse the French peasantry against the allies, but in vain, for Wellington's justice and moderation afforded them no grievances. Wellington wished to pass the Garonne above Toulouse in order to attack the city from the south—its weakest side—and interpose between Soult and Suchet. But finding it impracticable to operate in that direction, he left Hill on the west side and crossed at Grenade below Toulouse (April 3). When Beresford, who had now rejoined Wellington, had passed over, the bridge was swept away, which left him isolated on the right bank. But Soult did not attack; the bridge (April 8) was restored; Wellington crossed the Garonne and the Ers, and attacked Soult on the 10th of April. In the battle of Toulouse the French numbered about 40,000 (exclusive of the local National Guards) with 80 guns; the Allies under 52,000 with 64 guns. Soult's position to the north and east of the city was exceedingly strong, consisting of the canal of Languedoc, some fortified suburbs, and (to the extreme east) the commanding ridge of Mont Rave, crowned with redoubts and earthworks. Wellington's columns, under Beresford, were now called upon to make a flank march of some two miles, under artillery, and occasionally musketry, fire, being threatened also by cavalry, and then, while the Spanish troops assaulted the north of the ridge, to wheel up, mount the eastern slope, and carry the works. The Spaniards were repulsed, but Beresford gallantly took Mont Rave and Soult fell back behind the canal. On the 12th of April Wellington advanced to invest Toulouse from the south, but Soult on the night of the 11th had retreated towards Villefranche, and Wellington then entered the city. The allied loss was about 5000; the French 3000. Thus, in the last great battle of the war, the courage and resolution of the soldiers of the Peninsular army were conspicuously illustrated.

On the 13th of April 1814 officers arrived with the announcement to both armies of the capture of Paris, the abdication of Napoleon, and the practical conclusion of peace; and on the 18th a convention, which included Suchet's force, was entered into between Wellington and Soult. Unfortunately, after Toulouse had fallen, the Allies and French, in a sortie from Bayonne on the 14th of April, each lost about 1000 men: so that some 10,000 men fell after peace had virtually been made.

In the east, during this year (1814), Sir W. Clinton had, on the 16th of January, attacked Suchet at Molins de Rey and blockaded Barcelona (Feb. 7); the French posts of Lerida,

¹ "Gave" in the Pyrenees means a mountain stream or torrent.

Mequinenza and Monzon had also been yielded up, and Suchet, on the 2nd of March, had crossed the Pyrenees into France. Figueras surrendered to Cuesta before the end of May ; and peace was formally signed at Paris on the 30th of May.

Thus terminated the long and sanguinary struggle of the Peninsular War. The British troops were partly sent to England, and partly embarked at Bordeaux for America, with which country war had broken out : the Portuguese and Spanish recrossed the Pyrenees : the French army was dispersed throughout France : Louis XVIII. was restored to the French throne : and Napoleon was permitted to reside in the island of Elba, the sovereignty of which had been conceded to him by the allied powers. For the operations of this campaign Wellington was created marquess of Douro and duke of Wellington, and peerages were conferred upon Beresford, Graham and Hill.

The events of the Peninsular War, especially as narrated in the Wellington Despatches, are replete with instruction not only for the soldier, but also for the civil administrator. Even in a brief summary of the war one salient fact is noticeable, that all Wellington's reverses were in connexion with his sieges, for which his means were never adequate. In his many battles he was always victorious, his strategy eminently successful, his organizing and administrative power exceptionally great, his practical resource unlimited, his soldiers most courageous ; but he never had an army fully complete in its departments and warlike equipment. He had no adequate corps of sappers and miners, or transport train. In 1812 tools and material of war for his sieges were often insufficient. In 1813, when he was before San Sebastian, the ammunition ran short ; a battering train, long demanded, reached him not only some time after it was needed, but even then with only one day's provision of shot and shell. For the siege of Burgos heavy guns were available in store on the coast ; but he neither had, nor could procure, the transport to bring them up. By resource and dogged determination Wellington rose superior to almost every difficulty, but he could not overcome all ; and the main teaching of the Peninsular War turns upon the value of an army that is completely organized in its various branches before hostilities break out.

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN, 1815

CHAPTER I

NAPOLÉON'S PLANS

ON February 27, 1815, Napoleon set sail from Elba with his force of 1,000 men and 4 guns, determined to reconquer the throne of France. On March 1 he landed near Cannes, and proceeded at once to march on Paris. He deliberately chose the difficult route over the French Alps because he recognized that his opponents would neither expect him by this route nor be able to concert combined operations in time to thwart him. Events proved the wisdom of his choice. His advance to Paris was a series of triumphs, his power waxing with every league he covered, and when he reached Paris the Bourbons had fled. But he had soon to turn his attention to war. His sudden return, far from widening the breaches between the allies, had fused them indissolubly together, and the four powers bound themselves to put 150,000 men apiece under arms and to maintain them in the field until Napoleon had been utterly crushed. So, from the first, France was faced with another war against an affrighted and infuriated Europe, a war in which the big battalions would be on the side of the Seventh Coalition; and to oppose their vast armies Napoleon only had in March the 150,000 men he had taken over from Louis XVIII. when the Bourbon hurriedly quitted the throne. Of this force the emperor could have drawn together some 50,000 men within ten days and struck straight at the small allied forces that were in Belgium at the moment. But he wisely refrained from taking the immediate offensive. Such an act would have proved that he desired, nay provoked, a war; and further, the engagement of such small forces could lead to no decisive results. Napoleon therefore stayed his hand and proceeded to hasten forward the organization, almost the creation, of an army, with which he could confront the coalition. Meanwhile he sought to detach Great Britain and Austria from the alliance. But he did not permit his political enterprise to stay his military preparations; and, by constant attention to the minutest details, by June 1 he had got together an army of 360,000 for the defence of France, one half of which was available for field service. In this army was comprised his whole means of defence; for he had no allies. On his return from Elba it is true that Murat, the king of Naples, took his side; but recklessly opening an offensive campaign, Murat was beaten at Tolentino (May 2-3), and he found himself compelled to fly in disguise to France, where the emperor refused him an audience or employment. Herein Napoleon wronged France, for he deprived her of the most brilliant cavalry soldier of the period. Shorn thus of his single ally, the emperor realized that the whole eastern land-frontier of France was open to invasion, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. By the end of May he had placed his forces as follows to protect his empire:—

D'Erlon's I. Corps cantoned between Lille and Valenciennes.
Reille's II. Corps cantoned between Valenciennes and Avesnes.
Vandamme's III. Corps cantoned around Rocroi.
Gérard's IV. Corps cantoned at Metz.
Lobau's VI. Corps cantoned at Laon.
Grouchy's Cavalry Reserve at Guise.
Marshal Mortier with the Imperial Guard at Paris.
Rapp with the V. Corps (20,000) near Strassburg.

18,500 more troops under Suchet, Brune and Lecourbe guarded the S.E. frontier from Basel to Nice, and covered Lyons; 8,000 men under Clausel and Decaen guarded the Pyrenean frontier; whilst Lamarque led 10,000 men into La Vendée to quell

the insurrection in that quarter. In 1815 Napoleon was not supported by a united and unanimous France; the country was weakened by internal dissensions at the very moment when it was needful to put every man in line to meet the rising tide of invasion surging against the long curving eastern frontier.

Napoleon now pondered over his plan of campaign. In Belgium, across an almost open frontier, lay an ever-increasing force of Anglo-Dutch and Prussian troops under Wellington and Blücher. The Rhine frontier was threatened by Schwarzenberg's Austrians (210,000); Barclay de Tolly's Russians (150,000) were slowly coming up; and another Austrian force menaced the S.E. frontier of France. The Allies determined that they would wage a war without risks, and they were particularly anxious to avoid the risk of defeat in detail. It was accordingly arranged that Wellington and Blücher should await in Belgium the arrival of the Austrian and Russian masses on the Rhine, about July 1, before the general invasion of France was begun. Thereafter, whatever befell, the allied armies would resolutely press forward towards Paris, affording each other mutual support, and with the tremendous weight of troops at their disposal thrust back Napoleon upon his capital, force him to fight in front of it, and drive him when defeated within its works. The end would then be in sight. Thus they had planned the campaign, but Napoleon forestalled them. In fact, the threatening danger forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he had collected a sufficient army for his defensive needs. Consequently he determined to advance swiftly and secretly against Wellington and Blücher, whose forces, as Napoleon knew, were dispersed over the country of their unenthusiastic ally. Thus he designed to crush a part of the coalition before the Russians and Austrians poured over the eastern frontier. Once Wellington and Blücher were destroyed he would move southwards and meet the other allies on the Rhine. He might thus compensate for his numerical inferiority by superior mobility and superior leadership.

His information showed that Wellington held the western half of Belgium from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the Scheldt, that his base of operations was Ostend, and that his headquarters were at Brussels. Blücher, based on the Rhine at Coblenz, held the eastern half from the Brussels-Charleroi road to the Meuse, and had his headquarters at Namur. The emperor was convinced that nothing could be gained by invading Belgium from the S.E. or W.; such a stroke would surely drive the allies together, and that was never Napoleon's custom. On the other hand, if he struck straight at Charleroi—the allied junction point—he would drive the "Armée du Nord" like an armoured wedge between the allies, if only he caught them unsuspecting and unready. Forced asunder at the outset, each would (in all probability) fall back along his own line of communication, and the gap thus made between the allies would enable the emperor to manœuvre between them and defeat them in turn. To gain the best chance of success he would have to concentrate his whole army almost within gunshot of the centre of the enemies' outposts without attracting their attention; otherwise he would find the allies concentrated and waiting for him.

Wellington and Blücher were disposed as follows in the early days of June (Map I.). The Anglo-Dutch army of 93,000 with headquarters at Brussels were cantoned: I. Corps (Prince of Orange), 30,200, headquarters Braine-le-Comte, disposed in the area Enghien-Genappe-Mons; II. Corps (Lord Hill), 27,300, headquarters Ath, distributed in the area Ath-Oudenarde-Ghent; reserve cavalry (Lord Uxbridge) 9900, in the valley of the Dendre river, between Grammont and Ninove; the reserve (under Wellington himself) 25,500, lay around Brussels. The frontier in front of Leuze and Binche was watched by the Dutch-Belgian light cavalry.

Blücher's Prussian army of 116,000 men, with headquarters at Namur, was distributed as follows:—

I. Corps (Zieten), 30,800, cantoned along the Sambre, headquarters Charleroi, and covering the area Fontaine l'Évêque-Fleurus-Moustier.

II. Corps (Pirch I.), 31,000, headquarters at Namur, lay in the area Namur-Hannut-Huy.

III. Corps (Thielemann), 23,900, in the bend of the river Meuse, headquarters Ciney, and disposed in the area Dinant-Huy-Ciney.

IV. Corps (Bülow), 30,300, with headquarters at Liège, around that place.

The frontier in front of Binche, Charleroi and Dinant was watched by the Prussian outposts.

Thus the allied front extended for nearly 90 m. across Belgium, and the mean depths of their cantonments was 30 m. To concentrate the whole army on either flank would take six days, and on the common centre, about Charleroi, three days.

The allies had foreseen the very manœuvre that Napoleon designed to put into execution, and had decided that if an attempt were made to break their centre they would concentrate forwards and on their inner flanks, the Anglo-Dutch army forming up at Gosselies and the Prussians at Fleurus. Here they would be in contact, and ready to act united against Napoleon with a numerical superiority of two to one. The necessary three days' warning of the French concentration they felt certain they would obtain, for Napoleon's troops were at this juncture distributed over an area (Lille-Metz-Paris

of 175 m. by 100 m. ; and to concentrate the French army unknown to, and unobserved by, the allies, within striking distance and before they had moved a man to meet the onrush of the foe, was unthinkable. But, as in 1800, it was the unthinkable that happened.

It will be seen that Blücher covered Fleurus, his concentration point, by Zieten's corps, in the hope of being able to collect his army round Fleurus in the time that Zieten would secure for him by a yielding fight. Wellington on the other hand was far less satisfactorily placed ; for in advance of Gosselies he had placed only a cavalry screen, which would naturally be too weak to gain him the requisite time to mass there. Hence his ability to concentrate hung on the mere good luck of obtaining timely information of Napoleon's plans, which in fact he failed to obtain. But the two tracts of country covered by the allies differed vastly in configuration. Blücher's left was protected by the difficult country of the Ardennes. On the other hand, the duke's whole section lay close to an open frontier across which ran no fewer than four great roads, and the duke considered that his position " required, for its protection, a system of occupation quite different from that adopted by the Prussian army." He naturally relied on his secret service to warn him in such time as would enable him to mass and meet the foe. His reserve was well placed to move rapidly and promptly in any direction and give support wherever required.

The emperor made his final preparations with the utmost secrecy. The Army of the North was to concentrate in three fractions—around Solre, Beaumont and Philippeville—as close to Charleroi as was practicable ; and he arranged to screen the initial movements of the troops as much as possible, so as to prevent the allies from discovering in time that their centre was aimed at. He directed that the movements of the troops when they drew near the allied outposts should be covered as far as possible by accidents of ground, for there was no great natural screen to cover his strategical concentration.

Gérard and the IV. Corps from Metz, having the longest distance to go, started first (on June 6), and soon the whole army was in motion for the selected points of concentration, every effort being made to hide the movements of the troops. On June 11 Napoleon himself left Paris for the front, and by June 14 he had achieved almost the impossible itself ; for there, at Solre, Beaumont and Philippeville, lay his mass of men, 124,000 strong, concentrated under his hand without rousing the enemy's suspicions, and ready to march across the frontier at dawn. Far different were things on the other side of the Sambre. The allies were still resting in fancied security, dispersed throughout widely distant cantonments ; for nothing but vague rumours had reached them, and they had not moved a man to meet the enemy.

The opposing armies were of very different quality. Wellington's was a collection of many nationalities ; the kernel being composed of his trusty and tenacious British and King's German Legion troops, numbering only 42,000 men. Of the remainder many were far from enthusiastic in the cause for which they had perforce to take up arms, and might prove a source of weakness should victory incline to the French eagles. Blücher's army was undoubtedly more homogeneous, and though it is doubtful if he possessed any troops of the same quality as Wellington's best, on the other hand he had no specially weak elements.

Napoleon was at the head of a veteran army of Frenchmen, who worshipped their leader and were willing to die for France if necessity demanded. But there were lines of weakness, too, in his army. He had left Marshal Davout behind in Paris, and Murat in disgrace ; Suchet was far off on the eastern frontier, and Clausel was in the south of France. The political reasons for these arrangements may have been cogent, but they injured France at the very outset. Marshal Soult was appointed chief of the staff, a post for which he possessed very few qualifications ; and, when the campaign began, command of the left and right wings had perforce to be given to the only two marshals available, Ney and Grouchy, who did not possess the ability or strategic skill necessary for such positions. Again, the army was morally weakened by a haunting dread of treason, and some of the chiefs, Ney for example, took the field with disturbing visions of the consequences of their late betrayal of the Bourbon cause, in case of Napoleon's defeat. Finally, the army was too small for its object. Herein Napoleon showed that he was no longer the Napoleon of Austerlitz ; for he left locked up in far distant secondary theatres no less than 56,500 men, of whom he could have collected some 30,000 to 36,000 for the decisive campaign in Belgium. Had he made in 1815 the wise distribution of his soldiers in the theatre of war which he made in his former immortal campaigns, he would have concentrated 155,000 to 160,000 of his available force opposite to Charleroi on June 14, and the issue of the campaign would hardly have been in doubt. But he failed to do so, and by taking the field with such inferior numbers he left too much to Fortune.

For his advance into Belgium in 1815 Napoleon divided his army into two wings and a reserve. As the foe would lie away to his right and left front after he had passed the Sambre, one wing would be pushed up towards Wellington and another towards Blücher ; whilst the mass of the reserve would be centrally placed so as to strike on either side, as soon as a force of the enemy worth destroying was encountered and gripped. To this end he had, on the 14th, massed his left wing (Reille and D'Erlon) around Solre, and his

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French Bivouacs D'EXLON

right wing (Gérard) at Philippeville; whilst the central mass (Vandamme, Lobau, the Guard and the Cavalry Reserve) lay around Beaumont.

The orders for the French advance next day, among the finest ever issued, directed that the army should march at dawn and move to the Sambre at Marchienne and Charleroi. By evening it was expected that the whole would have crossed the Sambre, and would bivouac between the sundered allies.

But at the very outset delays occurred. Owing to an accident that befell the single orderly despatched with orders for Vandamme, the III. Corps remained without other definite orders than those issued on June 13, warning them to be ready to move at 3 A.M. The corps therefore stood fast on the morning of June 15, awaiting further instructions. This was the more unfortunate as Vandamme was destined to lead the advance on Charleroi by the centre road. But the emperor regarded it merely as "an unfortunate accident," nothing more, and the advance in two wings and a reserve continued, undisturbed by such occurrences.

Gérard, too, was late in starting, for his corps had not been fully concentrated overnight. Zieten's outposts on the right bank of the Sambre gained still further time, for they fought stubbornly to retard the French advance on Marchienne and Charleroi. But Zieten declined, and very wisely, to fight on the right bank, and he made the most of the screen afforded by the little river. He had to delay the French advance for 24 hours and give time for Blücher's concentration, at the same time retaining his own freedom of manœuvre, and this in spite of the great length of the summer day, the short distance that he lay in front of Fleurus, the tremendous numerical superiority of the French and Napoleon's personal presence at their head.

When the French left wing and centre reached the Sambre bridges, at Marchienne and Charleroi, they found them held and strongly barricaded, and the cavalry were powerless to force the passage. It was nearing noon when the emperor reached the front with the Young Guard, whom he had personally hurried forward. He immediately took action, and under his direction the bridge at Charleroi was stormed shortly after noon. Almost at the same time Reille forced the passage at Marchienne. Instead of drawing his corps together and retreating *en masse* up the Fleurus road, Zieten wisely withdrew on two roads, using those to Quatre Bras and Fleurus. The defenders of Marchienne used the former, while the brigade which had held Charleroi fell back by the latter. The emperor at once began the advance along both the roads. The left wing was directed to push up the Gosselies-Quatre Bras road, and Pajol's cavalry followed the Prussians who retired along the Gilly-Fleurus road. The emperor took post at Charleroi. About 3 P.M. Marshal Ney joined the army, was given the command of the left wing, and ordered to drive the Prussians out of Gosselies, and clear the road northward of that place. Ney took over his command just when the attack on Gosselies was impending. The Prussians were driven from the town, but they managed to effect a roundabout retreat to Ligny, where they rallied. Ney pushed on his advance up the Brussels road. When he had left for the front, the emperor proceeded with Grouchy to reconnoitre the Prussian position at Gilly; and handing over the command of the right wing to the marshal, whom he ordered to capture Gilly, Napoleon returned to Charleroi, to hasten the passage of the French army across the Sambre and mass it in the gap between the allies. But the head of Vandamme's corps had by this time crossed the river, and the emperor ordered it to assist Grouchy.

What meanwhile were the allies doing? There is no doubt that, surprised by the suddenness of the French advance, they were caught unprepared. But on the 15th the critical nature of the situation dawned on them, and naturally on Blücher first, as his headquarters were nearer to the frontier than Wellington's, and Blücher had had previous experience of Napoleon's powers. As soon as the Prussian marshal got the first real warning of imminent danger, he ordered (in accordance with the pre-arranged plan) an immediate concentration of his army on his inner flank at Sombrefe. Unfortunately for him the first orders sent to Bülow by Gneisenau, chief of the staff, at midnight June 14-15, were written in so stilted and hazy a style that Bülow did not consider any extensive display of energy was required. Hence the IV. Corps was neutralized until after the 16th. The other two corps commanders (Pirch I. and Thielemann) received clearer orders, and acted promptly enough. They concentrated their scattered men and hastened to march to the appointed rendezvous. By nightfall Pirch I. had bivouacked the II. Corps at Mazy, only 4 m. short of Sombrefe, and Thielemann and the III. Corps had reached Namur, within easy distance of the Ligny battlefield. Blücher wisely shifted his own headquarters to Sombrefe on the afternoon of the 15th.

Wellington's position at nightfall was very different, and can hardly be termed safe or even satisfactory. Definite news of the French advance only reached Brussels about 3 P.M. on the 15th; and even then the duke was by no means certain of the direction of Napoleon's main stroke. Hence the first orders he issued were for his divisions to concentrate at their respective alarm-posts, intending later to send them further orders when the situation had somewhat cleared up. For whatever reasons, Wellington thought Napoleon would attempt to turn his right and cut his line of communications. Had

Napoleon attempted this he would (if successful) have driven the Anglo-Dutch army back upon the Prussians, instead of separating the allies, as he actually tried to do and very nearly succeeded in doing. Failing to appreciate this fully, Wellington omitted to order an immediate concentration on his inner (left) flank as Blücher had done, and the danger of Blücher's position was thus enormously increased.

Curiously enough, the allies do not appear to have decided upon the course to be taken in case they were surprised, as they virtually were, and their system of intercommunication—if system it can be called—was most imperfect. They ought to have arranged loyally and promptly to let each other know every move it was proposed to make and the reasons for moving, for thus only could concerted action be ensured when confronted with Napoleon, "in whose presence it was so little safe to make . . . a false movement."

Wellington's subordinates at the critical point, however, acted with admirable boldness. Prince Bernard, in command of a brigade at Quatre Bras and Frasnès, recognizing the pressing danger that threatened on the Brussels road, retained his position there to check the French advance, instead of drawing off westwards and massing with the rest of his division at Nivelles; and in this action he was firmly supported by his immediate superiors. It was due to their presence of mind that Wellington maintained his hold on the important strategic point of Quatre Bras on June 15 and 16. Consequently, as Ney's wing advanced northward from Gosselies along the Brussels road, it came upon an advanced detachment of this force at Frasnès. The detachment was quickly forced to retire on its supports at the cross-roads, but here Prince Bernard firmly held his position; and by his skilful use of cover and the high standing corn he prevented the French gauging the weakness of the small force that barred their way. The day was now drawing to a close, and Ney decided wisely not to push his advance any further. He was in front of a force of unknown strength which appeared resolved to stand its ground, his men were tired, and the cannon-thunder to his right rear proclaimed clearly that Grouchy had not made much headway on the Fleurus road. To push on farther might isolate the left wing among a host of allies. He therefore halted his command, and, later, made a report to the emperor.

Meanwhile two long hours had been wasted on the right whilst Grouchy and Vandamme deliberated over their plan of action in front of the Prussian brigade at Gilly; and it was not until the emperor himself again reached the front, about 5.30 p.m., that vigour replaced indecision. There was a brief bombardment, and then Vandamme's corps was sent forward with the bayonet to drive out the foe. The shock was too great; the Prussians gave way immediately and were chased back into the woods by cavalry. Grouchy now pushed on towards Fleurus, which was still held by Blücher's troops, and there the advance came to a halt, as the light was failing and the troops exhausted.

Thus, thanks to Zieten's fine delaying action, Blücher by nightfall on June 15 had secured most of the ground requisite for his pre-arranged concentration; for one corps was in position, and two others were at hand. Bülow's corps was unavailable, for the reason already given, but of this fact Blücher was still necessarily ignorant. Wellington, owing to his original dispositions and the slowness of his concentration, had only retained a grip on Quatre Bras thanks to the boldness of his subordinates on the spot. His other troops were assembling: I. Corps, Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte and Enghien; II. Corps, Ath, Grammont and Sotteghem; heavy cavalry at Ninove; Reserve at Brussels. During the night of the 15th orders were sent for the divisions to move eastwards towards Nivelles, and at dawn the Reserve marched for Mt. S. Jean. Thus Wellington did not even yet realize the full significance of the emperor's opening moves.

But if the intelligence which the duke rightly relied on had come to hand on the 15th, it cannot be doubted that he would have effected a more expeditious concentration on his inner flank. His trusted intelligence officer, Colonel Colquhoun Grant, was at this time in France, and it had been arranged that his reports should be received at the duke's outposts by General Dörnberg, for transmission to the duke. On June 15 Grant wrote to Wellington stating that the French were advancing, and that French officers spoke freely about a decisive action being fought within three days. But Dörnberg, arrogating to himself the right of selecting the reports which were worth forwarding, sent it back, saying that, so far from convincing him that the emperor was advancing to give battle, it assured him of the contrary. Owing to this officer's presumptuous folly Grant's information only reached the duke on June 18, too late to be of use.

The Army of the North on this night was disposed as follows:—The left wing stretched from Frasnès back to the Sambre at Marchienne and Thuin. Reille's corps was to the front and was covered by the light cavalry of the Guard and Piré's lancers. Ney's headquarters were at Gosselies; one division (Girard's) was at Wangenies and acted as a link between the two wings. The right wing, under Grouchy, had come to a halt in front of Fleurus. It was covered by Pajol's and Exelman's cavalry corps. Vandamme's was the leading infantry corps, and it bivouacked with its head at Winage. Gérard's corps (with which was Kellermann's cuirassier corps) halted astride the Sambre at Chatelet. Gérard's advance had been delayed owing to the commander of his leading division deserting with his staff to the Prussians. Consequently the IV. Corps had not assisted at all in the passage of the river; though had it only been present, it would have been magnificently

placed to co-operate with Grouchy in the action of Gilly. Thus each of these strategical covering forces was itself protected by an adequate tactical advanced guard, to perform the service of local protection. The centre (or reserve) was meanwhile disposed as follows: The Guard was halted between Gilly and Charleroi; the emperor's headquarters being at the latter place. Milhaud's Cuirassier corps and Lobau's (VI.) corps were south of the Sambre, between Charleroi and Jamioulx. In this particular the execution on June 15 fell short of the original conception, for at nightfall about one-third of the French army was still on the right bank of the river. This, however, signified little, for the emperor still occupied a dominant strategical position.

CHAPTER II

LIGNY, QUATRE BRAS AND WATERLOO


NAPOLEON had now perfected his arrangements for the invasion of Belgium, and his army was organized definitely in two wings and a reserve; the latter being so placed that it could be brought "into action on either wing as circumstances dictated." As circumstances dictated, either wing would fasten upon one of the allied armies and detain it until the reserve had time to come up and complete its destruction; the other wing meantime containing the other allied army and preventing its commander from coming to his colleague's assistance. The emperor was not in possession of the Namur-Nivelles road. The allies were thus afforded an opportunity of committing the very blunder which Napoleon longed for, namely to attempt a risky forward concentration. His dispositions on the night of the 15th-16th were skilfully calculated to encourage the allies to mass at Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, and his covering force were pushed sufficiently forward—to Frasnes and Fleurus—to grip whichever ally ventured his army first. At nightfall the Army of the North lay concentrated "in a square whose sides measured 12 m. each; and it could with equal facility swing against the Prussians or the Anglo-Dutch, and was already placed between them."

Early on the morning of June 16 Prince Bernard was reinforced at Quatre Bras by the rest of his division (Perponcher's); and Wellington's other troops were now all on the march eastward except the reserve, who were heading southwards and halted at the cross-road of Mt. S. Jean until the duke had resolved that their objective should be Quatre Bras. They then marched in that direction. Blücher meanwhile was making his arrangements to hold a position to the south of the Namur-Nivelles road and thus maintain uninterrupted communication with Wellington at Quatre Bras. In this way he would keep open the Namur road, and also that from Gembloux for Bülow's arrival.

Napoleon spent the early morning in closing up his army, and writing what proved to be the most important letter of the campaign to Ney (Charleroi, about 8 A.M.): "I have adopted as the general principle for this campaign to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. . . . The Guard will form the reserve, and I shall bring it into action on either wing just as circumstances dictate. . . . According to circumstances I shall weaken one wing to strengthen my reserve. . . ." Here, in its simplest form, is the principle that underlies Napoleon's strategy in 1815. Only on the wing on which the reserve is brought into action will a decisive result be aimed at. The other is to be used exclusively to neutralize the other enemy, by holding him at bay.

Napoleon's original plan for the 16th was based on the assumption that the allies, who had been caught napping, would not attempt a risky forward concentration; and he intended therefore to push an advanced guard as far as Gembloux, for the purpose of feeling for and warding off Blücher. To assist this operation the reserve would move at first to Fleurus to reinforce Grouchy, should he need assistance in driving back Blücher's troops; but, once in possession of Sombreffe, the emperor would swing the reserve westwards and join Ney, who, it was supposed, would have in the meantime mastered Quatre Bras. In pursuance of this object Ney, to whom Kellermann was now attached, was to mass at Quatre Bras and push an advanced guard 6 m. northward of that place, with a connecting division at Marbais to link him with Grouchy. The centre and left wing together would then make a night-march to Brussels. The allies would thus be irremediably sundered, and all that remained would be to destroy them in detail. Napoleon now awaited further information from his wing commanders at Charleroi, where he massed the VI. Corps (Lobau), to save it, if possible, from a harassing countermarch, as it appeared likely that it would only be wanted for the march to Brussels. Ney spent the morning in massing his two corps, and in reconnoitring the enemy at Quatre Bras, who, as he was informed, had been reinforced. But up till noon he took no serious step to capture the cross-roads, which then lay at his mercy. Grouchy meantime reported from Fleurus that Prussian masses were coming up from Namur, but Napoleon does not appear to have attached much importance to this report. He was still at Charleroi when, between 9 and 10 A.M., further news reached him from the left that considerable hostile forces were visible

at Quatre Bras. He at once wrote to Ney saying that these could only be some of Wellington's troops, and that Ney was to concentrate his force and crush what was in front of him, adding that he was to send all reports to Fleurus. Then, keeping Lobau provisionally at Charleroi, Napoleon hastened to Fleurus, arriving about 11. He found that Grouchy had made little progress beyond the town. As he surveyed the field from the windmill north of Fleurus it struck him as significant that Blücher's troops were disposed parallel to the Namur road, as if to cover a forward concentration, and not at right angles to it, as they would be had they been covering a retreat. Still, at the moment, only one corps was showing. Possibly, however, the decisive day of the campaign had come. By the emperor's arrangements Vandamme, Gérard, Pajol and Exelmans would be available after 2 P.M. to attack whatever force Blücher might command, and the Guard and Milhaud would be at hand to act as reserve. The wonder is that he did not now order Lobau to move to some intermediate position, such as Wangenies, where he would be available for either wing as circumstances dictated. At 2 P.M. Napoleon ordered Ney to master



Quatre Bras, and added that the emperor would attack the corps which he saw in front of him. Whichever wing succeeded first would then wheel inwards and help the other. Not yet had Napoleon grasped the full significance of the allied movements, for the decisive flank had not yet become clear.

Blücher had already determined to fight. Meanwhile, Wellington, having reached Quatre Bras in the morning, wrote to him to concert the day's operations; then, as all was quiet in his front, he rode over to meet Blücher at Brye. The two chiefs, surveying the French army in their front, considered that no serious force was in front of Quatre Bras, and Wellington terminated the interview with the conditional promise that he would bring his army to Blücher's assistance at Ligny, if he was not attacked himself. This promise, of course, was never fulfilled, for Ney employed the duke all day at Quatre Bras; and, furthermore, the duke's tardy concentration made it quite impossible for him to help Blücher directly on the Ligny battlefield. On his return to Quatre Bras he found that a crisis had already been reached.

Ney had allowed the valuable hours to slip away when he could have stormed Quatre Bras with ease and ensured co-operation with his master. Remembering the surprises

that the battles in Spain had provided for the marshals opposed to the duke, he massed nearly the whole of Reille's corps before he advanced. The prince of Orange, in command at Quatre Bras, had only 7500 troops. But by boldly scattering his force and by making use of the Bossu wood and the farms, he covered the cross-roads and showed a firm front to the very superior force which Ney commanded. It was then 2 P.M. The Dutch-Belgian troops to the east of the Brussels highway were at once forced back by the mass of men moved against them, and it looked as if the whole defence would crumble up. But about 3 P.M. timely succour reached the field—Van Merlen's cavalry from Nivelles, Picton and the 5th division from Brussels—and Wellington returned and took over the command. Picton at once stopped the victorious French advance to the east of the road, but the remaining division (Jérôme) of Reille's corps now reached the front and Ney flung it into the Bossu wood to clear that place and keep his left flank free. A fierce fight now broke out all along the line, in which Jérôme steadily made ground in the Bossu wood, while Picton showing a dauntless front maintained his position. The Brunswick contingent now reached the field, but their duke whilst leading a charge received a mortal wound and the attack failed. It was nearly 4.15 P.M. when Ney received Napoleon's 2 P.M. order, and in obedience to it he made another attack, in which the Bossu wood was virtually cleared of its defenders. However, about 5 P.M. further reinforcements reached Wellington, Alten's (3rd) division coming in from Nivelles. Ney now realized that he could only capture Quatre Bras with D'Erlon's help.

But shortly afterwards (about 5.15) he heard that the I. Corps, without his direct order or knowledge, had moved eastwards to assist in the battle of Ligny. Immediately afterwards (about 5.30) he received an order from Napoleon to seize Quatre Bras and then turn eastwards to crush Blücher, who was caught at Ligny. Napoleon added, "The fate of France is in your hands." Ney's duty was merely to hold Wellington for certain at Quatre Bras and allow D'Erlon to carry out the movement which must ensure a decisive result at Ligny, in accordance with Napoleon's plan of campaign. In any case D'Erlon could not come back in time to give him effectual help. But incapable of grasping the situation, and beside himself with rage, Ney sent imperative orders to D'Erlon to return at once, and immediately afterwards he ordered Kellermann to lead his one available cuirassier brigade and break through Wellington's line. The charge was admirably executed; it overthrew one British regiment which it caught in line, but being unsupported it achieved nothing further of importance, and was beaten back. When this attempt to master the cross-roads had ended in failure, Ney received a verbal message from the emperor, enjoining him that, whatever happened at Quatre Bras, D'Erlon must be allowed to carry out the movement ordered by the emperor. The bearer, Major Baudus, knowing the importance of the manoeuvre which the I. Corps was carrying out, strove to induce Ney to reconsider D'Erlon's recall; but the marshal refused and ended the discussion by plunging into the fight. Shortly afterwards (about 7 P.M.) Wellington received further reinforcements (Cooke's division of the British Guards), which brought his force up to 33,000 against Ney's 22,000 men. The duke then attacked strenuously all along the line, and before darkness stopped the fight he drove back the French to their morning position at Frasnès. The losses were as follows: Anglo-Dutch 4700, and French 4300. At 9 P.M., when the battle was lost and won, D'Erlon's corps arrived. It had already reached the edge of the Ligny battlefield when the counter-order arrived, and conceiving that he was still under Marshal Ney (for the officer who bore the pencil-note directing Ney to detach D'Erlon, had on his own initiative ordered the I. Corps to the eastward) the general considered he ought to return to the left wing, and leaving one division at Wagnelée he withdrew his force. The incident was immeasurably unfortunate for the French. Had the I. Corps been thrown into the doubtful struggle at Quatre Bras, it must have crushed Wellington; had it been used at Ligny it would have entailed Blücher's annihilation. But oscillating between the two fields, it took part in neither. When the fighting was over, at 10 P.M., Ney wrote a short and somewhat one-sided account of the action to Soult.

On the other flank there had meanwhile been waged the bitterly fought battle of Ligny. As Blücher's dispositions gradually became clearer the emperor realized that the first decisive day of the campaign had actually come, and he promptly made arrangements for defeating the Prussian army in his front. Blücher, to cover the Namur road, held with the I. Corps the villages of Brye, St Amand and Ligny, whilst behind his centre was massed the II. Corps, and on his left was placed the III. Corps. Wellington and Bülow on arrival would act as general reserve. Blücher's army, as he finally disposed it, was quite visible to Napoleon on the bare open slopes which it occupied above St Amand and Ligny, the II. Corps being especially exposed. The emperor decided to bear down Blücher's centre and right with the corps of Vandamme and Gérard and with Girard's division which he had drawn into his operations, containing the Prussian left meanwhile with the squadrons of Pajol and Exelmans, assisted by a few infantry. The Guard and Milhaud were in hand at Fleurus. Further, he could order up Lobau, and direct Ney to move his rearward corps across and form it up behind Blücher's right. When the battle was ripe, he would crush the Prussian centre and right between the Guard and D'Erlon's corps. It was a somewhat complicated manoeuvre; for he was attempting to outflank



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BLÜCHER.

GEBHARD LEBERECHT VON BLÜCHER, born 1742, died 1819, the Prussian field-marshal who fought beside Wellington at Waterloo and previously won the great victory at Laon which sent Napoleon to Elba in 1814.

his enemy with a corps that he had subordinated to Marshal Ney. Much depended on whether Ney would grasp the full purport of his orders; in a similar case at Bautzen he had failed to do so, and he failed as badly now. The usual Napoleonic simplicity was wanting at Ligny, and he paid in full for the want.

It was just after 2.30 P.M. when Napoleon, hearing the sound of Ney's cannon to the westward and realizing that Wellington was attacked and neutralized, commenced the battle at Ligny. Blücher's force was numerically very superior. The Prussians numbered about 83,000 men to Napoleon's 71,000 (including Lobau, who only came up at the end of the day). A fierce fight was soon raging for the villages. Vandamme and Girard attacked S. Amand, whilst Gérard attempted to storm Ligny; on the right Grouchy held Thielemann in play, and in the centre near Fleurus were the Guard and Milhaud in reserve, close to the emperor's headquarters on the mill. At 3.15 P.M., when the battle was in full swing, Napoleon wrote in duplicate to Ney, saying, "The fate of France is in your hands," and ordering the marshal to master Quatre Bras and move eastwards to assist at Ligny. Immediately afterwards, hearing that Ney had 20,000 men in front of him, he sent the "pencil-note" by General La Bédoyère which directed Ney to detach D'Erlon's corps to Ligny. This, as we know, the A.D.C. in a fit of mistaken zeal took upon himself to do. Hence the corps appeared too soon, and in the wrong direction. But neither order made it sufficiently clear to Ney that co-operation at Ligny was the essential, provided that Wellington was held fast at Quatre Bras. In other words, Ney had merely to hold Wellington with part of the French left wing all day, and detach the remainder of his force to co-operate in the deathblow at Ligny. This is clear when the first letter to Ney is studied with the orders, as it was meant to be; but Ney in the heat of action misread the later instructions. Meanwhile the emperor ordered Lobau to bring up his corps at once to Fleurus where he could hardly be of great service, whereas had he been directed to move on Wagnelée he might have co-operated in the last struggle far more efficiently. The fight for the villages continued to rage fiercely and incessantly, each side behaving as if its mortal foe was in front. The villages were captured and re-captured, but generally the French had the better of the fighting, for they compelled Blücher to use up more and more of his reserves, and prevented the Prussians from breaking through to the southward of S. Amand. Eventually the fighting became so furious that the troops engaged literally melted away, particularly at Ligny, and the emperor was finally compelled to call on his reserve to replenish the troops first engaged. But hardly had the Young and Middle Guard marched off to reinforce Vandamme and Gérard, when Vandamme sent word that a hostile column, over 30,000 strong, was threatening the French left (in reality this was D'Erlon's corps). Vandamme's exhausted troops were unnerved at the sight of this fresh foe, and an incipient panic was only quelled by turning guns on the fugitives. It was now between 5.30 and 6. The emperor concluded that this could not be D'Erlon, because he had arrived too soon and was marching in an evidently wrong direction. He at once sent an officer to reconnoitre. Meanwhile the reinforcements which he had despatched were most opportune. The Prussians had seized the opportunity offered by the slackening of the French attacks to rally and deliver a counterstroke, which was parried, after achieving a small measure of success, by the bayonets of the Young Guard. It was about 6.30 before Napoleon learned that the unknown force was actually D'Erlon's, and somewhat later he heard that it had counter-marched and withdrawn westwards. Repeated orders sent to the commander of the division left by D'Erlon failed to induce him to engage his command decisively, and thus Napoleon obtained no direct co-operation from his left wing on this, the first decisive day of the campaign. Thus relieved about his left, but realizing that D'Erlon had returned to Ney, the emperor had perforce to finish the battle single-handed. Blücher now delivered a general counterstroke against Vandamme. Massing every available man he led the attack in person; but he vainly attempted to make ground to the south of S. Amand; the exhausted Prussians were overpowered by the chasseurs of the Guard and forced to retire in disorder. Napoleon's opportunity to finish the battle had come at last. He could at least beat Blücher and render the Prussians unfit for any serious operation except retreat on June 17, although he could no longer expect to destroy the Prussian army. Lobau's corps, too, was now arriving and forming up on the heights east of Fleurus. The artillery of the Guard, therefore, came into action above Ligny to prepare Blücher's centre for assault. Some delay was occasioned by a thunderstorm; but, as this passed over, the guns opened and the Old Guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers proceeded to form up opposite to Ligny. About 7.45 P.M. a crashing salvo of 60 guns gave the signal for a combined assault to be delivered by Gérard and the Guard, with Milhaud moving on their right flank. Blücher's worn-out soldiers could not withstand the tremendous impact of Napoleon's choicest troops, and the Prussian centre was pierced and broken. But the gallant old marshal still had some fresh squadrons in hand, and he promptly launched them to stem the French advance. While leading one of the charges in person his horse was shot and fell under him, but he was rescued and borne in a semi-conscious condition from the field. Without doubt, the personal risk to which Blücher exposed himself at this crisis was far too great; for it was essential that the command of the Prussian army should remain

vested in a chief who would loyally keep in touch and act entirely in concert with his colleague. In this way only could the allies hope to obtain a decisive success against Napoleon. By 9 P.M. the main battle was over, and everywhere the French pushed resistlessly forward. Napoleon was master of Blücher's battlefield, and the beaten Prussians had retired to the north of the Namur-Nivelles road. Under the circumstances, the late hour, the failing light and the lack of information as to events on the left wing, immediate pursuit was out of the question.

The execution had again fallen short of the conception; Blücher though beaten was not destroyed, nor was his line with Wellington cut. If the Prussians now retired northwards, parallel to the direction which Wellington would follow perforce on the morrow, the chance of co-operating in a decisive battle would still remain to the allies; and Gneisenau's order issued by moonlight, directing the retreat on Tilly and Wavre, went far to ensuring the possibility of such combined action. However, Gneisenau was very remiss in not immediately reporting this vital move and the necessity for it to the duke, as it left the Anglo-Dutch inner flank quite exposed. Gneisenau apparently selected Wavre, not with the intention of assisting his ally, but rather to re-establish his own line of communication, and the presence of the Prussians on the field of battle of Waterloo must be put down to the immortal credit of Blücher and Grolmann, his quartermaster-general. Gneisenau at this crisis in the affairs of the allies does not appear to have subordinated everything to co-operation at all cost with Wellington, and he allowed supply considerations and the re-establishment of his communications to overweigh the paramount necessity of arranging concerted action with his ally. Probably Wellington's failure to co-operate at Ligny had heightened the Prussian chief-of-staff's unworthy suspicions of the good faith and soldierly qualifications of the British marshal; and it was well for the allies that Blücher was able to resume command before Napoleon had time to profit from the dissensions that would probably have arisen had Gneisenau remained in control. The casualties in the hard-fought battle of Ligny were very heavy. The Prussians lost about 12,000 men and 21 guns, and the French 8,500; in Ligny more than 4,000 dead lay on an area of about 400 sq. yds., and in one of the hamlets of S. Amand there lay, almost to a man, the gallant 82nd of the line (Girard's division). So close was the fighting that most of the 20,000 casualties lay on about 2 sq. m. of ground. It was a really Napoleonic battle.

Despite D'Erlon's misadventure the emperor had the game still in his hands, for Ney's failure had actually placed the Anglo-Dutch army in a precarious position. So true is it that a tactical failure encountered in carrying out a sound strategical plan matters but little. Again Napoleon's plan of campaign had succeeded. The emperor having beaten Blücher, the latter must fall back to rally and re-form, and call in Bülow, who had only reached the neighbourhood of Gembloux on June 16; whilst on the other flank Ney, reinforced by D'Erlon's fresh corps, lay in front of Wellington, and the marshal could fasten upon the Anglo-Dutch army and hold it fast during the early morning of June 17, sufficiently long to allow the emperor to close round his foe's open left flank and deal him a deathblow. But it was clearly essential to deal with Wellington on the morrow, ere Blücher could again appear on the scene. Wellington was by no means so well acquainted with the details of the Prussian defeat at Ligny as he ought to have been. It is true that, before leading the final charge, Blücher despatched an aide-de-camp to his colleague, to tell him that he was forced to retire; but this officer was shot and the message remained undelivered. To send a message of such vital importance by a single orderly was a piece of bad staff work. It should have been sent in triplicate at least, and it was Gneisenau's duty to repeat the message directly he assumed temporary command. Opposed as they were to Napoleon, Gneisenau's neglect involved them in an unnecessary and very grave risk.

Napoleon was unwell, and consequently was not in the saddle on the 17th as early as he would otherwise have been. In his absence neither Ney nor Soult appears to have made any serious arrangements for an advance, although every minute was now golden. During the night more reinforcements arrived for Wellington, and on the morning of June 17 the duke had most of his army about Quatre Bras. But it was 24 hours too late, for Blücher's defeat had rendered the Anglo-Dutch position untenable. Early in the morning Wellington (still ignorant of the exact position of his ally) sent out an officer, with an adequate escort, to establish touch with the Prussians. This staff officer discovered and reported that the Prussians were drawing off northwards to rally at Wavre; and about 9 A.M. a Prussian orderly officer arrived from Gneisenau to explain the situation and learn Wellington's plans. The duke replied that he should fall back on Mt. S. Jean, and would accept battle there, in a selected position to the south of the Forest of Soignes, provided he was assured of the support of one of Blücher's corps. Like the good soldier and loyal ally that he was, he now subordinated everything to the one essential of manœuvring so as to remain in communication with Blücher. It was 2 A.M. on June 18 before he received the answer to his suggestion.

Early on the 17th the Prussians drew off northwards on three roads, Thielemann covering the withdrawal and moving via Gembloux to join hands with Bülow. The

French cavalry on the right, hearing troops in motion on the Namur road, dashed in pursuit down the turnpike road shortly after dawn, caught up the fugitives and captured them. They turned out to be stragglers; but their capture for a time helped to confirm the idea, prevalent in the French army, that Blücher was drawing off towards his base. Some delay too was necessary before Napoleon could finally settle on his plan for this day. The situation was still obscure, details as to what had happened on the French left were wanting, and the direction of Blücher's retreat was by no means certain. Orders, however, were sent to Ney, about 8 A.M., to take up his position at Quatre Bras, and if that was impossible he was to report at once and the emperor would co-operate. Napoleon clearly meant that Ney should attack whatever happened to be in his front. If confronted by a rear-guard he would drive it off and occupy Quatre Bras; and if Wellington was still there the marshal would promptly engage and hold fast the Anglo-Dutch army, and report to the emperor. Napoleon would in this case hasten up with the reserve and crush Wellington. Wellington in fact was there; but Ney did nothing whatever to retain him, and the duke began his withdrawal to Mt. S. Jean about 10 A.M. The last chance of bringing about a decisive French success was thus allowed to slip away.

Meanwhile Napoleon paid a personal visit about 10 A.M. to the Ligny battlefield, and about 11 A.M. he came to a decision. He determined to send the two cavalry corps of Pajol and Exelmans, and the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, with Teste's division (VI. Corps), a force of 33,000 men and 110 guns, to follow the Prussians, penetrate their intentions and discover if they meditated uniting with Wellington in front of Brussels. As Exelmans' dragoons had already gained touch of the III. Prussian corps at Gembloux, the emperor directed Marshal Grouchy, to whom he handed over the command of this force, to "proceed to Gembloux." This order the marshal only too literally obeyed. After an inconceivably slow and wearisome march, in one badly arranged column moving on one road, he only reached Gembloux on June 17, and halted there for the night. His cavalry gained contact before noon with Thielemann's corps, which was resting at Gembloux, but the enemy was allowed to slip away and contact was lost for want of a serious effort to keep it. Grouchy did not proceed to the front, and entirely failed to appreciate the situation at this critical juncture. Pressing danger could only exist if Blücher had gone northwards, and northwards, therefore, in the Dyle valley, he should have diligently sought for traces of the Prussian retreat.¹ Had Blücher gone eastwards, Grouchy, holding the Dyle, could easily have held back any future Prussian advance towards Wellington. Grouchy, however, went to Gembloux as ordered. By nightfall the situation was all in favour of the allies; for Grouchy was now actually outside the IV Prussian corps, who were by this time concentrated astride the Dyle at Wavre. Their retreat having been unmolested, the Prussians were ready once more to take the field, quite twenty-four hours before Napoleon deemed it possible for the foe defeated at Ligny.

On the other flank, too, things had gone all in favour of Wellington. Although the emperor wrote to Ney again at noon, from Ligny, that troops had now been placed in position at Marbais to second the marshal's attack on Quatre Bras, yet Ney remained quiescent, and Wellington effected so rapid and skilful a retreat that, on Napoleon's arrival at the head of his supporting corps, he found only the duke's cavalry screen and some horse artillery still in position. Can we wonder that he gave vent to his anger and declared that Ney had ruined France? This was the fatal mistake of the campaign, and Fortune turned now against her former favourite. Although the smouldering fires of his old energy flamed out once more and Napoleon began a rapid pursuit of the cavalry screen, which crumpled up and decamped as he advanced, yet all his efforts were powerless to entangle the Anglo-Dutch rearguard to such an extent that Wellington must turn back to its assistance. The pursuit, too, was carried out in the midst of a tropical thunderstorm which broke at the roar of the opening cannonade, and very considerably retarded the French pursuit. It was not until the light was failing that Napoleon reached the heights of Rossomme opposite to Wellington's position and, by a masterly reconnaissance in force, compelled the duke to disclose the presence of practically the whole Anglo-Dutch army. The French halted, somewhat loosened by pursuit, between Rossomme and Genappe and spent a wretched night in the sodden fields.

During the night Wellington received the reassuring news that Blücher would bring two corps certainly, and possibly four, to Waterloo, and determined to accept battle. Napoleon's plan being to penetrate between the allies and then defeat them successively, the left was really the threatened flank of the Anglo-Dutch army. Yet so far was Wellington from divining Napoleon's object that he stationed 17,000 men (including Colville's

¹ There appears to be no reason to believe that Grouchy pushed any reconnaissances to the northward and westward of Gentinnes on June 17; had he done so, touch with Blücher's retreating columns must have been established, and the direction of the Prussian retreat made clear. The right of Milhaud's cuirassier corps, whilst marching from Marbais to Quatre Bras, saw a column of Prussian infantry retreating towards Wavre, and Milhaud reported this fact about 9 P.M. to the emperor, who, however, attached little weight to it.

British division) at Hal and Tubize, 8 m. away to his right, to repel the turning movement that he groundlessly anticipated and to form a rallying point for his right in case his centre was broken. By deliberately depriving himself of this detachment, on June 18, the duke ran a very grave risk. With the 67,600 men whom he had in hand, however, he took up a truly admirable "Wellingtonian" position astride the Nivelles-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels roads which meet at Mt. S. Jean. He used a low ridge to screen his main defensive position, exposing comparatively few troops in front of the crest. Of his 156 guns, 78 belonged to the British artillery; but of his 67,600 men only 29,800 were British or King's German Legion troops, whereas all Napoleon's were Frenchmen and veterans. Wellington occupied Hougomont in strength, chiefly with detachments of the British Guards; and he also placed a garrison of the K.G.L. in La Haye Sainte, the tactical key of the allied position. Both these farms were strengthened; but, still nervous about his right flank, the duke occupied Hougomont in much greater force than La Haye Sainte, and massed the bulk of his troops on his right. The main position was very skilfully taken up, and care was taken to distribute the troops so that the indifferent and immature were closely supported by those who were "better disciplined and more accustomed to war." Owing to a misconception, one Dutch-Belgian brigade formed up in front of the ridge. Full arrangements were made for Blücher's co-operation through General Müffling, the Prussian attaché on the duke's staff. The duke was to stand fast to receive the attack, whilst the Prussians were to close around Napoleon's exposed right and support Wellington's left. The Prussians were thus the real general reserve, and it was Wellington's task to receive Napoleon's attack and prepare him for the decisive counter-stroke.


Blücher loyally kept his promise to his ally; but the execution left much to be desired. He did not start his corps on their westward march until a considerable time after dawn, and then, owing to bad staff work, the rear corps of all (Bülow) was selected to lead the march. This unnecessary delay was aggravated further by a fire that broke out in Wavre and delayed the march. In spite of his hurts the old marshal was in the saddle.

Meanwhile Napoleon formed his army for the attack on Wellington's position. The wet state of the ground (largely composed of corn-fields) and the scattered bivouacs of the French army prevented the attack from being made at 6 A.M. as Napoleon had desired. It was therefore put off first of all until 9 A.M., and later until 11.30, to permit the sodden ground to dry sufficiently for the mounted arms to manoeuvre freely and give time to the French army to close up. During the night the emperor had received a report from Marshal Grouchy, dated Gembloux, 10 P.M., 17th, which stated that the Prussians were retiring in two columns towards Wavre and Perwez. Grouchy added that if he found that the bulk of the Prussians were moving on Wavre he would follow them and separate them from Wellington. But a glance at the map shows that this was impossible. By following the Prussians Grouchy, who had taken up a position outside the Prussian left flank, would inevitably drive the allies together. It was 10 A.M. when the emperor answered this letter, and he directed the marshal to march for Wavre, thus approaching the French army and entering the zone of the main operations. The underlying idea of manoeuvring in two wings and a reserve should be kept in mind when considering this letter. Its meaning will then clearly be, that Grouchy was to endeavour to place his force on the inner Prussian flank and hold them back from Waterloo. But this is just what the despatch does not state verbally and precisely, and accordingly Grouchy, like Ney on the 16th and 17th, misread it.

The French army proceeded to form up in an imposing array some 1300 yards from Wellington's position, and if some misgivings as to the result filled the minds of men like Soult, Reille and Foy, who had had previous experience of Wellington in the field, none at any rate dwelt in Napoleon's mind. The lateness of the hour at which the attack was delivered, and the emperor's determination to break Wellington's centre instead of out-flanking the Anglo-Dutch left and further separating the allies, deprived him of whatever chance he still possessed of beating Wellington before Blücher could intervene. Napoleon drew up his army of 74,000 men and 246 guns in three lines, fully in view of the allies. In the first line were the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, who were destined to attack the allied line and prepare it for the final assault. In the second line were Kellermann's cuirassiers, the incomplete corps of Lobau, the squadrons of Domon and Subervie, and Milhaud's cuirassiers. In the third line was the Guard. It was an imposing array of veteran troops, and when their emperor rode along the lines they received him with extraordinary enthusiasm.

The battle of Waterloo may be divided into five phases. About 11.30 the first phase opened with an attack by one of Reille's divisions on Hougomont. This was a mere side-issue, destined to draw Wellington's attention to his right, and in this it failed. About noon, however, a battery of 80 French guns unlimbered on the long spur to the S.E. of La Haye Sainte, to prepare the duke's centre for the main attack. Here the form of the ground so skilfully chosen sheltered the defence in some degree from the tempest of iron that now beat against the position. After 1 P.M., and just before he gave orders for Ney to lead the main attack, the emperor scanned the battlefield, and on his right front he saw a dense dark cloud emerging from the woods at Chapelle Saint Lambert. It was soon discovered that this was Bülow's corps marching to Wellington's assistance. A letter was now await-

ing despatch to Grouchy, and to it was added a postscript that the battle was raging with Wellington, that Bülow's corps had been sighted by the emperor, and that the marshal was to hasten to the field and crush Bülow. This order at least was precise and clear, but it was sent 12 hours too late, and when Grouchy received it he was unable to carry it out. To neutralize Bülow when necessity arose, the emperor now detached Lobau



together with the squadrons of Domon and Subervie. The French general, however, hardly drew out far enough from the French right; otherwise the magnificent resolution he displayed and the admirable obstinacy with which his troops fought against ever-increasing odds are worthy of all praise. Thus as early as 1.30 P.M. the Prussian intervention deranged the symmetry of Napoleon's battle-array.

It did not occur to the emperor that it would be wise to break off the fight now and seek a more favourable opportunity of beating the allies in detail. He was still determined to play the game out to the bitter end, and involve Wellington and Bülow's corps in a common ruin.

Ney was therefore ordered to attack Wellington's centre with D'Erlon's corps. Owing to a misconception the columns used for advance were over-heavy and unwieldy, and the corps failed to achieve anything of importance. As D'Erlon's troops advanced the Dutch-Belgian brigade in front of the ridge, which had been subjected to an overwhelming fire from the 80 French guns at close range, turned about and retired in disorder through the main position. This, however, was the solitary success secured by I. corps; for the left division failed to storm La Haye Sainte, which was most gallantly defended, and Picton's division met the remainder of D'Erlon's corps face to face, engaging them in a murderous infantry duel in which Picton fell. It was during this struggle that Lord Uxbridge launched two of his cavalry brigades on the enemy; and the "Union brigade" catching the French infantry unawares rode over them, broke them up, and drove them to the bottom of the slope with the loss of two eagles. The charge, however, over-reached itself, and the British cavalry, crushed by fresh French horsemen hurled on them by the emperor, were driven back with great loss. So far no success against Wellington had been achieved, and Bülow was still an onlooker.

Ney was now ordered to attack La Haye Sainte again, but the attack failed. A furious cannonade raged, and the Anglo-Dutch line withdrew slightly to gain more cover from the ridge. Ney misinterpreted this manœuvre and led out, about 4 P.M., Milhaud's and Lefebvre-Desnouëttes' horsemen (43 squadrons) to charge the allied centre between the two farms. For several reasons, the cavalry could only advance at a trot. As the horsemen closed they were received with volleys of case from the guns, and the infantry formed into squares. Against the squares the horsemen were powerless, and failing to break a single square, they were finally swept off the plateau by fresh allied horsemen. Kellermann's cuirassiers and the heavy horse of the Guard (37 fresh squadrons) now advanced to support the baffled cavalry, the latter falling in as supports. The whole 80 squadrons resumed the attack, but with no better result. The cavalry gradually became hopelessly entangled among the squares they were unable to break, and at last they were driven down the face of the ridge and the most dramatic part of the battle came to an end. Had these great cavalry attacks been closely supported by infantry, there can be little doubt that they must have achieved their object. But they were not. In his handling of the three arms together, Napoleon on this day failed to do justice to his reputation.

About 4.30 P.M. Bülow at last engaged. Lobau's men were gradually overpowered and forced back into Plancenoit, the village was stormed, and the Prussian round shot reached the main road. To set his right flank free the emperor called further on his reserve, and sent Duhesme with the Young Guard to Lobau's support. Together, these troops drove Bülow out of Plancenoit, and forced him back towards the Paris wood. But the Prussians had not yet changed the fate of the day.

Napoleon now ordered Ney to carry La Haye Sainte at whatever cost, and this the marshal accomplished with the wrecks of D'Erlon's corps soon after 6 P.M. The garrison (King's German Legion) had run out of rifle ammunition and the French bursting in seized the post. This was the first decided advantage that Napoleon had gained during the day. The key of the duke's position was now in Napoleon's hands, Wellington's centre was dangerously shaken, the troops were exhausted, and the reserves inadequate. But the Iron Duke faced the situation unmoved. Calmly he readjusted his line and strengthened the torn centre. Happily for him, Pirch I.'s and Zieten's corps were now at hand. Pirch I. moved to support Bülow; together they regained possession of Plancenoit, and once more the Charleroi road was swept by the Prussian round shot. Napoleon, therefore, had to free his right flank before he could make use of Ney's capture. To this end he sent two battalions of the Old Guard to storm Plancenoit. The veterans did the work magnificently with the bayonet, ousted the Prussians from the place, and drove them back 600 yards beyond it. But Napoleon could not turn now on Wellington. Zieten was fast coming up on the duke's left, and the crisis was past. Zieten's advent permitted the two fresh cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur on the duke's extreme left to be moved and posted behind the depleted centre. The value of this reinforcement at this particular moment can hardly be overestimated.

The French army now fiercely attacked Wellington all along the line; and the culminating point of this phase was reached when Napoleon sent forward the Guard, less 5 battalions, to attack Wellington's centre. Delivered in three échelons, these final attacks were repulsed, the first échelon by Colin Halkett's British Brigade, a Dutch-Belgian battery, and a brigade of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division; the second and third échelons by the Guards, the 52nd, and the Royal Artillery. Thus ended the fifth phase.

As the Guard recoiled (about 8 P.M.) Zieten pierced the north-east corner of the French front, and their whole line gave way as the allies rushed forward on their now defenceless prey. Three battalions of the Guard indeed stood their ground for some time, but they were finally overwhelmed. Afterwards, amidst the ruins of their army, two battalions

of the 1st Grenadiers of the Guard defied all efforts to break them. But, with the exception of these two battalions, the French army was quickly transformed into a flying rabble. Bülow and Pirch I. now finally overpowered Lobau, once more recaptured Plancenoit, and sealed the doom of the French army. But Lobau's heroic efforts had not been in vain; they had given his master time to make his last effort against Wellington; and when the Guard was beaten back the French troops holding Plancenoit kept free the Charleroi road, and prevented the Prussians from seizing Napoleon's line of retreat.

When Wellington and Blücher met about 9.15 P.M. at "La Belle Alliance," the victorious chiefs arranged that the Prussians should take up the pursuit, and they faithfully carried out the agreement. Pushing on through the night, they drove the French out of seven successive bivouacs and at length drove them over the Sambre. The campaign was virtually at an end, and the price paid was great. The French had lost over 40,000 men and almost all their artillery on June 18; the Prussians lost 7000, and Wellington over 15,000 men. So desperate was the fighting that some 45,000 killed and wounded lay on an area of roughly 3 sq. m. At one point on the plateau "the 27th (Inniskillings) were lying literally dead in square"; and the position that the British infantry held was plainly marked by the red line of dead and wounded they left behind them.

A few words may now be bestowed on Marshal Grouchy, commanding the right wing. The marshal wrongly determined on the 18th to continue his march to Wavre in a single column, and he determined, still more wrongly, to move by the right bank of the Dyle. Breaking up from bivouac long after dawn, he marched forward, via Walhain. Here he stopped to report to the emperor some intelligence which turned out to be false, and he remained for breakfast. Hardly had he finished when the opening roar of the cannonade at Waterloo was heard. Grouchy was now urged by his generals, especially by Gérard, to march to the sound of the firing, but he refused to take their advice, and pushed on to Wavre, where he found the Prussians (Thielemann's corps of 16,000 men) holding the passages across the Dyle. A fierce fight (called the action of the Wavre) began about 4 P.M., in which the Prussians were for long victorious. Instead of concentrating his force upon one bridge over the swampy and unfordable Dyle, Grouchy scattered it in attacks upon several; and when the emperor's despatch arrived, saying Bülow was in sight, the marshal was powerless to move westward. Towards the end of the day Colonel Vallin's Hussars stormed the Limale bridge, and a large part of Grouchy's force then promptly gained the left bank. The action continued till about 11 P.M., when it died out, to recommence shortly after dawn. Thielemann was at length overborne by sheer weight of numbers and towards 11 A.M. he was forced to retire towards Louvain. The losses were considerable, about 2400 men on each side.

Grouchy's victory was barren. In the far higher duty of co-operation he had failed miserably. His tactical achievement could avail the emperor nothing, and it exposed his own force to considerable danger. Whilst pondering on the course he should follow, the marshal received the news of the awful disaster that had overtaken the emperor at Waterloo. In a flash he realized his danger and made prompt arrangements to begin his retreat to Namur, the only line to France that was then available. This retreat he carried out resolutely, skilfully and rapidly, slipping past Blücher and finally bringing his force to Paris. But the rapid advance of the allies gave France no time to rally. Napoleon was forced to abdicate, and finding escape was impossible, he surrendered (on July 14) to the British—"the most powerful, the most unwavering and the most generous of his foes."

The causes of Napoleon's failure in the Waterloo campaign were as follows:—The French army was numerically too weak for the gigantic task it undertook. Napoleon himself was no longer the Napoleon of Marengo or Austerlitz, and though he was not broken down, his physical strength was certainly impaired. Ney failed to grasp and hold Wellington on the critical 17th June; and on the 17th and 18th Grouchy's feeble and false manœuvres enabled Blücher to march and join Wellington at Waterloo. Napoleon's chance of success was dangerously diminished, if not utterly destroyed, by the incompetence of the two marshals whom in an evil hour he selected for high commands. Another dominant influence in shaping the course of events was the loyalty of Blücher to his ally, and the consequent appearance of the Prussian army at Waterloo. Nor must we overlook Wellington's unswerving determination to co-operate with Blücher at all costs, and his firmness on June 18; or the invincible steadiness shown by the British troops and those of the King's German Legion.

THE ITALIAN WARS, 1848-70

CHAPTER I

AUSTRO-SARDINIAN WAR OF 1848-1849

FROM about 1846 the spirit of revolt against foreign domination had gathered force, and two years later, when Europe was on the verge of a revolutionary outburst, the struggle for Italian unity was initiated by the insurrection at Milan. At this moment the Austrian army in Lombardy, practically a highly-trained force of long-service professional soldiers, was commanded by Radetzky, one of the greatest generals in Austrian history. Being, however, virtually an army of occupation, it was broken up into many garrisons, and in all was not more than 70,000 strong, so that after five days' fighting in the streets of Milan, Radetzky did as Wellington had proposed to do in 1817 when his army of occupation in France was threatened by a national rising, and withdrew to a concentration area to await reinforcements. This area was the famous Quadrilateral, marked by the fortresses of Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Legnago, and there, in the early days of April, the scattered fractions of the Austrians assembled. Lombardy and Venetia had followed the example of Milan, and King Charles Albert of Sardinia, mobilizing the Piedmontese army in good time, crossed the frontier with 45,000 regulars two days after the Austrians had withdrawn from Milan. Had the insurrectionary movements and the advance of the Piedmontese been properly co-ordinated, there can be little doubt that some, at any rate, of the Austrian detachments would have been destroyed or injured in their retreat, but as it was they escaped without material losses. The blow given to Austrian prestige by the revolt of the great cities was, however, so severe that the whole peninsula rallied to Charles Albert. Venice, reserving a garrison for her own protection, set on foot an improvised army 11,000 strong on the mainland; some 5000 Lombards and 9000 insurgents from the smaller duchies gathered on both sides of the Po; 15,000 Papal troops under Durando and 13,000 Neapolitans under the old patriot general Pepe moved up to Ferrara and Bologna respectively, and Charles Albert with the Piedmontese advanced to the Mincio at the beginning of April. His motley command totalled 96,000 men, of whom, however, only half were thoroughly trained and disciplined troops. The reinforcements available in Austria were about 25,000 disciplined troops not greatly inferior in quality to Radetzky's own veterans. Charles Albert could call up 45,000 levies at a few weeks' notice, and eventually all the resources of the patriot party.

The regular war began in the second week of April on the Mincio, the passages of which river were forced and the Austrian advanced troops driven back on the 8th (action of Goito) and 9th. Radetzky maintained a careful defensive, and the king's attempts to surprise Peschiera (14th) and Mantua (19th) were unsuccessful. But Peschiera was closely invested, though it was not forced to capitulate until the end of May. Meanwhile the Piedmontese army advanced towards Verona, and, finding Radetzky with a portion of his army on their left flank near Pastrengo, swung northward and drove him over the Adige above Verona, but on turning towards Verona they were checked (action of Pastrengo 28th-30th April and battle of Santa Lucia di Verona, 6th May).

Meanwhile the Austrian reinforcements assembled in Carniola under an Irish-born general, Count Nugent von Westmeath (1777-1862) and entered Friuli. Their junction with the field marshal was in the last degree precarious, every step of their march was contested by the levies and the townsmen of Venetia. The days of rifled artillery were not yet come, and a physical obstacle to the combined movements

of trained regulars and a well-marked line of defence were all that was necessary to convert even medieval walled towns into centres of effective resistance. When the spirit of resistance was lacking, as it had been for example in 1799, the importance of the walled towns corresponded simply to their material strength, which was practically negligible. But throughout the campaign of 1848-1849, the essential moral conditions of defence being present, the Austrians were hampered by an endless series of minor sieges, in which the effort expended was out of all proportion to the success achieved.

Nugent, however, pressed on, though every day weakened by small detachments, and, turning rather than overpowering each obstacle as it was encountered, made his way slowly by Belluno to Vicenza and Treviso and joined Radetzky at Verona on the 25th of May. The latter then for a moment took the offensive, passing round the right flank of the loyal army by way of Mantua (actions of Curtatone, 29th May, and Goito, 30th May), but, failing of the success he expected he turned swiftly round and with 30,000 men attacked the 20,000 Italians (Papal troops, volunteers, Neapolitans) under Durando, who had established themselves across his line of communication at Vicenza, drove them away and reoccupied Vicenza (9th June), where a second body of reinforcements from Trent, clearing the Brenta valley (Val Sugana) as they advanced, joined him, the king meanwhile being held in check by the rest of Radetzky's army.

After beating down resistance in the valleys of the Brenta and Piave, the field marshal returned to Verona. Charles Albert had now some 75,000 men actually in hand on the line of high ground, S. Giustina-Somma Campagna, and made the mistake of extending inordinately so as to cover his proposed siege of Mantua. Napoleon, fifty years before on the same ground, had only with great difficulty solved this same problem by the economical grouping and resolute handling of his forces, and Charles Albert, setting out his forces *en cordon*, was weak at all points of his long front of 45 m. Thus Radetzky, gathering his forces opposite the king's centre (Sona, Somma Campagna), was able to break it (23rd July). The Piedmontese, however, fell back steadily, and 25,000 of them collected at Villafranca, whence on the 24th they counter-attacked and regained the heights at Custoza and Somma Campagna that they had lost. Radetzky, however, took the offensive again next morning and having succeeded in massing half of his army opposite to one quarter of the Piedmontese, was completely victorious (first battle of Custoza, 24th-25th July). Pursuing vigorously, the Austrians drove the king over the Mincio (action of Volta, 26th-27th), the Chiese, the Adda and the Ticino into his own dominions, Milan being reoccupied without fighting. The smaller bands of patriots were one after the other driven over the borders or destroyed. Venice alone held out to the end. Besieged by land and water, and bombarded as well, she prolonged her resistance until October 1849, long after the war had everywhere else come to an end.

The first campaign for unity had ended in complete failure, thanks to the genius of Radetzky and the thorough training, mobility and handiness of his soldiers. During the winter of 1848-1849—for, to avoid unnecessary waste of his precious veterans, Radetzky let the Piedmontese army retire unmolested over the Ticino—Charles Albert took energetic measures to reorganize, refit and augment his army. But his previous career had not fitted him to meet the crisis. With aspirations for unity he sympathized, and to that ideal he was soon to sacrifice his throne, but he had nothing in common with the distinctively revolutionary party, with whom circumstances had allied him. Radicalism, however, was a more obvious if a less real force than nationalism, and Charles Albert made it a fatal concession in appointing the Polish general Albert Chrzanowski (1788-1861) his principal adviser and commander-in-chief—an appointment that alienated the generals and the army, while scarcely modifying the sentiments of distrust with which the Liberal party regarded the king.¹

In March the two main armies were grouped in the densely intersected district between Milan, Vercelli and Pavia (see sketch map below), separated by the Ticino, of which the outposts of either side watched the passages. Charles Albert had immediately in hand 65,000 men, some 25,000 more being scattered in various detachments to right and left. Radetzky disposed of 70,000 men for field operations, besides garrisons. The recovery of Milan, the great city that had been the first to revolt, seemed to the Italians the first objective of the campaign. It was easier indeed to raise the whole country in arms than to crush the field-marshal's regulars, and it was hoped that Radetzky would, on losing Milan, either retire to Lodi and perhaps to Mantua (as in 1848), or gather his forces for battle before Milan. Radetzky himself openly announced that he would take the offensive, and the king's plans were framed to meet this case also. Two-thirds of the army, 4 divisions, were grouped in great depth between Novara, Galliate and Castelnovo. A little to the right, at Vespolate and Vigevano, was one division under Durando, and the remaining division under Ramorino was grouped opposite Pavia with orders to take that place if possible, but if Radetzky advanced thence, to fall back fighting either on Montara

¹ Several of the French generals—Lamoricière, Bedeau, Changarnier and others—who had been prominent in Algeria and in the 1848 revolution in France had been invited to take the command, but had declined it.

or Lomello,¹ while the main body descended on the Austrian flank. The grouping both of Ramorino and of the main body—as events proved in the case of the latter—cannot be seriously criticized, and indeed one is almost tempted to assume that Chrzanowski considered the case of Radetzky's advance on Montara more carefully than that of his own advance on Milan. But the seething spirit of revolt did not allow the army that was Italy's hope to stand still at a foreign and untried general's dictation and await Radetzky's coming. On the 19th of March orders were issued to the main body for the advance on Milan, and on the 20th one division, led by the king himself, crossed the Ticino at San Martino.

But no Austrians were encountered, and such information as was available indicated that Radetzky was concentrating to his left on the Pavia-Lodi road. Chrzanowski thereupon, abandoning (if indeed he ever entertained) the idea of Radetzky's retirement and his own triumphal march on Milan, suspended the advance. His fears were justified, for that evening he heard that Ramorino had abandoned his post and taken his division across the Po. After the war this general was shot for disobedience, and deservedly, for the covering division, the fighting flank-guard on which Chrzanowski's defensive-offensive depended, was thus withdrawn at the moment when Radetzky's whole army was crossing the Ticino at Pavia and heading for Mortara.²

The four Austrian corps began to file across the Ticino at noon on the 20th, and by nightfall the heads of Radetzky's columns were at Zerbolo, Gambolo and La Cava, the reserve at Pavia, a flank-guard holding the Cava-Casatisma road over the Po against the contingency of Ramorino's return, and the two brigades that had furnished the outposts along the Ticino closing on Bereguardo.

Chrzanowski, however, having now to deal with a foreseen case, gave his orders promptly. To replace Ramorino, the 1st division was ordered from Vespolate through Mortara to Trumello; the 2nd division from Cerano to push south on Vigevano; the reserve from Novara to Mortara; the remainder to follow the 2nd division. Had the 1st division been placed at Mortara instead of Vespolate in the first instance the story of the campaign might have been very different, but here again, though to a far less culpable degree, a subordinate general's default imperilled the army. Durando (21st March), instead of pushing on as ordered to Trumello to take contact with the enemy, halted at Mortara. The reserve also halted there and deployed west of Mortara to guard against a possible attack from San Giorgio. The Sardinian advanced guard on the other road reached Borgo San Siro, but there met and was driven back by Radetzky's II. corps under Lieut. Field Marshal d'Aspre (1789-1850), which was supported by the brigades that now crossed at Bereguardo. But the Italians were also supported, the Austrians made little progress, and by nightfall the Sardinian II., III. and IV. divisions had closed up around Vigevano. Radetzky indeed intended his troops on the Vigevano road to act simply as a defensive flank-guard and had ordered the rest of his army by the three roads, Zerbolo-Gambolo, Gropello-Trumello and Lomello-San Giorgio, to converge on Mortara. The rearmost of the two corps on the Gambolo road (the I.) was to serve at need as a support to the flank-guard, and, justly confident in his troops, Radetzky did not hesitate to send a whole corps by the eccentric route of Lomello. And before nightfall an important success had justified him, for the II. corps from Gambolo, meeting Durando outside Mortara, had defeated him before the Sardinian reserve, prematurely deployed on the other side of the town, could come to his assistance. The remaining corps of Radetzky's army were still short of Mortara when night came, but this could hardly be well known at the royal headquarters, and, giving up the slight chances of success that a counterstroke from Vigevano on Mortara offered, Chrzanowski ordered a general concentration on Novara. This was effected on the 22nd, on which day Radetzky, pushing out the II. corps towards Vespolate, concentrated the rest at Mortara. That the Italians had retired was clear, but it was not known whither, and, precisely as Napoleon had done before Marengo (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS), he sent one corps to seize the king's potential line of retreat, Novara-Vercelli, kept one back at Mortara—ready, it may be presumed, to grapple an enemy coming from Vigevano—and engaged the other three in a single long column, widely spaced out, on the Novara road. Thus it came about that on the 23rd d'Aspre's II. corps encountered Charles Albert's whole army long before the III. and Reserve could join it. The battle of Novara was, nevertheless, as great an event in the history of the Imperial-Royal Army as Marengo in that of the French.

First the II. corps, and then the II. and III. together attacked with the utmost resolution, and as the hours went by more and more of the white coats came on the field,

¹ Students of Napoleonic strategy will find it interesting to replace Ramorino by, say, Lannes, and to post Durando at Mortara-Vigevano instead of Vespolate-Vigevano, and from these conditions to work out the probable course of events.

² Ramorino's defence was that he had received information that the Austrians were advancing on Alessandria by the south bank of the Po. But Alessandria was a fortress, and could be expected to hold out for forty-eight hours; moreover, it could easily have been succoured by way of Vaenza if necessary.

until at last the IV. corps, swinging inward from Robbio, came on to the flank of the defence. This was no mere strategical triumph; the Austrians, regiment for regiment, were more than a match for the Italians and the result was decisive. Charles Albert abdicated, and the Young Victor Emmanuel II., his successor, had to make a hasty armistice.

After Novara, the first great struggle for Italian unity was no more than a spasmodic, if often desperate, struggle of small bodies of patriots and citizens of walled towns to avert the inevitable. The principal incidents in the last phase were the siege of Venice, the sack of Brescia by the merciless Haynau and the capture of Rome by a French expeditionary corps under General Oudinot.

CHAPTER II

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO

The campaign of Magenta and Solferino took place ten years later. Napoleon III., himself an *ex-carbonaro*, and the apostle of the theory of "nationalities," had had his attention and his ambitions drawn towards the Italian problem by the attempt upon his life by Orsini. The general political horizon was by no means clear at the end of 1858, and on the 1st of January 1859 the emperor of the French publicly expressed to the Austrian ambassador his regret that "our relations are not so good as heretofore." This was regarded by all concerned as a prelude to war, and within a short time a treaty and a marriage-contract allied Sardinia with the leading European power. In the smaller Italian states, as before, the governments were on the side of Austria and the "settlement of 1815," and the peoples on that of United Italy. The French still maintained a garrison in Rome to support the pope. The thorny question of the temporal power *versus* the national movement was not yet in the foreground, and though Napoleon's support of the former was later to prove his undoing, in 1859 the main enemy was Austria and the paramount factor was the assistance of 200,000 French regulars in solving the immediate problem.


The Sardinian army, reconstituted by La Marmora with the definite object of a war for union and rehabilitated by its conduct in the Crimea, was eager and willing. The French army, proud of its reputation as the premier army in the world, and composed, three-fourths of it, of professional soldiers whose gospel was the "Legend," welcomed a return to the first Napoleon's battle-grounds, while the emperor's ambitions coincided with his sentiments. Austria, on the other hand, did not desire war. Her only motive of resistance was that it was impossible to cede her Italian possessions in face of a mere threat. To her, even more than to France and infinitely more than to Italy, the war was a political war, a "war with a limited aim" or "stronger form of diplomatic note"; it entirely lacked the national and personal spirit of resistance which makes even a passive defence so powerful.

Events during the period of tension that preceded the actual declaration of war were practically governed by these moral conditions. Such advantages as Austria possessed at the outset could only be turned to account, as will presently appear, by prompt action. But her army system was a combination of conscription and the "nation in arms," which for the diplomatic war on hand proved to be quite inadequate. Whereas the French army was permanently on a two-thirds war footing (400,000 peace, 600,000 war), that of Austria required to be more than doubled on mobilization by calling in reservists. Now, the value of reservists is always conditioned by the temper of the population from which they come, and it is more than probable that the indecision of the Austrian government between January and April 1859 was due not only to its desire on general grounds to avoid war, but also, and perhaps still more, to its hopes of averting it by firmness, without having recourse to the possibly dangerous expedient of a real mobilization. A few years before the method of "bluffing" had been completely successful against Prussia. But the Prussian reservist of 1850 did not want to fight, whereas the French soldier of 1859 desired nothing more ardently.

In these conditions the Austrian preparations were made sparingly, but with ostentation. The three corps constituting the Army of Italy [commanded since Radetzky's death in 1858 by Feldzeugmeister Count Franz Gyulai (1798-1863)], were maintained at war efficiency, but not at war strength (corps averaging 15,000). Instead, however, of mobilizing them, the Vienna government sent an army corps (III.) from Vienna at peace strength in January. This was followed by the II. corps also at peace strength, in February, and the available field force, from that point, could have invaded Piedmont at once.¹

¹ The Sardinians, at peace strength, had some 50,000 men, and during January and February the government busied itself chiefly with preparations of supplies and armament. Here the delay in calling out the reserves was due not to their possible ill-will, but to the necessity of waiting on the political situation.

The initial military situation was indeed all in favour of Austria. Her mobilization was calculated to take ten weeks, it is true, but her concentration by rail could be much more speedily effected than that of the French, who had either to cross the Alps on foot or to proceed to Genoa by sea and thence by one line of railway to the interior. Further, the demands of Algeria, Rome and other garrisons, the complicated political situation and the consequent necessity of protecting the French coasts against an English attack,¹ and still more the Rhine frontier against Prussia and other German states (a task to which the greatest general in the French army, Pélissier, was assigned), materially reduced the size of the army to be sent to Italy. But the Austrian government held its hand, and the Austrian commander, apparently nonplussed by the alternation of quiescence and boldness at Vienna, asked for full mobilization and turned his thoughts to the Quadrilateral that had served Radetzky so well in gaining time for the reserves to come up. March passed away without an advance, and it was not until the 5th of April that the long-deferred order was issued from Vienna to the reservists to join the II., III., V., VII. and VIII. corps in Italy. And, after all, Gyulai took the field, at the end of April, with most of his



units at three-quarters of their war strength.² On the side of the allies the Sardinians mobilized 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, totalling 64,000, by the third week in April. A few days later Austria sent an ultimatum to Turin. This was rejected on the 26th, war being thereupon declared. As for the French, the emperor's policy was considerably in advance of his war minister's preparations. The total of about 130,000 men (all that could be spared out of 500,000) for the Italian army was not reached until operations were in progress; and the first troops only entered Savoy or disembarked in Genoa on the 25th and 26th of April.

Thus, long as the opening had been delayed, there was still a period after both sides had re-

solved on and prepared for war, during which the Austrians were free to take the offensive. Had the Austrians crossed the frontier instead of writing an ultimatum on the 19th of April, they would have had from a week to a fortnight to deal with the Sardinians. But even the three or four days that elapsed between the declaration and the arrival of the first French soldiers were wasted. Vienna ordered Gyulai to take the offensive on the 27th, but it was not until the 30th that the Austrian general crossed the Ticino. His movements were unopposed, the whole of the Sardinian army having concentrated (by arrangement between La Marmora and Marshal Canrobert) in a flank position between Casale and Alessandria, where it covered Turin indirectly and Genoa, the French disembarkation port directly. Gyulai's left was on the 2nd of May opposite the allied centre, and his right stretched as far as Vercelli.³ On the 3rd he planned a concentric attack

¹ The Volunteer movement in England was the result of this crisis in the relations of England and France.

² As far as possible Italian conscripts had been sent elsewhere and replaced by Austrians.

³ The movements of the division employed in policing Lombardy (Urban's) are not included here, unless specially mentioned.

on King Victor Emmanuel's position, and parts of his scheme were actually put into execution, but he suspended it owing to news of the approach of the French from Genoa, supply difficulties (Radetzky, the inheritor of the 18th-century traditions, had laid it down that the soldier must be well fed and that the civilian must not be plundered, conditions which were unfavourable to mobility) and the heavy weather and the dangerous state of the rivers.

Gyulai then turned his attention to the Sardinian capital. Three more days were spent in a careful flank march to the right, and on the 8th of May the army (III., V. and VII.) was grouped about Vercelli, with outposts 10-14 m. beyond the Sesia towards Turin, reserves (II. and VIII.) round Mortara, and a flank-guard detached from Benedek's VIII. corps watching the Po. The extreme right of the main body skirmished with Garibaldi's volunteers on the edge of the Alpine country. The Turin scheme was, however, soon given up. Bivouacs, cancelled orders and crossings of marching columns all contributed to exhaust the troops needlessly. On the 9th one corps (the V.) had its direction and disposition altered four times, without any change in the general situation to justify this. In fact, the Austrian headquarters were full of able soldiers, each of whom had his own views on the measures to be taken and a certain measure of support from Vienna—Gyulai, Colonel Kuhn his chief of staff, and Feldzeugmeister Hess, who had formerly played Gneisenau to Radetzky's Blücher. But what emerges most clearly from the movements of these days is that Gyulai himself distrusted the offensive projects he had been ordered to execute, and catching apparently at some expression of approval given by the emperor, had determined to imitate Radetzky in "a defensive based on the Quadrilateral." His immediate intention, on abandoning the advance on Turin, was to group his army around Mortara and to strike out as opportunity offered against the heads of the allied columns wherever they appeared. Meantime, the IX. corps had been sent to Italy, and the I. and XI. were mobilizing. These were to form the I. Army, Gyulai's the II. The latter was by the 13th of May grouped in the Lomellina, one-third (chiefly VII. corps) spread by brigades fanwise from Vercelli along the Sesia and Po to Vaccarizza, two-thirds massed in a central position about Mortara. There was still no information of the enemy's distribution, except what was forwarded from Vienna or gathered by the indefatigable Urban's division, which moved from Milan to Biella, thence to Brescia and Parma, and back to Lombardy in search of revolutionary bands, and the latter's doings in the nature of things could not afford any certain inferences as to the enemy's regular armies.

On the side of the allies, the Piedmontese were grouped on the 1st of May in the fortified positions selected for them by Canrobert about Valenza-Casale-Alessandria. The French III. corps arrived on the 2nd and 3rd and the IV. corps on the 7th at Alessandria from Genoa. Unhampered by Gyulai's offensive, though at times and places disquieted by his minor reconnaissances, the allies assembled until on the 16th the French were stationed as follows: I. corps, Voghera and Pontecurone, II., Sale and Bassignana, III., Tortona, IV., Valenza, Guard, Alessandria, and the king's army between Valenza and Casale. The V. French corps under Prince Napoleon had a political mission in the duchies of middle Italy; one division of this corps, however, followed the main army. On the eve of the first collision the Emperor Napoleon, commanding in chief, had in hand about 100,000 French and about 60,000 Sardinian troops (not including Garibaldi's enlisted volunteers or the national guard). Gyulai's II. Army was nominally of nearly equal force to that of the allies, but in reality it was only about 106,000 strong in combatants.

The first battle had no relation to the strategy contemplated by the emperor, and was still less a part of the defence scheme framed by Gyulai. The latter, still pivoting on Mortara, had between the 14th and 19th drawn his army somewhat to the left, in proportion as more and more of the French came up from Genoa. He had further ordered a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Voghera by a mixed corps drawn from the V., Urban's division and the IX. (the last belonging to the I. Army). The saying that "he who does not know what he wants, yet feels that he must do something, appeases his conscience by a reconnaissance in force," applies to no episode more forcibly than to the action of Montebello (20th May) where Count Stadion, the commander of the V. corps, not knowing what to reconnoitre, engaged disconnected fractions of his available 24,000 against the French division of Forey (I. corps), 8000 strong, and was boldly attacked and beaten, with a loss of 1400 men against Forey's 700.

Montebello had, however, one singular result: both sides fell back and took defensive measures. The French headquarters were already meditating, if they had not actually resolved upon, a transfer of all their forces from right to left, to be followed by a march on Milan (a scheme inspired by Jomini). But the opening of the movement was suspended until it became quite certain that Stadion's advance meant nothing, while Gyulai (impressed by Forey's aggressive tactics) continued to stand fast, and thus it was not until the 28th that the French offensive really began.¹ The infantry of the French III. corps was sent by

¹ The advantages and dangers of the flank march are well summarized in Colonel H. C. Wylly's *Magenta and Solferino*, p. 65, where the doctrinaire objections of Hamley and Rüstow are set in parallel with the common-sense views of a much-neglected English writer (Major Adams, *Great Campaigns*) and with the clear and simple doctrine of Moltke,

rail from Pontecurone to Casale, followed by the rest of the army, which marched by road. To cover the movement D'Autemarre's division of Prince Napoleon's corps (V.) was posted at Voghera and one division of the king's army remained at Valenza. The rest of the Piedmontese were pushed northward to join Cialdini's division which was already at Vercelli. The emperor's orders were for Victor Emmanuel to push across the Sesia and to take post at Palestro on the 30th to cover the crossing of the French at Vercelli. This the king carried out, driving back outlying bodies of the enemy in spite of a stubborn resistance and the close and difficult character of the country. Hearing of the fighting, Gyulai ordered the recapture of Palestro by the II. corps, but the Sardinians during the night strengthened their positions and the attack (31st) was repulsed with heavy loss. These two initial successes of the allies, the failures in Austrian tactics and leadership which they revealed, and the fatigues and privations to which indifferent staff work had exposed his troops, combined to confirm Gyulai in his now openly expressed intention of "basing his defensive on the Quadrilateral." And indeed his only alternatives were now to fall back or to concentrate on the heads of the French columns as soon as they had passed the Sesia about Vercelli. Faithful to his view of the situation he adopted the former course (1st June). The retreat began on the 2nd, while the French were still busied in closing up. Equally with the Austrians, the French were the victims of a system of marching and camping that, by requiring the tail of the columns to close up on the head every evening, reduced the day's net progress to 6 or 7 m., although the troops were often under arms for fourteen or fifteen hours. The difference between the supreme commands of the rival armies lay not in the superior generalship of one or the other, but in the fact that Napoleon III. as sovereign knew what he wanted and as general pursued this object with much energy, whereas Gyulai neither knew how far his government would go nor was entire "master in his own house."

The latter became very evident in his retreat. Kuhn, the chief of staff, who was understood to represent the views of the general staff in Vienna, had already protested against Gyulai's retrograde movement, and on the 3rd Hess appeared from Vienna as the emperor's direct representative and stopped the movement. It was destined to be resumed after a short interval, but meanwhile the troops suffered from the orders and counter-orders that had marked every stage in the Austrian movements and were now intensified instead of being removed by higher intervention. Meanwhile (June 1-2) the allies had regrouped themselves east of the Sesia for the movement on Milan. The IV. corps, driving out an Austrian detachment at Novara, established itself there, and was joined by the II. and Guard. The king's army, supported by the I. and III. corps, was about Vercelli, with cavalry far out to the front towards Vespolate. From Novara, the emperor, who desired to give his troops a rest-day on the 2nd, pushed out first a mixed reconnaissance and then in the afternoon two divisions to seize the crossing of the Ticino, Camou's of the Guard on Turbigo, Espinasse's of the II. corps on San Martino. Further the whole of the Vercelli group was ordered to advance on the 3rd to Novara and Galliate, where Napoleon would on the 4th have all his forces, except one division, beyond Gyulai's right and in hand for the move on Milan. The division sent to Turbigo bridged the river and crossed in the night of the 2nd-3rd, that at San Martino (on the main road) occupied the bridge-head and also the river bridge itself, though the latter was damaged. Espinasse's division here was during the night replaced by a Guard division and went to join a growing assembly of troops under General MacMahon, which established itself at Turbigo and Robecchetto on the morning of the 3rd. Lastly, in order to make sure that no attack was impending from the direction of Mortara, Napoleon sent General Niel with a mixed reconnoitring force thither, which returned without meeting any Austrian force—fortunately for itself, if the fate of the "reconnaissance in force" at Montebello proves anything.

The centre of gravity was now at Buffalora, a village on the main Milan road at the point where it crosses the Naviglio Grande. Here, on the night of the 1st, Count Clam-Gallas, commanding the Austrian I. corps (which had just arrived in Italy and was to form part of the future I. army) had posted a division, with a view to occupying the bridge-head of San Martino. On inspecting the latter Clam-Gallas concluded that it was indefensible, and, ordering the San Martino road and railway bridges to be destroyed (an order which was only partially executed), he called on Gyulai for support, sent out detachments to the right against the French troops reported at Turbigo, and prepared to hold his ground at Buffalora. On receipt of Clam-Gallas's report at the Austrian headquarters, Hess ordered the resumption of the retreat that he had countermanded, but it was already late and many of the troops did not halt for the night till midnight, June 3rd-4th. Gyulai promised them the 4th as a rest-day, but fortune ordered it otherwise. This much at least was in favour of the Austrians, that when the troops at last reached their assigned positions four-fifths of them were within 12 m. of the battlefield. But, as before, the greater part of the army was destined to be chained to "supporting positions" well back from the battlefield.

that rested on the principle that strategy does not exist to avoid but to give effect to tactics. The waste of time in execution, rather than the scheme, is condemned by General Silvestre.

When day broke on the 4th, the emperor of the French was still uncertain as to Gyulai's whereabouts, and his intention was therefore no more than to secure the passage of the Ticino and to place his army on both sides of the river, in sufficient strength to make head against Gyulai, whether the latter advanced from Mortara and Vigevano or from Abbiategrasso. He therefore kept back part of the French army and the whole of the Sardinian. But during the morning it became known that Gyulai had passed the Ticino on the evening of the 3rd; and Napoleon then ordered up all his forces to San Martino and Turbigo. The battlefield of Magenta is easily described. It consists of two level plateaux, wholly covered with vineyards, and between them the broad and low-lying valley of the Ticino. This, sharply defined by the bluffs of the adjoining plateaux, is made up of backwaters, channels, water meadows and swampy woods. At Turbigo the band of low ground is $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. wide, at Buffalora $2\frac{1}{2}$. Along the foot of the eastern or Austrian bluffs between Turbigo and Buffalora runs the Grand Canal (Naviglio Grande); this, however, cuts into the plateau itself at the latter place and trending gradually inwards leaves a tongue of high ground separate from the main plateau. The Novara-Milan road and railway, crossing the Ticino by the bridge of San Martino, pass the second obstacle presented by the canal by the New Bridges of Magenta, the Old Bridge being 1000 yards south of these. The canal is bridged at several points between Turbigo and Buffalora, and also at Robecco, $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. to the (Austrian) left of the Old Bridge. Clam-Gallas's main line of defence was the canal between Turbigo and the Old Bridge, skirmishers being posted on the tongue of high ground in front of the New Bridges, which were kept open for their retreat. He had been joined by the II. corps and disposed of 40,000 men, 27,000 more being at Abbiategrasso ($2\frac{1}{2}$ m. S. of Robecco). Of his immediate command, he disposed about 12,000 for the defence of the New Bridges, 12,000 for that of Buffalora, 8000 at Magenta and 8000 at Robecco; all bridges, except the New Bridges, were broken. Cavalry played no part whatever, and artillery was only used in small force to fire along roads and paths.

Napoleon, as has been mentioned, spent the morning of the 4th in ascertaining that Gyulai had repassed the Ticino. Being desirous merely of securing the passage and having only a small force available for the moment at San Martino, he kept this back in the hope that MacMahon's advance from Turbigo on Magenta and Buffalora would dislodge the Austrians. MacMahon advanced in two columns, 2 divisions through Cuggiono and 1 through Inveruno. The former drove back the Austrian outposts with ease, but on approaching Buffalora found so serious a resistance that MacMahon broke off the fight in order to close up and deploy his full force. Meantime, however, on hearing the cannonade Napoleon had ordered forward Mellinet's division of the Guard on the New Bridges and Buffalora. The bold advance of this *corps d'élite* carried both points at once, but the masses of the allies who had been retained to meet a possible attack from Mortara and Vigevano were still far distant and Mellinet was practically unsupported. Thus the French, turning towards the Old Bridge, found themselves (3.30 p.m.) involved in a close fight with some 18,000 Austrians, and meantime Gyulai had begun to bring up his III. and VII. corps towards Robecco and (with Hess) had arrived on the field himself. The VII. corps, on its arrival, drove Mellinet back to and over the New Bridges, but the French, now broken up into dense swarms of individual fighters, held on to the tongue of high ground and prevented the Austrians from destroying the bridges, while the occupants of Buffalora similarly held their own, and beyond them MacMahon, advancing through orchards and vineyards in a line of battle 2 m. long, slowly gained ground towards Magenta. The III. Austrian corps, meanwhile, arriving at Robecco spread out on both sides of the canal and advanced to take the defenders of the New Bridges in rear, but were checked by fresh French troops which arrived from San Martino (4 p.m.). The struggle for the New and Old Bridges continued till 6 p.m., more and more troops being drawn into the vortex, but at last the Austrians, stubbornly defending each vineyard, fell back on Magenta. But while nearly all the Austrian reinforcements from the lower Ticino had successfully been directed on the bridges, MacMahon had only had to deal with the 8000 men who had originally formed the garrison of Magenta. The small part of the reinforcing troops that had been directed thither by Gyulai before he was aware of the situation, had in consequence no active rôle defined in their orders and (initiative being then regarded as a vice) they stood fast while their comrades were beaten. But it was not until after sunset that the thronging French troops at last broke into Magenta and the victory was won. The splendid Austrian cavalry (always at a disadvantage in Italy) found no opportunity to redress the balance, and their slow-moving and over-loaded infantry, in spite of its devotion, was no match in broken country for the swift and eager French. The forces engaged were 54,000 French (one-third of the allied army) to 58,000 Austrians (about half of Gyulai's total force). Thus the fears of Napoleon as regards an Austrian attack from Mortara-Vigevano neutralized the bad distribution of his opponent's force, and Magenta was a fair contest of equal numbers. The victory of the French was palpably the consequence not of luck or generalship but of specific superiority in the soldier. The great result of the battle was therefore a conviction, shared by both sides, that in future encounters nothing but exceptional good fortune or skilful generalship could give the

Austrians victory. The respective losses were: French 4000 killed and wounded and 600 missing, Austrians 5700 killed and wounded, 4500 missing.

While the fighting was prolonged to nightfall, the various corps of the Austrian army had approached, and it was Gyulai's intention to resume the battle next day with 100,000 men. But Clam-Gallas reported that the I. and II. corps were fought out, and thereupon Gyulai resolved to retreat on Cremona and Mantua, leaving the great road Milan-Brescia unused, for the townsmen's patriotism was sharpened by the remembrance of Haynau, "the Hyena of Brescia." Milan and Pavia were evacuated on the 5th, Hess departed to meet the emperor Francis Joseph (who was coming to take command of the united I. and II. Armies), and although Kuhn was still in favour of the offensive Gyulai decided that the best service he could render was to deliver up the army intact to his sovereign on the Mincio. On the 8th of June Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their triumphal entry into Milan, while their corps followed up rather than pursued the retreating enemy along the Lodi and Cremona roads. On the same day, the 8th of June, the I. and II. French corps, under the general command of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, attacked an Austrian rearguard (part of VIII. corps, Benedek) at the village of Melegnano. MacMahon with the II. corps was to turn the right flank, the IV. the left of the defenders, while Baraguay attacked in front. But MacMahon, as at Magenta, deployed into a formal line of battle before closing on the village, and his progress through the vineyards was correspondingly slow. The IV. corps was similarly involved in intricate country, but Baraguay, whose corps had not been present at Magenta, was burning to attack, and being a man *aussi dur à ses soldats qu'à lui-même*, he delivered the frontal attack about 6 P.M. without waiting for the others. This attack, as straightforward, as brusque, and as destitute of tactical refinements as that of the Swiss on that very ground in 1515 (Marignano), was carried out, without "preparation," by Bazaine's division *à la baïonnette*. Benedek was dislodged, but retreated safely, having inflicted a loss of over 1000 men on the French, as against 360 in his own command.

After Melegnano, as after Magenta, contact with the retiring enemy was lost, and for a fortnight the story of the war is simply that of a triumphal advance of the allies and a quiet retirement and reorganisation of the Austrians. Up to Magenta Napoleon had a well-defined scheme and executed it with vigour. But the fierceness of the battle itself had not a little effect on his strange dreamy character, and although it was proved beyond doubt that under reasonable conditions the French must win in every encounter, their emperor turned his attention to dislodging rather than to destroying the enemy. War clouds were gathering elsewhere—on the Rhine above all. The simple brave promise to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" became complicated by many minor issues, and the emperor was well content to let his enemy retire and to accelerate that retirement by manœuvre as far as might be necessary. He therefore kept on the left of his adversary's routes as before, and about the 20th of June the whole allied army (less Cialdini's Sardinian division, detached to operate on the fringe of the mountain country) was closely grouped around Montechiaro on the Chiese. It now consisted of 107,000 French and 48,000 Sardinians (combatants only).

The Austrians had disappeared into the Quadrilateral, where the emperor Francis Joseph assumed personal command, with Hess as his chief of staff. Gyulai had resigned the command of the II. Army to Count Schlick, a cavalry general of 70 years of age. The I. Army was under Count Wimpffen. But this partition produced nothing but evil. The imperial headquarters still issued voluminous detailed orders for each corps, and the intervening army staff was a cause not of initiative or of simplification, but of unnecessary delay. The direction of several armies, in fact, is only feasible when general directions (*directives* as they are technically called) take the place of orders. All the necessary conditions for working such a system—uniformity of training, methods and doctrine in the recipients, abstention from interference in details by the supreme command—were wanting in the Austrian army of 1859. The I. Army consisted of the III., IX. and XI. corps with one cavalry division and details, 67,000 in all; the II. Army of the I., V., VII. and VIII. corps, one cavalry division and details, or 90,000 combatants—total 160,000, or practically the same force as the allies. The emperor had made several salutary changes in the administration, notably an order to the infantry to send their heavy equipment and parade full-dress into the fortresses, which enormously lightened the hitherto overburdened infantryman. At this moment the political omens were favourable, and gathering the impression from his outpost reports that the French were in two halves, separated by the River Chiese, the young emperor at last accepted Hess's advice to resume the offensive, in view of which Gyulai had left strong outposts west of the Mincio, when the main armies retired over that river, and had maintained and supplemented the available bridges.

The possibility of such a finale to the campaign had been considered but dismissed at the allied headquarters, where it was thought that if the Austrians took the offensive it would be on their own side, not the enemy's, of the Mincio and in the midst of the Quadrilateral. Thus the advance of the French army on the 24th was simply to be a general move to the line of the Mincio, preparatory to forcing the crossings, coupled with the destruction of the strong outpost bodies that had been left by the Austrians at Solferino,

Guidizzolo, &c. The Austrians, who advanced over the Mincio on the 23rd, also thought that the decisive battle would take place on the third or fourth day of their advance. Thus, although both armies moved with all precautions as if a battle was the immediate object, neither expected a collision, and Solferino was consequently a pure encounter-battle.

Speaking generally, the battlefield falls into two distinct halves, the hilly undulating country, of which the edge (almost everywhere cliff-like) is defined by Lonato, Castiglione, Cavriana and Volta, and the plain of Medole and Guidizzolo. The village of Solferino is within the elevated ground, but close to the edge. Almost in the centre of the plateau is Pozzolengo, and from Solferino and Pozzolengo roads lead to crossing places of the Mincio above Volta (Monzambano-Salonia and Valeggio). These routes were assigned to the Piedmontese (44,000) and the French left wing (I., II. and Guard, 57,000), the plain to the III. and IV. corps and two cavalry divisions (50,000). On the other side the Austrians, trusting to the defensive facilities of the plateau, had directed the II. Army and part of the I. (86,000) into the plain, two corps of the I. Army (V. and I.) on Solferino-Cavriana (40,000), and only the VIII. corps (Benedek), 25,000 strong, into the heart of the undulating ground. One division was sent from Mantua towards Marcaria. Thus both armies, though disposed in parallel lines, were grouped in very unequal density at different points in these lines.

The French orders for the 24th were—Sardinian army on Pozzolengo, I. corps Esenta to Solferino, II. Castiglione to Cavriana, IV. with two cavalry divisions, Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo, III. Mezzana to Medole by Castel Goffredo; Imperial Guard in reserve at Castiglione. On the other side the VIII. corps from Monzambano was to reach Lonato, the remainder of the II. Army from Cavriana, Solferino and Guidizzolo to Esenta and Castiglione, and the I. Army from Medole, Rebecco and Castel Grimaldo towards Carpenedolo. At 8 A.M. the head of the French I. corps encountered several brigades of

the I. Army in advance of Solferino. The fighting was severe, but the French made no progress. MacMahon advancing on Guidizzolo came upon a force of the Austrians at Casa Morino and (as on former occasions) immediately set about deploying his whole corps in line of battle. Meanwhile masses of Austrian infantry became visible on the edge of the heights near Cavriana and the firing in the hills grew in intensity. Marshal MacMahon therefore called upon General Niel on his right rear to hasten his march. The latter had already expelled a small body of the Austrians from Medole and had moved forward to Rebecco, but there more Austrian masses were found, and Niel, like MacMahon, held his hand until Canrobert (III. corps) should come up on his right. But the latter, after seizing Castel Goffredo, judged it prudent to collect his corps there before actively intervening. Meantime, however, MacMahon had completed his preparations, and capturing Casa Morino with ease, he drove forward to a large open field called the Campo di Medole; this, aided by a heavy cross fire from his artillery and part of Niel's, he carried without great loss, Niel meantime attacking Casa Nuova and Rebecco. But the Austrians had not yet developed their full strength, and the initial successes of the French, won against isolated brigades and battalions, were a mere prelude to the real struggle. Meanwhile the stern Baraguay d'Hilliers had made ceaseless attacks on the V. corps at Solferino,



where, on a steep hill surmounted by a tower, the Austrian guns fired with great effect on the attacking masses. It was not until after midday, and then only because it attacked at the moment when, in accordance with an often fatal practice of those days, the Austrian V. corps was being relieved and replaced by the I., that Forey's division of the I. corps, assisted by part of the Imperial Guard, succeeded in reaching the hill, whereupon Baraguay stormed the village and cemetery of Solferino with the masses of infantry that had gradually gathered opposite this point. By 2 P.M. Solferino was definitively lost to the Austrians.

During this time MacMahon had taken, as ordered, the direction of Cavriana, and was by degrees drawn into the fighting on the heights. Pending the arrival of Canrobert—who had been alarmed by the reported movement of an Austrian force on his rear (the division from Mantua above mentioned) and having given up his cavalry to Niel was unable to explore for himself—Niel alone was left to face the I. Army. But Count Wimpffen, having been ordered at 11 to change direction towards Castiglione, employed the morning in redistributing his intact troops in various "mutually supporting positions," and thus the forces opposing Niel at Robecco never outnumbered him by more than three to two. Niel, therefore, attacking again and again and from time to time supported by a brigade or a regiment sent by Canrobert, not only held his own but actually captured Robecco. About the same time MacMahon gained a foothold on the heights between Solferino and Cavriana, and as above mentioned, Baraguay had stormed Solferino and the tower hill. The greater part of the II. Austrian Army was beaten and in retreat on Valeggio before 3 P.M. But the Austrian emperor had not lost hope, and it was only a despairing message from Wimpffen, who had suffered least in the battle, that finally induced him to order the retreat over the Mincio. On the extreme right Benedek and the VIII. corps had fought successfully all day against the Sardinians, this engagement being often known by the separate name of the battle of San Martino. On the left Wimpffen, after sending his despondent message, plucked up heart afresh and, for a moment took the offensive against Niel, who at last, supported by the most part of Canrobert's corps, had reached Guidizzolo. In the centre the Austrian rearguard held out for two hours in several successive positions against the attacks of MacMahon and the Guard. But the battle was decided. A violent storm, the exhaustion of the assailants, and the firm countenance of Benedek, who, retiring from San Martino, covered the retreat of the rest of the II. Army over the Mincio, precluded an effective pursuit.

The losses on either side had been: Allies, 14,415 killed and wounded and 2776 missing, total 17,191; Austrians, 13,317 killed and wounded, 9220 missing, total 22,537. The heaviest losses in the French army were in Niel's corps (IV.), which lost 4483, and in Baraguay d'Hilliers' (I.), which lost 4431. Of the total of 17,191, 5521 was the share of the Sardinian army, which in the battle of San Martino had had as resolute an enemy, and as formidable a position to attack, as had Baraguay at Solferino. On the Austrian side the IX. corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the plain, lost 4349 and the V. corps, that had defended Solferino, 4442. Solferino, in the first instance an encounter-battle in which each corps fought whatever enemy it found in its path, became after a time a decisive trial of strength. In the true sense of the word, it was a soldier's battle, and the now doubly-proved superiority of the French soldier being reinforced by the conviction that the Austrian leaders were incapable of neutralizing it by superior strategy, the war ended without further fighting. The peace of Villafranca was signed on the 11th of July.

APPENDIX

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866¹

In the seven years that elapsed between Solferino and the second battle of Custoza the political unification of Italy had proceeded rapidly, although the price of the union of Italy had been the cession of Savoy and Nice to Napoleon III. Garibaldi's irregulars had in 1860 overrun Sicily, and regular battles, inspired by the same great leader, had destroyed the kingdom of Naples on the mainland (Volturno, 1st-2nd October 1860). At Castelfidardo near Ancona on the 18th of September in the same year Cialdini won another victory over the Papal troops commanded by Lamoricière. In 1866, then, Italy was no longer a "geographical expression," but a recognized kingdom. Only Rome and Venetia remained of the numerous, disunited and reactionary states set up by the congress of Vienna. The former, still held by a French garrison, was for the moment an unattainable aim of the liberators, but the moment for reclaiming Venetia, the last relic of the Austrian dominions in Italy, came when Austria and Prussia in the spring of 1866 prepared to fight for the hegemony of the future united Germany.

The new Italian army, formed on the nucleus of the Sardinian army and led by veterans of Novara and Solferino, was as strong as the whole allied army of 1859, but in absorbing

¹ See also p. 159.

so many recruits it had temporarily lost much of its efficiency. It was organized in four corps, of which one, under Cialdini, was detached from the main body. Garibaldi, as before, commanded a semi-regular corps in the Alpine valleys, but being steadily and skilfully opposed by Kuhn, Gyulai's former chief of staff, he made little or no progress during the brief campaign, on which indeed his operations had no influence. The main Austrian army, still the best-trained part of the emperor's forces, had been, up to the verge of the war, commanded by Benedek, but Benedek was induced to give up his place to the archduke Albert, and to take up the far harder task of commanding against the Prussians in Bohemia. It was in fact a practically foregone conclusion that in Italy the Austrians would win, whereas in Bohemia it was more than feared that the Prussians would carry all before them. But Prussia and Italy were allied, and whatever the result of a battle in Venetia, that province would have to be ceded in the negotiations for peace with a victorious Prussia. Thus on the Austrian side the war of 1866 in Italy was, even more than the former war, simply an armed protest against the march of events.

The part of Hess in the campaign of Solferino was played with more success in that of Custozza by Major-General Franz, Freiherr von John (1815-1876). On this officer's advice the Austrian army, instead of remaining behind the Adige, crossed that river on the 23rd of June and took up a position on the hills around Pastrengo on the flank of the presumed advance of Victor Emmanuel's army. The latter, crossing the Mincio the same day, headed by Villafranca for Verona, part of it in the hills about Custozza, Somma-Campagna and Castelnovo, partly on the plain. The object of the king and of La Marmora, who was his adviser, was by advancing on Verona to occupy the Austrian army (which was only about 80,000 strong as against the king's 120,000), while Cialdini's corps from the Ferrara region crossed the lower Po and operated against the Austrian rear. The archduke's staff, believing that the enemy was making for the lower Adige in order to co-operate directly with Cialdini's detachment, issued orders for the advance on the 24th so as to reach the southern edge of the hilly country, preparatory to descending upon the flank of the Italians next day. However, the latter were nearer than was supposed, and an encounter-battle promptly began for the possession of Somma-Campagna and Custozza. The king's army was unable to use its superior numbers and, brigade for brigade, was much inferior to its opponents. The columns on the right, attempting in succession to debouch from Villafranca in the direction of Verona, were checked by two improvised cavalry brigades under Colonel Pulz, which charged repeatedly, with the old-fashioned cavalry spirit that Europe had almost forgotten, and broke up one battalion after another. In the centre the leading brigades fought in vain for the possession of Custozza and the edge of the plateau, and on the left the divisions that had turned northward from Valeggio into the hills were also met and defeated. About 5 P.M. the Italians, checked and in great disorder, retreated over the Mincio. The losses were—Austrians, 4600 killed and wounded and 1000 missing; Italians, 3800 killed and wounded and 4300 missing. The archduke was too weak in numbers to pursue, his losses had been considerable, and a resolute offensive, in the existing political conditions, would have been a mere waste of force. The battle necessary to save the honour of Austria had been handsomely won. Ere long the bulk of the army that had fought at Custozza was transported by rail to take part in defending Vienna itself against the victorious Prussians. One month later Cialdini with the re-organized Italian army, 140,000 strong, took the field again, and the 30,000 Austrians left in Venetia retreated to the Isonzo without engaging.

The naval battle of Lissa was fought between the Austrian and Italian navies on the 20th of July 1866. The island, then in possession of the Austrians, was attacked by an Italian squadron from Ancona of 12 ironclads and 22 wooden vessels. One of the ironclads was damaged in a bombardment of the forts, and two were detached on other service, when an Austrian squadron of seven ironclads, one unarmoured warship the "Kaiser" and a number of small craft which had left Fasano under the command of Admiral Tegethoff came to interrupt their operations. The Italian admiral Persano arranged his ships in a single long line ahead, which allowing for the necessary space between them meant that the Italian formation stretched for more than 2 m. Just before the action began Admiral Persano shifted his flag from the "Ré d'Italia," the fourth ship in order from the van, to the ram "Affondatore," the fifth. This made it necessary for the "Affondatore" and the ships astern to shorten speed, and, as the leading vessels stood on, a gap was created in the Italian line. Admiral Tegethoff, who was on the port bow of the Italians, attacked with his squadron in three divisions formed in obtuse angles. The Italians opened a very rapid and ill-directed fire at a distance of 1000 yds. The Austrians did not reply till they were at a distance of 300 yds. Under Tegethoff's vigorous leadership, and aided by the disorder in the Italian line, the Austrians brought on a brief, but to the Italians, destructive *mêlée*. They broke through an interval between the third and fourth Italian ships. The unarmed Austrian ships headed to attack the unarmed Italians in the rear. At this point an incident occurred to which an exaggerated importance was given. The Italian ironclad "Ré di Portogallo" of 5600 tons, in the rear of the line, stood out to cover the unarmoured squadron by ramming the Austrians. She was herself

rammed by the wooden "Kaiser" (5000 tons), but received little injury, while the Austrian was much injured. The "Kaiser" and the wooden vessels then made for the protection of fort San Giorgio on Lissa unpursued. In the centre, where the action was hottest, the Austrian flagship "Ferdinand Max" of 5200 tons rammed and sank the "Ré d'Italia." The Italian "Palestro" of 2000 tons was fired by a shell and blew up. By midday the Italians were in retreat, and Tegethoff anchored at San Giorgio. His squadron had suffered very little from the wild fire of the Italians. The battle of the 20th July was the first fought at sea by modern ironclad steam fleets, and therefore attracted a great deal of attention. The sinking of the "Ré d'Italia," and the ramming of the "Portogallo" by the "Kaiser" gave an immense impulse to the then popular theory that the ram would be a leading, if not the principal, weapon in modern sea warfare. This calculation has not been borne out by more recent experience, and indeed was not justified by the battle itself, in which the attempts to ram were many and the successes very few. The "Ré d'Italia" was struck only because she was suddenly and most injudiciously backed, so that she had no way on when charged by the "Ferdinand Max."

In spite of Custoza and of the great defeat sustained by the Italian navy at Lissa on the 20th of July, Venetia was now liberated and incorporated in the kingdom of Italy, and the struggle for unity, that had been for seventeen years a passionate and absorbing drama, and had had amongst its incidents Novara, Magenta, Solferino and the Garibaldian conquest of the Two Sicilies, ended in an anti-climax.

Three years later the cards were shuffled, and Austria, France and Italy were projecting an offensive alliance against Prussia. This scheme came to grief on the Roman question, and the French chassépôt was used for the first time in battle against Garibaldi at Mentana, but in 1870 France was compelled to withdraw her Roman garrison, and with the assent of their late enemy Austria, the Italians under Cialdini fought their way into Rome and there established the capital of united Italy.

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION

CHAPTER I

HOW THE QUESTION AROSE

THE whole complex of diplomatic and other issues arising in the 19th century out of the relations of the two "Elbe duchies," Schleswig and Holstein, to the Danish crown on the one hand and the German Confederation on the other, came to a crisis with the extinction of the male line of the reigning house of Denmark by the death of King Frederick VII. on the 15th of November 1863. The central question was whether the two duchies did or did not constitute an integral part of the dominions of the Danish crown, with which they had been more or less intimately associated for centuries. This involved the purely legal question, raised by the death of the last common male heir to both Denmark and the duchies, as to the proper succession in the latter, and the constitutional questions arising out of the relations of the duchies to the Danish crown, to each other, and of Holstein to the German Confederation. There was also the national question: the ancient racial antagonism between German and Dane, intensified by the tendency, characteristic of the 19th century, to the consolidation of nationalities. Lastly, there was the international question: the rival ambitions of the German powers involved, and beyond them the interests of other European states, notably that of Great Britain in preventing the rise of a German sea-power in the north.

To take the racial question first, from time immemorial the country north of the Elbe had been the battle-ground of Danes and Germans. Danish scholars point to the prevalence of Danish place-names¹ far southward into the German-speaking districts as evidence that at least the whole of Schleswig was at one time Danish; German scholars claim it, on the other hand, as essentially German. That the duchy of Schleswig, or South Jutland (Sönderjylland), had been from time immemorial a Danish fief was, indeed, not in dispute, nor was the fact that Holstein had been from the first a fief of the Germano-Roman Empire. The controversy in the 19th century raged round the ancient "indissoluble" union of the two duchies, and the inferences to be drawn from it; the "Eider Danes"² claimed Schleswig as an integral part of the Danish monarchy, which, on the principle of the union, involved the retention of Holstein also; the Germans claimed Holstein as a part of Germany and, therefore, on the same historic principle, Schleswig also. The history of the relations of Schleswig and Holstein thus became of importance in the practical political question.

Though the designation of Schleswig-Holstein, implying the fusion of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in a single Prussian province, only dates from 1866, the history of the duchies has since the 14th century been so closely interwoven that it is impossible to treat them separately. Something must, however, be said about their origins and their separate history up to the time of their first union under the Holstein counts.

When it first appears in history South Jutland was inhabited by mingled Cimbri, Angles, Jutes and Frisians, upon whom the Danes exercised an unceasing pressure from the north. To the south of Schleswig what is now Holstein was inhabited

¹ *I.e.* place-names according to popular usage, not the official names given in German maps (*e.g.* Haderslev for Hadersleben).

² *I.e.* the party at Copenhagen which aimed at making the Eider, the southern boundary of Schleswig, the frontier of the Danish kingdom proper.

mainly by Saxons, pressed upon from the east by the Wends and other Slavonic races. These Saxons were the last of their nation to submit to Charlemagne (804), who put their country under Frankish counts, the limits of the Empire being pushed in 810 as far as the Schlei in Schleswig. Then began the secular struggle between the Danish kings and the German emperors, and in 934 the German king Henry I. established the Mark of Schleswig (*Limes Danarum*) between the Eider and the Schlei as an outpost of Germany against the Danes. South of this raged the contest between Germans and Slavs. The latter, conquered and Christianized, rose in revolt in 983, after the death of the emperor Otto II., and for a while reverted to paganism and independence. The Saxon dukes, however, continued to rule central Holstein, and when Lothair of Süpplingenburg became duke of Saxony (1106), on the extinction of the Billung line, he invested Adolf I. of Schauenburg with the countship of Holstein. Adolf I.'s son, Adolf II. (1128-1164), succeeded in reconquering the Slavonic Wagri and founded the city and see of Lübeck to hold them in check. Adolf III. (d. 1225), his successor, received Dithmarschen in fee from the emperor Frederick I., but in 1203 the fortunes of war compelled him to surrender Holstein to Valdemar II. of Denmark, the cession being confirmed by the emperor Frederick II. in 1214 and the pope in 1217. Valdemar appointed Albert of Orlamünde his lieutenant in Holstein, and the Schleswig-Holstein question might have been thus early settled but for Valdemar's ill fortune in being taken prisoner in 1223. During his captivity Albert of Orlamünde was beaten at Mölln by Count Adolf III., to whom Valdemar restored his countship as the price of his own release. A papal dispensation from oaths taken under duress excused a new war; but Valdemar himself was beaten at Bornhöved on the 22nd of July 1227, and Holstein was permanently secured to the house of Schauenburg. After the death of Adolf IV. in 1261, Holstein was split up into several countships by his sons and grandsons: the lines of Kiel, Plön, Schauenburg-Pinneberg and Rendsburg.

In 1232 King Valdemar II., who had retained the former German Mark north of the Eider, erected South Jutland (Schleswig) into a duchy for his second son, Abel. On the death of the latter's descendant, Duke Eric, in 1319, Christopher II. of Denmark attempted to seize the duchy, the heir of which, Valdemar V., was a minor; but Valdemar's guardian and uncle, Gerhard III. of Holstein-Rendsburg (1304-1340), surnamed "the Great" and a notable warrior, drove back the Danes and, Christopher having been expelled, succeeded in procuring the election of Valdemar to the Danish throne. His reward was the duchy of Schleswig and the famous charter, known as the *Constitutio Valdemariana*, which laid down the principle that the duchy of south Jutland was never to be incorporated in the kingdom of Denmark or ruled by the same sovereign (7 June 1326). Thus Schleswig and Holstein were for the first time united. The union was, indeed, as yet precarious. In 1330 Christopher II. was restored to his throne and Valdemar V. to his duchy, Gerhard having to be content with the reversion in the case of the duke dying without issue. Gerhard however, was assassinated in 1340 by a Dane, and it was not till 1375, when the male lines both in the kingdom and the duchy became extinct by the deaths of King Valdemar IV. and Duke Valdemar V., that the counts of Holstein seized on their inheritance, assuming at the same time the style of "lords of Jutland." In 1386 Queen Margaret allowed their claim in return for the usual homage and promise of feudal service, and directed that one of their number should be elected duke of Schleswig. The choice fell on Gerhard VI., grandson of Gerhard III. of Rendsburg, who after the extinction of the line of Kiel (1390) obtained in 1403 the whole of the countship of Holstein, except the small Schauenburg territories. With this begins the history of the union of Schleswig and Holstein.

Gerhard VI. died in 1404, and soon afterwards war broke out between his sons and Eric of Pomerania, Margaret's successor on the throne of Denmark, who claimed South Jutland as an integral part of the Danish monarchy, a claim formally recognized by the emperor Sigismund in 1424. It was not till 1440 that the struggle ended with the investiture of Count Adolf VIII., Gerhard's son, with the hereditary duchy of Schleswig by Christopher III. of Denmark. On the death of Christopher eight years later, Adolf's influence secured the election of his nephew Count Christian of Oldenburg to the vacant throne.

On the death of Adolf in 1459 without issue, King Christian I., though he had been forced to swear to the *Constitutio Valdemariana*, succeeded in asserting his claim to Schleswig in right of his mother, Adolf's sister. Instead of incorporating South Jutland with the Danish kingdom, however, he preferred to take advantage of the feeling of the estates in Schleswig and Holstein in favour of union to secure both countries. On Schleswig the Schauenburg counts had no claim; their election in Holstein would have separated the countries; and it was easy therefore for Christian to secure his election both as duke of Schleswig and count of Holstein (5 March 1460). The price he paid was a charter of privileges, issued first at Ribe and afterwards at Kiel, in which he promised to preserve the countries for ever as "one and indivisible," and conceded to the estates the right to refuse to elect as count and duke any Danish prince who should not undertake, on becoming king, to confirm their privileges. By these privileges the union between South Jutland and Holstein, established under the Schauenburg line, was officially recognized. For external affairs the two countries were to be regarded as one, the bishop of Lübeck and five "good men" elected by the estates of each country forming an advisory and executive

council under the duke-count. For internal affairs duchy and country were to retain their separate estates and peculiar customs and laws. Above all, Holstein remained a German, Schleswig a Danish fief. The claims of the Schauenburg counts were surrendered for a money payment; it was not till 1640, however, that the extinction of their line brought Schauenburg itself to the Danish crown. Finally, in 1472 the emperor Frederick III. confirmed Christian I.'s overlordship over Dithmarschen, and erected Dithmarschen, Holstein and Stormarn into the duchy of Holstein.

On the death of King Frederick I. (1523-1533), under whom the reformation had been introduced into the duchies,¹ occurred the first of several partitions of the inheritance of the house of Oldenburg; the elder son, Christian III., succeeding as king of Denmark, the younger, Adolphus (Adolf) I., founding the line of the dukes of Gottorp. In 1581 a further partition was made, by a compact signed at Flensburg, between King Frederick II. and his uncle Duke Adolphus I., under which the rights of overlordship in the various towns and territories of Schleswig were divided between them; the estates, however, remain undivided, and the king and duke ruled the country alternately. To make confusion worse confounded, Frederick II. in 1582 ceded certain lands in Hadersleben to his brother John, who founded the line of Schleswig-Sonderburg, and John's grandsons again partitioned this appanage, Ernest Günther (1609-1689), founding the line of Schleswig-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, and Augustus Philip (1612-1675) that of Schleswig-Beck-Glücksburg (known since 1825 as Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg).

Meanwhile the Gottorp dukes were making themselves a great position in Europe. Frederick III., duke from 1616 to 1659, established the principle of primogeniture for his line, and the full sovereignty of his Schleswig dominions was secured to him by his son-in-law Charles X. of Sweden by the convention of Copenhagen (12 May 1658)² and to his son Christian Albert (d. 1694) by the treaty of Oliva, though it was not till after years of warfare that Denmark admitted the claim by the convention of Altona (30 June 1689). Christian Albert's son Frederick IV. (d. 1702) was again attacked by Denmark, but had a powerful champion in Charles XII. of Sweden, who secured his rights by the treaty of Travendal in 1700. Frederick was killed at the battle of Klissow in 1702, and his brother Christian Augustus acted as regent for his son Charles Frederick until 1718. In 1713 the regent broke the stipulated neutrality of the duchy in favour of Sweden, and Frederick IV. of Denmark seized the excuse to expel the duke by force of arms. Holstein was restored to him by the peace of Frederiksberg in 1720, but in the following year Frederick IV. was recognized as sovereign of Schleswig by the estates and by the princes of the Augustenburg and Glücksburg lines.

The situation was ultimately simplified by the marriage of Duke Charles Frederick with the tsarevna Anna Pavlovna, and the recognition in 1742 of their son Charles Peter Ulrich as *cesarevitch* by the empress Elizabeth of Russia. For Peter as duke of Gottorp, Adolphus Frederick, bishop of Lübeck, son of Christian Augustus, acted as regent until 1745; in 1751 he became king of Sweden.³ But the rulers of Russia had no interest in maintaining their part of Holstein and their confused and disputed common rights in Jutland, and in 1767 the empress Catherine II. resigned them, by the treaty of Copenhagen, in the name of her son Paul, who confirmed this action on coming of age in 1773. Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, surrendered by the Danish king in compensation, were handed over to Frederick Augustus, bishop of Lübeck, the second son of Christian Augustus, who thus founded the younger line of the house of Gottorp. Schleswig and Holstein were thus once more united under the Danish king.

On the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, Holstein was practically, though not formally, incorporated in Denmark. Under the administration of the Danish prime minister Count Bernstorff, himself from Schleswig, many reforms were carried out in the duchies, *e.g.* abolition of torture and of serfdom; at the same time Danish laws and coinage were introduced, and Danish was made the official language for communication with Copenhagen. Since, however, the Danish court itself at the time was largely German in language and feeling, this produced no serious expressions of resentment.

The Congress of Vienna, instead of settling the questions involved in the relations of the duchies of Schleswig once for all,⁴ sought to stereotype the old divisions in the interests of Germany. The settlement of 1806 was reversed, and while Schleswig remained as before,

¹ The Church (Lutheran) was organized under a *Probst* (provost) and consistory, the king himself assuming the jurisdiction of *summus episcopus*.

² The king by a convention of the same date secured the full sovereignty for his own particular appanage in Schleswig. The attempt of the dukes of Gottorp to partition the actual government of the duchy broke on the opposition of the estates.

³ Adolphus Frederick had renounced his rights in Schleswig by an agreement with the Danish king signed on the 25th of April 1750.

⁴ The best solution, which afterwards had the support of Napoleon III., would have been to partition Schleswig on the lines of nationality, assigning the Danish part to Denmark, the German to Holstein. This idea, which subsequently had supporters both among Danes and Germans, proved impracticable later owing to the intractable temper of the majority on both sides.

Holstein and Lauenburg were included in the new German Confederation. The opening up of the Schleswig-Holstein question thus became sooner or later inevitable. The Germans of Holstein, influenced by the new national enthusiasm evoked by the War of Liberation, resented more than ever the attempts of the government of Copenhagen to treat them as part of the Danish monarchy and, encouraged by the sympathy of the Germans in Schleswig, early tried to reassert in the interests of Germanism the old principle of the unity of the duchies. The political atmosphere, however, had changed at Copenhagen also; and their demands were met by the Danes with a nationalist temper as intractable as their own. Affairs were ripe for a crisis, which the threatened failure of the common male heirs to the kingdom and the duchies precipitated.

CHAPTER II

DANISH CLAIMS

WHEN Christian VIII. succeeded his father Frederick VI. in 1839 the elder male line of the house of Oldenburg was obviously on the point of extinction, the king's only son and heir having no children. Ever since 1834, when joint consultative estates had been re-established for the duchies, the question of the succession had been debated in this assembly. To German opinion the solution seemed clear enough. The crown of Denmark could be inherited by female heirs; in the duchies the Salic law had never been repealed and, in the event of a failure of male heirs to Christian VIII., the succession would pass to the dukes of Augustenburg. Danish opinion, on the other hand, clamoured for a royal pronouncement proclaiming the principle of the indivisibility of the monarchy and its transmission intact to a single heir, in accordance with the royal law. To this Christian VIII. yielded so far as to issue in 1846 letters patent declaring that the royal law in the matter of the succession was in full force so far as Schleswig was concerned, in accordance with the letters patent of August 22, 1721, the oath of fidelity of September 3, 1721, the guarantees given by France and Great Britain in the same year and the treaties of 1767 and 1773 with Russia. As to Holstein, he stated that certain circumstances prevented him from giving, in regard to some parts of the duchy, so clear a decision as in the case of Schleswig. The principle of the independence of Schleswig and of its union with Holstein were expressly reaffirmed. An appeal against this by the estates of Holstein to the German diet received no attention. The revolutionary year 1848 brought matters to a head. On the 28th of January, Christian VIII. issued a rescript proclaiming a new constitution which, while preserving the autonomy of the different parts of the country, incorporated them for common purposes in a single organization. The estates of the duchies replied by demanding the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein, as a single constitutional state, in the German Confederation. Frederick VII., who had succeeded his father at the end of January, declared (March 4) that he had no right to deal in this way with Schleswig, and, yielding to the importunity of the Eider-Danish party, withdrew the rescript of January (April 4) and announced to the people of Schleswig (March 27) the promulgation of a liberal constitution under which the duchy, while preserving its local autonomy, would become an integral part of Denmark.

Meanwhile, however, the duchies had broken out into open insurrection; a provisional government had been established at Kiel; and the duke of Augustenburg had hurried to Berlin to secure the assistance of Prussia in asserting his rights. This was at the very crisis of the revolution in Berlin, and the Prussian government saw in the proposed intervention in Denmark in a popular cause an excellent opportunity for restoring its damaged prestige. Prussian troops were accordingly marched into Holstein; and, the diet having on the 12th of April recognized the provisional government of Schleswig and commissioned Prussia to enforce its decrees, General Wrangel was ordered to occupy Schleswig also.

The principles which Prussia was commissioned to enforce as the mandatory of Germany were: (1) that they were independent states, (2) that their union was indissoluble, (3) that they were hereditary only in the male line. But the Germans had reckoned without the European powers, which were united in opposing any dismemberment of Denmark, even Austria refusing to assist in enforcing the German view. Swedish troops landed to assist the Danes; Nicholas I. of Russia, speaking with authority as representing the elder Gottorp line, pointed out to King Frederick William IV. the risks of a collision; Great Britain, though the Danes rejected her mediation, threatened to send her fleet to assist in preserving the *status quo*. Frederick William now ordered Wrangel to withdraw his troops from the duchies; but the general refused to obey, on the plea that he was under the command not of the king of Prussia but of the regent of Germany, and proposed that, at least, any treaty concluded should be presented for ratification to the Frankfort govern-

ment. This the Danes refused; and negotiations were broken off. Prussia was now confronted on the one side by the German nation urging her clamorously to action, on the other side by the European powers with one voice threatening the worst consequences should she persist. After painful hesitation, Frederick William chose what seemed the lesser of two evils and, on the 26th of August 1848, Prussia signed at Malmoe a convention which yielded practically all the Danish demands. The Holstein estates appealed to the German parliament, which hotly took up their cause; but it was soon clear that the central government had no means of enforcing its views, and in the end the convention was ratified at Frankfurt.

The convention was only in the nature of a truce establishing a temporary *modus vivendi*, and the main issues, left unsettled, continued to be hotly debated. At a conference held in London in October, Denmark suggested an arrangement on the basis of a separation of Schleswig from Holstein, which was about to become a member of the new German empire, Schleswig to have a separate constitution under the Danish crown. This was supported by Great Britain and Russia and accepted by Prussia and the German government (27th January 1849). The negotiations broke down, however, on the refusal of Denmark to yield the principle of the indissoluble union with the Danish crown; on the 23rd of February the truce was at an end, and on the 3rd of April the war was renewed. At this point the tsar intervened in favour of peace; and Prussia, conscious of her restored strength and weary of the intractable temper of the Frankfurt government, determined to take matters into her own hands. On the 10th of July 1849 another truce was signed; Schleswig, until the peace, was to be administered separately, under a mixed commission, Holstein was to be governed by a vicegerent of the German empire—an arrangement equally offensive to German and Danish sentiment. A settlement seemed as far off as ever; the Danes still clamoured for the principle of succession in the female line and union with Denmark, the Germans for that of succession in the male line and union with Holstein. In utter weariness Prussia proposed, in April 1850, a definite peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum* and the postponement of all questions as to mutual rights. To Palmerston the basis seemed meaningless, the proposed settlement to settle nothing. The emperor Nicholas, openly disgusted with Frederick William's weak-kneed truckling to the Revolution, again intervened. To him the duke of Augustenburg was a rebel; Russia had guaranteed Schleswig to the Danish crown by the treaties of 1767 and 1773; as for Holstein, if the king of Denmark was unable to deal with the rebels there, he himself would intervene as he had done in Hungary. The threat was reinforced by the menace of the European situation. Austria and Prussia were on the verge of war, and the sole hope of preventing Russia from throwing her sword into the scale of Austria lay in settling the Schleswig-Holstein question in the sense desired by her. The only alternative, an alliance with "the devil's nephew," Louis Napoleon, who already dreamed of acquiring the Rhine frontier for France at the price of his aid in establishing German sea-power by the cession of the duchies, was abhorrent to Frederick William. On the 2nd of July 1850 was signed at Berlin a treaty of peace between Prussia and Denmark. Both parties reserved all their antecedent rights; but for Denmark it was enough, since it empowered the king- duke to restore his authority in Holstein with or without the consent of the German Confederation.

Danish troops now marched in to coerce the refractory duchies; but while the fighting went on negotiations among the powers continued, and on the 2nd of August 1850 Great Britain, France, Russia and Norway-Sweden signed a protocol, to which Austria subsequently adhered, approving the principle of restoring the integrity of the Danish monarchy. The Copenhagen government, which in May 1851 made an abortive attempt to come to an understanding with the inhabitants of the duchies by convening an assembly of notables at Flensburg, issued on the 6th of December 1851 a project for the future organization of the monarchy on the basis of the equality of its constituent states, with a common ministry; and on the 28th of January 1852 a royal letter announced the institution of a unitary state which, while maintaining the fundamental constitution of Denmark, would increase the parliamentary powers of the estates of the two duchies. This proclamation was approved by Prussia and Austria, and by the German federal diet in so far as it affected Holstein and Lauenburg. The question of the succession was next approached. Only the question of the Augustenburg succession made an agreement between the powers impossible, and on the 31st of March 1852 the duke of Augustenburg resigned his claim in return for money payment. Further adjustments followed. After the renunciation by the emperor of Russia and others of their eventual rights, Charlotte, landgravine of Hesse, sister of Christian VIII., and her son Prince Frederick transferred their rights to the latter's sister Louise, who in her turn transferred them to her husband Prince Christian of Glücksburg. This arrangement received international sanction by the protocol signed in London on the 8th of May 1852 by the five great powers and Norway and Sweden. On the 31st of July 1853 King Frederick VII. gave his assent to a law settling the crown on Prince Christian, "prince of Denmark," and his heirs male. The protocol of London, while consecrating the principle of the integrity of Denmark, stipulated that the rights of the German Confederation in Holstein and Lauenburg should remain unaffected. It

was, in fact, a compromise, and left the fundamental issues unsettled. The German federal diet had been unrepresented in London, and the terms of the protocol were regarded in Germany as a humiliation. As for the Danes, they were far from being satisfied with the settlement, which they approved only in so far as it gave them a basis for a more vigorous prosecution of their unionist schemes. On the 15th of February and the 11th of June 1854 the king of Denmark, after consulting the estates, promulgated special constitutions for Schleswig and Holstein respectively, under which the provincial assemblies received certain very limited powers. On the 26th of July 1854 he published a common constitution for the whole monarchy; this, which was little more than a veiled absolutism, was superseded on the 2nd of October 1855 by a parliamentary constitution of a modified type. The legality of this constitution was disputed by the two German great powers, on the ground that the estates of the duchies had not been consulted as promised in the royal letter of the 6th of December 1851; the diet of the Confederation refused to admit its validity so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned (11th February 1858).

The question was now once more the subject of lively international debate; but the European situation was no longer so favourable as it had been to the Danish view. The Crimean War had crippled the power of Russia, and Nicholas I. was dead. France was prepared to sell the interests of Denmark in the duchies to Prussia in return for "compensations" to herself elsewhere. Great Britain alone sided with the Danes; but the action of British ministers, who realized the danger to British supremacy at sea of the growth of German sea-power in the Baltic, was hampered by the natural sympathy of Queen Victoria and the prince consort with the German point of view.¹ The result was that the German diet, on the motion of Bismarck, having threatened federal intervention (July 29), King Frederick VII. issued a proclamation abolishing the general constitution so far as it affected Holstein and Lauenburg, while retaining it for Denmark and Schleswig (November 6).

Though even this concession violated the principle of the "indissoluble union" of the duchies, the German diet, fully occupied at home, determined to refrain from further action till the Danish parliament should make another effort to pass a law or budget affecting the whole kingdom without consulting the estates of the duchies. This contingency arose in July 1860, and in the spring of the following year the estates were once more at open odds with the Danish government. The German diet now prepared for armed intervention; but it was in no condition to carry out its threats, and Denmark decided, on the advice of Great Britain, to ignore it and open negotiations directly with Prussia and Austria as independent powers. These demanded the restoration of the union between the duchies, a question beyond the competence of the Confederation. Denmark replied with a refusal to recognize the right of any foreign power to interfere in her relations with Schleswig; to which Austria, anxious to conciliate the smaller German princes, responded with a vigorous protest against Danish infringements of the compact of 1852. Lord John Russell now intervened, on behalf of Great Britain, with a proposal for a settlement of the whole question on the basis of the independence of the duchies under the Danish crown, with a decennial budget for common expenses to be agreed on by the four assemblies, and a supreme council of state consisting in relative proportion of Danes and Germans. This was accepted by Russia and by the German great powers, and Denmark found herself isolated in Europe. The international situation, however, favoured a bold attitude, and she met the representations of the powers with a flat defiance. The retention of Schleswig as an integral part of the monarchy was to her a matter of life and death; the German Confederation had made the terms of the protocol of 1852, defining the intimate relations between the duchies, the excuse for unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of Denmark; and on the 30th of March 1863 a royal proclamation was published at Copenhagen repudiating the compacts of 1852, and, by defining the separate position of Holstein in the Danish monarchy, negating once for all the claims of Germany upon Schleswig.

The reply of the German diet to this move was to forward a note to Copenhagen (July 9) demanding, on pain of federal execution, the withdrawal of the proclamation and the grant of a fresh constitution, based on the compacts of 1852 or on the British note of the 24th of September 1862. Instead, King Frederick VII. issued on the 28th of September 1863 a new constitution for "our Kingdom of Denmark-Slesvig." The diet now resolved on federal execution; but action was delayed, partly through British efforts at mediation, partly because Bismarck judged the time for a satisfactory solution of the whole question had not yet come. Encouraged by this hesitating attitude, the Danish parliament passed the new constitution on the 13th of November. Two days later Frederick VII. died.

¹ See Queen Victoria to Lord Malmesbury, 1st of May 1858, in *Letters* (pop. ed., 1908), iii. 280. Compare the letters to Palmerston of 21st of June 1849, ii. 222, and 22nd of June 1850, ii. 279, with Palmerston to Russell, 23rd of June 1850, and Queen Victoria to Russell, ii. 250.

² Note of Sept. 24, 1862.

The "Protocol-King," Christian IX., who now ascended the throne, was in a position of extraordinary difficulty. The first sovereign act he was called upon to perform was to sign the new constitution. To sign was to violate the terms of the very protocol which was his title to reign; to refuse to sign was to place himself in antagonism to the united sentiment of his Danish subjects. He chose what seemed the remoter evil, and on the 18th of November signed the constitution. The news was received in Germany with violent manifestations of excitement and anger. Frederick, duke of Augustenburg, son of the prince who in 1852 had renounced the succession to the duchies, now claimed his rights on the ground that he had had no share in the renunciation. In Holstein an agitation in his favour had begun from the first, and this was extended to Schleswig on the terms of the new Danish constitution becoming known. His claim was enthusiastically supported by the German princes and people, and in spite of the negative attitude of Austria and Prussia the federal diet decided to occupy Holstein "pending the settlement of the succession." On the 24th of December Saxon and Hanoverian troops marched into the duchy in the name of the German Confederation, and supported by their presence and by the loyalty of the Holsteiners the duke of Augustenburg assumed the government under the style of Duke Frederick VIII. With this "folly"—as Bismarck roundly termed it—Austria and Prussia, in the teeth of violent public opinion, would have nothing to do, for neither wished to risk a European war. It was clear to Bismarck that the two powers, as parties to the protocol of 1852, must uphold the succession as fixed by it, and that any action they might take in consequence of the violation of that compact by Denmark must be so "correct" as to deprive Europe of all excuse for interference. The publication of the new constitution by Christian IX. was in itself sufficient to justify a declaration of war by the two powers as parties to the signature of the protocol. As to the ultimate outcome of their effective intervention, that could be left to the future to decide. Austria had no clear views. King William wavered between his Prussian feeling and a sentimental sympathy with the duke of Augustenburg. Bismarck alone knew exactly what he wanted, and how to attain it. "From the beginning," he said later (*Reflections*, ii. 10), "I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."

CHAPTER III

GERMAN INTERVENTION

THE protests of Great Britain and Russia against the action of the German diet, together with the proposal of Count Beust, on behalf of Saxony, that Bavaria should bring forward in that assembly a formal motion for the recognition of Duke Frederick's claims, helped Bismarck to persuade Austria that immediate action must be taken. On the 28th of December a motion was introduced in the diet by Austria and Prussia, calling on the Confederation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for *the observance by Denmark of the compacts of 1852*. This implied the recognition of the rights of Christian IX., and was indignantly rejected; whereupon the diet was informed that the Austrian and Prussian governments would act in the matter as independent European powers. The agreement between them was signed on the 16th of January 1864. An article drafted by Austria, intended to safeguard the settlement of 1852, was replaced at Bismarck's instance by another which stated that the two powers would decide only in concert on the relations of the duchies, and that they would in no case determine the question of the succession save by mutual consent.

At this stage, had the Danes yielded to the necessities of the situation and withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the European powers would probably have intervened, a congress would have restored Schleswig to the Danish crown, and Austria and Prussia, as European powers, would have had no choice but to prevent any attempt upon it by the duke of Holstein. To prevent this possibility Bismarck made the Copenhagen government believe that Great Britain had threatened Prussia with intervention should hostilities be opened, "though, as a matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind." The cynical stratagem succeeded; Denmark remained defiant; and on the 1st of February 1864 the Austrian and Prussian forces crossed the Eider.

An invasion of Denmark itself had not been part of the original programme of the allies; but on the 18th of February some Prussian hussars, in the excitement of a cavalry skirmish, crossed the frontier and occupied the village of Kolding. Bismarck determined to use this circumstance to revise the whole situation. He urged upon Austria the necessity for a strong policy, so as to settle once for all not only the question of the duchies but the wider question of the German Confederation; and Austria reluctantly consented to press the war. On the 5th of March a fresh agreement was signed between the powers, under which the compacts of 1852 were declared to be no longer valid, and the position of the

duchies within the Danish monarchy as a whole, was to be made the subject of a friendly understanding. Meanwhile, however, Lord John Russell on behalf of Great Britain, supported by Russia, France and Sweden, had intervened with a proposal that the whole question should once more be submitted to a European conference.¹ The German powers agreed on condition that the compacts of 1852 should not be taken as a basis, and that the duchies should be bound to Denmark by a personal tie only. But the proceedings of the conference, which opened at London on the 25th of April, only revealed the inextricable tangle of the issues involved. Beust, on behalf of the Confederation, demanded the recognition of the Augustenburg claimant; Austria leaned to a settlement on the lines of that of 1852; Prussia, it was increasingly clear, aimed at the acquisition of the duchies. The first step towards the realization of this latter ambition was to secure the recognition of the absolute independence of the duchies, and this Austria could only oppose at the risk of forfeiting her whole influence in Germany. The two powers, then, agreed to demand the complete political independence of the duchies bound together by common institutions. The next move was uncertain. As to the question of annexation Prussia would leave that open, but made it clear that any settlement must involve the complete military subordination of Schleswig-Holstein to herself. This alarmed Austria, which had no wish to see a further extension of Prussia's already overgrown power, and she began to champion the claims of the duke of Augustenburg. This contingency, however, Bismarck had foreseen and himself offered to support the claims of the duke at the conference if he would undertake to subordinate himself in all naval and military matters to Prussia, surrender Kiel for the purposes of a Prussian war-harbour, give Prussia the control of the projected North Sea Canal, and enter the Prussian Customs Union. On this basis, with Austria's support, the whole matter might have been arranged without—as Beust pointed out (*Mem. i. 272*)—the increase of Prussia's power beyond the Elbe being any serious menace to Austrian influence in Germany. Fortunately, however, for Bismarck's plans, Austria's distrust and jealousy of Prussia led her to oppose this settlement and at her instigation the duke of Augustenburg rejected it.

On the 25th of June the London conference broke up without having arrived at any conclusion. On the 24th, in view of the end of the truce, Austria and Prussia had arrived at a new agreement, the object of the war being now declared to be the complete separation of the duchies from Denmark. A short campaign followed, the most important event in which was the siege of Düppel by the Prussians in 1864. The flanks of the defenders' line rested upon the Alsen Sund and the sea, and it was strengthened by ten redoubts. A second line of trenches with lunettes at intervals was constructed behind the front attacked, and a small réduit opposite Sonderburg to cover the bridges between Alsen and the mainland. The Prussian siege corps was commanded by Prince Frederick Charles (headquarters, Düppel village), and after three weeks' skirmishing a regular siege was begun, the batteries being opened on the 15th of March. The first parallel was completed fifteen days later, the front of attack being redoubts II. to VI., forming the centre of the Danish entrenchments on the road Düppel-Sonderburg. The siege was pushed rapidly from the first parallel and the assault delivered on the 18th of April, against the redoubts I. to VI., each redoubt being attacked by a separate column. The whole line was carried after a brief but severe conflict, and the Prussians had penetrated to and captured the réduit opposite Sonderburg by 2 P.M. The loss of the Danes, half of whose forces were not engaged, included 1800 killed and wounded and 3400 prisoners. This operation was followed by the daring passage of the Alsen Sund, effected by the Prussians in boats almost under the guns of the Danish warships, and resulting in the capture of the whole island of Alsen (June 29th, 1864). As a result the preliminaries of a treaty of peace were signed on the 1st of August, the king of Denmark renouncing all his rights in the duchies in favour of the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia. The definitive treaty was signed at Vienna on the 30th of October 1864. By Article XIX., a period of six years was allowed during which the inhabitants of the duchies might "opt" for Danish nationality and transfer themselves and their goods to Denmark; and the right of "indigenacy" was guaranteed to all, whether in the kingdom or the duchies, who enjoyed it at the time of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.

The Schleswig-Holstein Question from this time onward became merged in the larger question of the general relations of Austria and Prussia. So far as Europe was concerned it was settled by the decisive result of the war of 1866. It survived, however, as between Danes and Germans, though narrowed down to the question of the fate of the Danish population of the northern duchy. This question is of great interest to students of international law and as illustrating the practical problems involved in the assertion of the modern principle of "nationality."

The position of the Danes in Schleswig after the session was determined, so far as treaty rights are concerned, by two instruments—the Treaty of Vienna (October 30, 1864) and the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866). By Article XIX. of the former treaty

¹ Beust (*Mem. i. 252*) says that Queen Victoria personally intervened to prevent British action in favour of Denmark.

subjects domiciled in the ceded territories had the right, within six years of the exchange of ratifications, of opting for the Danish nationality and transferring themselves, their families and their personal property to Denmark, while keeping their landed property in the duchies. The last paragraph of the Article ran: "Le droit d'indigénat, tant dans le royaume de Danemark que dans les Duchés, est conservé à tous les individus qui le possèdent à l'époque de l'échange des ratifications du présent Traité." By Article V. of the Treaty of Prague Schleswig was ceded by Austria to Prussia with the reservation that "the populations of the North of Schleswig shall be again united with Denmark in the event of their expressing a desire so to be by a vote freely exercised." Taking advantage of the terms of these treaties, about 50,000 Danes from North Schleswig (out of a total population of some 150,000) opted for Denmark and migrated over the frontiers pending the *plébiscite* which was to restore their country to them. But the *plébiscite* never came. Its inclusion in the treaty had been no more than a diplomatic device to save the face of the emperor Napoleon III.; Prussia had from the first no intention of surrendering an inch of the territory she had conquered; the outcome of the Franco-German War made it unnecessary for her even to pretend that she might do so; and by the Treaty of Vienna of October 11, 1878, the clause relating to the *plébiscite* was formally abrogated with the assent of Austria.

Meanwhile the Danish "optants," disappointed of their hopes, had begun to stream back over the frontier into Schleswig. By doing so they lost, under the Danish law, their rights as Danish citizens, without acquiring those of Prussian subjects; and this disability was transmitted to their children. By Article XIX. of the Treaty of 1864, indeed, they should have been secured the rights of "indigenacy," which, while falling short of complete citizenship, implied, according to Danish law, all the essential guarantees for civil liberty. But in German law the right of *Indigenat* is not clearly differentiated from the *status* of a subject; and the supreme court at Kiel decided in several cases that those who had opted for Danish nationality had forfeited their rights under the *Indigenat* paragraph of the Treaty of Vienna. There was thus created in the frontier districts a large and increasing class of people who dwelt in a sort of political limbo, having lost their Danish citizenship through ceasing to be domiciled in Denmark, and unable to acquire Prussian citizenship because they had failed to apply for it within the six years stipulated in the Treaty of 1864. Their exclusion from the rights of Prussian subjects was due, however, to causes other than the letter of the treaty. The Danes, in spite of every discouragement, never ceased to strive for the preservation and extension of their national traditions and language; the Germans were equally bent on effectually absorbing these recalcitrant "Teutons" into the general life of the German empire; and to this end the uncertain *status* of the Danish optants was a useful means. Danish agitators of German nationality could not be touched so long as they were careful to keep within the limits of the law; pro-Danish newspapers owned and staffed by German subjects enjoyed immunity in accordance with the constitution, which guarantees the liberty of the press. The case of the "optants" was far other. These unfortunates, who numbered a large proportion of the population, were subject to domiciliary visits, and to arbitrary perquisitions, arrest and expulsion. When the pro-Danish newspapers, after the expulsion of several "optant" editors, were careful to appoint none but German subjects, the vengeance of the authorities fell upon "optant" type-setters, printers and printers' devils. The Prussian police, indeed, developed an almost superhuman capacity for detecting optants; and since these pariahs were mingled indistinguishably with the mass of the people, no household and no business was safe from official inquisition. One instance out of many may serve to illustrate the type of offence that served as excuse for this systematic official persecution. On the 27th of April 1896 the second volume for 1895 of the *Sønderjyske Aarbøger* was confiscated for having used the historic term *Sønderjylland* (South Jutland) for Schleswig. To add to the misery, the Danish government refused to allow the Danish optants expelled by Prussia to settle in Denmark, though this rule was modified by the Danish Nationality Law of 1898 in favour of the children of optants born after the passing of the law. It was not till the signature of the treaty between Prussia and Denmark on the 11th of January 1907 that these intolerable conditions were ended. By this treaty the German government undertook to allow all children born of Danish optants before the passing of the new Danish Nationality Law of 1898 to acquire Prussian nationality on the usual conditions and on their own application. This provision was not to affect the ordinary legal rights of expulsion as exercised by either power, but the Danish government undertook not to refuse to the children of Schleswig optants who should not seek to acquire or who could not legally acquire Prussian nationality permission to reside in Denmark. The provisions of the treaty apply not only to the children of Schleswig optants, but to their direct descendants in all degrees.

This adjustment, brought about by the friendly intercourse between the courts of Berlin and Copenhagen, seemed to close the last phase of the Schleswig question. Yet, so far from allaying, it apparently only served to embitter the inter-racial feud. The "autochthonous Germans of the Northern Marches" regarded the new treaty as a betrayal, and refused "to give the kiss of peace" to their hereditary enemies. For forty years

Germanism, backed by all the weight of the empire and imposed with all the weapons of official persecution, had barely held its own in North Schleswig ; in spite of an enormous emigration, in 1905, of the 148,000 inhabitants of North Schleswig 139,000 spoke Danish, while of the German-speaking immigrants it was found that more than a third spoke Danish in the first generation ; and this in spite of the fact that, from 1864 onward, German had gradually been substituted for Danish in the churches, the schools, and even in the playground. But the scattered outposts of Germanism could hardly be expected to acquiesce without a struggle in a situation that threatened them with social and economic extinction. Forty years of dominance, secured by official favour, had filled them with a double measure of aggressive pride of race, and the question of the rival nationalities in Schleswig, like that in Poland, remained a source of trouble and weakness within the frontiers of the German empire.

THE SEVEN WEEKS' (AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN) WAR.

THIS name is given to the war of 1866 between Prussia on the one side, and Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony and allied German states on the other. Concurrently with this war another was fought in Venetia between the Italians and the Austrian army of the South, which has already been described (see p. 146).

In 1850 Prussia, realizing from the breakdown of her mobilization for the war then impending with Austria that success was impossible, submitted to the Austrian demands, but her statesmen saw from the first that the "surrender of Olmütz," as it was termed, rendered eventual war with Austria "a military necessity." Preparation was begun in earnest after the accession of King William I., who selected Bismarck as his chancellor, Moltke as his chief of staff and Roon as his minister of war, and gave them a free hand to create the political situation and prepare the military machinery necessary to exploit it. Within six years the mobilization arrangements were recast, the war against Denmark in 1864 proving an opportune test of the new system. The number of field battalions was nearly doubled, two-thirds of the artillery received breech-loading rifled guns, the infantry had for some years had the breech-loading "needle-gun," and steps were initiated to train an adequate number of staff officers to a uniform appreciation of strategical problems, based on Moltke's personal interpretation of Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege*. There was, however, a fundamental disagreement in the tactical ideas of the senior and those of the junior officers. The former, bred in the tradition of the Napoleonic battle, looked for the decision only from the employment of "masses"; the latter, trained with the breech-loader and without war experience, expected to decide battles by infantry fire only. Both overlooked the changes brought by the introduction of the long-range rifle (muzzle- and breech-loading alike), which had rendered impossible the "case shot preparation" which had formed the basis of Napoleon's tactical system. The men were trained for three years in the infantry and four years in the cavalry and artillery, but the war was not popular and many went unwillingly.

In contemporary military opinion, the Austrians were greatly superior in all arms to their adversary. Their rifle,¹ though a muzzle-loader, was in every other respect superior to the Prussian needle-gun, and their M.L. rifled guns with shrapnel shell were considered more than sufficient to make good the slight advantage then conceded to the breech-loader. The cavalry was far better trained in individual and real horsemanship and manœuvre, and was expected to sweep the field in the splendid cavalry terrain of Moravia. All three arms trained their men for seven years, and almost all officers and non-commissioned officers had considerable war experience. But the Prussians having studied their allies in the war of 1864 knew the weakness of the Austrian staff and the untrustworthiness of the contingents of some of the Austrian nationalities, and felt fairly confident that against equal numbers they could hold their own.

The occasion for war was engineered entirely by Bismarck; and it is doubtful how far Moltke was in Bismarck's confidence, though as a far-seeing general he took advantage of every opening which the latter's diplomacy secured for him. The original scheme for the strategic deployment worked out by Moltke as part of the routine of his office contemplated a defence of the kingdom against not only the

¹ The Lorenz rifle carried a .57 bullet and was sighted to 1000 yds.; the needle-gun with a much lighter bullet was sighted to 400 only.

whole standing army of Austria, but against 35,000 Saxons, 95,000 unorganized Bavarians and other South Germans, and 60,000 Hanoverians, Hessians, &c., and to meet these he had two corps (VII. and VIII.) on the Rhine, the Guard and remaining six in Brandenburg and Prussia proper. Bismarck diverted three Austrian corps by an alliance with Italy, and by consenting to the neutralization of the Federal fortresses set at liberty von Beyer's division for field service in the west. Moltke thereupon brought the VIII. corps and half the VII. to the east and thus made himself numerically equal to his enemy, but elsewhere left barely 45,000 men to oppose 150,000. The magnitude of the risk was sufficiently shown at Langensalza. The direction of the Prussian railways, not laid out primarily for strategic purposes, conditioned the first deployment of the whole army, with the result that at first the Prussians were distributed in three main groups or armies on a front of about 250 m. As there had been no money available to purchase supplies beforehand, each of these groups had to be scattered over a wide area for subsistence, and thus news as to the enemy's points of concentration necessarily preceded any determination of the plan of campaign.


Of the lines of concentration open to the Austrians, the direction of the roads and railways favoured that of Olmütz so markedly that Moltke felt reasonably certain that it would be chosen, and the receipt of the complete *ordre de bataille* of the Austrian army of the north secured by the Prussian secret service on the 11th of June set all doubts at rest.

According to this, the Austrian troops already in Bohemia, 1st corps, Count Clam-Gallas, 30,000 strong, were to receive the Saxons if the latter were forced to evacuate their own country, and to act as an advance guard or containing wings to the main body under Feldzeugmeister von Benedek (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 10th corps) which was to concentrate at Olmütz, whence the Prussian staff on insufficient evidence concluded the Austrians intended to attack Silesia, with Breslau as their objective. On this date (June 11th) the Prussians stood in the following order: The army of the Elbe, General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, three divisions only, about Torgau; the I. army, Prince Frederick Charles (II., III., IV. corps), about Görlitz; the II. army under the crown prince (I., V., VI.) near Breslau; the Guard and a reserve corps of Landwehr at Berlin. As the army of the Elbe was numerically inferior to Clam-Gallas and the Saxons, the reserve corps was at once despatched to reinforce it, and the Guard was sent to the crown prince. Further, in deference to political (probably dynastic) pressure, the crown prince was ordered eastwards to defend the line of the Neisse, thus increasing the already excessive length of the Prussian front. Had the Austrians attacked on both flanks forthwith, the Prussian central (I.) army could have reached neither wing in time to avert defeat, and the political consequences of the Austrian victory might have been held to justify the risks involved, for even if unsuccessful the Austrians and Saxons could always retreat into Bavaria and there form a backbone of solid troops for the 95,000 South Germans.

Advance of the Elbe and I. Armies.—This was one of the gravest crises in Moltke's career. To overcome it he at length obtained authority (June 15th) to order the army of the Elbe into Saxony, and on the 18th the Prussians entered Dresden, the Saxons retiring along the Elbe into Bohemia; and on the same day the news that the Austrian main body was marching from Olmütz towards Prague arrived at headquarters. Moltke took three days to solve the new problem, then, on the 22nd, he ordered the I. and II. armies to cross the Austrian frontier and unite near Gitschin, a point conveniently situated about the convergence of the roads crossing the Bohemian mountains. As during this operation the II. army would be the most exposed, the I., to which the army of the Elbe had now been attached, was to push on its advance to the utmost. Apparently with this purpose in view, Prince Frederick Charles was instructed to break up his army corps into their constituent divisions, and move each division as a separate column on its own road, the reserve of cavalry and artillery following in rear of the centre. The consequences were the reverse of those anticipated. On the afternoon of the 26th the advance guards of the I. army and army of the Elbe came in contact with the Austrians at Hühnerwasser and Podol and drove the latter back after a sharp engagement, but, having no cavalry, could neither observe their subsequent proceedings nor estimate their strength. The prince, seeing the opportunity for a battle, immediately issued orders for an enveloping attack on Münchengrätz by his whole army, but, owing to distances and the number of units now requiring direction, it was late in the following day before all were in readiness for action. The Austrians then slipped away, and the whole of the next day was spent in getting the divisions back to their proper lines of advance. Clam-Gallas then retired deliberately to Gitschin and took up a new position. The Prussians followed on the 29th, but, owing to the lie of the roads, they had to march in two long columns, separated by almost a day's march, and when the advanced guard of the left column, late in the afternoon, gained touch with the enemy, the latter were in a position to crush them by weight of numbers, had they not suddenly been ordered to continue the retreat on Miletin.

Battles of the II. Army: Trautenau and Nachod.—Meanwhile the situation of the II. army had become critical. On its right wing the I. corps (General v. Bonin) had received orders on the 27th to seize the passages over the Aupa at Trautenau. This was accom-

plished without much difficulty, but the main body was still in the defiles in rear, when about 3 P.M. the leading troops were attacked by an overwhelming Austrian force and driven back in confusion; the confusion spread and became a panic, and the I. corps was out of action for the next forty-eight hours. Almost at the same hour, a few miles to the south-eastward, the advanced guard of the V. corps (Steinmetz) began to emerge from the long defile leading from Glatz to Nachod, and the Prussians had hardly gained room to form for action beyond its exit before they too were attacked. Steinmetz was a different man from Bonin, and easily held his own against the disconnected efforts of his adversary, ultimately driving the latter before him with a loss of upwards of 5000 men. Still the situation remained critical next day, for the I. corps having retreated, the Guard corps (next on its left) was endangered, and Steinmetz on his line of advance towards Skalitz (action of Skalitz, June 28th) could only count on the gradual support of the VI. corps. Benedek's resolution was, however, already on the wane. From the first his supply arrangements had been defective, and the requisitions made by his leading troops left nothing for the rest to eat. While trying to feed his army he omitted to fight it, and, with the chance of overwhelming the Prussians by one great effort of marching, he delayed the necessary orders till too late, and the Prussian II. army made good its concentration on the Upper Elbe with insignificant fighting at Soor and Königinhof (Guard corps) on the 28th and 29th, and at Schweinschädel (Steinmetz) on the 29th, the Prussians in every encounter proving



themselves, unit for unit, a match for their adversaries. It is customary to ascribe their successes to the power of the breech-loader, but there were actions in which it played no part, cavalry *versus* cavalry encounters, and isolated duels between batteries which gave the Prussian gunners a confidence they had not felt when first crossing the frontier.

Junction of the Prussian Armies.—By the morning of the 30th it was clear that the junction between the two armies could be completed, whenever desired, by a forward march of a few miles. But Moltke, wishing to preserve full freedom for manœuvre for each army, determined to preserve the interval between them, and began his dispositions to manœuvre the Austrians out of the position he had selected as the best for them to take up, on the left or farther bank of the Elbe.

This is so characteristic of von Moltke's methods and of the tactical preconceptions of the time that it deserves more detailed notice. Neither army had covered its front by a cavalry screen, both preferring to retain the mounted troops for battlefield purposes. Hence, though they were only a few miles apart, each was ignorant of the other's position. Moltke, knowing well the danger for a great army of being forced into a battle with an unfordable river behind it, and with his naturally strong bent towards the defensive in tactics, concluded that Benedek would elect to hold the left bank of the Elbe, between the fortified towns of Josephstadt and Königgrätz, with his right thrown back and covered by the lower courses of the Aupa and the Mettau. Frontal attack on such a position being out of the question, he decided, after weighing well the weaknesses of the Austrian flanks, to direct his principal efforts against the left (*i.e.* southern), although that entailed the uncovering of the communication of the II. army and a flank march of almost the whole of the I. and II. armies across the front of the Austrians in position. As an eminent French critic (General Bonnal) says, this was but to repeat Frederick the Great's manœuvre at

Kolin and, the Austrians being where they actually were and not where Moltke decided they ought to be, the result might have been equally disastrous. Nevertheless the necessary movements were initiated by orders at noon on the 2nd of July, and one phrase in these saved the situation. According to these orders, the Elbe army was directed to Chlumetz on the way to Pardubitz, the I. army diagonally to the south-east across the front of the Austrian position. Two corps of the II. army were to make a demonstration against Josephstadt on the 3rd of July, and the other two were to move in a general direction south-west to keep touch with the I. Prince Frederick Charles was warned to guard the left flank of his marching troops and authorized to attack any forces of the enemy he might encounter in that direction, if not too strong for him. On receipt of these orders (about 3.30 P.M. July 2nd) the prince immediately despatched officers' patrols towards the Elbe, and about 6 P.M. these, having crossed the Bistritz, discovered the enemy in considerable force, at least three corps, behind the line of low hills which here border that stream. The remainder of the Austrian main body, the whole of which was in fact still on the right bank of the Elbe, was hidden from view behind high ground farther to the eastward.

The 2nd of July.—The three Austrian corps were exactly the target Prince Frederick Charles desired. He promised himself with the I. and the Elbe armies an easy victory if he attacked them. Orders in this sense were issued about 7 p.m. They instructed every corps under his command to be in readiness for action towards the Bistritz at 3 A.M. on the 3rd, and in a concluding paragraph announced that the crown-prince had been requested to co-operate from the north. A copy of the orders and an explanatory letter were in fact despatched to the II. army, another copy also went direct to the king. Both appear to have been delayed in transmission. For the former only reached the crown prince's quarters at 2 A.M. He was then asleep and had given orders that he was not to be awakened. His chief of the staff, Blumenthal, was absent at the royal headquarters, and since the bearer of the order had not been warned of the importance of the despatch he carried, no one roused the prince. At 3 A.M. Blumenthal returned and read the letter, and without troubling to disturb his chief he dealt with the matter himself in what is certainly one of the most remarkable documents ever issued in a grave crisis by a responsible staff officer. Briefly he informed Prince Frederick Charles that the orders for the II. army based on the instructions received from the royal headquarters, having been already issued, the co-operation of the I. corps alone might be looked for.

Meanwhile the duplicates had reached Moltke, and he, knowing well the temperament of the "Red Prince" and the impossibility of arresting the intended movement, obtained the royal sanction to a letter addressed to the crown prince, in which the latter was ordered to co-operate with his whole command. This vital despatch was sent off in duplicate at midnight and reached von Blumenthal at 4 A.M. In face of this no evasion was possible. Army orders were issued at 5 A.M., but still the urgency of the situation was so little understood that had they been verbally adhered to the force of the II. army could hardly have been brought to bear before 5 P.M., by which time the defeat of the I. army might well have been an accomplished fact. Fortunately, however, the initiative of the Prussian subordinates was sufficient to meet the strain.

Battle of Königgrätz (Sadowa).—Thick mist and driving rain delayed the I. and Elbe armies, but by 5 A.M. the troops had reached their allotted positions. The 7th division now moved forward, taking as point of direction the wood of Maslowed (or Swiep Wald), and supported on the right by the 8th division which was to seize the bridge of Sadowa. The leading troops of the former easily rushed the Austrian outposts covering the wood, but the reserves of the Austrian outposts counter-attacked. The firing drew other troops towards the critical point, and very shortly the wood of Maslowed became the scene of one of the most obstinate conflicts in military history. In about two hours the 12 Prussian battalions and 3 batteries found themselves assailed by upwards of 40 Austrian battalions and 100 guns, and against such swarms of enemies each man felt that retreat from the wood across the open meant annihilation. The Prussians determined to hold on at all costs. The 8th division, belonging to the same corps, could not see their comrades sacrificed before their eyes, and pushed on through Sadowa to relieve the pressure on the right of the 7th division. Meanwhile fresh Austrian batteries appeared against the front of the 8th division, and fresh Prussians in turn had to be engaged to save the 8th. Fortunately the Prussians here derived an unexpected advantage from the shape of the ground, and indeed from the weather. The heavy rain, which had delayed the commencement of the action, had swollen the Bistritz so as to check their advance and thus postpone the decision, whilst the mist and driving rain hid the approaching troops from the Austrian gunners, whose shells burst almost harmlessly on the sodden ground. Then when once across the stream it was discovered that unlike the normal slopes in the district the hillside in front of them showed a slight convexity under cover of which they were able to re-form in regular order. The advantage of the breech-loader now began to assert itself, for the Austrian skirmishers who covered the front of the guns could only load when standing up, while the Prussians lay down or fired from cover. The defenders were therefore steadily driven up the hill, and then cleared the front to give the guns room to act. But the

Austrian gunners were intent on the Prussian batteries farther back, which as the light improved had come into action. The Prussian infantry crept nearer and nearer, till at under 300 yds. range and from cover they were able to open fire on the Austrian gunners under conditions which rendered the case fire of the latter practically useless; but here was the opportunity a great cavalry leader on the Austrian side might have seized to restore the battle, for the ground, the shortness of the distance, and the smoke and excitement of the cannonade were all in favour of the charge. Such a charge as prelude to the advance of a great infantry bayonet attack must have swept the exhausted Prussians down the hill like sheep, but the opportunity passed, and the gunners finding their position untenable,



limbered up, not without severe losses, and retired to a second position in rear. This withdrawal took place about 2 P.M., and the crisis on the Prussian side may be said to have lasted from about 11 A.M. By this time every infantry soldier and gun within call had been thrown into the fight, and the Austrians might well have thrown odds of three to one upon the Prussian centre and have broken it asunder.

Arrival of the II. Army.—But suddenly the whole aspect of affairs was changed. The 2nd and 4th Austrian corps found themselves all at once threatened in flank and rear by heavy masses of Prussian infantry, the leading brigades of the crown prince's army, and they began to withdraw towards the centre of their position in ordered brigade masses, apparently so intent on keeping their men in hand that they seem never to have noticed the approach of the Prussian reserve artillery of the Guard which (under Prince Kraft von Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen) was straining forward over heavy soil and through standing corn towards their point of direction, a clump of trees close to the tower of the church

of Chlum. Not even deigning to notice the retreating columns, apparently too without escort, the batteries pressed forward till they reached the summit of the ridge trending eastward from Chlum towards the Elbe, whence the whole interior of the Austrian position was disclosed to them, and then they opened fire upon the Austrian reserves which lay below them in solid masses of army corps. Occurring about 2.30, and almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Austrian guns on their left already alluded to, this may be said to have decided the battle, for although the Saxons still stood firm against the attacks of the Elbe army, and the reserves, both cavalry and infantry, attempted a series of counterstrokes, the advantage of position and *moral* was all on the side of the Prussians. The slopes of the position towards the Austrians now took on the usual concave section, and from the crest of the ridge every movement could be seen for miles. The Austrian cavalry, on weak and emaciated horses, could not gallop at speed up the heavy slopes ($\frac{1}{20}$), and the artillery of both Prussian wings practically broke every attempt of the infantry to form for attack.

Close of the Battle.—Still the Austrians made good their retreat. Their artillery driven back off the ridges formed a long line from Stösser to Plotitz facing the enemy, and under cover of its fire the infantry at length succeeded in withdrawing, for the Prussian reserve cavalry arrived late on the ground, and the local disconnected efforts of the divisional cavalry were checked by the still intact Austrian squadrons. Whereas at 2.30 absolute destruction seemed the only possible fate of the defeated army, by 6 P.M., thanks to the devoted heroism of the artillery and the initiative of a few junior commanders of cavalry, it had escaped from the enclosing horns of the Prussian attack. In spite of heavy losses the Austrians were perhaps better in hand and more capable of resuming the battle next morning than the victors, for they were experienced in war, and accustomed to defeat, and retired in good order in three organized columns within easy supporting distance of each other. On the other hand, the Prussians were new to the battlefield, and the reaction after the elation of victory was intense; moreover, if what happened at Hühnerwasser affords a guide, the staff would have required some days to disentangle the units which had fought and to assign them fresh objectives.

Final Operations.—The convergence of the Prussian armies on the battlefield ended in the greatest confusion. The Elbe army had crossed the front of the I. army, and the II. army was mixed up with both. The reserve cavalry reached the front too late in the day to pursue. Thus the Austrians gained 24 hours, and the direction of their retreat was not established with any degree of certainty for several days. Moreover the little fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz both refused to capitulate, and the whole Prussian armies were thus compelled to move down the Elbe to Pardubitz before they could receive any definite new direction. Meanwhile Benedek had in fact assigned only one corps with the reserve cavalry to oppose a Prussian advance towards Vienna, and the remaining seven retired to Olmütz, where they were on the flank of a Prussian advance on Vienna, and had all the resources of Hungary behind them to enable them to recuperate. They were also still in railway communication with the capital. On purely military grounds the Prussians should have marched at once towards the Austrian field army, *i.e.* to Olmütz. But for political reasons Vienna was the more important objective, and therefore the I. and Elbe armies were directed towards the capital, whilst the II. army only moved in the direction of the Austrian main body. Political motives had, however, in the meantime exercised a similar influence on the Austrian strategy. The emperor had already consented to cede Venetia to Italy, had recalled two corps from the south to the capital, and had appointed the archduke Albert to command the whole army. The Army of the North, which had reached Olmütz on the 10th of July, now received orders to move by road and rail towards Vienna, and this operation brought them right across the front of the II. Prussian army. The cavalry established contact on the 15th in the neighbourhood of Tobitschau and Rochetinitz (action of Tobitschau, July 15th), and the Austrians finding their intention discovered, and their men too demoralized by fear of the breech-loader to risk a fresh battle, withdrew their troops and endeavoured to carry out their concentration by a wide circuit down the valley of the Waag and through Pressburg. Meanwhile the Prussian main army was pursuing its advance under very adverse circumstances. Their railway communication ended abruptly at the Austrian frontier; the roads were few and bad, the country sparsely cultivated and inhospitable, and the troops suffered severely. One-third of the cavalry broke down on a march of 97 m. in five days, and the infantry, after marching 112 m. in ten days, had to have a two days' halt accorded them on the 17th. They were then in the district about Brünn and Iglau, and on the 18th the royal headquarters reached Nikolsburg. News had now been received of the arrival of Austrian reinforcements by rail at the capital both from Hungary and Italy, and of the preparation of a strong line of provisional defences along the Florisdorf position directly in front of Vienna. Orders were therefore issued during the 18th for the whole army to concentrate during the following days in the position held by the Austrians around Wagram in 1809, and these orders were in process of execution when on the 21st an armistice was agreed upon to commence at noon on the 22nd. The last fight was that of Blumenau near Pressburg on the 22nd; this was broken off at the stated time.

Langensalza.—In Western Germany the Prussian forces, depleted to the utmost to furnish troops for the Bohemian campaign, were opposed to the armies of Hanover and Bavaria and the 8th Federal corps (the last consisting of Hessians, Württembergers, Badensers and Nassauers with an Austrian division drawn from the neutralized Federal fortresses), which were far superior in number. These minor enemies were, however, unready and their troops were mostly of indifferent quality. Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, which were nearest to Prussia and therefore immediately dangerous, were dealt with promptly and without waiting for the decision in the main theatre of war. The 13th Prussian division (v. Goeben) was at Minden, Manteuffel's troops from the Elbe duchies at Altona, v. Beyer's division (Federal fortress garrisons) at Wetzlar. On the 15th and 16th of June Beyer moved on Cassel, while the two other Prussian generals converged on Hanover. Both places were in Prussian hands before the 20th. The Hessians retired upon Hanau to join the 8th Federal corps; only the Hanoverians remained in the north, and they too, threatened by Beyer's advance, marched from their point of concentration at Göttingen southward for the Main. With proper support from Bavaria the Hanoverians could perhaps have escaped intact; but the Bavarians considered that their allies (about 20,000) were strong enough by themselves to destroy whichever of the converging Prussian columns tried to bar their way, and actually the Hanoverian general v. Arentschild won a notable success over the improvised Prussian and Coburg division of General v. Flies, which advanced from Gotha and barred the southward march of the Hanoverians at Langensalza. The battle of Langensalza (June 27th) showed that the risks Moltke deliberately accepted when he transferred so many of the western troops to the Bohemian frontier were by no means imaginary, for v. Flies, outnumbered by two to one, sustained a sharp reverse before the other columns closed in. But the strategical object of General Vogel v. Falckenstein, the Prussian commander-in-chief in the west, was achieved next day. By the morning of the 29th Manteuffel and Goeben lay north, v. Flies's column (backed by a fresh brigade) south of Langensalza, and Beyer approached from Eisenach. Whatever had been the prospects of the Hanoverian army five days previously, it was now surrounded by twice its numbers, and on the 29th of June the capitulation of Langensalza closed its long and honourable career.

The Main Campaign.—The Prussian army, now called the "Army of the Main," of three divisions (one being unusually strong), had next to deal with the 7th (Bavarians) and 8th (other South Germans) Federal corps in the valley of the Main. These were nominally over 100,000 strong and were commanded by Prince Charles of Bavaria. The *ordre de bataille* of the 8th corps is interesting. It was commanded by Prince Alexander of Hesse; the 1st division (3 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, 6 batteries) came from Württemberg; the 2nd division (2 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, 5 batteries) from Baden, the least anti-Prussian of all these states; the 3rd division (2 infantry and 1 cavalry brigades, 1 rifle battalion, 4 batteries) from Hesse-Darmstadt; the 4th division consisted of an Austrian brigade of 7 battalions (three of which were Italians), a Nassau brigade, and two batteries and some hussars of Hesse-Cassel. The remainder of the Hesse-Cassel troops, which had retired southward before Beyer's advance on Cassel, went to the Rhine valley about Mainz. The centre of the *rayon* of the 8th corps was Darmstadt, and the Bavarian line extended from Coburg to Gemünden. It appears that Prince Charles wished to march via Jena and Gera into Prussia, as Napoleon had done sixty years before, but the scheme was negatived by the Austrian government, which exercised the supreme command of the allies. The Bavarians did, however, advance, and made for the Eisenach-Gotha region, where the Prussian-Hanoverian struggle was in progress. Meanwhile the 8th Federal corps advanced also, but actuated probably by political motives it took the general direction of Cassel, and between the two German corps a wide gap opened, of which Vogel v. Falckenstein was not slow to take advantage. On the day of Königgrätz the Prussians moved into position to attack the Bavarians, and on the 4th of July v. Goeben won the victory of Wiesenthal (near Dermbach). The 7th corps thereupon drew back to the Franconian Saale, the 8th to Frankfurt, and on the 7th of July the Prussian army was massed about Fulda between them. Vogel v. Falckenstein moved forward again on the 8th, and on the 10th the Bavarians were again defeated in a series of actions around Kissingen, Waldaschach and Hammelburg. Meanwhile Prince Alexander's motley corps began its advance from Frankfurt up the Main valley to join the Bavarians, who had now retired on Schweinfurt. The army of the Main, however, had little difficulty in defeating the 8th corps at Laufach on the 13th and Aschaffenburg on the 14th of July. The Prussians occupied Frankfurt (16th). Vogel v. Falckenstein was now called to Bohemia, and v. Manteuffel was placed in command of the army of the Main for the final advance. The 7th and 8th corps now at last effected their junction about Würzburg, whither the army of the Main marched from Frankfurt to meet them. The Federals advanced in their turn, the Bavarians on the right, the 8th on the left, and the opponents met in the valley of the Tauber. More partial actions, at Hundheim (23rd), Tauber Bischofsheim (24th), Gerchsheim (25th), Helmstadt (25th) and Rossbrunn (26th) ended in the retreat of the Germans to Würzburg and beyond; the armistice (Aug. 2nd) then put an end to operations. A Prussian reserve corps under the grand

duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, formed at Leipzig, had meanwhile overrun eastern Bavaria up to Nuremberg.

This campaign presents the sharpest contrast to that of Bohemia. Small armies moving freely within a large theatre of war, the occupation of hostile territory as a primary object of operations, the absence of a decision-compelling spirit on either side, the hostile political "view" over-riding the hostile "feeling"—all these conditions remind the student of those of 17th and 18th century warfare. But the improved organization, better communications and supplies, superior *moral*, and once again the breech-loader *versus* a standing target, which caused the Prussian successes, at least give us an opportunity of comparing the old and the new systems under similar conditions, and even thus the principle of the "armed nation" achieved the decision in a period of time which, for the old armies, was wholly insufficient.

The various treaties of Prague, Berlin and Vienna which followed the armistice secured the annexation by Prussia of Hanover, the Elbe duchies, the electorate of Hesse, Nassau and Frankfurt, the dissolution of the existing confederation and the creation of a new North German Confederation under the hegemony of Prussia, and the payment of war indemnities to Prussia (the Austrian share being £6,000,000). Venetia was ceded by Austria to Napoleon III. and by him to King Victor Emmanuel.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71

CHAPTER I

SAARBRÜCKEN TO WÖRTH

THE victories of Prussia in 1866 over the Austrians and their German allies rendered it evident to the statesmen and soldiers of France that a struggle between the two nations could only be a question of time. Army reforms were at once undertaken, and measures were initiated in France to place the armament and equipment of the troops on a level with the requirements of the times. The chassepot, a new breech-loading rifle, immensely superior to the Prussian needle-gun, was issued; the artillery trains were thoroughly overhauled, and a new machine-gun, the *mitrailleuse*, from which much was expected, introduced. Wide schemes of reorganization (due mainly to Marshal Niel) were set in motion, and, since these required time to mature, recourse was had to foreign alliances in the hope of delaying the impending rupture. In the first week of June 1870, General Lebrun, as a confidential agent of the emperor Napoleon III., was sent to Vienna to concert a plan of joint operations with Austria against Prussia. Italy was also to be included in the alliance, and it was agreed that in case of hostilities the French armies should concentrate in northern Bavaria, where the Austrians and Italians were to join them, and the whole immense army thus formed should march via Jena on Berlin. To what extent Austria and Italy committed themselves to this scheme remains uncertain, but that the emperor Napoleon believed in their *bona fides* is beyond doubt.

Whether the plan was betrayed to Prussia is also uncertain, and almost immaterial, for Moltke's plans were based on an accurate estimate of the time it would take Austria to mobilize and on the effect of a series of victories on French soil. At any rate Moltke was not taken into Bismarck's confidence in the affair of Ems in July 1870, and it is to be presumed that the chancellor had already satisfied himself that the schemes of operations prepared by the chief of the General Staff fully provided against all eventualities. These schemes were founded on Clausewitz's view of the objects to be pursued in a war against France—in the first place the defeat of the French field armies and in the second the occupation of Paris. On these lines plans for the strategic deployment of the Prussian army were prepared by the General Staff and kept up to date year by year as fresh circumstances (*e.g.* the co-operation of the minor German armies) arose and new means of communication came into existence. The campaign was actually opened on a revise of 1868-1869, to which was added, on the 6th of May 1870, a secret memorandum for the General Staff.

Under the German organization then existing the preliminary to all active operations was of necessity full and complete mobilization. Then followed transport by road and rail to the line selected for the "strategic deployment," and it was essential that no part of these operations should be disturbed by action on the part of the enemy. But no such delay imposed itself of necessity upon the French, and a vigorous offensive was so much in harmony with their traditions that the German plan had to be framed so as to meet such emergencies. On the whole, Moltke concluded that the enemy should not undertake this offensive before the eighth day after mobilization. At that date about five French army corps (150,000 men) could be collected near Metz, and two corps (70,000) near Strassburg; and as it was six days' march from Metz to the Rhine, no serious attack could be delivered before the fourteenth day, by which day it could be met by superior forces near Kirchheimbolanden. Since, however, the transport of the bulk of the Prussian forces could not begin till the ninth day, their ultimate line of detrainment need not be fixed

until the French plans were disclosed, and, as it was important to strike at the earliest moment possible, the deployment was provisionally fixed to be beyond the Rhine on the line Wittlich-Neunkirchen-Landau. Of the thirteen North German corps three had to be left behind to guard the eastern frontier and the coast, one other, the VIII., was practically on the ground already and could concentrate by road, and the remaining nine were distributed to the nine through railway lines available. These ten corps were grouped in three armies, and as the French might violate Belgian neutrality or endeavour to break into southern Germany, two corps (Prussian Guard and Saxon XII. corps) were temporarily held back at a central position around Mainz, whence they could move rapidly up or down the Rhine valley. If Belgian neutrality remained unmolested, the reserve would join the III. army on the left wing, giving it a two to one superiority over its adversary; all three armies would then wheel to the right and combine in an effort to force the French army into a decisive battle on the Saar on or about the twenty-third day. As in this wheel the army on the right formed the pivot and was required only to stand fast, two corps only were allotted to it; two corps for the present formed the III. army, and the remaining five were assigned to the II. army in the centre.

When (16th-17th July) the South German states decided to throw in their lot with the rest, their three corps were allotted to the III. army, the Guards and Saxons to the II. army, whilst the three corps originally left behind were finally distributed one to each army, so that up to the investment of Metz the order of battle was as follows:

Headquarters:

The king of Prussia (General v. Moltke, chief of staff).

I. Army :	{	(I. corps, v. Manteuffel)	
General v. Steinmetz		VII. " v. Zastrow	
(C. of S., v. Sperling)		VIII. " v. Goeben	
		(1st) and 3rd cavalry divisions	
		Total . .	85,000
	{	Guard Pr. August of Württemberg	
		(II. corps, v. Fransecky)	
		III. " v. Alvensleben II.	
		IV. " v. Alvensleben I.	
		IX. " v. Manstein	
		X. " v. Voigts-Rhetz	
		XII. " (Saxons) crown prince of Saxony	
		5th and 6th cavalry divisions	
		Total . .	210,000
	{	V. corps, v. Kirchbach	
		(VI.) " v. Tümppling	
		XI. " v. Bose	
		I. Bavarian, v. der Tann	
		II. " v. Hartmann	
		Württemberg div. } v. Werder	
		Baden div. }	
		(2nd) and 4th cavalry divisions	
		Total . .	180,000

Grand Total . . 475,000

(The units within brackets were those at first retained in Germany.)

On the French side no such plan of operations was in existence when on the night of the 15th of July *Krieg mobil* was telegraphed all over Prussia. An outline scheme had indeed been prepared as a basis for agreement with Austria and Italy, but practically no details were fixed, and the troops were without transport and supplies. Nevertheless, since speed was the essence of the contract, the troops were hurried up without waiting for their reserves, and delivered, as Moltke had foreseen, just where the lie of the railways and convenience of temporary supply dictated, and the Prussian Intelligence Department was able to inform Moltke on the 22nd of July (seventh day of mobilization) that the French stood from right to left in the following order, on or near the frontier:

1st corps	Marshal MacMahon, duke of Magenta, Strassburg.
5th corps	General de Failly, Saargemund and Bitche
2nd corps	General Frossard, St Avold
4th corps	General de Ladmirault, Thionville
With, behind them:	
3rd corps	Marshal Bazaine, Metz
Guard	General Bourbaki, Nancy
6th corps	Marshal Canrobert, Chalons
7th corps	General Félix Douay, Belfort

If therefore they began a forward movement on the 23rd (eighth day) the case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became necessary to detrain the II. army upon the Rhine. Without waiting for further confirmation of this intelligence, Moltke, with the consent of the king, altered the arrangements accordingly, a decision which, though foreseen, exercised the gravest influence on the course of events. As it happened this decision was premature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains had to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even arms and ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded in joining. Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions on the part of the railways and administrative services, all essential deficiencies were made good, and by the 28th of July (13th day) the troops had received all that was absolutely indispensable and might well have been led against the enemy, who, thanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at a very serious disadvantage. But the French generals were unequal to their responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the great Napoleon and his marshals been in command, they would have made light of the want of cooking pots, cholera belts, &c., and, by a series of rapid marches, would have concentrated odds of at least three to one upon the heads of the Prussian columns as they struggled through the defiles of the Hardt, and won a victory whose political results might well have proved decisive.

To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge during the course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential staff officer, Colonel v. Verdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress upon the crown prince the necessity of an immediate advance to distract the enemy's attention from the I. and II. armies; but, like the French generals, the crown prince pleaded that he could not move until his trains were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, the French intelligence service not only failed to inform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it allowed itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In imagination they saw armies of 100,000 men behind every forest, and, to guard against these dangers, the French troops were marched and counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain hope of discovering an ideal defensive position which should afford full scope to the power of their new weapons.

As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on public opinion not only in France but throughout Europe, the emperor decided on the 1st of August to initiate a movement towards the Saar, chiefly as a guarantee of good faith to the Austrians and Italians.

On this day the French corps held the following positions from right to left :

1st corps		Hagneau
2nd corps		Forbach
3rd corps		St Avold
4th corps		Bouzonville
5th corps		Bitche
6th corps		Châlons
7th corps		Belfort and Colmar
Guard		near Metz

The French 2nd corps was directed to advance on the following morning direct on Saarbrücken, supported on the flanks by two divisions from the 5th and 3rd corps. The order was duly carried out, and the Prussians (one battalion, two squadrons and a battery), seeing the overwhelming numbers opposed to them, fell back fighting and vanished to the northward, having given a very excellent example of steadiness and discipline to their enemy.¹ The latter contented themselves by occupying Saarbrücken and its suburb St Johann, and here, as far as the troops were concerned, the incident closed. Its effect, however, proved far-reaching. The Prussian staff could not conceive that nothing lay behind this display of five whole divisions, and immediately took steps to meet the expected danger. In their excitement, although they had announced the beginning of the action to the king's headquarters at Mainz, they forgot to notify the close and its results, so that Moltke was not in possession of the facts till noon on the 3rd of August. Meanwhile, Steinmetz, left without instructions and fearing for the safety of the II. army, the heads of whose columns were still in the defiles of the Hardt, moved the I. army from the neighbourhood of Merzig obliquely to his left front, so as to strike the flank of the French army if it continued its march towards Kaiserslautern, in which direction it appeared to be heading.

Whilst this order was in process of execution, Moltke, aware that the II. army was behind time in its march, issued instructions to Steinmetz for the 4th of August which entailed a withdrawal to the rear, the idea being that both armies should, if the French advanced, fight a defensive battle in a selected position farther back. Steinmetz obeyed, though bitterly resenting the idea of retreat. This movement, further, drew his left across the roads reserved for the right column of the II. army, and on receipt of a peremptory order from Prince Frederick Charles to evacuate the road, Steinmetz telegraphed for

¹ This was the celebrated "baptême de feu" of the prince imperial.

instructions direct to the king, over Moltke's head. In reply he received a telegram from Moltke, ordering him to clear the road at once, and couched in terms which he considered as a severe reprimand. An explanatory letter, meant to soften the rebuke, was delayed in transmission and did not reach him till too late to modify the orders he had already issued. It must be remembered that Steinmetz at the front was in a better position to judge the apparent situation than was Moltke at Mainz, and that all through the day of the 5th of August he had received intelligence indicating a change of attitude in the French army.

The news of the German victory at Weissenburg on the 4th (see below) had in fact completely paralysed the French headquarters, and orders were issued by them during the course of the 5th to concentrate the whole army of the Rhine on the selected position of Cadenbronn. As a preliminary, Frossard's corps withdrew from Saarbrücken and began to entrench a position on the Spichenen heights, 3000 yds. to the southward. Steinmetz, therefore, being unaware of the scheme for a great battle on the Saar about the 12th of August, felt that the situation would best be met, and the letter of his instructions strictly obeyed, by moving his whole command forward to the line of the Saar, and orders to this effect were issued on the evening of the 5th. In pursuance of these orders, the advance guard of the 14th division (Lieutenant General von Kameke) reached Saarbrücken about 9 A.M. on the 6th, where the Germans found to their amazement that the bridges were intact. To secure this advantage was the obvious duty of the commander on the spot, and he at once ordered his troops to occupy a line of low heights beyond the town to serve as a bridge-head. As the leading troops deployed on the heights Frossard's guns on the Spichenen Plateau opened fire, and the advanced guard battery replied. The sound of the guns unchained the whole fighting instinct carefully developed by a long course of Prussian manoeuvre training. Everywhere, generals and troops hurried towards the cannon thunder. Kameke, even more in the dark than Steinmetz as to Moltke's intentions and the strength of his adversaries, attacked at once, precisely as he would have done at manoeuvres, and in half an hour his men were committed beyond recall. As each fresh unit reached the field it was hurried into action where its services were most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a new view of the combat and issued new orders. On the other side, Frossard, knowing the strength of his position, called on his neighbours for support, and determined to hold his ground. Victory seemed certain. There were sufficient troops within easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical superiority. But the other generals had not been trained to mutual support, and thought only of their own immediate security, and their staffs were too inexperienced to act upon even good intentions; and, finding himself in the course of the afternoon left to his own devices, Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the pressure of the 13th German division on his left flank (about 8 P.M.) compelled his retirement. When darkness ended the battle the Prussians were scarcely aware of their victory. Steinmetz, who had reached the field about 6 P.M., rode back to his headquarters without issuing any orders, while the troops bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas out of 42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay within striking distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,000, with 78 guns were actually engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 with 210 guns only 24,000 with 90 guns took part in the action.

Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun its advance. Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier and fell upon a French detachment under Abel Douay, which had been placed near Weissenburg, partly to cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to consume the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled fortress, as these could not easily be moved. Against this force of under 4000 men of all arms, the Germans brought into action successively portions of three corps, in all over 25,000 men with 90 guns. After six hours' fighting, in which the Germans lost some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the French withdrew deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the death of their leader at the critical moment. The Germans were so elated by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and thus entirely lost touch with the enemy.

During the 5th of August the French concentrated in a selected position running nearly N. and S. along the Sauer Bach on the left front of the German III. army which was moving S. to seek them. The position is marked from right to left by Morsbronn, the Niederwald, the heights W. of Wörth and the woods N.E. of Fröschweiler. E. of the Sauer the German III. army was moving S. towards Hagenau, when their cavalry found the French position about noon. Thereafter the German vedettes held the French under close observation, while the latter moved about within their lines and as far as the village of Wörth as if in peace quarters, and this notwithstanding the defeat of a portion of the army at Weissenburg on the previous day. The remnant of the force which had been engaged, with many of its wounded still in the ranks, marched in about noon with so soldiery a bearing that, so far from their depressing the *moral* of the rest, their appearance actually raised it.

About 5 P.M. some horses were watered at the Sauer, as in peace, without escort, though

hostile scouts were in sight. A sudden swoop of the enemy's hussars drove the party back to camp. The alarm was sounded, tents were struck and the troops fell in all along the line and remained under arms until the confusion died down, when orders were sent to fall out, but not to pitch the tents. The army therefore bivouacked, and but for this incident the battle of the next day would probably not have been fought. A sudden and violent storm broke over the bivouacs, and when it was over, the men, wet and restless, began to move about, light fires, &c. Many of them broke out of camp and went into Wörth, which was unoccupied, though Prussians were only 300 yds. from the sentries. These fired, and the officer commanding the Prussian outposts, hearing the confused murmur of voices, ordered up a battery, and as soon as there was light enough dropped a few shells into Wörth. The stragglers rushed back, the French lines were again alarmed, and several batteries on their side took up the challenge.

The Prussian guns, as strict orders had been given to avoid all engagement that day, soon withdrew and were about to return to camp, when renewed artillery fire was heard from the S. and presently also from the N. In the latter direction, the II. Bavarian corps had bivouacked along the Mattstall-Langensulzbach road with orders to continue the march if artillery were heard to the S. This order was contrary to the spirit of the III. army orders, and moreover the V. Prussian corps to the S. was in ignorance of its having been given.

The outpost battery near Wörth was heard, and the Bavarians at once moved forward. Soon the leading troops were on the crest of the ridge between the Sauer and the Sulzbach, and the divisional commander, anxious to prove his loyalty to his new allies—his enemies in 1866—ordered his troops to attack, giving the spire of Fröschweiler, which was visible over the woods, as the point of direction. The French, however, were quite ready and a furious fusillade broke out, which was multiplied by the echoes of the forest-clad hills out of all proportion to the numbers engaged. The Prussian officers of the V. corps near Dieffenbach, knowing nothing of the orders the Bavarians had received, were amazed; but at length when about 10.30 A.M. their comrades were seen retiring, in some cases in great disorder, the corps commander, General von Kirchbach, decided that an effort must at once be made to relieve the Bavarians. His chief of staff had already ordered up the divisional and corps artillery (84 guns in all), and he himself communicated his intention of attacking to the XI. corps (General von Bose) on his left and asked for all available assistance. A report was also despatched to the crown prince at Sulz, 5 m. away.

Meanwhile the XI. corps had become involved in an engagement. The left of the V. corps' outposts had over night occupied Gunstett and the bank of the Sauer, and the French shortly after daylight on the 6th sent down an unarmed party to fetch water. As this appeared through the mist, the Prussians naturally fired upon it, and the French General Lartigue (to whose division the party belonged), puzzled to account for the firing, brought up some batteries in readiness to repel an attack. These fired a few rounds only, but remained in position as a precaution.

Hearing the firing, the XI. corps' advanced guard, which had marched up behind in accordance with the general movement of the corps in changing front to the west, and had halted on reaching the Kreuzhecke Wood, promptly came up to Spachbach and Gunstett. In this movement across country to Spachbach some bodies appear to have exposed themselves, for French artillery at Elsasshausen suddenly opened fire, and the shrapnel bursting high, sent showers of bullets on to the house roofs of Spachbach, in which village a battalion had just halted. As the falling tiles made the position undesirable, the major in command ordered the march to be resumed, and as he gave the order, his horse ran away with him towards the Sauer. The leading company, seeing the battalion commander gallop, moved off at the double, and the others of course followed. Coming within sight of the enemy, they drew a heavy shell fire, and, still under the impression that they were intended to attack, deployed into line of columns and doubled down to the river, which they crossed. One or two companies in the neighbourhood had already begun to do so, and the stream being too wide for the mounted officers to jump, presently eight or ten companies were across the river and out of superior control. By this time the French outposts (some 1,500 rifles), lining the edge of the Niederwald, were firing heavily. The line of smoke was naturally accepted by all as the objective, and the German companies with a wild rush reached the edge of the wood.

The same thing had happened at Gunstett. A most obstinate struggle ensued and both sides brought up reinforcements. The Prussians, with all their attention concentrated on the wood in their front, and having as yet no superior commanders, soon exhibited signs of confusion, and thereupon General Lartigue ordered a counter attack towards the heights of Gunstett, when all the Prussians between the Niederwald and the Sauer gave way. The French followed with a rush, and, fording the Sauer opposite Gunstett, for a moment placed the long line of German guns upon the heights in considerable danger. At this crisis a fresh battalion of the XI. corps arrived by the road from Surburg to Gunstett, and attacked the French on one flank whilst the guns swept the other. The momentum of the charge died out, and the French drifted backwards after an effort which compelled the admiration of both sides.

ing, to join the troops collecting to the east of Gunstett. Schkopp, however, seeing that his present line of advance led him direct on to the French right about Morsbronn and kept him clear of the confusion to be seen around Gunstett, disregarded the order and continued to advance on Morsbronn. This deliberate acceptance of responsibility really decided the battle, for his brigade quietly deployed as a unit and compelled the French right wing to fall back.

To cover the French retreat Michel's brigade of cavalry was ordered to charge. The order was somewhat vague, and in his position under cover near Eberbach, General Michel had no knowledge of the actual situation. Thus it came about that, without reconnoitring or manœuvring for position, the French cavalry rode straight at the first objective which offered itself, and struck the victorious Prussians as they were crossing the hills between the Albrechtshäuserhof and Morsbronn. Hence the charge was costly and only partly successful. However, the Prussians were ridden over here and there, and their attention was sufficiently absorbed while the French infantry rallied for a fresh counter-stroke. This was made about 1.20 P.M. with the utmost gallantry, and the Prussians were driven off the hillsides between the Albrechtshäuserhof and Morsbronn which they had already won. But the counter-attack soon came under the fire of the great artillery mass above Gunstett, and, von Bose having at length concentrated the main body of the XI. corps in the meadows between the Niederwald and the Sauer, the French had to withdraw. Their withdrawal involved the retreat of the troops who had fought all day in defence of the Niederwald.

By 3 P.M. the Prussians were masters of the Niederwald and the ground S. of it on which the French right wing had originally stood, but they were in indescribable confusion after the prolonged fighting in the dense undergrowth. Before order could be restored came another fierce counter-stroke. As the Prussians emerged from the N. edge of the wood, the French reserves suddenly came out from behind the Elsasshausen heights, and striking due S. drove the Prussians back. It was a grave crisis, but at this moment von Schkopp, who throughout all this had kept two of his battalions intact, came round the N.W. corner of the Wald, and these fresh battalions again brought the French to a standstill. Meanwhile von Kirchbach, seeing the progress of the XI. corps, had ordered the whole of his command forward to assault the French centre, and away to the right the two Bavarian corps moved against the French left, which still maintained its original position in the woods N.E. of Fröschweiler.

MacMahon, however, was not beaten yet. Ordering Bonnemains' cavalry division to charge, by squadrons to gain time, he brought up his reserve artillery, and sent it forward to case-shot range to cover a final counter-stroke by his last intact battalions. But from his position near Fröschweiler he could not see into the hollow between Elsasshausen and the Niederwald. The order was too late, and the artillery unlimbered just as the counter-attack on the Niederwald alluded to above gave way before von Schkopp's reserve. The guns were submerged in a flood of fugitives and pursuers. Elsasshausen passed into the hands of the Germans. To rescue the guns the nearest French infantry attacked in a succession of groups, charging home the bayonet with the utmost determination. Before each attack the Prussians immediately in front gave way, but those on the flanks swung inwards and under this converging fire each French attempt died out, the Prussians following up their retreat. In this manner, step by step, in confusion which almost defies analysis, the Prussians conquered the whole of the ground to the S. of the Fröschweiler-Wörth road, but the French still held on in the village of Fröschweiler itself and in the woods to the N. of the road, where throughout the day they had held the two Bavarian corps in check with little difficulty. To break down this last stronghold, the guns of the V. and XI. corps, which had now come forward to the captured ridge of Elsasshausen, took the village as their target; and the great crowd of infantry, now flushed with victory but in the direst confusion, encouraged by the example of two horse artillery batteries which galloped boldly forward to case-shot range, delivered one final rush which swept all resistance before it.

The battle was won and cavalry only were needed to reap its consequences, but the Prussian cavalry division had been left behind without orders and did not reach the battlefield till late at night. The divisional cavalry squadrons did their best, but each pursued on its own account, and the results in prisoners and guns fell far short of what the opportunity offered. Under cover of darkness the French escaped, and on the following day the cavalry division was quite unable to discover the direction of the retreat.

MacMahon received no support from the neighbouring French troops. The battle was won by overpowering weight of numbers. The Prussian general staff were able to direct upon the field no fewer than 75,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 300 guns, of which 71,000 rifles, 4250 sabres and 234 guns came into action, against 32,000 rifles, 4850 sabres and 101 guns on the French side. The superiority of the French chassepot to the needle guns may reasonably be set against the superior number of rifles on the German side, for though the Germans were generally, thanks to their numbers, able to bring a converging fire upon the French, the latter made nearly double the number of hits for about the same weight of ammunition fired, but the French had nothing to oppose to the superior

German artillery, and in almost every instance it was the terrible shell fire which broke up the French counter attack. All of these attacks were in the highest degree honourable to the French army, and many came nearer to imperilling the ultimate success of the Germans than is generally supposed. One other point deserves special attention. As soon as the fighting became general, all order in the skirmisher lines disappeared on both sides, and invariably, except where the Prussian artillery fire intervened, it was the appearance of closed bodies of troops in rear of the fighting line which determined the retreat of their opponents. Even in the confused fighting in the Niederwald, the mere sound of the Prussian drums or the French bugles induced the adversary to give way even though drums and bugles frequently appealed to non-existent troops.

The losses of the Germans were 9270 killed and wounded and 1370 missing, or 13% ; those of the French were about 8000 killed and wounded, and perhaps 12,000 missing, and prisoners, representing a total loss of about 41%. Some French regiments retained a semblance of discipline after suffering enormous losses. The 2nd Turcos lost 93%, 13th hussars 87%, and thirteen regiments in all lost over 50% of their strength.

Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army escaped. When at length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded in forcing a way through the confusion of the battlefield, all touch with the enemy had been lost, and being without firearms the troopers were checked by the French stragglers in the woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish the true line of retreat of the French. Ultimately the latter, having gained the railway near Lunéville, disappeared from the German front altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were discovered, about the 26th of August, forming part of the army of Châlons, whither they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. This is a remarkable example of the strategical value of railways to an army operating in its own country.

In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry out the original programme of marches laid down in Moltke's memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle of Gravelotte-St Privat.

We return now to the I. army at Saarbrücken. Its position on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a dense fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops were in no condition to go forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within a day's march ; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one brigade towards Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few officers' patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and their reports were consequently unconvincing.

In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps behind the river on to the I. (which had arrived near Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrücken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly's corps), and early in the morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke informing him that MacMahon's beaten army was retreating on the same place (the troops observed were in fact those which had marched to MacMahon's assistance). The prince forthwith deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X. corps, towards Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the west and north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south and east, and a great gap was opening in the very centre of the German front. This was closed only by the III. corps, still on the battle-field, and by portions of the X. near Saargemünd,¹ whilst within striking distance lay 130,000 French troops, prevented only by the incapacity of their chiefs from delivering a decisive counter-stroke.

Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different view. Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front during the 7th, he telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies (10.25 P.M.) to halt on the 8th, and impressed on Steinmetz the necessity of employing his cavalry to clear up the situation. The I. army had already begun the marches ordered by Steinmetz. It was now led back practically to its old bivouacs amongst the unburied dead. Prince Frederick Charles only conformed to Moltke's order with the III. and X. corps ; the remainder executed their concentration towards the south and east.

During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the French army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forthwith busied himself with the preparation of fresh

¹ The II. corps had not yet arrived from Germany.

tables of march for the two armies, his object being to swing up the left wing to outflank the enemy from the south. This work, and the transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed time, hence no fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither commander would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The I. army therefore spent a fourth night in bivouac on the battle-field. But Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. corps, a man of very different stamp from his colleagues, hearing at first hand that the French had evacuated St Avold, set his corps in motion early in the morning of the 10th August down the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avold and obtained conclusive evidence that the French were retreating.

During the 9th the orders for the advance to the Moselle were issued. These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where the French army actually stood, but on the opinion Moltke had formed as to where it ought to have been on military grounds solely, overlooking the fact that the French staff were not free to form military decisions but were compelled to bow to political expediency.

Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to attack the Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, but this decision was upset by alarmist reports from the beaten army of MacMahon. He then decided to retreat to the Moselle, as Moltke had foreseen, and there to draw to himself the remnants of MacMahon's army (now near Lunéville). At the same time he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of the 8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the 9th urgent telegrams from Paris induced the emperor to suspend the movement, and during the 10th the whole army took up a strong position on the French Nied.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS ROUND METZ

MEANWHILE the II. German army had received its orders to march in a line of army corps on a broad front in the general direction of Pont-à-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The I. army was to follow by short marches in échelon on the right; only the III. corps was directed on Falkenberg, a day's march farther towards Metz along the St Avold-Metz road. The movement was begun on the 10th, and towards evening the French army was located on the right front of the III. corps. This entirely upset Moltke's hypothesis, and called for a complete modification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be expected to resist the impact of Bazaine's five corps. The III. corps therefore received orders to stand fast for the moment, and the remainder of the II. army was instructed to wheel to the right and concentrate for a great battle to the east of Metz on the 16th or 17th.

Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden retreat of the French completely changed the situation. The Germans therefore continued their movement towards the Moselle. On the 13th the French took up a fresh position 5 m. to the east of Metz, where they were located by the cavalry and the advanced guards of the I. army.

Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the enemy, whilst the II. was to swing round to the north. The cavalry was to scout beyond the Moselle and intercept all communication with the heart of France. By this time the whole German army had imbibed the idea that the French were in full retreat and endeavouring to evade a decisive struggle.

On the morning of the 14th of August the German I. Army (I., VII. and VIII. Corps, under General v. Steinmetz) lay on and east of the French, with outposts well to the front, watching the French camps east of Metz, which were little more than 1 m. to the front. Steinmetz had received from headquarters overnight instructions that on the 14th of August the I. Army would maintain the positions occupied during the 13th, and merely passed on these orders to his corps commanders. In Metz, meanwhile, Bazaine had decided to retreat, and during the morning orders to that effect reached his corps commanders, who commenced preparations for their execution. The 2nd Corps (Frossard) and 6th (Canrobert) began to retire about midday, the 3rd (Lebœuf), 4th (Ladmirault) and Imperial Guard (Bourbaki) were to follow. These preparations being observed, the German outposts got under arms. General von der Goltz, in command of the VII. Corps (7 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries) hearing from a passing officer that the I. Corps on his right was preparing to attack, and noting personally signs of retreat in the enemy's lines, determined at 3 P.M. to advance his whole command to the ridge between Colombey and Borny (which was still occupied by French outposts), in order to clear up the situation. The ridge was captured with little resistance, but the sound of the firing at once set all the neighbouring troops in motion, and fortunately so, for the French had immediately retaliated on von der Goltz's audacious attack. Between 4 and 6 P.M. there was continuous heavy fighting on the front from Borny to Méry, as both sides brought fresh troops into the field. The convex slopes falling from the Prussian position towards Metz gave plenty of cover to the

French, and the setting sun shone full in the faces of the Prussian artillerymen. Thus the Prussian infantry encountered unusually obstinate resistance and the troops engaged rapidly slipped from all superior control. The above front was held by the French 3rd corps. Shortly before 6.30 the 4th corps (Ladmirault) suddenly began to deploy on the high ground to the north-west beyond Méy, thus threatening the right flank of the Prussian I. corps (General v. Manteuffel). To meet this danger Manteuffel was compelled to direct his corps artillery and reserves, which were now rapidly coming up, away from the hard-pressed centre towards the oncoming infantry masses of Ladmirault. These, with the sun now almost at their backs, were shooting better than usual, and Manteuffel was compelled to call on the VIII. corps for assistance, which its commander, under positive orders from Steinmetz, refused to give. Meanwhile Steinmetz had been sending peremptory orders to the battlefield to stop the battle, but neither of the corps commanders was able to enforce them. Fortunately for the Prussians, Bazaine had issued similar orders to his subordinates, who, having their men better in hand, were able to obey; and as night began to close in the French broke off the action and retired under the guns of the Metz forts, convinced that at last they had "broken the spell" of German success.

Finding that, in spite of his orders, the firing at the front continued increasing in intensity, Steinmetz at length rode to the front himself. Meeting Manteuffel near the Brasserie of Noisseville, he overwhelmed him with reproaches, and at the crisis of this scene the bands struck up "Heil dir im Siegeskranz!" In this action the Germans brought 30,500 rifles and 150 guns on to the battlefield only out of more than 100,000 with 300 guns which could have been engaged before darkness. Bazaine actually deployed 50,700 rifles and 206 guns to oppose them. He might, however, had he been so minded, have struck with his whole army—nearly three times this force, and, judging from the course events actually took, we can have little doubt as to the result of such a blow. The losses on either side were in killed and wounded—French about 3600, Germans about 4800.

The chain of causation in this action is particularly worthy of attention: A young reserve officer, seeing some troops of the I. corps standing to arms, reported to von der Goltz that the corps was standing to arms and about to attack. Von der Goltz thereupon decided to go forward and discover what was actually going on, and this action unchained the whole battle power of all the troops within call. When, on the following morning, Steinmetz reported von der Goltz and the commander of the I. corps for disobedience, the king thanked Manteuffel warmly for the part he had played, and then turned to the young brigadier who had disobeyed orders and congratulated him on having twice distinguished himself in the first fortnight of the war.

The Battle of Vionville—Mars-la-Tour (August 16).—On the following day (15th) the II. German Army approached the Moselle above and below Pont-à-Mousson, with a view to overtaking and heading off Bazaine in his presumed retreat to the Meuse. So far, however, from being ahead of the Germans on the road to Verdun, the French were actually, late in the afternoon of the 15th of August, bivouacked on the plateau of Rezonville, and there their outposts were placed, not where they could see the surrounding country, but at the regulation distances of 600 to 1000 paces from the bivouacs. Friendly inhabitants kept Bazaine well informed as to the magnitude of the danger threatening him from the south, and a special telegram from Paris, the true origin of which has never been traced, led him to believe that the I. German Army was crossing the Moselle near Thionville and about to descend on him from the north. This telegram might have exercised the most prejudicial influence on the course of the battle had not Ladmirault (4th Corps), nearer to the seat of the imaginary danger, taken upon himself to disregard the warning transmitted to him by headquarters. At daybreak on the 16th, no Prussians being reported in sight by the outposts, the troops began nonchalantly to prepare for the resumption of the march.

On the Prussian side, von Alvensleben's corps (III.) shortly after daybreak was moving north-westward from the Moselle in two columns, on the right the 5th division, via Gorze and Flavigny on Vionville, on the left the 6th division with corps artillery by Arnaville on Mars-la-Tour, von Alvensleben himself riding a little in advance between the two. The 6th cavalry division was ordered to precede the right column and scout towards Rezonville. No one was aware of the dangerous proximity of the French army.

About 9 A.M. the 5th cavalry division, reinforced by two horse artillery batteries (flank guard of the X. corps from Thiancourt), and accompanied by von Caprivi (chief of staff, X. corps, and afterwards chancellor of the German Empire), were trotting up the western slopes of the ridge which runs between Tronville and Vionville. Reaching its summit they suddenly found themselves in face of at least 40,000 French troops, which were not under arms, but busied with miscellaneous camp duties. The temptation proved too great for the artillery, who promptly fired into the midst of the cavalry camp (Forton's division) which lay nearest to them. The momentary result was a wild panic, especially among the horses; but this panic gave the alarm to the infantry all along the road, and these (Frossard's 2nd corps) at once stood to arms and moved forward, deployed for attack—one division to the west, another division, from Rezonville, to the south. The latter almost at once encountered the heads of the 6th cavalry division, at that moment just



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COUNT VON MOLTKE.


HELMUTH CARL BERNHARD, COUNT VON MOLTKE, born 1800, died 1891, Prussian field-marshal, for thirty years chief of the staff of the Prussian army, the greatest strategist since Napoleon. A strong, quiet man of rare self-control who could be "silent in seven languages."



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COUNT VON ROON.

ALBRECHT THEODOR EMIL, COUNT VON ROON, born 1803, died 1879, Prussian general and field-marshal, re-organizer of the Prussian army in 1860, and war minister during the victorious campaigns against Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866.



clearing the defile leading up to the Rezonville plateau from Gorze. The Prussian cavalry promptly bore away to cover to the westward, and reported what they had seen to superior authority, but not to the advanced guard of the 5th infantry division, which, emerging in its turn from the defile, ran right against the deployed French infantry moving to meet them. So sudden was the collision that the Prussian advanced guard battery had to fire case to clear its own front.

Meanwhile von Alvensleben himself, riding on the field track from Gorze towards Vionville, whence he could overlook the whole country to the north and west, had met von Rheinbaben (commanding the 5th cavalry division) and had seen the surprise of the French camps. The sound of the heavy firing coming from the eastward convinced him of what had been gradually dawning on him—that with barely 30,000 men he was in the presence of the whole French army, whose attitude at this moment sufficiently indicated their determination to fight.

In a few moments his decision was taken. Calling on the X. corps, away to the



south-westward, for support, he determined to screen his own weakness by a vigorous attack. By universal consent this is approved as the boldest resolution arrived at by an independent commander throughout the war. Orders were forthwith despatched to the 6th infantry division, at that moment between Puxieux and Tronville, to wheel in to their right and attack, and, their movement being still hidden from the enemy, these troops were formally drawn up for action and sent forward as a whole. The French meanwhile had occupied Vionville and Flavigny, and other troops were moving down the slopes from Rezonville to their support, but the united onset of this whole German division overbore all resistance, and the French began to retire eastward, suffering terribly from the shell fire of the Prussian batteries.

Marshal Bazaine had meanwhile arrived on the scene, and ordering forward fresh troops to relieve (not to reinforce) those already engaged, he rode forward with a horse artillery battery to watch the operations. The retreating French troops belonged to Frossard's command, and as they were in considerable confusion Frossard called on du Preuil's brigade of the imperial guard cavalry to charge. He gave no objective, and when the brigadier pointed out that the enemy was still beyond the striking radius of his horses, Frossard reiterated the order, which was obeyed to the letter.

The result was disastrous. The Prussians, having seen the cavalry whilst yet at a

distance, ceased firing, formed their skirmishers into groups, and the closed supports standing in deployed lines, two deep, shattered the cavalry with volleys and file-firing, as with blown and exhausted horses they endeavoured to close with their adversaries. When in addition two hussar regiments struck them in flank they were driven back in wild disorder upon Rezonville. In the dust and confusion of the charge a group of the hussars approached Bazaine and his horse artillery battery, and almost carried off the marshal.

Alvensleben, mistaking the withdrawal of the French for the beginning of a retreat, had meanwhile sent orders to the 6th cavalry division to charge in pursuit towards Rezonville; but before it could reach the field the French relieving troops had forced their way through the stragglers and showed such a bold front to the Prussian horsemen that an attack held no promise of success, more especially since they had lost their intervals in their advance and had no room for a proper deployment. To steady the young soldiers, the cavalry commander (Carl von Schmidt) halted his men, made them correct their intervals and dressing as in peace, though under a heavy fire from the French infantry, and then withdrew them behind the cover of the nearest hill at a walk.

The threat of the charge had, however, induced caution on the French side, and for about two hours there was a lull in the fighting, which the Prussians utilized on their right in bringing up reinforcements through the Bois des Ognons. On their left, however, no fresh troops were as yet available, and on being informed, about 2.30 P.M., that French cavalry seemed to be about to charge the exhausted 6th division, Alvensleben ordered Bredow's cavalry brigade to charge and if necessary to sacrifice itself, to save the infantry. Bredow's command (six squadrons of the 16th Ulans and 7th Cuirassiers) was at that moment drawn up under cover about half a mile west of Vionville, and from its position could see nothing of the events in progress on the battlefield. Nettle by the form in which the order was conveyed to him, Bredow drew his sword and ordered his trumpeter to sound the "trot," the brigade moving off in line of squadron columns at close intervals in the direction in which they happened at the moment to be facing. Near Vionville they took ground to their left, opening to full intervals as they did so, and then ascended the gentle incline which still hid them from their enemy.

Arrived at the summit, Bredow sounded "line to the front," but at that moment a storm of French bullets swept down on them, and the men, no longer to be restrained, dashed forward, before the line could be completed, almost due east against long lines of infantry and artillery which they now saw for the first time about 1200 yards in front of them.

This distance was covered at the fullest extended speed of the horses, and reaching the infantry they swept over them "like hounds over a fence"—in the words of an eye-witness. So sudden had been their onset that very few were hit until the infantry had been passed; then the latter, recovering from the shock, turned and fired into the cavalry from behind, whilst a whole fresh division of French horsemen charged them in flank. After a desperate mêlée of some minutes, the rally was sounded, and the survivors of the charge, breaking their way a second time through the French infantry, eventually reached the shelter of their own lines, having lost rather more than half their number, but having saved the situation momentarily for their own army. Again there was a lull in the operations.

Meanwhile, unknown to Alvensleben, a fresh storm was brewing on his left rear.

Ladmirault, commanding the French 4th corps, had seen, during the afternoon of the 15th, the terrible crowd and confusion prevailing in the defiles leading to Gravelotte, and resolved to disobey his orders and to move direct from his bivouacs by the road from Woippy to St Privat, disregarding altogether the alleged danger from the Prussians supposed to be advancing from Thionville. Thus, about noon on the 16th he reached the high ground between St Privat and Amanvillers, and still without instructions he determined to direct his corps on Bruville and Doncourt, whence he could judge from the drift of the smoke-clouds whether he could fall on the Prussian left.

Much time was lost owing to the heat of the day and the fatigue of the troops, but shortly after 3 P.M. he reached a position north of the Tronville copses whence his guns could fire into the left rear of the long line of Prussian guns (6th division and corps artillery) on the heights above Vionville and Flavigny. Their fire threw the latter into serious confusion and he had already decided to attack with his nearest division (de Cisse) in the direction of the steeple of Vionville, when his attention was caught by the outbreak of heavy firing in the copses below him, and the entry of fresh Prussian guns into action.

This diversion was brought about by the arrival of the corps artillery of the X. corps and of the 40th brigade, which latter had been at once ordered into the Tronville copses to check portions of Tixier's division of the French 3rd corps, which under cover of these copses had gradually worked round the Prussian flank. Seeing then that the troops before him could hold their own, Ladmirault continued his preparations for his counter-stroke, and Cisse's division had begun to move into its prescribed alignment, facing towards Vionville, when the sudden apparition of a closed mass of Prussian troops detaching itself from the low dust-cloud of a slow-moving infantry column, and forming

to the south of Mars-la-Tour, again arrested his attention. Unanimously he and his staff agreed that this fresh enemy could only be the advanced guard of a large Prussian force, possibly, it was suggested, of the crown prince's army, from Alsace and Nancy, and a fresh delay arose while the situation was investigated. Actually this body consisted only of the 38th brigade (von Wedell), forming part of the X. corps. It had no knowledge of the state of affairs on the battlefield, or in the direction of Bruville, though Prussian cavalry had been observing the approach of Ladmirault's corps for some hours. It was now ordered to deploy and to co-operate with the 40th brigade in an attack on the Tronville cosses. This meanwhile had been delivered, and had more or less failed.

The deployment completed, about 4 P.M. the 38th brigade began its advance on the north-west corner of the Tronville cosses, this direction taking them diagonally across the front of Cissey's division, still out of their sight but moving due south. Hardly had they stepped off when Cissey's first line, catching sight of them, opened a devastating flank, and to meet this fresh danger the Prussians endeavoured to change front half-left whilst still on the move. Without pausing to fire, the men raced onward, but the French striking their outer wing rolled up the whole line in succession, the actual collision occurring in and near the Bruville ravine, a deep-cut natural trench which, starting from the Tronville cosses, here intersects the plateau from west to east. Against the weight of French numbers, nearly three to one, the Prussians were unable to stand, and presently they broke and drifted backwards, completely routed. Then the 1st Guard Dragoons (since known as Queen Victoria's regiment), after a brilliant manœuvre under heavy fire to get into the best position for delivering a charge, rode down the whole French line of pursuers from left to right, and by their heroic self-sacrifice relieved the remnants of the infantry from further pursuit.

This was the scene which for the moment held the attention of Prince Frederick Charles when at length he reached the battlefield from Pont-à-Mousson. All along the rest of the line the Prussians were still holding their own, and on the extreme right fresh troops from the IX. Corps were streaming up through the woods against the French left wing. But on the left there was every sign of incipient disaster, and to avert this only the cavalry were at hand. Sending, therefore, hasty orders to the 5th and 6th cavalry divisions to concentrate to the west of Mars-la-Tour, the prince ordered them from there to sweep round on the right rear of the French army. The same idea had, however, occurred to Ladmirault, and he had called on the two nearest French cavalry divisions to put it into execution, and as the Prussians began to reach the plateau west of Mars-la-Tour and the Yron brook from the south, the French were deploying across it some two thousand yards to the north.

Then followed a duel—the one great cavalry duel of the war—between upwards of two thousand horsemen a side. But it was delivered by both sides in a series of regimental charges, and in result was singularly indecisive. For about half an hour great crowds of riders, hidden by dense clouds of dust, drifted aimlessly about the plain, till at length the charge of a single squadron of the Oldenburg Dragoons (who had joined in their own initiative), delivered on the outer French flank, brought the whole mass



into motion north-eastward, and, both sides sounding the rally, the engagement gradually ceased.

It was now about 7 P.M. and night was coming on. Seeing the dust-clouds drifting away northward, and noting the lethargy which seemed to have settled over the whole French line, Prince Frederick Charles decided to assert his own independent will to conquer by a final assault along his whole front. Guns, cavalry, infantry, everything that could still stand were to take part in it. Weary as they all were, his indomitable will put fresh life into the whole army. With drums beating and colours flying, every unit within call went forward for the final effort. It was almost dark when the Prussians approached the French position between Rezonville and the woods to the northward, and the troops soon lost direction in the smoke and became involved in the direst confusion; the firing again blazed out for a few moments, only to die away as utter exhaustion at length put an end to the Prussian advance. Then the wearied troops, for the most part, lay down and slept in the positions they had reached.

Thus closed the hardest fought battle of the Franco-German War. From 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. only 23,700 rifles, 8100 sabres and 126 guns had been brought into action by the Germans against 59,100 rifles, 6700 sabres and 300 guns on the French side, and even at the close of the day the former had only deployed 47,100 rifles, 8300 sabres and 222 guns against 83,000 rifles, 8000 sabres and 432 guns including 24 mitrailleuses. The chief characteristic of the day's fighting was the terrible effectiveness of the Prussian artillery, which was handled in masses and not, as on the French side, by batteries. The manœuvring power of the latter attracted the admiration of the Germans, but arriving singly on the field they were generally reduced to silence in a few minutes. Deprived of their support, not all the gallantry of the French infantry could avail anything. Again and again, particularly on their left wing, they chased the German infantry before them, but the moment the retreat of the latter downhill uncovered the pursuing French to the Prussian guns, a tornado of shells shattered their order and compelled them to retreat. Though the cavalry were freely engaged, the training of both was so far beneath the standard of the present day that the most that can be credited to them in respect of results is that they from time to time averted imminent disaster, but failed altogether to achieve such a decision as was well within their potential capacities.

Gravelotte—St Privat (August 18).—The position on to which the French army fell back from the field of Vionville is formed by a ridge some six miles long running from Rozerieulles almost due north to Roncourt, a little village overhanging the steep and wooded banks of the Orne, and connected with the general plateau between the Meuse and Moselle by a gentle saddle running from about Amanvillers nearly due west through the Bois de la Cusse towards Doncourt. North of this saddle the slopes show a slight concavity, but are passable by troops of all arms in close order. To the south the rivulet of the Mance soon forms a formidable obstacle as its bed cuts its way through the sandstone. Scrub and woods with dense undergrowth line both its banks, and, except by the great chaussée from Metz to Verdun, access to the French side becomes impossible to troops in ordered bodies.

It does not appear that the position had been systematically examined, or apportioned to the several corps in accordance with any predetermined plan. The army merely swung backwards, pivoting on its left wing, the corps preserving their relative order as it had been on the 16th, with the exception that the Imperial Guard was withdrawn to the spur on which Fort Plappeville stands, and the 6th Corps (Marshal Canrobert) crossed the line of march of the 3rd and 4th corps in order to gain St Privat la Montagne. No lines of march were assigned to the several units, consequently the confusion became so great that though the distance to be traversed in no case exceeded six miles, only the right wing and centre reached their destinations as night was falling. Many of them had so little idea of the general situation that they actually placed outposts to the north and east, whilst the whole of the enemy's army lay to the south and west. No attempt was made to entrench the position systematically, but on the left the 2nd and 3rd corps made some disconnected shelter trenches and gun-pits, while the 4th corps in the centre began to improve available cover about an hour before the battle began, and the 6th corps on the right, not yet having received any entrenching tools, could do no more than improvise a few loopholes in the walls of the villages of St Privat and Roncourt with such tools as the sappers could obtain from the inhabitants.

Fortunately for the French the Germans were too exhausted by the battle of the 16th to attempt to interfere with these movements. At daybreak on the morning of the 18th the royal headquarters (which now for the first time arrived at the front) still had no certain knowledge as to whether the French main army was in retreat—covered by the force which they could see on the high ground north of the Metz road—or whether they had taken up a position in order to fight.

Hence the orders issued overnight on the presumption that the main force of the French was retreating to the north and west were allowed to stand, and the whole II. army (Prince Frederick Charles) moved off in échelon from left to right, the I. army under Steinmetz, consisting for the day of the I., II. and VII. corps, being left in observation

of the troops visible on their front and of the garrison of Metz itself. The I. corps was kept back beyond the Moselle on the east side of Metz, the II. was not due to arrive at Rezonville before 4 p.m., hence the VII. only was immediately available if the enemy counter-attacked. But Steinmetz had not ordered, nor had von Zadow, the corps commander, undertaken, any preparations to meet an emergency. About 10 a.m. the corps had reached the following positions: VIII. corps, Rezonville; XI. near St Marcel; Guard approaching Doncourt; XII. towards Jarny; the III. and X., which had been so heavily engaged on the 16th, still in their bivouacs preparing to move. The cavalry of the Saxons had established the fact that the French had not retreated northward, but though scouts from the Guard had already seen the enemy on the heights of St Privat, this information had not yet reached headquarters, nor had it been transmitted to the IX. corps, which it most closely concerned.

Shortly after 10 a.m. Moltke, still under the impression that the French right extended no farther than La Folie (2 m. north of the Metz road), determined to attack with the IX. and VIII. corps whilst the Guard executed a turning movement via Habonville against the French right. The IX. corps was to engage, but not to push its attack home until the Guard could co-operate. The XII. corps was left to its own devices, but fortunately the crown prince of Saxony, who commanded it, had ridden forward and, seeing the French in force towards Roncourt, had issued orders which in the event proved decisive.

In pursuance of his instructions von Manstein, commanding the IX. Corps, set his two divisions in motion towards La Folie and the Bois de la Cusse, and advanced to reconnoitre the French position. From the eastern edge of the above-named copses he suddenly descried the camp of a whole French corps (the 4th) evidently ignorant of their danger, on the slopes trending westward from Amanvillers. Unmindful of the experience of the 16th, he decided to execute an artillery surprise on a grand scale, and sent orders to his corps artillery to come into action on the long spur overlooking the French camps from the westward. At noon, just as the French infantry were falling in for midday roll-call, sufficient guns were in position, and suddenly opened fire. But the effect was disappointing. The French infantry ran to their arms, piled along the front of their positions, and moved forward to attack, covering their advance by a hail of bullets. Simultaneously the French artillery also took up the challenge, and from the heights near St Privat the 6th corps, whose presence had been unsuspected by the Prussians, joined in the fight.

In a few minutes the batteries on the extreme Prussian left were completely overwhelmed, and suddenly dense lines of French skirmishers emerged from a fold in the ground upon their flank and front, and the gunners were compelled to resort to case-shot, so imminent was their danger. But at this critical moment the leading companies of the Hessian infantry arrived, re-established the equilibrium (though not before four Prussian batteries had been temporarily overrun by the enemy), and a most obstinate fight ensued.

Prince Frederick Charles now rode forward to a point north-east of Vernéville, whence the southern boundary of St Privat could be seen. But the northern side of the village and the country towards Roncourt was hidden from his view by the high poplars bordering the Metz-Briey road. Seeing the Hessians hard pressed, he now brought forward the 2nd division of the Guard to their assistance, sending in the 3rd brigade immediately, and holding the 4th brigade in reserve. The 1st division, warned by their own scouts that French troops were in Ste Marie, deployed to attack this village, and were assisted in their endeavour by a brigade of Saxons detached by the crown prince of Saxony, who from his position could see behind the poplar screen that limited the view of the commander-in-chief. Hence he was already aware that the French position extended to Roncourt at least, and had despatched a whole division down the valley of the Orne to outflank them. No news of this movement, however, appears to have reached Prince Frederick Charles.

The French troops in Ste Marie were only an outpost of the 6th corps, and seeing themselves outnumbered, they withdrew about 2.30, the Prussians rushing the village immediately afterwards. Considerable confusion arose from the convergence of these three brigades upon one village, and more than an hour passed before the troops could be disentangled and massed for further operations. The leaders of the two Guard brigades, still ignorant of the extent of the French position, rallied their men on the main bodies of their commands (which had not been engaged) and then lay down facing exactly as they had done when brought forward to the attack. Thus the 1st brigade lay facing about east-south-east, south of the chaussée and some five hundred yards west of the village. The 2nd brigade lay south-west of the village about three hundred yards away from it and facing nearly north-east.

The Saxons were on the left rear of the 1st brigade, but took longer to recover themselves than the Guards. With the Hessians and the IX. Corps the action still dragged; the 3rd brigade of the Guards had become involved in the fight, and notwithstanding the arrival of the corps artillery of the III. corps in the centre the situation was still critical. From the south also came the thunder of guns and no encouraging news from that quarter had as yet reached the prince's headquarters.

About 4.30 P.M. the prince therefore had to consider how long it would take to obtain a decision. To postpone it till the morrow seemed undesirable; to achieve it before nightfall was only possible at the cost of immediate effort.

He therefore decided to assault St Privat with all the Guards available, and called up the III., X. and Saxons to assist them.

The 4th brigade of the Guards now received their orders to attack Jérusalem (a hamlet a little south of St Privat), and the 1st division was ordered to assault St Privat itself.

Von Pape, commanding the latter division, pointed out that no artillery force adequate to prepare the way for him was as yet on the ground, and that the Saxons were still a long way to the rear. But his orders were imperative, and the 4th brigade was already moving off and had to be supported at any cost. Actually all available batteries had already been sent for and were trotting forward from every quarter towards the objective. He accordingly transmitted his orders, and the 2nd brigade was the first to attempt their execution. It had to wheel half-right in mass to bring it in the required direction, and then to advance till its rear was clear of the obstruction formed by the gardens of Ste Marie. By the time (5.30) it had sufficiently cleared this village it became apparent that the 4th brigade in its extension for attack would overlap the front assigned to the 2nd, hence a further (half-left) wheel, still in mass, had to be undertaken before room for deployment could be obtained. Almost as the commands were given, the French suddenly opened an overwhelming long-range fire and their bullets swept like hail through the crowded mass of the German troops. Nevertheless the wheel was effected, the fresh direction taken, the troops extended for attack, and then the whole brigade dashed towards the houses assigned them as their objective. Meanwhile the 1st brigade had moved round the north of the village and carried out its extension without serious hindrance. But emerging from the hollow running north from Ste Marie, they came under a heavy fire not only from St Privat but also from Roncourt, which latter village they now saw for the first time. Instinctively a portion of their line worked to the left to face this new menace, and the front thus became dangerously extended. They were, however, now abreast of the 2nd brigade, and the whole line raced forward to reach the effective range of their very inferior weapons, which were about equal at 200 yds. to the French rifle at 600. But the losses of the 2nd brigade, particularly in officers, had been too heavy, and the rush died out whilst still 500 yds. from the two villages.

It was now about 6 P.M. and a long pause ensued, while the 220 guns, which by degrees had unlimbered behind them, brought St Privat and Roncourt under fire. About 7 P.M. the Saxon turning-movement took effect; their infantry from the Orne valley attacked Roncourt from the north, and about 7.15 the village was carried.

Neither Prince Frederick Charles nor the troops in the fighting-line could see what had taken place; but the former seeing other Saxons moving towards Montois and the masses of the III. and X. corps approaching, whilst the rain of shells into St Privat exceeded anything hitherto seen on any battlefield, decided to call on the whole of his force to attack. He was in the act of issuing his orders when a psychological wave swept through the fighting-line, and the men rose and rushed the village at the point of the bayonet. It was now about eight o'clock, and the light was rapidly failing.

The French artillery had already evaded the coming blow, and had changed position, "right back," to cover the flank of the rest of the army, and the Prussian and Saxon artillery trotting forward conformed to this new front, their shells sweeping the ground for 2000 yards to the south of Amanvillers. The confusion in and around St Privat, where troops from four several corps were all intermingled, became so extreme that no further infantry-advance could be attempted; so under cover of the fierce artillery duel the remnants of the unfortunate 6th corps drifted away towards Metz down the many ravines leading into the river valley. The "annihilation" of the Guard at St Privat has become historic. Yet, heavy as were the losses of the 1st Guard division they were not excessive compared with those previously endured. In round numbers one-third of their effectives had fallen—most of them in the first great rush forward at 5.30 P.M.; but actually they had been more or less under fire since about 2 P.M., and many were hit by French shells plunging into the turmoil about St Privat from 8 to 10 P.M. But the legend cannot be justified when the facts are compared with the slaughter of the Seven Years' War, of Napoleon's battles, the Crimea, and the American Civil War, or with the horrible punishment of von Wedell's brigade (38th) only two days before.

It is now time to return to the southern theatre of the battle-field, where an entirely independent engagement had been raging all the afternoon. Von Goeben with the VIII. Corps was standing massed about Rezonville when von Manstein's guns opposite Amanvillers suddenly made themselves heard. Wheeling his corps to face the French to the eastward he immediately sent forward his artillery and prepared to support his comrade. Von Zastrow with the VII. corps followed his example. Both corps took as their primary objective the farms of St Hubert and Point du Jour, standing just above the defile made by the Verdun-Metz road where it climbs out of the Mance ravine towards the French position. About 3.30 P.M. St Hubert was carried by a confused mass of some 49 companies, and von Steinmetz, believing the main French position to have been pierced, ordered the

4th cavalry division to cross the ravine by the chaussée and pursue. Simultaneously von Zastrow, under the same impression, had ordered his corps artillery to advance by the same road, and von Goeben, thinking his troops in front required support, had sent forward an infantry brigade by the same line of road.

Presently all these columns converged upon the defile and a hopeless entanglement ensued. Three batteries succeeded in struggling through the mass, and, in coming into action, their left resting on St Hubert. But the remainder of the troops had to be withdrawn, and confusion breaking out in their rear, exposed to all the random bullets and shells of the French, a panic ensued, thousands of men breaking away and flying in wildest confusion through Gravelotte towards the west. Hardly had they melted away when the French made a most brilliant counter-attack from their main position between the farms of Leipzig and Moscow. This was stopped almost entirely by the Prussian artillery fire; but the news of its coming spread through the stragglers in the ravine south of the great road, and a wave of panic again swept through the mass, many thousands bolting right upon the front of their own batteries, thus masking their fire at the most critical moment, and something like a crisis in the battle arose. Fortunately the II. corps was now rapidly approaching (about 6 P.M.), and the king, against Moltke's advice, now ordered von Steinmetz (to whom the II. corps had been allotted for the day) to attack again with all his forces. Meanwhile a third panic broke out which delayed the preliminary movements and it was now growing dark in the ravine. At length the II. corps, together with all of the VII. that could be collected, moved down into the valley. Just as the leading German troops were approaching St Hubert the French again began to fire, their bullets plunging down among the fresh arrivals, who knowing nothing of what had taken place about St Hubert (where the remnant of their own infantry were still offering a desperate resistance) opened fire into the backs of their own men, and a fourth panic began which soon spread to the stragglers crowding the Mance ravine. Fortunately, by the superb gallantry of some of the company officers and men, the new arrivals were induced to recognize their mistake, and by degrees about 10 P.M. the whole of the II. corps succeeded in reaching the plateau between St Hubert and Point du Jour, where the débris of the VII. and VIII. corps had gathered. But in the darkness and confusion no forward movement against the French (only 400 yds. to their front) could be initiated, therefore the whole mass passed the night where they stood until daylight disclosed that the French had retreated.

Meanwhile the king, Moltke, and Bismarck had ridden back behind Gravelotte where they passed two hours of intense anxiety. From the flash of the rifles, it was clear that the French main position was still intact, and as every body of troops within thirty-six hours' call had been engaged there seemed little prospect of renewing the struggle next morning. No news too had come in from Prince Frederick Charles. Ultimately about midnight the welcome tidings of the capture of St Privat arrived, and all anxiety was at an end.

The Investment of Metz (Aug. 19-Oct. 14).—During the night following the battle of Gravelotte the French army withdrew within the line of the forts round Metz. The 6th Corps only was severely shaken, the 4th (the best in the whole army), though it had fought hard twice within forty-eight hours, losing nearly 30% of its strength, was still well in hand, and the 3rd, 2nd and Imperial Guards were almost intact. A fresh issue of ammunition and food was all the men needed to make them a thoroughly efficient fighting force comprising some 100,000 troops capable, with a resolute leader and an efficient staff, of crossing over to the right bank of the Moselle, overrunning the I. German Corps, the only one in their direct path, and then fighting their way across the communications of the II. and III. German armies until they regained touch with the French railways to the south-west about Troyes.

The mere fact of the effort being made would have given the battle of Gravelotte the moral effect of a victory, and the reaction in the German ranks from the feeling of over-confidence, which had mastered them after the early successes of Spicheren and Woerth must have had most far-reaching consequences.

Bazaine, however, withdrew entirely under cover of the forts, and set about the reorganization of his troops in the most leisurely manner. The Metz forts, though neither sufficiently armed nor even completely finished in some cases, were nevertheless, with their deep ditches and self-protecting bastion trace, far too formidable for any field army to attempt without the aid of a siege train of some 200 guns, which for the moment was not available. Of this fact the Germans were well aware, and hence they decided from the first to reduce the place by hunger, calculating that with the extra 150,000 men thrown back upon the fortress, its food supplies could not last very long. On the morning of the 19th the German army was far too exhausted for further efforts. Except the I. corps, which had been summoned overnight from its position about Courcelles towards the battlefield of Gravelotte and had almost reached the Moselle before this move could be counter-ordered, the remainder kept their places of the previous night, only following the French retreat with a screen of outposts. They were sufficiently occupied in collecting the wounded and clearing up the confusion resulting from an accumulation of trains and transport in the defiles of Gorze and about Novéant. No eastward movement could have taken place

that day. In the course of the afternoon of the 19th the royal headquarters, creating a new army under the crown prince of Saxony [Guard, IV. and XII. (Saxons) corps] for field operations towards the Meuse, assigned the remainder of the II. army, and the whole of the I., to Prince Frederick Charles as commander-in-chief of the army of investment.¹ This brought the strength of his command up to eight corps, numbering some 220,000 men; an enormous mass to feed in a district swept bare of supplies by the operations of the preceding week, and with only one railway line, terminating at Courcelles, to depend upon.

For the moment the chief care of the Prince was to guard against an attempt of the French army to break out to the westward. The I. army corps with Kummer's Landwehr division (which arrived during the night of the 19th-20th of August) were to occupy a position to cover the rail head at Courcelles-Rémilly, and the remainder were disposed in the following order: The X. corps was on the north, with a bridge head at Hauconcourt-sur-Moselle, the II., VIII. and VII. along the eastern slopes overlooking the Moselle valley, the latter having also a fortified bridge head at Ars-sur-Moselle. The III. and IX. were cantoned almost on the battlefield of the 18th, between Caulre Farm and Roncourt, ready to move off to the left and support the X. corps in the event of an attempt on the part of the French to break out towards Thionville.

The positions were fortified with a light outpost line, behind which was drawn a main position on which every art of the engineer was expended. Ample arrangements were made for obtaining and circulating intelligence, and all lateral communications were improved and supplemented to the utmost. A light field-railway from Rémilly to Pont à Mousson (14 m.) was also put in hand, but progress on this was very slow. The water-supply of the town was promptly interrupted, but the river water was quite drinkable.

Meanwhile, the French in Metz had been diligently at work. There was no real deficiency of ammunition and stores in the fortress, and provisions for forty days were reported in hand. Bazaine was still in communication with the outside world, though return messages came in sparingly. On the afternoon of the 25th he decided to break out to the northward by the right bank of the river, and orders to this effect were duly issued. Many delays arose in their execution, and it was not till 2 P.M. on the 26th that the troops were formed up ready for action. But at the last moment the marshal wavered. Calling a council of war on the heights of Fort St Julien, he asked the opinion of his subordinates, who were unanimously against the proposed sortie, principally because the artillery "had only ammunition enough for a *single* battle"! Besides, the Germans had long since become aware of the movement in progress, and all chance of surprise was past. It was also raining very heavily. Accordingly the scheme was abandoned.

On the 29th of August Bazaine received a despatch, dated the 27th, from MacMahon, according to which his army should have been at Stenay on the Meuse and farther to the south by the 30th. The marshal accordingly determined to renew the attempt of the 26th, and orders—almost a repetition of those of the previous occasion—were issued.

At this moment (Aug. 31) the positions of von Manteuffel's command (I. corps and 3rd Landwehr division) were most dangerously extended, and a surprise at daybreak might have had far-reaching results. But the habit of excessive bugling and band-playing betrayed the French design even before daybreak. Not until 1.30 P.M. was the concentration completed, and Bazaine again assembled his commanding officers to give them their final instructions. This time he adhered to his decision, and about 4 P.M. the attack opened (battle of Servigny or Noisseville); but his opportunity had been allowed to slip, and though his first onset overwhelmed the German outposts, their main line held good, and masses of guns unlimbering over a front of some 4 m. rendered all further attempts to break the German cordon abortive. Firing only ceased as darkness fell, and next morning the fighting was again renewed. But the whole French army was disheartened. It was obvious that what they had failed to do by surprise was hopeless now that twenty-four hours had been given in which the Germans could make counter-preparations. Therefore about noon a general retirement under the guns of the forts took place, and the last serious hope of the French army had vanished. Some 120,000 men with 528 guns had been engaged against 60,000 Germans with 222 guns, and had been beaten off with a loss of 3500 men. The Germans had lost about 3000.

The investment now resumed its regular course. The Germans, secure in the strength of their position on the left bank of the Moselle, drew more troops over to the right, and added to their defences and communications. The idea was even mooted of damming up the river near Hauconcourt, and thus flooding out the whole of the civil population of Metz; but expert civil engineers, who were sent for from Germany, reported against the proposal.

As time wore on the conditions in Metz and the surrounding camps became deplorable. The hospitals and private houses had been crowded with wounded from the first, and now, owing to the persistent wet weather, small-pox and dysentery became epidemic. Towards the close of September rations had to be reduced, and the troops began slaughter-

¹ Steinmetz was shortly afterwards relieved of his command and returned to Germany.

ing the cavalry horses for food. Probably to cheer the men by a semblance of activity, Marshal Bazaine attempted a sortie on a large scale on the 1st of October in the direction of Ladorchamps, and fighting continued into the 2nd, but without prospect of success, and the profound depression following on defeat sent up the sick list rapidly. One other sortie towards Noisseville followed on the 7th, the alleged reason for which was the hope of obtaining provisions in the neighbouring villages. But it was beaten off with the utmost ease by the investing troops, who were well fed and cared for; and as by this time even the gun-teams had followed the cavalry horses to the slaughter-house, the French army as an army—*i.e.* a combination of the three arms—had ceased to exist. On the recognition of this fact negotiations for the capitulation of Metz were begun on the 13th of October, and on the 14th the army of the Rhine surrendered. Had it held out even forty-eight hours longer events before Paris and Orleans might have taken a different turn.

The investment of Metz had lasted 54 days, and the death-roll of the civil population had risen to 3587 against 1200 in the corresponding period of a normal year. The army itself had only lost from sickness 2600 men, or barely 2% of its full effective.

This seems a fitting place to discuss the much-disputed point of Bazaine's conduct in allowing himself to be driven back into Metz when fortune had thrown into his hands the great opportunity of the 16th and 17th of August. He had been appointed to command on the 10th, but the presence of the emperor, who only left the front early on the 16th, and their dislike of Bazaine, exercised a disturbing influence on the headquarters staff officers. During the retreat to Metz the marshal had satisfied himself as to the inability of his corps commanders to handle their troops, and also as to the ill-will of the staff. In the circumstances he felt that a battle in the open field could only end in disaster; and, since it was proved that the Germans could outmarch him, his army was sure to be overtaken and annihilated if he ventured beyond the shelter of the fortress. But near Metz he could at least inflict very severe punishment on his assailants, and in any case his presence in Metz would neutralize a far superior force of the enemy for weeks or months. What use the French government might choose to make of the breathing space thus secured was their business, not his; and subsequent events showed that, had they not forced MacMahon's hand, the existence of the latter's nucleus army of trained troops might have prevented the investment of Paris. Bazaine was condemned by court-martial after the war, but if the case was reheard to-day it is certain that no charge of treachery could be sustained.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN

THE operations which led to the capture of MacMahon's army in Sedan call for little explanation. Given seven corps, each capable of averaging 15 m. a day for a week in succession, opposed to four corps only, shaken by defeat and unable as a whole to cover more than 5 m. a day, the result could hardly be doubtful. But Moltke's method of conducting operations left his opponent many openings which could only be closed by excessive demands on the marching power of the men. Trusting only to his cavalry screen to secure information, he was always without any definite fixed point about which to manœuvre, for whilst the reports of the screen and orders based thereon were being transmitted, the enemy was free to move, and generally their movements were dictated by political expediency, not by calculable military motives.


Thus whilst the German army, on a front of nearly 50 m., was marching due west on Paris, MacMahon, under political pressure, was moving parallel to them, but on a northerly route, to attempt the relief of Metz.

So unexpected was this move and so uncertain the information which called attention to it, that Moltke did not venture to change at once the direction of march of the whole army, but he directed the Army of the Meuse northward on Damvillers and ordered Prince Frederick Charles to detach two corps from the forces investing Metz to reinforce it. For the moment, therefore, MacMahon's move had succeeded, and the opportunity existed for Bazaine to break out. But at the critical moment the hopeless want of real efficiency in MacMahon's army compelled the latter so to delay his advance that it became evident to the Germans that there was no longer any necessity for the III. army to maintain the direction towards Paris, and that the probable point of contact between the Meuse army and the French lay nearer to the right wing of the III. army than to Prince Frederick Charles's investing force before Metz.

The detachment from the II. army was therefore countermanded, and the whole III. army changed front to the north, while the Meuse army headed the French off from the east. The latter came into contact with the head of the French columns, during the 29th, about Nouart, and on the 30th at Buzancy (battle of Beaumont); and the French, yielding to the force of numbers combined with superior *moral*, were driven north-westward upon

Sedan, right across the front of the III. army, which was now rapidly coming up from the south.

During the course of the 31st of August the retreating French army (1st, 5th, 7th and 12th corps) under Marshal MacMahon assembled in and around Sedan, watched throughout the day by the German cavalry but not severely pushed by them. Sedan is a small old-fashioned fortress, lying in a depression between two ridges which converge in the plateau of Illy about 2½ m. north-east of the town. The only part which its defences played, or might have played, in the ensuing battle lay in the strategic possibilities contained in the fine and roomy bridge-head of Torcy, covering an elbow bend of the Meuse whence the whole French army might have been hurled into the gap between the



German III. and Meuse armies, had there been a Napoleon to conceive and to execute this plan. But MacMahon seems to have been too despondent to contemplate anything further than a battle for the honour of the army, and though communications with Mézières, where Vinoy's corps (13th) was gathering, lay open throughout the day, he neither sent orders to it nor made any arrangements to meet the coming danger.

The troops received food and ammunition, the disorders consequent on the successive days' fighting in retreat were remedied, and the men themselves got what they needed most of all, an almost unbroken day's rest. Locally their positions were strong, particularly to the east, where the stream flowing through the Fond du Givonne, though fordable, presented a serious obstacle to the tactical handling of the German infantry. But as a whole it was far too cramped for the numbers crowded into it; it could be completely overlooked from the heights of Frénois, where the king of Prussia's headquarters took their stand, and whence in the afternoon the German artillery fire began to cross

over the town itself. At nightfall on the 31st the leading German infantry were approaching. The army of the Meuse on the right bank of the river, with the II. Bavarians moving towards Bazeilles to reinforce it, and the III. army, consisting of the V. and XI. corps with the Württemberg division, was heading for Donchéry to cut off the French from Mézières, and only a weak cavalry screen closed the gap between them.

During the night of the 31st of August the Bavarians threw a pontoon bridge across the Meuse below Rémilly, and soon after daybreak, in a fog which lay thickly over the whole country, they began their advance towards Bazeilles, held by Vassoigne's division of the 12th corps and fairly prepared for defence. The firing called all troops within reach of the sound to arms, and before 5 A.M. the Meuse army was marching to the battle-field, the Guards on the northern road *via* Villers-Arnav, the Saxons and IV. corps to the south along the river.

Vassoigne's division contained a number of Marine battalions, and their stubborn resistance completely disconcerted the Bavarians. Deprived of all artillery co-operation owing to the fog, the latter spent themselves in fruitless and disconnected efforts in the gardens and streets of the village, and reinforcements were soon urgently needed. About 6 A.M. the fog lifted, and the German batteries at once took part in the struggle. One of the first shells wounded Marshal MacMahon. The next senior officer, General Ducrot, at once assumed command (7 A.M.). But it happened that General Wimpffen, who had only joined the army from Algiers on the night of the 30th, brought with him a secret commission to assume command in the event of the death or disablement of MacMahon. Of this power he did not at first avail himself, since he was a stranger both to the army and the country, whilst Ducrot possessed the confidence of the one and the knowledge of the other in the highest degree. But when about 9 A.M. he learnt that Ducrot proposed to move the whole army under cover of rearguards to the west towards Mézières, he produced his commission and countermanded the movement, being himself convinced that eastward towards Bazaine at Metz lay the road to salvation. Orders once issued on a battle-field are not easily recalled, and the result of this change of command was dire confusion. The French troops northwards of Bazeilles, along the Fond du Givonne, were already commencing their withdrawal, when the leading troops of the Saxon XII. corps began to arrive about Daigny, and being only opposed by a weak rearguard, easily carried the ridge south of the Givonne-Sedan road, thus threatening the retreat of Vassoigne's division in and about Bazeilles, which then fell into the hands of the Bavarians between 10 and 11 A.M. At the same moment the Guard corps had begun to form up between Daigny and Givonne, and there being no serious force of the enemy in front of them, the artillery was deploying along the western heights above the valley of Givonne, covered only by weak advanced guards of infantry, when suddenly a great column of French infantry, some 6,000 strong, moving west in pursuance of Wimpffen's orders, came over the eastern border of the valley and charged down at full speed towards the guns. Then followed one of the most dramatic spectacles of the entire war. The whole of the corps artillery of the Guard turned upon these devoted men, and tore the column in half, shrouding it in dense clouds of dust and smoke from the bursting shells, above which could be seen the trunks and limbs of men flung upwards by their explosion. The head of the column, perhaps 2000 strong, nevertheless kept on its way, but under the combined fire of the Guard rifle battalion and the flanking fire from other guns its impetus died out and its debris disappeared by degrees under convenient cover. The German Guards were now free to stretch out their right towards the Belgian frontier (where the scouts of the III. army were already moving) and prepare with all deliberation for the attack on the Bois de la Garenne.

The III. army had moved off as early as 2.30 A.M., and by 4 A.M. was already crossing the Meuse at Donchéry, aided by several pontoon and trestle bridges thrown over during the night. Their right was covered from sight by the peninsula formed by a bend of the river, and the march of the several columns was unopposed till, clearing its northern extremity, they began to deploy to their right between St Menges and Floing. Here they encountered French outposts, which fell back on their main position on the ridge, to the south of the Floing-Illy road. Against this position the German artillery now pressed forward, and seeing their exposed position, General Gallifet brought forward his brigade of Chasseurs d'Afrique and delivered a most dashing charge. But being unsupported he was compelled to withdraw again behind the cover of the Cazal-Illy ridge.

It was now about 11 A.M., and, whether moved by the belated impulse of Ducrot's orders, or attracted by the apparent weakness of the Prussians within sight, the French infantry now made a brilliant counter-attack out of their position in their usual manner. But German reinforcements coming suddenly into view, and their *élan* having spent itself, they fell back again, holding only to Floing, whence it required nearly two hours more to expel them.

About noon Wimpffen rode up to General Douay and asked him whether he could hold on to his position. The latter, possibly elated by the success of his recent attack, replied in the affirmative, pointing out only the importance of maintaining the Calvaire d'Illy to the north. De Wimpffen promised him support from the 1st corps on the right

rear, part of which, hidden in the Bois de la Garenne, had as yet been little engaged, and then rode south to Balan, where he found the 12th corps fighting desperately. He then sent back to Douay for reinforcements, and the latter despatched all he could spare. These, marching south, crossed the troops of the 1st corps sent to Douay's assistance. The Prussian shells were already crashing into the woods from all sides, and countless stragglers and riderless horses caused most serious delay. To gain time, Margueritte's division was ordered to charge. Margueritte was killed as he rode forward to reconnoitre, and Gallifet took command. "For the next half-hour," says the Prussian official account, "the scene defies description. Gallifet and his squadrons covered themselves with glory, but he had not 2000 sabres at his disposal. Under the storm of shell and over the broken ground manœuvring was impossible. But a series of isolated charges were delivered with results which convinced well-nigh every survivor that the day of cavalry, in sufficient numbers and properly handled on the battle-field, was by no means spent." About an hour after the cavalry charges, between 3 and 4 P.M., the Germans at length gathered weight enough to attempt the assault of the French main position, and moved by a common instinct, lines of men almost 2 m. in extent pressed on, gaining cover from the convex slope of the hill, till at length they were able to storm the stubbornly-defended ridge. Meanwhile, Wimpffen had initiated a fresh counter-stroke from the Fond du Givonne against Balan and Bazeilles. Carried out with magnificent courage, it swept the Bavarians out of both villages, and for a moment the road seemed open for escape, but Wimpffen did not know that the IV. Prussian corps stood waiting behind the gap.

Riding back to the town to seek the emperor and implore him to place himself at the head of all available reinforcements, he saw a white flag break out from the steeple of the church tower, but almost instantaneously disappear. He did indeed reach the emperor, but, delayed by the appalling confusion, was too late. The flag had gone up again and he knew that further resistance was hopeless. The fighting did not cease at once. The troops he had directed to make the final effort, their eyes fixed on the enemy in front of them, never saw the flag; and until 6 P.M. a series of isolated attempts were made to break the iron circle with which the Germans had surrounded them. The emperor, who during the early hours of the day had fearlessly courted death, at length overcome by extreme physical pain and exhaustion, had ridden back to the town, and about 4 P.M., seeing no hope of success, had sent a parlementaire conveying his personal surrender to the king of Prussia, at the same time ordering the white flag to be hoisted. It was torn down by a Colonel Fauve, but was hoisted again half an hour later, when Prussian troops from Cazal were almost at the western gates of Sedan. It only remained for Wimpffen to make terms for the army, and after a long and gallant effort to avert the inevitable, he at length signed an unconditional surrender, with the sole alleviation (introduced as a tribute of respect for the gallantry shown by his men) that all officers were to retain their swords.

Thus passed into captivity 82,000 men, 558 guns, and stores to an immense amount. The price to the victors for this result was in round numbers 9,000. The French killed and wounded numbered about 17,000. It is indicative of the demoralization in the French army that this figure is 1000 less than the cost of the victory to the Germans at Wörth, although on that occasion the French troops actually engaged numbered one-half those available at Sedan. The duration of the fighting was the same in both cases.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEFENCE OF PARIS

Thus in five weeks one of the French field armies was imprisoned in Metz, the other destroyed, and the Germans were free to march upon Paris. This seemed easy. There could be no organized opposition to their progress,¹ and Paris, if not so defenceless as in 1814, was more populous. Starvation was the best method of attacking an over-crowded fortress, and the Parisians were not thought to be proof against the deprivation of their accustomed luxuries. Even Moltke hoped that by the end of October he would be "shooting hares at Creisau," and with this confidence the German III. and IV. armies left the vicinity of Sedan on the 4th of September. The march called for no more than good staff arrangements, and the two armies arrived before Paris a fortnight later and gradually encircled the place—the III. army on the south, the IV. on the north side—in the last days of September. Headquarters were established at Versailles. Meanwhile the Third Empire had fallen, giving place on the 4th of September to a republican government

¹ The 13th corps (Vinoy), which had followed MacMahon's army at some distance, was not involved in the catastrophe of Sedan, and by good luck as well as good management evaded the German pursuit and returned safely to Paris.

of National Defence, which made its appeal to, and evoked, the spirit of 1792. Henceforward the French nation, which had left the conduct of the war to the regular army and had been little more than an excited spectator, took the burden upon itself.

The regular army, indeed, still contained more than 500,000 men (chiefly recruits and reservists), and 50,000 sailors, marines, douaniers, &c., were also available. But the Garde Mobile, framed by Marshal Niel in 1868, doubled this figure, and the addition of the Garde Nationale, called into existence on the 15th of September, and including all able-bodied men of from 31 to 60 years of age, more than trebled it. The German staff had of course to reckon on the Garde Mobile, and did so beforehand, but they wholly underestimated both its effective members and its willingness, while, possessing themselves a system in which all the military elements of the German nation stood close behind the troops of the active army, they ignored the potentialities of the Garde Nationale.

Meanwhile, both as a contrast to the events that centred on Paris and because in point of time they were decided for the most part in the weeks immediately following Sedan, we must briefly allude to the sieges conducted by the Germans. Old and ruined as many of them were, the French fortresses possessed considerable importance in the eyes of the Germans. Strassburg in particular, the key of Alsace, the standing menace to South Germany and the most conspicuous of the spoils of Louis XIV.'s *Raubkriege*, was an obvious target. Operations were begun on the 9th of August, three days after Wörth, General v. Werder's corps (Baden troops and Prussian Landwehr) making the siege. The French commandant, General Uhrich, surrendered after a stubborn resistance on the 28th of September. Of the smaller fortresses many, being practically unarmed and without garrisons, capitulated at once. Toul, defended by Major Huck, with 2000 mobiles, resisted for forty days, and drew upon itself the efforts of 13,000 men and 100 guns. Verdun, commanded by General Guérin de Waldersbach, held out till after the fall of Metz. Some of the fortresses lying to the north of the Prussian line of advance on Paris, e.g. Mézières, resisted up to January 1871, though of course this was very largely due to the diminution of pressure caused by the appearance of new French field armies in October. On the 9th of September a strange incident took place at the surrender of Laon. A powder magazine was blown up by the soldiers in charge and 300 French and a few German soldiers were killed by the explosion. But as the Germans advanced, their lines of communication were thoroughly organized, and the belt of country between Paris and the Prussian frontier subdued and garrisoned. Most of these fortresses were small town enceintes, dating from Vauban's time, and open, under the new conditions of warfare, to concentric bombardment from positions formerly out of range, upon which the besieger could place as many guns as he chose to employ. In addition they were usually deficient in armament and stores and garrisoned by newly-raised troops. Belfort, where the defenders strained every nerve to keep the besiegers out of bombarding range, and Paris formed the only exceptions to this general rule.

The policy of the new French government was defined by Jules Favre on the 6th of September. "It is for the king of Prussia, who has declared that he is making war on the Empire and not on France, to stay his hand; we shall not cede an inch of our territory or a stone of our fortresses." These proud words, so often ridiculed as empty bombast, were the prelude of a national effort which re-established France in the eyes of Europe as a great power, even though provinces and fortresses were ceded in the peace that that effort proved unable to avert. They were translated into action by Léon Gambetta, who escaped from Paris in a balloon on the 7th of October, and established the headquarters of the defence at Tours, where already the "Delegation" of the central government—which had decided to remain in Paris—had concentrated the machinery of government. Thenceforward Gambetta and his principal assistant de Freycinet directed the whole war in the open country, co-ordinating it, as best they could with the precarious means of communication at their disposal, with Trochu's military operations in and round the capital. His critics—Gambetta's personality was such as to ensure him numerous enemies among the higher civil and military officials, over whom, in the interests of *La Patrie*, he rode rough-shod—have acknowledged the fact, which is patent enough in any case, that nothing but Gambetta's driving energy enabled France in a few weeks to create and to equip twelve army corps, representing thirty-six divisions (600,000 rifles and 1400 guns), after all her organized regular field troops had been destroyed or neutralized. But it is claimed that by undue interference with the generals at the front, by presuming to dictate their plans of campaign, and by forcing them to act when the troops were unready, Gambetta and de Freycinet nullified the efforts of themselves and the rest of the nation and subjected France to a humiliating treaty of peace. We cannot here discuss the justice or injustice of such a general condemnation, or even whether in individual instances Gambetta trespassed too far into the special domain of the soldier. But even the brief narrative given below must at least suggest to the reader the existence amongst the generals and higher officials of a dead weight of passive resistance to the Delegation's orders, of unnecessary distrust of the qualities of the improvised troops, and above all of the utter fear of responsibility that twenty years of literal obedience had bred. The closest study of the war cannot lead to any other conclusion than this, that whether or not Gambetta as a strategist

took the right course in general or in particular cases, no one else would have taken any course whatever.

On the approach of the enemy Paris hastened its preparations for defence to the utmost, while in the provinces, out of reach of the German cavalry, new army corps were rapidly organized out of the few constituted regular units not involved in the previous catastrophes, the depot troops and the mobile national guard. The first-fruits of these efforts were seen in Beauce, where early in October important masses of French troops prepared not only to bar the further progress of the invader but actually to relieve Paris. The so-called "fog of war"—the armed inhabitants, francs-tireurs, sedentary national guard and volunteers—prevented the German cavalry from venturing far out from the infantry camps around Paris, and behind this screen the new 15th army corps assembled on the Loire. But an untimely demonstration of force alarmed the Germans, all of whom, from Moltke downwards, had hitherto disbelieved in the existence of the French new formations, and the still unready 15th corps found itself the target of an expedition of the I. Bavarian corps, which drove the defenders out of Orleans after a sharp struggle, while at the same time another expedition swept the western part of Beauce, sacked Châteaudun as a punishment for its brave defence, and returned via Chartres, which was occupied.

After these events the French forces disappeared from German eyes for some weeks. D'Aurelle de Paladines, the commander of the "army of the Loire" (15th and 16th corps), improvised a camp of instruction at Salbris in Sologne, several marches out of reach, and subjected his raw troops to a stern régime of drill and discipline. At the same time an "army of the West" began to gather on the side of Le Mans. This army was almost imaginary, yet rumours of its existence and numbers led the German commanders into the gravest errors, for they soon came to suspect that the main army lay on that side and not on the Loire, and this mistaken impression governed the German dispositions up to the very eve of the decisive events around Orleans in December. Thus when at last D'Aurelle took the offensive from Tours (whither he had transported his forces, now 100,000 strong) against the position of the I. Bavarian corps near Orleans, he found his task easy. The Bavarians, outnumbered and unsupported, were defeated with heavy losses in the battle of Coulmiers (November 9), and, had it not been for the inexperience, want of combination, and other technical weaknesses of the French, they would have been annihilated. What the results of such a victory as Coulmiers might have been, had it been won by a fully organized, smoothly working army of the same strength, it is difficult to overestimate. As it was, the retirement of the Bavarians rang the alarm bell all along the line of the German positions, and that was all.

Then once again, instead of following up its success, the French army disappeared from view. The victory had emboldened the "fog of war" to make renewed efforts, and resistance to the pressure of the German cavalry grew day by day. The Bavarians were reinforced by two Prussian divisions and by all available cavalry commands, and constituted as an "army detachment" under the grand-duke Friedrich Franz of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to deal with the army of the Loire, the strength of which was far from being accurately known. Meantime the capitulation of Metz on the 28th of October had set free the veterans of Prince Frederick Charles, the best troops in the German army, for field operations. The latter were at first misdirected to the upper Seine, and yet another opportunity arose for the French to raise the siege of Paris. But D'Aurelle utilized the time he had gained in strengthening the army and in imparting drill and discipline to the new units which gathered round the original nucleus of the 15th and 16th corps. All this was, however, unknown and even unsuspected at the German headquarters, and the invaders, feeling the approaching crisis, became more than uneasy as to their prospects of maintaining the siege of Paris. The first siege of Paris began on the 19th of September 1870, with the occupation by the Germans of the heights on the left side of the river and the capture of the unfinished redoubt of Châtillon. Two days later the investment was complete. General Trochu, head of the French government and governor of the city, had under his command 400,000 men—a force which ought to have been able to hold out against the 240,000 Germans by whom it was besieged, had it not been composed for the most part of hurried levies of raw soldiers with inexperienced officers, and of national guards who, never having been subjected to strict military discipline, were a source of weakness rather than of strength. The guards, it is true, displayed a certain warlike spirit, but it was for the sole purpose of exciting disorder. Open revolt broke out on the 31st of October; it was suppressed, but increased the demoralization of the besieged and the demands of the Prussians. The partial successes which the French obtained in engagements on both sides of the river were rendered useless by the Germans recapturing all the best positions; the severity of winter told heavily on the garrison, and the armies in the provinces which were to have co-operated with it were held in check by the Germans in the west and south. In obedience to public opinion a great sortie was undertaken; this, in fact, was the only alternative to a surrender; for, the empire having organized everything in expectation of victory and not of disaster, Paris, insufficiently provisioned for the increase of population caused by the influx of refugees, was already suffering the horrors of famine. Accidental circumstances combined with the indecision

of the leaders to render the enterprise a failure. Despatches sent by balloon to the army of the Loire instructing it to make a diversion reached their destination too late; the bridge of Champigny over the Marne could not be constructed in time; the most advantageous positions remained in the hands of the Germans; and on the 2nd and 3rd of December the French abandoned the positions they had seized on the 29th and 30th of November. Another sortie made towards the north on the 21st of December was repulsed, and the besieged lost the Avron plateau, the key to the positions which they still held on that side. The bombardment began on the 17th of December, and great damage was done to the forts on the left of the Seine, especially those of Vanves and Issy, directly commanded by the Châtillon battery. A third and last sortie (which proved fatal to Regnault the painter) was attempted in January 1871, but resulted in hopeless retreat. An armistice was signed on the 27th of January, the capitulation on the 28th. The revictualling of the city was not accomplished without much difficulty, in spite of the generous rivalry of foreign nations (London alone sending provisions to the value of £80,000).

On the 1st of March the Germans entered Paris. This event, which marked the close of the siege, was at the same time the first preparation for the "commune"; for the national guard, taking advantage of the general confusion and the powerlessness of the regular army, carried a number of cannon to the heights of Montmartre and Belleville under pretext of saving them. President Thiers appreciating the danger, attempted on the 18th of March to remove the ordnance; his action was the signal of an insurrection which, successful from the first, initiated a series of terrible outrages by the murder of the two generals, Lecomte and Thomas. The government, afraid of the defection of the troops, who were demoralized by failure and suffering, had evacuated the forts on the left side of the river and concentrated the army at Versailles (the forts on the right side were still to be held for some time by the Germans). Mont Valérien happily remained in the hands of the government and became the pivot of the attack during the second siege. All the sorties made by the insurgents in the direction of Versailles (where the National Assembly was in session from the 20th of March) proved unsuccessful, and cost them two of their improvised leaders—Generals Flourens and Duval. The incapacity and mutual hatred of their chiefs rendered all organization and durable resistance impossible. On Sunday the 21st of May the government forces, commanded by Marshal MacMahon, having already captured the forts on the right side of the river, made their way within the walls; but they had still to fight hard from barricade to barricade before they were masters of the city; Belleville, the special Red Republican quarter, was not assaulted and taken till Friday. Meanwhile the communists were committing the most horrible excesses: the archbishop of Paris (Georges Darboy), President Bonjean, priests, magistrates, journalists and private individuals, whom they had seized as hostages, were shot in batches in the prisons; and a scheme of destruction was ruthlessly carried into effect by men and women with cases of petroleum (*pétroleurs* and *pétroleuses*). The Hôtel de Ville, the Palais de Justice, the Tuileries, the Ministry of Finance, the palace of the Legion of Honour, that of the Council of State, part of the Rue de Rivoli, &c., were ravaged by the flames; barrels of gunpowder were placed in Notre Dame and the Pantheon, ready to blow up the buildings; and the whole city would have been involved in ruin if the national troops had not gained a last and crowning victory in the neighbourhood of La Roquette and Père-la-Chaise on the 28th of May. Besides the large number of insurgents who, taken in arms, were pitilessly shot, others were afterwards condemned to death, to penal servitude, to transportation; and the survivors only obtained their liberty by the decree of 1879.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORLEANS CAMPAIGN

ORLEANS was the central point of the second portion of the Franco-German War, the city and the line of the Loire being at first the rendezvous of the new armies improvised by the government of National Defence and afterwards the starting-point of the most important attempt made to relieve Paris. The campaign has thus two well-marked phases, the first ending with the first capture of Orleans on the 10th of October, and the second with the second and final capture on the night of the 4th of December.

Shortly after the fall of the empire the government of National Defence, having decided that it must remain in Paris in spite of the impending siege, despatched a delegation to Tours to direct the government and the war in the provinces. This was originally composed (10-15 September) of two aged lawyers, Crémieux and Glais-Bizoin, and a naval officer, Vice-Admiral Fourichon, who had charge of both the war and the marine ministries. A retired general, de la Motte-Rouge, was placed in command of the "territorial division of Tours." He found, scattered over the south and west of France, a number of regular units, mostly provisional regiments, squadrons and batteries, assembled

from the depots, and all exceedingly ill supplied and equipped ; but of such forces as he could muster he constituted the 15th corps. There were also ever-growing forces of mobiles, but these were wholly untrained and undisciplined, scarcely organized in battalions and for the most part armed with old-pattern weapons.

In these circumstances—the relative unimportance of the provincial war, the senility of the directors, the want of numbers, equipment and training in the troops available outside the walls of Paris—the rôle of the delegation was at first restricted to the establishment of a cordon of weak posts just out of reach of the German cavalry, with the object of protecting the formation of new corps and divisions in the interior. At the time of the investment of Paris part of the provincial forces were actually called in to reinforce the garrison. Only Reyau's weak cavalry division was sent out from Paris into the open country.

On their side the Germans had not enough forces left, after investing the capital with the III. and IV. armies and Metz with the I. and II., to undertake a long forward stride to the Loire or the Cher. The only covering force provided on the south side of their Paris lines was the I. Bavarian corps, which had also to act as the reserve of the III. army, and the cavalry divisions (6th, 4th, 2nd), whose chief work was the collection of supplies for the besiegers.

Shortly after this, near the end of September, francs-tireurs and small parties of National Guards became very active in Beauce, Perche and Gâtinais, and the German 4th cavalry division between Etampes and Toury was reinforced by some Bavarian battalions in consequence. But no important assemblies of French troops were noted, and indeed Orleans was twice evacuated on the mere rumour of the German advance. Moltke and every other German soldier gave no credence to rumours of the formation of a 15th corps behind the Loire—Trochu himself disbelieved in its existence—and the cavalry divisions, with their infantry supports, went about their ordinary business of gathering supplies.

In reality, however, the Delegation, unready as were its troops, was on the point of taking the offensive. In deference to popular clamour, a show of force in Beauce was decided upon. This was carried out by a force of all arms under Reyau on the 5th of October. It succeeded only too well. Prince Albert of Prussia, commander of the 4th cavalry division, which engaged Reyau at Toury, was so much impressed that he gave back 20 m. and sent alarming reports to army headquarters, which thereupon lost its incredulity and announced in army orders that the French "army of the Loire" was advancing from Orleans. Von der Tann, the commander of the I. Bavarian corps, was ordered to take up a defensive position at Montlhéry and to send out a detachment to cover Prince Albert's retreat. The 22nd infantry division was added to his command, and the 2nd and 6th cavalry divisions warned to protect his flanks. Thus the Germans were led to pay attention to the existence of the 15th corps when that corps was not only itself incomplete but also unsupported by the 16th, 17th and other still merely potential formations.

The preparations of the Germans were superfluous, for the demonstration ended in nothing. Reyau drew away leisurely towards Fontainebleau forest, and only a part of the 15th corps was sent up from Bourges to Orleans. Further, the fears of a sortie from Paris, which had occupied the German headquarters for some time, having for a moment ceased, Moltke on the 7th ordered von der Tann, with the I. Bavarian corps, 22nd division, and the three cavalry divisions, to advance. Next day these orders expanded. Orleans and, if possible, Tours itself were to be captured.

The punishment for the military promenade in Beauce was at hand. The main body of the 15th corps, which had not been required to take part in it, was kept back at Bourges and Vierzon, and only the miscellaneous troops actually in Beauce were available to meet the blow they had provoked. On the 10th von der Tann attacked Reyau, who had returned from Fontainebleau towards Orleans, at Artenay. Had it not been that von der Tann believed that the 15th corps was in front of him, and therefore attacked deliberately and carefully, Reyau's resistance would have been even more brief than it was. The French were enormously outnumbered, and, after a brave resistance, were driven towards Orleans in great disorder. Being still without any real offensive intentions, the Delegation and La Motte-Rouge decided, the same night, to evacuate Orleans. On the 11th, therefore, von der Tann's advance had to deal with no more than a strong rearguard on the outskirts of Orleans. But he was no longer on the plain of Beauce ; villas, hedges and vineyards, as well as the outskirts of the great forest of Orleans, gave excellent cover to the French infantry, all of which showed steadiness and some battalions true heroism, and the attack developed so slowly that the final positions of the defenders were not forced till close upon nightfall. The Germans lost at least 1000 men, and the harvest of prisoners proved to be no more than 1500. So far from pressing on to Tours, the Germans were well content with the occupation of Orleans.

The defeated enemy disappeared into Sologne, whither the assailants could not follow. Rumours of all sorts began to assail the German commander, who could not collect reliable news by means of the agencies under his own control because of the fluctuating but dense cordon of mobiles and francs-tireurs all around him. Moltke and Blumenthal

wished him to strike out southward towards the arsenals of Bourges, the depots of vehicles at Châteauroux and the improvised government offices at Tours. But he represented that he could not maintain himself nine or ten marches away from his nearest supports, and he was therefore allowed to stay at Orleans. The 22nd division and the 4th cavalry division, however, were withdrawn from him, and under these conditions von der Tann became uneasy as to his prospects of retaining even Orleans. His uneasiness was emphasized by reports of the appearance of heavy masses of French troops on the Loire above and below Orleans—reports that were true as regards the side of Blois, and more or less false as regards the Gien country. This news was obtained by the III. army headquarters on the 19th of October, and next day von der Tann was ordered "not to abandon Orleans unless threatened by a greatly superior force." Such a threat soon became pronounced.

A new directing influence was at work at Tours in the person of Léon Gambetta, who arrived there by balloon from Paris and took control of the Delegation on the 11th. With de Freycinet (who was appointed deputy minister of war) as his most valued assistant, Gambetta at once became not merely the head of the government in the provinces, but the actual director of the war, in virtue of the fact that he was the very incarnation of the spirit of resistance to the invader. De la Motte-Rouge was replaced at the head of the 15th corps by General d'Aurelle de Paladines, under whom at the same time the embryo 16th corps was placed. The new commander with practically dictatorial powers occupied himself first of all with the organization and training of his motley troops. The Delegation indeed planned an advance from Gien on Fontainebleau, but this was given up on d'Aurelle's representations, and the 15th corps drew back to a strong position at Salbris in front of Bourges. There by dint of personal ascendancy, relentless drilling and a few severe courts-martial, d'Aurelle produced an enormous improvement in the quality of his troops. Gambetta reinforced the troops at Salbris to the figure of 60,000, for the camp there was not merely a rendezvous but a school, the atmosphere of which profoundly affected even troops that only spent three or four days within its bounds. Meantime the 16th corps was formed at Blois and Vendôme, covered by a screen of francs-tireurs and National Guards. On October 23 a large force was sent over to the 16th corps from Salbris. This step was the first in a new plan of campaign.


A few days before it was taken, there had occurred an incident which led Moltke to a fresh misunderstanding of the situation towards the Loire. As mentioned above, the 22nd infantry and 4th cavalry divisions had been withdrawn from von der Tann's command and ordered back to Paris, and on their way thither they were told to clear the country round Châteaudun and Chartres. General von Wittich, therefore, with the 22nd division and some cavalry, appeared before Châteaudun on the 18th of October. The little town was strongly held and repulsed the first attack. Wittich then prepared a second assault so carefully that sunset was at hand when it was made. It would seem indeed that at this period, when the Germans were hoping for a speedy return to their fatherland, the spirit of the offensive in all ranks had temporarily died away. The assailants carried the edge of the town, only to find themselves involved in a painful struggle in the streets. House-to-house fighting went on long after dark, but at last the inhabitants gave way, and the Germans punished the town for its unconventional resistance by subjecting it to what was practically a sack.¹ After this von Wittich passed on to Chartres, which, making his preparations more carefully, he was able to occupy after a few shells had been fired. These events, and the presence of a French force at Dreux, as a matter of fact signified nothing, for the 15th and 16th corps were still on the Loire and at Salbris, but they bewildered the German headquarters and conjured up a phantom "army of the West," just as the promenade in Beauce had fashioned "the Army of the Loire" out of the small force under Reyau. Once more, indeed, as so often in the war, the Germans tried to solve the French problem by German data, and in their devotion to the net idea of "full steam ahead," could not conceive of military activity being spasmodic or unaimed. But this time the Versailles strategists were wrong only in their guess as to the direction of the blow. A blow was certainly impending.

By now the deliverance of Paris had become the defined objective of the "new formations" and of the provincial Delegation. Many plans were discussed, both at Paris and at Tours, for a combined effort, but each strategist had to convince the rest of the soundness of his own views, and the interchange of information and plans between Trochu and Gambetta was necessarily precarious. In the end, however, a few clear principles were accepted—Paris must be relieved, not merely revictualled, and the troops must be set in motion with that object at the earliest possible moment. For 200,000 French regulars were closely invested in Metz by Prince Frederick Charles with the I. and II. armies, if they passed into captivity, the veterans of Vionville and St Privat could be brought over to the Loire, and already there were strange rumours of intrigues between Bazaine, Bismarck and the empress Eugénie. But de Freycinet and d'Aurelle had different

¹ In 1879 the government added the cross of the Legion of Honour to the town arms of Châteaudun.

views as to the method of recapturing Orleans, which was agreed upon as the first thing to be done, and a compromise had to be made, by which 25,000 men were to advance by Gien and Châteauneuf and the main mass (75,000) from Blois by Beaugency, the hazards of this double movement being minimized by the weakness of the forces under von der Tann (the highest estimate of these that reached Tours was 60,000 and their real number only 26,000). The preliminary movements were to be completed by the 29th of October, when one strong division of the 15th corps was to be set at Gien and the remainder of the 15th and 16th corps between Blois and Vendôme.

This was duly carried out, and the Germans were confirmed in their suspicions of a concentration to the west of Paris by the despatch of dummy troop-trains to Le Mans. But bad weather, the news of the disastrous capitulation of Bazaine and the opening of a series of futile peace negotiations delayed the dénouement, the Gien column was hastily recalled, and the French armies stood fast all along the line in their original grouping, 75,000 men (15th and 16th corps) at Blois-Vendôme, 10,000 men in Sologne and 25,000 at Gien. The Germans round Orleans were some 25,000 strong. Between Montlhéry



and Chartres were 21,000 more; but these were paralysed by the fictitious "Western army" of the French, and von Wittich even thought of obtaining assistance from von der Tann. The activity of the irregulars, and the defiant attitude of the civil population everywhere, presaged a blow to be delivered by the once despised "new formations," but the direction of this blow was misconceived by the German headquarters, by the staff of the III. army and by von der Tann alike, till the eve of its delivery. The halt of the French army allowed this uneasiness to grow, and, in default of a target, Moltke was unable to assign a definite task to the II. army, now on its way from Metz. One of its corps, therefore, was sent to the lines before Paris to release the 17th and 22nd infantry divisions from siege duties, and these, with the I. Bavarian corps and the 2nd, 4th and 6th cavalry divisions, were constituted into a special detachment of the III. army, under Friedrich Franz, grand duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The duke was ordered to cover the siege of Paris and to break up the "new formations," but he was directed, not towards Orleans or even Tours, but towards Le Mans, concentrating with that object between Châteaudun and Chartres.

D'Aurelle, if cautious and slow, at least employed spare time well. The 16th corps was disciplined to the standard attained by the 15th and Chanzy was placed at the head of it, General Fiéreck, commanding at Le Mans, was ordered to attract the enemy's notice to the west by demonstrations, the defence of localities by irregulars was thoroughly

organized, and in the first days of November, on de Freycinet's demand, the general advance was resumed. There was a difference of opinion between d'Aurelle and Chanzy as to the objective, the latter wishing to make the main effort by the left, so as to cut off the Bavarians from Paris, the former to make it by the right with a view to recapturing Orleans, and, as on the German side at Gravelotte, a compromise was made whereby the army was deployed in equal force all along the line.

The début was singularly encouraging. Part of the German 2nd cavalry division, with its infantry supports, was severely handled by the French advanced guard near the hamlet of St Laurent des Bois (November 8). The half-heartedness of the Germans, evidenced by the number of prisoners taken unwounded, greatly encouraged the "new formations," who cheerfully submitted to a cold bivouac in anticipation of victory. Next morning the advance was resumed, d'Aurelle with the 15th corps on the right wing, Chanzy with the 16th on the left and Reyau's cavalry to the front. The march was made straight across country, in battle order, each brigade in line of battalion columns covered by a dense skirmish line. The French generals were determined that no accident should occur to shake the *moral* of the young troops they commanded.

At Orleans, meanwhile, von der Tann, in ever-growing suspense, had, rightly or wrongly, decided to stand his ground. He had been instructed by the headquarters staff not to fall back except under heavy pressure. He had his own reputation, dimmed by the failure of 1866, to retrieve, and national honour and loyalty seemed to him to require, in the words of his own staff officer, that "ere actual conflict had taken place with the 'greatly superior' enemy, no hostile force should enter the city placed under the protection of the Bavarians." But he could not allow himself to be enveloped in Orleans itself, and therefore, calling upon the far-distant III. army reserves for support, he took up his position with 23,500 men around Coulmiers, leaving 2500 men to hold Orleans. The line of defence was from St Péravy on the Châteaudun road through Coulmiers to La Renardière, and thence along the Mauve stream, and here he was attacked in force on the 9th of November. The French approached from the south-west, and when their right had taken contact, the remainder gradually swung round and attacked the Bavarian centre and right. The result was foregone, given the disparity of force, but the erratic movements of Reyau's cavalry on the extreme left of d'Aurelle's line exposed Chanzy to a partial repulse and saved the Bavarian right. When at last the French stormed Coulmiers, and von der Tann had begun to retire, it was already nightfall, and the exhausted remnant of the I. Bavarian corps was able to draw off unpursued. The Orleans garrison followed suit, and the French army, gathering in its two outlying columns from Sologne and Gien, reoccupied the city. So ended the first blow of the Republic's armies. Coulmiers would indeed have been a crushing victory had Reyau's cavalry performed its part in the scheme and above all had d'Aurelle, adopting unreservedly either his own plan or Chanzy's, massed his troops here, economized them there, in accordance with the plan, instead of arraying them in equal strength at all points. But d'Aurelle wished above all to avoid what is now called a "regrettable incident"—hence his advance across country *en bataille*—and to thin out his line at any point might have been disastrous. And incomplete as it was, the victory had a moral significance which can scarcely be overated. The "new formations" had won the first battle, and it was confidently hoped by all patriots that the spell of defeat was broken.

But d'Aurelle and the government viewed their success from the standpoint of their own side, and while von der Tann, glad to escape from the trap, fell back quickly to Angerville, d'Aurelle's only fear was an offensive return. Not even when von der Tann's defensive intentions were established did d'Aurelle resume the advance. The columns from Gien and the Sologne peacefully reoccupied Orleans, while the victors of Coulmiers went into cold and muddy bivouacs north of the city, for d'Aurelle feared that their dispersion in comfortable quarters would weaken the newly forged links of discipline. The French general knew that he had only put his hand to the plough, and he thought that before ploughing in earnest he must examine and overhaul his implement. In this opinion he was supported not only by soldiers who, like Chanzy, distrusted the staying power of the men, but even by the government, which knew that the limit of the capital's resistance was still distant, and felt the present vital necessity of protecting Bourges, Châteauroux and Tours from Prince Frederick Charles, who with the II. army was now approaching from the east. The plan of General Borel, the chief of staff, for a lateral displacement of the whole army towards Chartres and Dreux, which would have left the prince without an animate target and concentrated the largest possible force on the weakest point of Moltke's position, but would have exposed the arsenals of the south, was rejected, and d'Aurelle organized a large fortified camp of instruction to the north of the captured city, to which came, beside the 15th and 16th corps, the new 17th and 18th.

To return to the Germans. An army at the halt, screened by active irregulars, is invisible, and the German commanders were again at a loss. It has been mentioned that a day or two before the battle of Coulmiers Moltke had created an Army Detachment under the grand duke of Mecklenburg for operations south of Paris. His objects in so

doing must now be briefly summarized. On November the 1st he had written to the II. army to the effect that "the south of France would hardly make great efforts for Paris," and that the three disposable corps of the army were to range over the country as far as Chalon-sur-Saône, Nevers and Bourges. By the 7th his views had so far changed that he sanctioned the formation of the "Detachment" with a view to breaking up the army of the Loire by a march into the *west* towards Le Mans, the right wing of the II. army at the same time hurrying on to Fontainebleau to cover the south side of the Paris investment. The king, however, less convinced than Moltke of the position of the army of the Loire, suspended the westward deployment of the Detachment, with the result that on the 10th the retreating Bavarians were reinforced by two fresh divisions. But the same day all touch with the French was lost—perhaps deliberately, in accordance with the maxim that defeated troops should avoid contact with the victor. The curtain descended, and next day a few vague movements of small bodies misled the grand duke into seeking his target towards Chartres and Dreux, directly away from d'Aurelle's real position. Once more the king intervened and brought him back to the Orleans-Paris road (Nov. 13-14), but Moltke hurried forward the IX. corps (II. army) from Fontainebleau to Étampes so as to release the grand duke from covering duties while satisfying the king's wishes for direct protection towards Orleans.

Moltke's views of the problem had not fundamentally changed since the day when he ordered the II. army to spread out over southern France. He now told the grand duke to beat the army of the Loire or army of the West near Dreux or Chartres, and, that done, to sweep through a broad belt of country on the line Alençon-Verneuil towards Rouen, the outer wing of the II. army meanwhile, after recapturing Orleans and destroying Bourges, to descend the Loire and Cher valleys towards Tours (Nov. 14). On the 15th a fresh batch of information and surmises caused the leader of the Detachment, who had not yet received orders to do so, to leave the Paris-Orleans road to take care of itself and to swing out north-westward at once. The Detachment reached Chartres, Rambouillet and Auneau that night, and headquarters, having meanwhile been mystified by the news of a quite meaningless fight between German cavalry and some mobiles at Dreux, did not venture to reimpose the veto. The adventures of the Detachment need not be traced in detail. It moved first north towards the line Mantes-Dreux, and delivered a blow in the air. Then, hoping to find a target towards Nogent le Rotrou, it swung round so as to face south-west. Everywhere it met with the sharpest resistance from small parties, nowhere it found a large body of all arms to attack. Matters were made worse by staff blunders in the duke's headquarters, and on the 19th, after a day of indescribable confusion, he had to halt to sort out his divisions. Moltke gave him the rest day he asked for the more readily as he was beginning to suspect that the king was right, that there were considerable forces still at Orleans, and that the Detachment might be wanted there after all.

This alteration in his views had been brought about by the reports from the II. army during its advance from Champagne to the Gâtinais. At the time of the first order indicating Chalon, Nevers and Bourges as its objectives this army had just opened out into line from its circular position round Metz, and it therefore naturally faced south. Moving forward, it reached the line Troyes-Neufchâteau about the time Coulmiers was fought, and was ordered to send in its right (IX. corps) to Fontainebleau. The II. corps had already been taken to strengthen the besiegers, thereby releasing the two Prussian divisions (17th and 22nd) that joined von der Tann on the 10th. The II. army next changed front, in accordance with Moltke's directions, so as to face S.E. towards Orleans and Gien, and on the 16th the IX. corps and 1st cavalry division were at Méréville and on the Orleans-Paris road, the III. at Sens and the X. at Tonnerre. The III. and X. from this time onward marched, camped and slept in the midst of a population so hostile that von Voigts-Rhetz kept his baggage in the midst of the fighting troops, and Prince Frederick Charles himself, with an escort, visited the villages lying off the main roads to gauge for himself the temper of the inhabitants.

From prisoners it was gleaned that the French 18th corps, supposed by the Germans to be forming in the Dijon-Lyons region, had arrived on the Loire, and a deserter said that there were 40,000 men encamped at Chevilly, just north of Orleans. Moltke's faith in his own reading of the situation was at last shaken; whether the army of the Loire had joined the army of the West or was still on the Loire, he did not yet know, but it was almost certain that from wherever they came, considerable French forces were around Orleans. He warned the prince to check the southward swing of the X. corps "because it cannot yet be foreseen whether the whole army will not have to be employed towards Châteaudun and Orleans," and turned to the Detachment for further information, cautioning the grand duke at the same time to keep touch with the II. army. But, ignoring the hint, the grand duke, thinking that he had at last brought the elusive "army of the West" to bay in the broken ground round Nogent-le-Rotrou, opened out, in accordance with German strategic principles, for a double envelopment of the enemy. He struck another blow in the air. The "army of the West" had never really existed as an army, and its best-organized units had been sent back to join the new 21st corps at Le Mans

ere the Detachment came into action at all, while the older mobiles continued the "small war" in front of the Germans, and sniped their sentries and trapped their patrols as before. Almost simultaneously with the news of this disappointment, the prince, who had meanwhile used his cavalry vigorously, sent word to Versailles on the 20th that the French 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th corps (in all over 150,000 men) were round Orleans. At this moment the III. corps was close to the Forest of Orleans, the IX. corps away to the right rear at Angerville, and the X. equally distant to the south-east, as well as separated in three self-contained columns a day's march apart. It seemed as if another Vionville was at hand, but this time Alvensleben and Voigts-Rhetz did not attack an obscure objective *coûte que coûte*. They stood fast, by the prince's order, to close up for battle and to wait on events in front of the Detachment.

The Germans had now discovered their target, and their strategical system, uncomplicated by past nightmares, should have worked smoothly to a decisive result. But there was nearly as much confusion between the various high officers as before. Prince Frederick Charles, in possession of the facts and almost in contact with the enemy, wrote to the grand duke to say that the II. Army was about to attack the enemy, and to suggest that the Detachment, which he knew to be heading for Le Mans, should make a "diversion" in his favour towards Tours, reserving to himself and his own army, as on the 2nd of July 1866 before Königgrätz, the perils and the honours of the battle. The grand duke meanwhile, whose temper was now roused, was making a last attempt to bring the phantom "Army of the West" to action. Rejecting Blumenthal's somewhat timidly worded advice to go slowly, the grand duke spread out his forces for the last time for an enveloping advance on Le Mans.

He had not gone far when, on the 23rd, he received a peremptory order from the king, through the III. Army headquarters, to bring back his forces to Beauce and to be on the middle Loire at latest by the 26th. In vain he pleaded for a day to close up; the king replied that the march must go on, for much depended on it. Moltke, in fact, had seized the reins more firmly at the critical moment, and given directions to the army commanders that the II. Army and the Detachment were to make a combined and concerted attack as soon as possible after the 26th. By that date the last brigades of the II. Army would have come up, and the Detachment was to time its own march accordingly. Yet even at this step Blumenthal, the original author of the Western expedition, in transmitting the king's order to the grand duke, assigned not Orleans but Beaugency, some miles down the river, as the objective of the Detachment.

D'Aurelle meanwhile had resolutely maintained his policy of inaction, confirmed in that course by the miserable and ill-equipped condition of the troops that came from the east and the west to double the numbers of the relatively well-disciplined army of Coulmiers. In the grand duke's move to the west, d'Aurelle saw only a trap to lure him into the plains and to offer him up as a victim to the approaching II. Army, the force of which he at first greatly exaggerated. All this time Gambetta and de Freycinet were receiving messages from Paris that spoke of desperate sorties being planned, and assigned December 15th as the last day of resistance. On the 19th of November de Freycinet wrote to d'Aurelle urging him to form a plan of active operations without delay, and even suggesting one (which was, in fact, vicious), but in reply the general merely promised to study the civilian's scheme. A severe letter from Gambetta, which followed this, had no better effect. D'Aurelle had, in fact, become a pessimist, and the Delegation, instead of removing him, merely suggested fresh plans.

On the 24th, however, the French at last took the offensive, in the direction of Fontainebleau Forest, to co-operate with the great sortie from Paris which was now definitely arranged. But owing to d'Aurelle's objections the first orders were modified so far that on attaining the points ordered, Chilleurs (15th corps), Boiscommun-Bellegarde (20th), the troops were to await the order to advance. Shortly afterwards the 18th corps from Gien was ordered to advanced on the line Montargis-Ladon. The rest of d'Aurelle's huge army was scarcely affected by these movements. Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, to clear up the situation, had pushed out strong reconnaissances of all arms from the front of the II. Army, and these naturally developed strong forces of the defenders. The advanced troops of the X. corps had severe engagements with fractions of the 20th corps at Ladon and Maizières, and those of the III. corps were sharply repulsed at Neuville and drew the fire of several battalions and batteries at Artenay. The French offensive slowly developed on the 25th and 26th, for the Germans were not ready to advance, and in addition were greatly puzzled. The erratic movements of the grand duke towards Le Mans before he was recalled to the Loire had seriously disquieted both the Delegation and d'Aurelle, and the 17th corps, under a young and energetic leader, de Sonis, was moved restlessly hither and thither in the country south and west of Châteaudun. A fight at Brou (10 m. W. of Bonneval) provoked the grand duke into another false move. This time the Detachment, then near Droué (12 m. W. of Châteaudun) and Authon (22 m. W. of Bonneval), swung round north-east in defiance of the order to go to Beaugency, and had to be brought back by the drastic method of placing it under the orders of Prince Frederick Charles. General von Stosch of the headquarters staff was at the same time sent to act

as Moltke's representative with the duke's headquarters, and Lieut.-Colonel von Waldersee to Prince Frederick Charles's to report thence direct to the king, who was dissatisfied with the diluted information with which the various staff offices furnished him. Still, the upshot was that Prince Frederick Charles was entrusted with affairs on the Loire, and all superior control was voluntarily surrendered. The prince had very clear ideas, at the outset, of the task before him. If the French advanced towards Fontainebleau or elsewhere, he expected to be able to repeat Napoleon's strategy of 1814, fighting containing actions with the IX. and X. corps and delivering blow after blow at different points on d'Aurelle's line of march with the III. If the French, as seemed more likely, stood fast, he thought his task more formidable, and therefore, abandoning the idea of a strategic envelopment, he ordered the Detachment inwards with the intention of directly attacking the Orleans position from the north-west.

As regards the method of the offensive, there is herein no material advance on the prince's first scheme; the Detachment is simply added to the forces making the attack, and the diversion on Tours is abandoned. But the prince was at any rate a leader who enjoyed the responsibilities of director of operations—he even said that he would find the shuttle-play of the III. corps alluded to above “an interesting novelty in his experience of army command”—while at the same time the unfortunate d'Aurelle was asking the Delegation to give orders direct to his generals.

It was now the 27th of November. The Versailles headquarters were in a state of intense nervous exaltation waiting for the sortie of 70,000 men that was daily expected to be launched at the investing line, and the king's parting words to von Waldersee indicate sufficiently the gravity of the decision that was now entrusted to the most resolute troop leader in the service: “We are on the eve of a decisive moment. I know well that my troops are better than the French, but that does not deceive me into supposing that we have not a crisis before us. . . . If Prince Frederick Charles is beaten, we must give up the investment of Paris. . . .” The II. army was waiting events on a dangerously extended front from Toury on the Paris-Orleans road (which the prince still thought it his duty to cover) to Beaune-la-Rolande. The Detachment, which never yet had concentrated save to deliver blows in the air, was approaching Châteaudun and Bonneval when von Stosch arrived and gave it the encouragement, the reforms in the staff work and the rest-day it needed. The French, who themselves had suffered from over-extension, had by now condensed on the extreme right. In these general conditions the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande took place—an engagement almost as honourable to Voigts-Rhetz and the X. corps as Vionville to Alvensleben and the III. The French attack began early on the morning of the 28th, under command of General Crouzat. It was directed on Beaune-la-Rolande from three sides, and only the want of combination between the various units of the French and the arrival in the afternoon of part of the III. corps saved the X. from annihilation. As it was, the Germans engaged were utterly exhausted, and the X. corps had but three rounds of ammunition per man left. But the magnificent resistance of the men of Vionville prolonged the fight until night had fallen and Crouzat, thinking the battle lost, ordered his troops to evacuate the battlefield. As at Coulmiers, and with even more deplorable results, the French commander saw only the confusion in his own lines, and feared to hazard the issue of the campaign on the mere supposition that the enemy was even more exhausted. There was another resemblance, too, between Coulmiers and Beaune-la-Rolande, in that the French forces on the outer flank towards Artenay stood idle without attempting to influence the decision.

Prince Frederick Charles himself took only a cursory survey of the battlefield, and failed to realize that the whole of the enemy's right wing had been engaged, in spite of what Waldersee, who had been in Beaune, told him of events there. So far, therefore, from considering the battle as a great victory to be followed up by an energetic pursuit, he still feared a move round his left flank from Gien and Montargis towards Fontainebleau. The II. army orders issued on the night of the battle actually had in view a farther extension *eastward*. Beaune-la-Rolande was a French defeat without being a German victory, and for the fact that it was a defeat, not a mere check, there was no cause but Crouzat's impressions of the state of the 20th corps, which, composed as it was of the newest levies in his army, was the most susceptible of unreasoning bravery and unreasoning depression.

In view of this, d'Aurelle and de Freycinet decided that the offensive was to be continued not towards Beaune-Nemours, but from the front of the steadier 15th and 16th corps towards Pithiviers, and with that object, on the 29th—a day of inaction for the Germans—the 18th and 20th corps began to close on the centre. There was sharp fighting on the 30th at various points along the north-eastern and eastern fringes of the Forest of Orleans, in which for the most part the French were successful. On the 29th the II. army was inactive in spite of almost frantic appeals from Versailles to go forward (the great sortie from Paris had begun), and the Detachment, in accordance with the prince's orders and not with the views held by von Stosch, headed eastward to prolong the right of the II. army, halting on the 29th in the area Orgères-Toury. The prince's message to the grand duke contained the significant phrase, “my plans to drive the enemy out of Orleans”

—he no longer thought of a strategical envelopment of the Army of the Loire *in* Orleans. Disillusioned during the 30th as to the supposed danger on the side of Montargis, he closed from both wings towards the centre, but still defensively and well clear of the edge of the dangerous forest. On this day d'Aurelle and the French generals assembled to receive de Freycinet's orders for the next advance. The 18th and 20th corps were to attack Beaune-la-Rolande, the 15th and 16th Pithiviers, while the 17th, aided by the 21st from Le Mans, was to look after the security of Orleans against a possible southward advance of the Detachment. A wise modification was arranged between d'Aurelle and Chanzy, whereby the first day's operations should be directed to driving away the Detachment with the 17th and 16th corps, preparatory to the move on Pithiviers. On the 1st of December, then, no events of importance took place on the front of the II. Army, the centre of gravity having shifted to Orgères-Toury and the direction of events to the grand duke and Stosch. Fortunately for the Germans the cavalry general von Schmidt, who had been called upon to return to the II. Army with his division, managed to impress Stosch in a farewell interview, with the imminence of the danger, and a still more urgent argument was the action of Villepion-Terminiers, in which Chanzy with one infantry and one cavalry division attacked part of the I. Bavarian corps and drove it to Orgères with a loss of 1000 men. Von Stosch, therefore, so far from literally obeying the waiting policy indicated in the orders from Prince Frederick Charles, cautiously led the grand duke to prepare for a battle, and the grand duke, seeing the chance which he had been cheated of so often, and secure in his royal rank and in the support of Moltke, Stosch and Blumenthal, took control again. Lastly, von Stosch called back the 22nd division, which had been taken from the Detachment, to form the reserve of the II. Army.

The result of the decision thus made at the Detachment headquarters was of the highest importance. The French main body moving north-westward in the general direction of Toury encountered first the I. Bavarian corps, then the 17th division, and finally the 22nd division, and the leadership of the German generals, who took every advantage of the disconnected and spasmodic movements of the enemy, secured a complete success (battle of Loigny-Poupry, 2nd Dec.). Meanwhile, and long before victory had declared itself, Prince Frederick Charles, still keeping the III. and X. corps on the side of Boiscommun and Bellegarde, had sent the IX. corps westward to support the Detachment, and halted von Schmidt's returning cavalry division on the Paris road. But from this point there began an interchange of telegrams which almost nullified the strategical effect of the battle. The grand duke and von Stosch, desirous above all of enveloping—that is, driving into Orleans—the target that after so many disappointments they had found and struck, wished to expand westwards so as to prevent the escape of the French towards Châteaudun, and with that object asked the II. Army “to attack Artenay and to take over the protection of the great road.” Both von Stosch and von Waldersee had reported to the II. Army the importance of the French troops west of the main road, and Prince Frederick Charles, as above mentioned, had already moved the IX. corps and 6th cavalry divisions towards the Detachment. But when after the battle the grand duke's request to the II. Army arrived at the prince's headquarters, the reply was a curt general order for a direct concentric attack *on Orleans* by all the forces under his command.

This was Moltke's doing. Before Waldersee's telegrams from the front arrived at Versailles, he had sent to the prince a peremptory order “to attack Orleans and thus to bring about the decision.” This order was based on Moltke's view that the main body of the French had, after Beaune-la-Rolande, gathered on the west side of the great road, and although the king, in spite of the repulse of the great sortie from Paris, was still uneasy as to the possibility of a French offensive on Fontainebleau, he allowed the chief of his staff to have his way. The order, consequently, went forth. Long before it could be translated into action, the battle of Loigny-Poupry had completely changed the situation. Yet it was obeyed, and no attempt was made by the prince either to obtain its cancellation or to override it by the exercise of the beloved “initiative.” At the prince's headquarters it was construed as a reflection upon the lethargy of that army after Beaune-la-Rolande, and—although it was the incompleteness of his own reports of that action that had misled Moltke as to the magnitude of the effort that had been expended to win it—the prince, bitterly resentful, fell into that dangerous condition of mind which induces a punctilious execution of orders to the letter, at whatever cost, and without regard to circumstances. Hence the order to the Detachment, which allowed the French field army to escape, and substituted for a decisive victory the barren “second capture of Orleans.”

The plan for this second capture was simple: III. corps to fight its way from Pithiviers to Chilleurs-aux-Bois and thence down the Pithivier-Orleans road through the forest, IX. corps to advance on Artenay and thence down the main road, Detachment to fight its way southward over the plains, X. corps in rear of the centre as reserve. Only a small force was left on the side of Montargis, and the III. and X. corps, which were many miles away to the south and south-east, had to get into position at once (evening of the 2nd) by night marches if necessary. In short, a single grand line of battle, 40 m. long, supported only by one corps in rear of the centre, was to sweep over all obstacles, woods, fields,

orchards and enemy, at a uniform rate of progress, and on the evening of the second day to converge on Orleans. The advance opened on the morning of the 3rd of December. The French left or main group included the 15th, 16th and 17th corps, the right of the 15th corps being in advance of the forest edge near Santeau. The right group, now under Bourbaki, consisted of the 18th and 20th corps, and faced north-east towards Beaune-la-Rolande and Montargis, the left flank being at Chambon. Fortunately for the III. corps, which numbered barely 13,000 rifles in all, the thinnest part of the opposing cordon was its centre, and the adventurous march of this corps carried it far into the forest to Loury. Only at Chilleurs was any serious resistance met with; elsewhere the French sheered off to their left, leaving the Pithiviers-Orleans road clear. In the night of the 3rd-4th isolated fractions of the enemy came accidentally in contact with von Alvensleben's outposts, but a sudden night encounter in woods was too much for the half-trained French, and a panic ensued, in which five guns were abandoned. But, as Alvensleben himself said, when he marched into the forest from Chilleurs he "went with open eyes into a den" from which it was more than probable he would never emerge—Chilleurs was, in fact, reoccupied behind him by part of the 15th corps. By the fortune of war the III. corps actually did emerge safely, but only thanks to the inactivity of the French right group under Bourbaki, and to the almost entire absence of direct opposition, not to Prince Frederick Charles's dispositions.

On the main road, meantime, the IX. corps had captured a series of villages, and at nightfall of the short December day reached the N.W. corner of the Forest. The Detachment, slowly pushing before it part of the army it had defeated at Loigny, and protecting itself on the outer flank by a flank guard (I. Bavarians) against the rest, had closed in towards Chevilly. Prince Frederick Charles, angered by the slow, painful and indecisive day's work, ordered the advance to be continued and the French positions about Chevilly stormed in the dark, but fortunately was dissuaded by von Stosch, who rode over to his headquarters. But the prince never (except perhaps for a brief moment during the battle of Loigny-Poupry) believed that there was any serious obstacle in the way of the Detachment except its own fears, and repeatedly impressed upon Stosch the fact that Orleans was the watch-word and the objective for every one.

In pursuance of the *idée fixe*, the prince issued orders for the 4th to the following effect: III. corps to advance on Orleans and to "bring artillery into action against the city," at the same time carefully guarding his left flank; IX. and 6th cavalry divisions to go forward along the general line of the main road; Detachment to make an enveloping attack on Gidy in concert with the attack of the IX. corps. In the forest Alvensleben, knowing that he could not capture Orleans single-handed, guarded his left with a whole division and with the other advanced on the city, stormed the village of Vaumainbert, which was stubbornly defended by a small French force, and close upon nightfall perfunctorily threw a few shells into Orleans. The flank-guard division had meanwhile been gravely imperilled by the advance of Crouzat's 20th corps, but once again the III. corps was miraculously saved, for Bourbaki, receiving word from d'Aurelle that the left group could not hold its position in advance of the Loire, and that the line of retreat of the right group was by Gien, ordered the fight to be broken off.

In the centre the IX. corps, after fighting hard all day, progressed no farther than Cercottes. The prince and the grand duke had a short interview, but, being personal enemies, their intercourse was confined to the prince's issuing his orders without inquiring closely into the positions of the Detachment and its opponents. Thus while the main body of the French left group, under the determined Chanzy, slipped away to the left, to continue the struggle for three months longer, the Detachment was compelled to conform to the movements of the IX. corps. But it was handled resolutely, and in the afternoon its right swung in to Ormes. The 2nd cavalry division, finding a target and open ground, charged the demoralized defenders with great effect, a panic began and spread, and by nightfall, when the prince, who was with the IX. corps, had actually given up hope of capturing Orleans that day and had issued orders to suspend the fight, his rival and subordinate was marching into Orleans with bands playing and colours flying. There was no pursuit, and the severed wings of the French army thenceforward carried on the campaign as two separate armies under Chanzy and Bourbaki respectively.

Bourbaki fell back at once and hastily, though not closely pursued, to Bourges. But Chanzy, opposing the Detachment between Beaugency and the Forest of Marchenoir, was of sterner metal, and in the five days' general engagement around Beaugency (December 7-11) the Germans gained little or no real advantage. Indeed their solitary material success, the capture of Beaugency, was due chiefly to the fact that the French there were subjected to conflicting orders from the military and the governmental authorities. Chanzy then abandoned little but the field of battle, and on the grand duke's representations Prince Frederick Charles, leaving a mere screen to impose upon Bourbaki (who allowed himself to be deceived and remained inactive), hurried thither with the II. army. After that Chanzy was rapidly driven north-westward, though always presenting a stubborn front. The Delegation left Tours and betook itself to Bordeaux, whence it directed the government for the rest of the war. But all this continuous marching and fighting, and the

growing severity of the weather, compelled Prince Frederick Charles to call a halt for a few days. About the 19th of December, therefore, the Germans (II. Army and Detachment) were closed up in the region of Chartres, Orleans, Auxerre and Fontainebleau, Chanzy along the river Sarthe about Le Mans and Bourbaki still passive towards Bourges.

During this, as during other halts, the French government and its generals occupied themselves with fresh plans of campaign, the former with an eager desire for results, the latter (Chanzy excepted) with many misgivings. Ultimately, and fatally, it was decided that Bourbaki, whom nothing could move towards Orleans, should depart for the south-east, with a view to relieving Belfort and striking perpendicularly against the long line of the Germans' communications. This movement, bold to the point of extreme rashness judged by any theoretical rules of strategy, seems to have been suggested by de Freycinet. As the execution of it fell actually into incapable hands, it is difficult to judge what would have been the result had a Chanzy or a Faïdherbe been in command of the French. At any rate it was vicious in so far as immediate advantages were sacrificed to hopes of ultimate success which Gambetta and de Freycinet did wrong to base on Bourbaki's powers of generalship. Late in December, for good or evil, Bourbaki marched off into Franche-Comté and ceased to be a factor in the Loire campaign. A mere calculation of time and space sufficed to show the German headquarters that the moment had arrived to demolish the stubborn Chanzy.

The numerous, but ill-trained and ill-equipped, levies of the French were followed up by Prince Frederick Charles with the German II. army, now very much weakened, but consisting of soldiers who had in six months' active warfare acquired the self-confidence of veterans. The Germans advanced with three army corps in first line and one in reserve. On the 9th of January the centre corps (III.) drove an advanced division of the French from Ardenay (13 m. E. of Le Mans). On the 10th of January Chanzy's main defensive position was approached. Its right wing was east of the Sarthe and 3-5 m. from Le Mans, its centre on the heights of Anvours with the river Huisne behind it, and its left scattered along the western bank of the same river as far as Montfort (12 m. E.N.E. of Le Mans) and thence northward for some miles. On the 10th there was a severe struggle for the villages along the front of the French centre. On the 11th Chanzy attempted a counter-offensive from many points, but owing to the misbehaviour of certain of his rawest levies, the Germans were able to drive him back, and as their cavalry now began to appear beyond his extreme left flank, he retreated in the night of the 11th on Laval, where a freshly raised corps joined him. The Prince's army was far too exhausted to deliver another effective blow, and the main body of it gradually drew back into better quarters, while the grand duke departed for the north to aid in opposing Faïdherbe. Some idea of the strain to which the invaders had been subjected may be gathered from the fact that army corps, originally 30,000 strong, were in some cases reduced to 10,000 and even fewer bayonets. And at this moment Bourbaki was at the head of 120,000 men! Indeed, so threatening seemed the situation on the Loire, though the French south of that river between Gien and Blois were mere isolated brigades, that the prince hurried back from Le Mans to Orleans to take personal command. A fresh French corps, bearing the number 25, and being the twenty-first actually raised during the war, appeared in the field towards Blois. Chanzy was again at the head of 156,000 men. He was about to take the offensive against the 40,000 Germans left near Le Mans when to his bitter disappointment he received the news of the armistice. "We have still France," he had said to his staff, undeterred by the news of the capitulation of Paris, but now he had to submit, for even if his improvised army was still cheerful, there were many significant tokens that the people at large had sunk into apathy and hoped to avoid worse terms of peace by discontinuing the contest at once.

CHAPTER VI

FINAL STRUGGLES

So ended the critical period of the "Défense nationale." It may be taken to have lasted from the day of Coulmiers to the last day of Le Mans, and its central point was the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande. Its characteristics were, on the German side, inadequacy of the system of strategy practised, which became palpable as soon as the organs of reconnaissance met with serious resistance, misjudgment of and indeed contempt for the fighting powers of "new formations," and the rise of a spirit of ferocity in the man in the ranks, born of his resentment at the continuance of the war and the ceaseless sniping of the franc-tireur's rifle and the peasant's shot-gun. On the French side the continual efforts of the statesmen to stimulate the generals to decisive efforts, coupled with actual suggestions as to the plans of campaign to be followed (in default, be it said, of the generals themselves producing such plans), and the professional soldiers' distrust of half-trained troops, acted and reacted upon one another in such a way as to neutralize the powerful, if disconnected and erratic, forces that the war and the Republic had unchained. As for the soldiers themselves, their most conspicuous qualities were their uncomplaining endurance of fatigues and wet bivouacs, and in action their capacity for a single great effort and no more. But they were unreliable in the hands of the veteran regular general, because they were heterogeneous in recruiting, and unequal in experience and military qualities, and the French staff in those days was wholly incapable of moving masses of troops with the rapidity demanded by the enemy's methods of war, so that on the whole it is difficult to know whether to wonder more at their missing success or at their so nearly achieving it.

The decision, as we have said, was fought out on the Loire and the Sarthe. Nevertheless, the glorious story of the "Défense nationale" includes two other important campaigns—that of Faidherbe in the north and that of Bourbaki in the east.

In the north the organization of the new formations was begun by Dr Testelin and General Farre. Bourbaki held the command for a short time in November before proceeding to Tours, but the active command in field operations came into the hands of Faidherbe, a general whose natural powers, so far from being cramped by years of peace routine and court repression, had been developed by a career of pioneer warfare and colonial administration. General Farre was his capable chief of staff. Troops were raised from fugitives from Metz and Sedan, as well as from depot troops and the Garde Mobile, and several minor successes were won by the national troops in the Seine valley, for here, as on the side of the Loire, mere detachments of the investing army round Paris were almost powerless. But the capitulation of Metz came too soon for the full development of these sources of military strength, and the German I. Army under Manteuffel, released from duty at Metz, marched north-eastward, capturing the minor fortresses on its way. Before Faidherbe assumed command, Farre had fought several severe actions near Amiens, but, greatly outnumbered, had been defeated and forced to retire behind the Somme. Another French general, Briand, had also engaged the enemy without success near Rouen. Faidherbe assumed the command on the 3rd of December, and promptly moved forward. A general engagement on the little river Hallue (December 23), east-north-east of Amiens, was fought with no decisive results, but Faidherbe, feeling that his troops were only capable of winning victories in the first rush, drew them off on the 24th. His next effort, at Bapaume (January 2-3, 1871), was more successful, but its effects were counterbalanced by the surrender of the fortress of Péronne (January 9) and the consequent establishment of the Germans on the line of the Somme. Meanwhile the Rouen troops had been contained by a strong German detachment, and there was no further chance of succouring Paris from the north. But Faidherbe, like Chanzy, was far from despair, and in spite of the deficiencies of his troops in equipment (50,000 pairs of shoes, supplied by English contractors, proved to have paper soles), he risked a third great battle at St Quentin (January 19), taking up a defensive position on both sides of the Somme Canal. The Germans, though inferior in numbers, were greatly superior in discipline and training, and General von Goeben boldly decided to attack both wings of the French together on the 19th. The attack took the customary enveloping form. After several hours' fighting it was brought to a standstill, but Goeben, using his reserves in masterly fashion, drove a wedge into the centre of the French line between the canal and the railway, and followed this up with another blow on the other bank of the canal, along the Ham road. This was the signal for a decisive attack by the whole of the left wing of the Germans, but the French offered strenuous resistance, and it was not until four o'clock that General Faidherbe made up his mind to retreat. By skilful dispositions and orderly movement most of his infantry and all but six of his guns were brought off safely, but a portion of the army was cut off by the victorious left wing of the Germans, and the defeat, the last act in a long-drawn-

out struggle, was sufficiently decisive to deny to the defenders any hope of taking the field again without an interval of rest and reorganization. Ten days later the general armistice was signed.

The last episode is Bourbaki's campaign in the east, with its mournful close at Pontarlier. Before the crisis of the last week of November, the French forces under General Crémier, Cambriel's successor, had been so far successful in minor enterprises that, as mentioned above, the right wing of the Loire army, severed from the left by the battle of Orléans and subsequently held inactive at Bourges and Nevers, was ordered to Franche-Comté to take the offensive against the XIV. corps and other German troops there, to relieve Belfort and to strike a blow across the invaders' line of communications. But there were many delays in execution. The staff work, which was at no time satisfactory in the French armies of 1870, was complicated by the snow, the bad state of the roads, and the mountainous nature of the country, and Bourbaki, a brave general of division in action, but irresolute and pretentious as a commander in chief, was not the man to cope with the situation. Only the furious courage and patient endurance of hardships of the rank and file, and the good qualities of some of the generals, such as Clinchant, Crémier and Billot, and junior staff officers such as Major Brugère (afterwards generalissimo of the French army), secured what success was attained.

Werder, the German commander, warned of the imposing concentration of the French, evacuated Dijon and Dôle just in time to avoid the blow and rapidly drew together his forces behind the Ognon above Vesoul. A furious attack on one of his divisions at Villersexel (January 9) cost him 2000 prisoners as well as his killed and wounded, and Bourbaki, heading for Belfort, was actually nearer to the fortress than the Germans. But at the crisis more time was wasted, Werder (who had almost lost hope of maintaining himself and had received both encouragement and stringent instructions to do so) slipped in front of the French, and took up a long weak line of defence on the river Lisaine, almost within cannon shot of Belfort. The cumbrous French army moved up and attacked him there with 150,000 against 60,000 (January 15-17, 1871). It was at last repulsed, thanks chiefly to Bourbaki's inability to handle his forces, and, to the bitter disappointment of officers and men alike, he ordered a retreat, leaving Belfort to its fate.


Ere this, so urgent was the necessity of assisting Werder, Manteuffel had been placed at the head of a new Army of the South. Bringing two corps from the I. army opposing Faidherbe and calling up a third from the armies around Paris, and a fourth from the II. army, Manteuffel hurried southward by Langres to the Saône. Then, hearing of Werder's victory on the Lisaine, he deflected the march so as to cut off Bourbaki's retreat, drawing off the left flank guard of the latter (commanded with much *éclat* and little real effect by Garibaldi) by a sharp feint attack on Dijon. The pressure of Werder in front and Manteuffel in flank gradually forced the now thoroughly disheartened French forces towards the Swiss frontier, and Bourbaki, realizing at once the ruin of his army and his own incapacity to re-establish its efficiency, shot himself, though not fatally, on the 26th of January. Clinchant, his successor, acted promptly enough to remove the immediate danger, but on the 29th he was informed of the armistice without at the same time being told that Belfort and the eastern theatre of war had been on Jules Favre's demand expressly excepted from its operation.¹ Thus the French, the leaders distracted by doubts and the worn-out soldiers fully aware that the war was practically over, stood still, while Manteuffel completed his preparations for hemming them in. On the 1st of February General Clinchant led his troops into Switzerland, where they were disarmed, interned and well cared for by the authorities of the neutral state. The rearguard fought a last action with the advancing Germans before passing the frontier. On the 16th, by order of the French government, Belfort capitulated after a memorable defence.

Even before its investment it had been cut off from the interior of France, and the German corps of von Werder was, throughout the siege, between the fortress and the forces which might attempt its relief. The siege corps was commanded by General von Tresckow and numbered at first 10,000 men with twenty-four field guns—a force which appeared adequate for the reduction of the antiquated works of Vauban. Colonel Denfert-Rochereau was, however, a scientific engineer of advanced ideas as well as a veteran soldier of the Crimea and Algeria, and he had been stationed at Belfort for six years. He was therefore eminently fitted for the command of the fortress. He had as a nucleus but few regular troops, but the energy of the military and civil authorities enabled his force to be augmented by national guards, &c., to 17,600 men. The artillery was very numerous, but skilled gunners were not available in any great strength and ammunition was scarce. Perhaps the most favourable circumstance from a technical point of view was the bomb-proof accommodation of the enceinte.

The old fortress consisted of the town enceinte, the castle (situated on high ground and fortified by several concentric envelopes), and the entrenched camp, a hollow enclosed by continuous lines, the salients of which were the castle, Fort La Justice and Fort La Miotte. These were planned in the days of short-range guns, and were therefore in 1870 open to

¹ Jules Favre, it appears, neglected to inform Gambetta of the exception.

an overwhelming bombardment by the rifled cannon of the attack. Denfert-Rochereau, however, understood better than other engineers of the day the power of modern artillery, and his plan was to utilize the old works as a keep and an artillery position. The Perches ridge, whence the town and suburbs could be bombarded, he fortified with all possible speed. On the right bank of the Savoureuse he constructed two new forts, Bellevue in the south-west and Des Barres to the west, and, further, he prepared the suburb on this side for a hand-to-hand defence. His general plan was to maintain as advanced a line as possible, to manœuvre against the investing troops, and to support his own by the long range fire of his rifled guns. With this object he fortified the outlying villages, and when the Germans (chiefly Landwehr) began the investment on the 3rd of November 1870, they encountered everywhere a most strenuous resistance. Throughout the month the garrison made repeated sorties, and the Germans were on several occasions forced by the long range fire of the fortress to evacuate villages which they had taken. Under these circumstances, and also because of their numerical weakness and the rigour of the weather, the Germans advanced but slowly. On the 2nd of December, when at last von Tresckow broke ground for the construction of his batteries, the French still held Danjoutin, Bosmont, Pérouse and the adjacent woods, and, to the northward (on this side the siege was not pressed) La Forge. Thus the first attack of the siege artillery was confined to the western side of the river between Essert and Bavillers. From this position the bombardment opened on the 3rd of December. Some damage was done



to the houses of Belfort, but the garrison was not intimidated, and their artillery replied with such spirit that after some days the German commander gave up the bombardment. On this occasion the distant forts La Miotte and La Justice fired with effect at a range of 4700 yds., affording a conspicuous illustration of the changed conditions of siege-craft. The German batteries, as more guns arrived, were extended from left to right, and on the 13th of December the Bosmont was captured, ground being also gained in front of

Bellevue. The difficulties under which the siege corps laboured were very great, and it was not until the 7th of January 1871 that the rightmost battery opened fire. The formal siege of the Perches redoubts had now been decided upon, and as an essential preliminary to further operations, Danjoutin, now isolated, was stormed by the Landwehr on the night of the 7th-8th January. In the meanwhile typhus and smallpox had broken out amongst the French, many of the national guards were impatient of control, and the German trenches, in spite of difficulties of ground and weather, made steady progress towards the Perches. A week after the fall of Danjoutin the victory of von Werder and the XIV. army corps at the Lisaine, in which a part of the siege corps bore a share, put an end to the attempt to relieve Belfort, and the siege corps was promptly increased to a strength of 17,600 infantry, 4700 artillery and 1100 engineers, with thirty-four field-guns besides the guns and howitzers of the siege train. The investment was now more strictly maintained even on the north side. On the night of the 20th of January the French lines about Pérouse were carried by assault, and, both flanks being now cleared, the formal siege of the Perches forts was opened, the first parallel extending from Danjoutin to Haut Taillis. In the early morning of the 27th a determined but premature attempt was made to storm the Perches redoubts, which cost the besiegers nearly 500 men. After this failure Tresckow once more resorted to the regular method of siege approaches, and on the 2nd of February the second parallel was thrown up. La Justice was now bombarded by two new batteries near Pérouse, the Perches were of course subjected to an "artillery attack," and henceforward the besiegers fired 1500 shells a day into the works of the French. But the besiegers were still weak in numbers and their

labours were very exhausting. Bellevue and Des Barres became very active in hindering the advance of the siege works, and the German battalions were so far depleted by losses and sickness that they could often muster but 300 men for duty. Still, the guns of the attack were now steadily gaining the upper hand, and at last on the 8th of February the Germans entered the two Perches redoubts. This success, and the arrival of German reinforcements, decided the siege. The Perches ridge was crowned with a parallel and numerous batteries, which in the end mounted ninety-seven guns. The attack on the castle now opened, but operations were soon afterwards suspended by the news that Belfort was now included in the general armistice (February 15th). A little later Denfert-Rochereau received a direct order from his own government to surrender the fortress, and the garrison, being granted free withdrawal, marched out with its arms and trains. "The town had suffered terribly . . . nearly all the buildings were damaged . . . the guns in the upper batteries could only be reached by ladders. The garrison, of its original strength of 17,700 officers and men, had lost 4750, besides 336 citizens. The place was no longer tenable." Nevertheless, "the defence was by no means at its last stage" at the time of the formal surrender. The total loss of the besiegers was about 2000 men.

It was not until the 11th of March that the Germans took possession of Bitche, the little fortress on the Vosges, where in the early days of the war de Failly had illustrated so signally the want of concerted action and the neglect of opportunities which had throughout proved the bane of the French armies.

The losses of the Germans during the whole war were 28,000 dead and 101,000 wounded and disabled, those of the French, 156,000 dead (17,000 of whom died, of sickness and wounds, as prisoners in German hands) and 143,000 wounded and disabled. 720,000 men surrendered to the Germans or to the authorities of neutral states, and at the close of the war there were still 250,000 troops on foot, with further resources not immediately available to the number of 280,000 more. In this connexion, and as evidence of the respective numerical yields of the German system working normally and of the French improvised for the emergency, we quote from Berndt (*Zahl im Kriege*) the following comparative figures:—

End of July	French 250,000, Germans 384,000 under arms.
Middle of November	" 600,000 " 425,000 "
After the surrender of Paris and the disarmament of Bourbaki's army	" 534,000 " 835,000 "

The date of the armistice was the 28th of January, and that of the ratification of the treaty of Frankfurt the 23rd of May 1871.¹

¹ In view of the present situation of events it is interesting to remember that Germany exacted from France an indemnity of £200,000,000, as well as the cession, opposed by Bismarck, of Alsace-Lorraine.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877-78

ON 24th April 1877, the tsar declared war against Turkey, with the avowed object of righting the wrongs of the Christians in Turkey. The Turco-Servian war was just over. Contrary to expectation the Turks had proved victorious. Hostilities had ceased in October 1876, though it was not till 1st March 1877 that peace had been signed. During 1876 the Turks had also quelled an insurrection of the Christians in Bulgaria, when the treatment they meted out to the Christians and the cry of "Bulgarian atrocities" had aroused the sentimental sympathies of Europe.

The Danube formed the Turkish frontier. Flowing west to east along the southern boundary of Rumania, it turned to the north and then to the east to the Black Sea, enclosing the Dobrudja, an inhospitable and difficult region, of rectangular shape, some 100 m. N. to S. by 30 to 60 m. E. to W., which was the extreme northern part of the Turkish dominions.

The Russians did not anticipate that the opposition to be encountered from the Turkish forces would be of a serious nature. As for natural obstacles, there were the Danube and the Balkans directly across the route, but the passage of these was not likely to cause any serious delay.

The Turkish fortresses of the Quadrilateral—Rustchuk, Silistria, Shumla and Varna—could be avoided, and Nikopol and Vidin were more or less isolated. It would only be necessary to cover the lines of communication from the action of the garrisons of these places. It was known that Osman Pasha was at Vidin with what remained of the Turkish force which had defeated the Servians the previous year, and it would be necessary to detach a force to operate against him. There would be some delay in the forwarding of supplies, due to the fact that the Roumanian railway was of different gauge to the railways of Russia, but this would not be serious. This line, the only railway through Rumania, ran from Galatz to Bucharest, where one branch ran west by Slatina and the other to Giurgevo on the Danube, where it connected with a line south of the river from Rustchuk to Shumla and Varna through Rasgrad. It was generally imagined that the advance to Constantinople would be of the nature of a triumphal march. By a clause of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea had been destroyed, and though this clause was revoked in 1871, in 1877 the Turks possessed the undoubted command of the sea. Had things been different, an advance through the Dobrudja, with a safe line of supply by water, would have offered many advantages. Under existing circumstances, with Turkish gunboats on the Danube and ironclads on the Black Sea, such a course was out of the question.

The plan of campaign formed by the Russians was as follows: One corps was to enter the Dobrudja to protect the line of communication against any Turkish advance east of the Danube, while the remainder would cross the Danube between Rustchuk and Nikopol, cross the Balkans and advance on Adrianople. Detached forces would meanwhile mask the "Quadrilateral" and the Turkish force at Vidin.

A Convention had been made with Rumania, allowing the passage of the Russians through the country. The Rumanians proclaimed their independence of Turkey, and although the tsar declined their offer of active co-operation for the time being, their troops occupied Calafat, facing Vidin, and early in May their batteries engaged the guns of Vidin across the river. The Russian army with which it was proposed to carry on the war, consisted of six army corps and two rifle brigades. Each corps was formed of one cavalry and two infantry divisions. There were in addition 74 squadrons and 52 guns of Cossacks. Each infantry division had 48, and each cavalry

division 12 guns. This force had been mobilized in the November of the previous year, and was now distributed as follows :—

Commander-in-chief : The grand-duke Nicholas, with headquarters at Kishinev.

VII. Army Corps	.	.	.	Odessa and Tatar Bunar.
XI.	"	.	.	Tarutinskaja and Kanszany.
VIII.	"	.	.	Kishinev.
XII.	"	.	.	Ungheni.
IX.	"	.	.	Winnica.
X.	"	.	.	Crimea.
Rifle Brigades	.	.	.	Bestomak.

The mobilization of the IV., XIII., and XIV. Army Corps had been ordered in December 1876, but they would not be ready to move till the following month—May 1877. In addition to the above, there were heavy artillery with 400 siege guns, engineers with pontoon trains, naval launches, and the necessary supply trains. The total Russian forces numbered 200,000 combatants of all arms, with 850 field and 400 siege guns.

For some months prior to the tsar's declaration, Turkey had realized that war was inevitable, but such preparations as were made were far from adequate. Abdul Kerim, who had commanded in Servia the previous year, was still acting as commander-in-chief, but the task set him was not an easy one. With the Russians in front, the Servians and Montenegrins, whose action was known to be uncertain, on the flank, and the Christian population of Bulgaria, in sympathy with the Russians, in the midst, it required a younger and more energetic man, with a greater knowledge of the art of war than he possessed, to plan and to carry out a successful defence of the Moslem dominions. The prospect of war had aroused the Turks, and the nation had taken steps to prepare for the conflict, but they lacked trained leaders. The Turkish officers were but ill-instructed. Works on the art of war did not exist in the Turkish language. General conscription existed in Turkey, but there was an entire absence of organization. Theoretically, each of the six districts into which the empire was divided should have produced an army of four corps, but it was only on paper. Practically the troops were not organized in corps. At the outbreak of war, Osman's force, some 30,000 strong, was at Vidin; a few battalions were spread along the Danube from Vidin to Silistria, with a brigade of infantry at Nikopol, another at Sistova, and the best part of two divisions at Rustchuk. Abdul Kerim's headquarters were at Shumla where there were two more infantry divisions. A cavalry division was in process of organization. Varna was the base of supply and was connected by rail with Shumla and Rustchuk. Suleiman Pasha with some 40,000 men was still in Montenegro. The total Turkish forces in Europe at that time were about 120,000 men with 450 guns, but they were disseminated instead of being concentrated, or grouped in view of a rapid concentration. Abdul Kerim's plan, or rather his idea, was, that the Russians would find some difficulty in the first place in forcing the passage of the Danube, and when they had succeeded in this, they would be bound to enter the zone of the Quadrilateral, where he hoped, operating with the fortresses as supports, to deal with them successfully. As regards the Turkish fleet, at the outset, in addition to a fleet of 8 ironclads below Braila, there were 7 monitors and 18 wooden ships of war on the Danube between Hirsova and Vidin.

In the matter of armament the Turks had the advantage. The artillery were armed with a Krupp breech-loading gun, which was better than the Russian bronze gun, while the Peabody-Martini rifles of the infantry were superior to the Russian Krenk. The firearm of the Turkish cavalry was the Winchester repeating carbine, which was inferior to the short Berden with which the Russian cavalry was armed. But this advantage in armament was discounted by the fact that, from motives of economy, the Turkish soldier had done but little rifle practice.

Hostilities commenced on the 24th of April, when the Russian army advanced in three columns towards Bucharest, the eastern flank covered by the XI. Corps which marched to Galatz. By the end of May the bulk of the Russian forces were assembled at Bucharest practically opposite the intended point of passage, with the advanced guard under General Skobelev at Giurgevo, and cavalry observing the river line from Turnu Magureli to Kalarashi. It was now decided to await the arrival of the IV., XIII., and XIV. Corps and the necessary bridging material for the passage of the Danube.

On June 15th the troops were disposed as follows: 8th Cavalry Division at Turnu Magureli; 12th at Oltenitza; 2nd at Kalarashi; Advanced Guard at Giurgevo; XI. Army Corps at Oltenitza and Giurgevo; VIII., XII., XIII., $\frac{1}{2}$ IX., at Bucharest; $\frac{1}{2}$ IX. at Slatina; IV. at Slobodisa; XIV. at Galtaz; VII. at Odessa; X. in the Crimea. Meanwhile steam launches were brought overland, and the Russians, by means of torpedoes, submarine mines and their shore batteries, had succeeded in clearing the Danube of Turkish vessels between Nikopolis and Rustchuk. Two of the smaller ironclads had been sunk, the remainder of the flotilla driven back under the shelter of the fortresses, while barricades of mines effectually isolated them and prevented them from again entering

the zone of operations. Of the large ironclads on the lower Danube, one was sunk near Sulina, and from that time the remainder stayed in Sulina harbour.

On June 22nd the XIV. Army Corps crossed into the Dobrudja at Galatz and advanced south, the Turkish detachment there retiring before them. Pontoons having been brought by rail, the necessary rafts and boats (which had been constructed at Slatina on the Aluta) were floated down to the neighbourhood of Zimnitza, and on June 24th siege batteries opened fire on Nikopol and Rustchuk, while the IX. Army Corps made a feint of crossing just below Nikopol. These measures were effective in confusing the Turkish commander as to the Russian intentions, and on the night of June 26/27th, 12 companies of rifles, with a squadron and 6 guns, were landed on the south bank opposite Zimnitza, and within twenty-four hours the whole of the VIII. Corps had crossed the river. By July 2nd the Russians had completed a bridge over the river, which is 1000 yds. wide at this part. At Sistova was a Turkish brigade of infantry. The commander, in the early morning of the 27th, received information from his outposts of the crossing, but instead of moving with his whole force, sent two battalions to oppose it. The Russians drove them back, and when reinforced, advanced against the heights in rear of Sistova, which were occupied with a loss of 800 men, the Turkish troops retreating to Tirnova and Nikopol. The Turks had remained ignorant of the Russians' concentration in Rumania and no attempt had been made to discover their plans. Abdul Kerim remained inactive in the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and even when he heard of the crossing at Sistova, decided that it was but a demonstration. No measures were taken to observe the Russians. They were thus able to complete their crossing practically undisturbed, and this although it was never likely that the Russians would voluntarily select a point of passage leading into the Quadrilateral. Everything pointed to a crossing between Nikopol and Rustchuk. The best course for the Turks under existing circumstances would have been to leave garrisons in the fortresses, to observe the river line and to push reconnaissances to the north of the river, and to dispose the field army in a central position, whence it could concentrate on any point as soon as the enemy's intentions were revealed.

On June 30th Lieut.-General Gurko was put in command of a detachment composed of 10 battalions, 31 squadrons and 32 guns, with which he was ordered to advance rapidly to Tirnova to gain possession of a pass over the Balkans, to damage railways and telegraphs, and to endeavour to stir up a Bulgarian revolt. He crossed the Danube by the Russian bridge on July 3rd and occupied Tirnova on July 7th, the Turkish garrison retreating to Osman Bazar. At Tirnova he learned that the Shipka Pass was occupied by 3000 Turks, and that none of the remaining passes were held in any force. He then determined to cross by the Hainkioi Pass and to turn the Shipka. He started from Tirnova on the 12th July, on which day the head of the VIII. Corps reached the town. Hainkioi was occupied on the 14th, a detachment of 300 Turks being driven away. Gurko then sent two squadrons to cut the telegraph at Yeni Zagra, and leaving a garrison to hold the pass, set out for Kazanlik on July 16th. It had been arranged that a force from the VIII. Corps should attack the Shipka Pass from the north on the 17th, Gurko attacking simultaneously from the south; but his advance was delayed by small bodies of the enemy, and he failed to co-operate, with the result that the attack from the north was repulsed. The Turkish commander, however, evacuated the pass that night (July 18th/19th). It was occupied by the Russians on July 19th, and held till the end of the war. Gurko's detachment was followed across the Danube bridge by the XII. and XIII. Army Corps, which crossed between July 3rd and 8th and moved towards the Jantra river; the IX. Corps was across by July 10th and advanced on Nikopol; the XI. Corps crossed July 10th-15th; and finally the IV. Corps between July 20th and 30th. The VIII. Corps had meanwhile advanced on Tirnova, as we have seen.

On July 3rd Abdul Kerim received orders from Constantinople to advance against the Russians, and set out with the force from Shumla for Rustchuk, immediately preceded by the cavalry division. Still no attempt was made to gain contact with the Russians and discover their intentions. From Rustchuk, Abdul Kerim advanced towards the Jantra, and after a skirmish between the Turkish cavalry and a Russian cavalry brigade again retired. Realizing Abdul Kerim's incapacity, and rendered anxious by Gurko's successful advance, the authorities at Constantinople now decided to give the command to Mehemet Ali. He superseded Abdul Kerim on July 19th, and at once ordered the concentration of all available forces at Rasgrad. Meanwhile Osman Pasha, who had till now been condemned to inactivity at Vidin, received permission to march.

Vidin, with its modern fortifications and heavy armament, and with the Danube on one side and marshy ground towards the interior, was a place of considerable strength. But with the Russians south of the Danube there could no longer be any justification for keeping Osman's 30,000 men isolated. Leaving garrisons in Vidin and the other towns along the Danube from Nikopol to Rakovitz, and to bar the roads from Servia, Osman left Vidin with the remaining 19 battalions, 6 squadrons and 9 batteries on July 13th. His original plan was to join the 10 battalions under Haidar Pasha, then garrisoning Nikopol, and attack the Russian flank between Biela and Tirnova; but on July 15th he received news that the Russians were attacking Nikopol, and he then decided to march straight to

Plevna, where there was a garrison of 3000 men under Atouf Pasha. Osman reached Plevna on July 19th, and at once took up a position which had been previously reconnoitred by Atouf Pasha, on the hills to the north-east and east of the town. He had arrived just in time. On July 16th the Russian IX. corps had taken Nikopol, and on the 18th orders were received to occupy Plevna with one division. At 5 A.M. on July 20th General Schilder-Schuldner, with the 5th division IX. corps and other forces, attacked Osman's position. No preliminary reconnaissance was made, and the Russians, after an artillery bombardment lasting about an hour, attacked at four points with separate columns. By midday the Russians were in retreat, having lost over 2800 men. There was no pursuit. On July 20th Osman was reinforced by fourteen battalions from Sofia, and the following day sent Rifaat Pasha with six battalions, a battery and some Circassian cavalry to occupy Lovcha in order to secure his communications with Sofia.

Osman's force at Plevna, within three days' march of the one Russian bridge over the Danube and flanking their line of operations, could not be neglected, and General Krüdener, commanding the IX. corps, received orders to attack again as soon as possible. After the battle of the 20th he had been reinforced by brigades of the IV. and XII. corps and a cavalry division. With this force, 30,000 in all, he attacked on July 30th. Krüdener advanced in two columns, cavalry covering both flanks. Skobelev, with the cavalry on the southern flank, was subsequently reinforced by infantry, so there were practically three columns of attack. A general reserve of one brigade was kept at Karagatsch (16 m. east of Plevna). After an artillery engagement which lasted from 8.30 A.M. till 2.30 P.M. the infantry advanced. The fighting lasted till sunset, when the Russians withdrew to Karagatsch, having lost 7300 officers and men. The Turkish casualties were 2000. General Krüdener, having reconnoitred the position, had hesitated to attack with the force available, and only acted in obedience to the orders received from headquarters, then 80 m. distant at Tirnova. His defeat was an unpleasant surprise for the Russians. Their plans were rudely upset, and their attention was now directed solely to the taking of Plevna. Headquarters were moved from Tirnova back to Bulgareni, Gurko was called back from south of the Balkans, the Rumanian army was called in to co-operate, orders were issued for the Guards and Grenadier corps and the 24th and 26th infantry divisions to mobilize, 188,000 of the 1st Ban militia and three divisions of the reserve were called out, and the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions and the 3rd Rifle Brigade from Moscow district, where they had been mobilized, were at once ordered to the front.

At this time the position of the Russians was as follows: the XIV. and part of the VII. corps were north of the Danube, covering the communications; the IV. and IX. corps were opposed to Osman Pasha at Plevna and his garrisons of Lovcha and Orchanie (the advanced depot of the Plevna force); the XI., XII. and XIII. corps were along the White Lom facing Mehemet Ali, who was on the line Rasgrad-Eski Djuma with a force of about 80,000 infantry with 60 guns and a few regiments of cavalry, in addition to the garrisons of the fortresses; a small garrison on the Shipka Pass. Gurko was south of the Balkans, where Suleiman Pasha had a force of some 30,000 men. The Russian casualties since the commencement had reached 15,000, and their numbers south of the Danube did not exceed 130,000. Suleiman Pasha could have joined Osman or Mehemet Ali, avoiding the Shipka, and a vigorous offensive against the Russian flank at that time held out every prospect of success. The Shipka Pass would of necessity have been evacuated, but all through we find the Turkish commanders with their eyes fixed on geographical, which were sometimes strategical, points, and losing sight of the fact that the Russian army was their first objective. It is true that the ministers at Constantinople were largely responsible for the faulty strategy, but the generals in the field were also to blame. It was the moment for vigorous action on the part of the Turks. The moral equilibrium of the enemy was upset and the whole army demoralized by this second defeat at Plevna, but not a move was made. Again Osman failed to pursue. He was weak in cavalry, but he had sufficient to keep in touch with the enemy, who were utterly demoralized, and could have followed on with his whole force. He was but 35 m. distant from Sistova, and the result of the demolition of the bridge would have been incalculable. He was subsequently forbidden by Constantinople to assume the offensive, but it was not necessary to consult ministers as to pursuit after a successful battle, and they cannot be held responsible for this. The other Turkish commanders received news of the results of the battles of Plevna with incredulity, and likewise failed to turn them to account.

South of the Balkans was Suleiman's army. He was ordered from Montenegro on July 1st, and, leaving garrisons along the Montenegrin frontier, embarked at Antivari on July 15th. Disembarking at Dedeagatch on the 21st, he moved thence by train to Adrianople. His command increased by some 15 battalions under Reouf Pasha, raised in the Balkan zone, amounted to approximately 30,000 men, and he was ordered to retake the Shipka Pass and to join Osman Pasha. Suleiman arrived at Karabunar on July 20th and moved to Eski Sagra, where he was joined by Reouf Pasha. Gurko, who had been resting about the Shipka Pass, ignorant of the arrival of Suleiman, moved against Reouf Pasha on the 27th of July, and found himself confronted by their combined forces on the 31st. He was attacked by Suleiman that day and was forced to retire. His force consisted

of 15,000 men, including six battalions of Bulgarian volunteers which had just been raised. The following day he retreated across the Balkans by Hainkioi, where he left two brigades to hold the Hainkoi and Elena Passes, the Bulgarian troops joining the garrison on the Shipka. Suleiman remained at Yeni Zagra till the 17th of August, when he set out for the Shipka. On August 21st the heights east of the pass were taken, and during the next few days there was desperate fighting; but the original garrison was gradually reinforced, and the Russians held on. In this fighting the Russian losses amounted to close on 4000, while the Turkish casualties were about treble that number. Suleiman now intrenched himself close to the Russian position, and there he remained till Sept. 17th, when after a three days' bombardment he again assaulted the position, but was repulsed with considerable loss. This was the last assault made on the Russian position. Suleiman replaced Mehemet Ali as commander-in-chief on Oct. 2nd, and was himself succeeded by Reouf Pasha. Thus, under orders from Constantinople, Suleiman frittered away his opportunity and his army in a fruitless attempt to retake the Shipka Pass.

It was not till the middle of August that Mehemet Ali decided to move against the Russians and ordered an advance. The Cesarevich (afterwards Alexander III.), who was opposing him with the XI., XII. and XIII. corps, in all about 50,000, was extended on the line of the White Lom from Pargos to Eski Djuma. On August 22nd and 23rd there were engagements about Ayaslar, resulting in the retirement of the Russians. On August 30th he attacked at Karahassankoi and drove the Russians across the river. On September 3rd he crossed the White Lom and again defeated them at Katzelevo, the enemy retiring behind the Banitcha Lom. On September 12th Mehemet Ali continued his advance, but halted on the 14th for a week. He then made an attack on Cerkovna on the 21st, but was repulsed with a loss of 1600 men, and two days later retired his army behind the White Lom. He had effected nothing. As will be seen later, the Russian operation against Plevna had not been in any way disturbed. The containing force under the Cesarevich had retired a certain distance, but it still held the main Turkish army. Mehemet Ali's original plan had been to advance by Osman Bazar, effect a junction with Suleiman, and move on Tirnova. But Suleiman was averse to his plan and it was negatived at Constantinople, though if this plan had been carried out with vigour, the position of the Russians should have been critical. He then advanced on a front of 50 m. instead of moving concentrated, which is the explanation of his failure. It is true that he was much hampered by the state of his cavalry, which was exhausted, and consequently was without information, while the Russians were well served. Mehemet Ali now concentrated his force, but at this juncture he was superseded by Suleiman Pasha.

To return to Plevna. At this time the Russians were disposed in a semicircle round Plevna, their right or N. flank resting on Ribina and the S. flank resting on Bogot. On August 30th Osman had moved out with a column of all arms towards Pelishat. The following day he engaged the Russians. The Turks lost 300 killed and 1000 wounded, and the Russian losses were about 1000. It is difficult to say what was the object of this sortie, which was of the nature of a reconnaissance in force. It achieved nothing. The Turks were not defeated, but retired again into Plevna the same evening. By the end of August the whole of the Rumanian army had crossed the Danube, and during the first days of September the first Russian reinforcements, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions and the 3rd Rifle brigade, had arrived and joined the forces round Plevna. Mehemet Ali's advance and the assaults on the Shipka had been repulsed. The Russians could expect no further reinforcements before October, and it was therefore decided to make a third attempt to take Plevna, but first of all to occupy Lovcha. Skobelev had already made an unsuccessful attempt on August 6th, and General Prince Imeretinski, with a force of two infantry divisions and a brigade of Cossacks, in addition to Skobelev's mixed brigade, was now entrusted with the task. The garrison under Rifaat Pasha amounted to 8 battalions, 6 guns and some Circassians. Fighting commenced on Sept. 1st and on the 3rd the Turks were driven out, most of the survivors finding their way to Plevna, and bringing 5 guns with them. The Russians lost 1500, the Turks 2500. On Sept. 2nd, Osman set out with a strong relieving column from Plevna, but on the 4th, hearing that the Russians had already occupied the town, he turned back and reached Plevna on the 6th. On Sept. 5th, 8 battalions and 2 batteries reached Orkhanie, and Osman's force, including the Lovcha troops, numbered about 30,000 men and 72 guns. The Russian forces, including the Rumanians, numbered about 90,000. Their plan was, after a long artillery bombardment, to attack the eastern front with the Rumanian forces, the south-eastern front with the IV. and IX. corps and the southern front with Imeretinski's command. The attacks were to be simultaneous. The cavalry divisions were to be kept in rear and close to the flank of the attacking infantry. During the night of Sept. 6th-7th the troops were moved into preparatory positions, and batteries were constructed at 3000 to 5000 yds. from the outer works. The artillery bombardment was commenced at 6 A.M. on Sept. 7th and continued till midday Sept. 11th. So far the infantry had only been engaged on the south flank, where Skobelev had succeeded Imeretinski in the command. He had succeeded in advancing to within 2000 yds of the southern Turkish redoubts and had entrenched himself. The orders for Sept. 11th were for the infantry assaults to be

delivered at 3 P.M. after a six hours' cannonade. A dense fog interfered with the artillery bombardment. At the end of the day the Rumanians had taken No. 1 Grivitzza redoubt, the attack on the S.E. front had been repulsed and Skobelev had established himself within 1000 yds. of Plevna, having taken Kavanlik and Issa forts. On Sept. 12th the Turks retook these forts and drove Skobelev back. During the next two days the Russians continued to bombard the works, but no further attack was made. The Rumanians remained in possession of the Grivitzza redoubt, defeating an attempt made by the Turks to retake it on Sept. 14th. The Russians then decided to retire and entrenched themselves on a line with Verbitza-Radishevo, with their cavalry extending to the Vid on either flank. There was no question of pursuit; in the first and second battles the numbers had been about equal, but now the Russians were vastly superior and Osman would have been crushed by a powerful counter-attack.

In their third battle the Turks had lost 5000, while the Russian casualties amounted to close on 20,000. The Russian bombardment, lasting four days, had effected nothing. It had not caused 200 casualties. The object of the artillery is to cover the advance of the infantry, and the arms must work in combination. The defender does not expose himself to the artillery fire unless compelled to do so by the approaching infantry. The Russians failed to realize this and practically wasted their ammunition. They had again failed to reconnoitre the position and attacked along the whole front instead of pressing home in strength at the decisive points. Their attacks were not even simultaneous, and Osman was able to shift his reserves from point to point. In addition to this, when the Russians retired one-third of their force had not been engaged. The defects in their plan of action are largely attributable to the fact that though control was nominally centred in one man, senior officers were present who interfered with his arrangements.

It was now decided to complete the investment of Plevna, and Todleben, the defender of Sevastopol, was entrusted with supreme control of the operations. He arrived on the scene on Sept. 28th, but it was not till Oct. 24th that the investment was completed, and, meanwhile, on Sept. 24th and again on Oct. 8th, strong reinforcements arrived, raising the Turkish force under Osman to 84 battalions, 25 squadrons and 96 guns, with an effective of 48,000 men. Plevna had been re-victualled and the sick and wounded had been sent back to Orhanie. General Krilov, who had been operating west of the Vid, with 52 squadrons and 30 horse artillery guns, had failed to prevent these movements, and was superseded by General Gurko on Oct. 8th. The Russian Guards corps had all reached Plevna by Oct. 20th, and two divisions were at once placed under Gurko's orders, raising his command to 35,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 48 guns. His instructions were to capture the Turkish positions along the Sofia road. He compelled the garrison of Dolni-Dubnik to retire into Plevna, and captured Gorni Dubnik and Telis with their garrisons after severe fighting on Oct. 24th and 28th. Osman's force was thereby reduced by 12 battalions. About the middle of November the opposing forces were distributed as follows: 6 divisions along the Lom, under the Cesarevich, facing Suleiman's army; 3 divisions holding the Shipka under Radetzky; 1 division at Lovcha; 2½ divisions west of the Vid, under Gurko; and 12 divisions east of the Vid, investing Plevna. The XIV. corps was in the Dobrudja, the VII. corps about Odessa and the X. corps in the Crimea.

On the Turkish side Suleiman advanced across the Lom, leaving small garrisons in the fortresses, and attacked at Mechka on Nov. 19th, and at Mechka and Tristenik on Nov. 26th, and again on Dec. 12th, but each time without success, and he retired across the Lom. South of the Balkans Vessil Pasha had succeeded Reouf Pasha on the Shipka. He continued to contain the three Russian divisions there, but made no attempt to dislodge them, beyond small offensive demonstrations made with the object of concealing the departure of large drafts which were sent to Sofia.

At Sofia and Orkhanie, the Turks were forming an army of recruits and reservists with the object of advancing to the relief of Osman. Mehemet Ali was entrusted with the command. Osman had already asked the sultan's permission to evacuate Plevna, with a view to co-operating with Mehemet Ali, but permission was refused. It was not till the investment was completed that the sultan changed his mind, too late, and gave his sanction to the move. The Russians received information of Mehemet Ali's intended advance, and as the force around Plevna amounted to 191 battalions, 120 squadrons and 650 guns, it was decided that Gurko should move with his detachment towards Sofia. He concentrated his force at Yablonitzza on Nov. 5th and succeeded in driving the Turkish advanced guard from Orkhanie. Mehemet Ali now occupied a strong position covering the Arabi Konak Pass over the Balkans, and, with a force of 43 battalions with cavalry and guns, made no attempt to relieve Osman.

Osman Pasha, his supplies having given out, eventually decided on a sortie. His troops had been short of food since the beginning of November, and the number of sick had risen to 10,000. His plan was to break through to the west and make for Sofia via Berkovitz. The Russians observed the preparations made and concentrated sufficient force at the threatened point, with the result that Osman and his army of 40,000 men capitulated. The Turkish losses in the action were about 6000 and the Russians lost about 1500. The Russians now decided, notwithstanding the difficulties due to the winter season, to push

on across the Balkans. The VII. and X. corps were still left guarding the Russian coasts. The Cesarevich was left north of the Balkans with 71,000 men to guard the communications. Gurko's force was raised to 80,000. Leaving a containing force to oppose the Turks at the Arabi Konak Pass positions, he crossed by the Curiak Pass. The Turks retired unobserved, and after a feeble stand at Tashkosen retreated to Kustendil. Gurko occupied Sofia on Jan. 4th. Radetzky's force at the Shipka was raised to 66,000, with which force, having defeated Vessil Pasha, he was to join Gurko south of the Balkans. Radetzky commenced operations on Jan. 5th. Keeping one division to hold the works on the Shipka, he moved the remainder of the force in two columns under Skobelev and Prince Mirski, who were to cross one on each side and attack simultaneously from the south. Vessil Pasha held an entrenched camp at Shenovo with some 12,000 men; the remainder of his force was in position on the mountains. Owing to the difficulties of the crossing, Skobelev was delayed. Mirski attacked on Jan. 8th and was repulsed. The following day Skobelev and Mirski attacking together were successful, and Vessil Pasha capitulated with his force, some 36,000, of whom 6000 were sick and wounded. Vessil Pasha had pointed out the danger of his position on Jan. 7th, but, contrary to Suleiman's advice, the war minister, believing an armistice imminent, had ordered him to hold on to the Shipka Pass. Mehemet Ali's force, dangerously delayed owing to interference by the minister of war, eventually reached Tatar-Bazardjik, which was selected by Suleiman (now commander-in-chief) for the concentration of his forces. Having received news of the capture of the Shipka force he retired on Philippopolis, with Gurko's forces closely pursuing. But Radetzky's forces had already pushed on and practically cut Suleiman off from Adrianople. After some engagements about Philippopolis on Jan. 15th, 16th and 17th, he retreated towards the Aegean Sea through the Rhodope mountains, having lost most of his guns, and reached Enos about Jan. 28th, whence what remained of his force was conveyed by water to Constantinople.

Suleiman had again missed his opportunity. The Russians crossed the Balkans in a wide front of about 180 miles, and there was opportunity for successful action by a capable commander. There were not only the columns commanded by Gurko and Radetzky, but also a third column under General Kartzoff, which crossed by the Trojan Pass, after which it joined Gurko's force. There were the troops under Mehemet Ali about Sofia, Vessil Pasha's force about the Shipka, and the main army on the Lom, which had been withdrawn south of the Balkans after the fall of Plevna, so that Suleiman, who had been appointed commander-in-chief, had an available force of 130 battalions, 120 guns and a proportion of cavalry. The fortified town of Adrianople offered a strong central position at which to concentrate his forces, and with this point as support, acting on interior lines, he could have dealt with the invading and widely separated columns in detail. But he missed his opportunity and left his scattered forces to be overwhelmed by superior numbers in each instance. The minister for war was undoubtedly responsible to a great extent for this faulty strategy, but the blame falls on the head of Suleiman as commander-in-chief. There was no object in leaving Vessil Pasha on the Shipka. All available forces should have been concentrated in a sound strategical situation.

The Servians had crossed the frontier after the fall of Plevna, and the Montenegrins were also pressing on. On Jan. 16th the Russians occupied Adrianople, and on Jan. 30th they were facing the Buyuk Tchemedjilines, with their flanks resting on the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora. Mehemet Ali was in command of what remained of the Turkish armies behind the lines. On Jan. 31st an armistice was arranged, and on March 3rd the treaty of San Stefano was signed, the terms of which were modified later at the Berlin Conference in June and July 1878.

The Russo-Turkish War proved once for all the great value of improvised fortifications, in other words, of spade work in warfare, and the advantages of field works as regards invisibility against artillery fire. It was not only at Plevna that field entrenchments were made use of. Notable instances were the defence of Lovcha by the small Turkish garrison of 8 battalions with one battery, which from their entrenchments kept Skobelev with over 20,000 men and 90 guns at bay for three days, inflicting on him a loss of over 1500 men. Again, at Gorni Dubnik on Oct. 24th, 3500 Turks with 4 guns held their works throughout the day against 20,000 Russians with 60 guns, inflicting a loss on them of over 3300, and eventually were forced to surrender by a surprise attack under cover of darkness, when their ammunition had run short, and their numbers had been reduced by 1500 casualties. In the attack the success of Skobelev stands out, and we find that he had realized the necessity of entrenching the ground he had gained.

The war was brought to a conclusion, but the Turks had not been beaten in battle. With the exception of the fighting round Plevna and the rout of Suleiman's army at Philippopolis there had been no decisive battles. The Turks had been defeated owing to the incapacity of their leaders, none of whom had previously commanded an army organized according to modern ideas. They were ignorant of strategic principles. Then, again, the interference with the generals in the field by the authorities at Constantinople had in each case resulted in the disasters which invariably follow the attempt of civilian amateurs to control warlike operations.

On the Russian side, the enemy had been at first despised, and consequently the forces originally employed were inadequate, which meant subsequent delays, losses and expense. The command of the sea had proved of little value to the Turks. Their flotilla rendered them no assistance. In the early stages it could have materially assisted by landing reconnoitring parties N. of the Danube, and by interfering with the Russians when crossing the river. The Russian bridge offered a tempting objective throughout the campaign but commanders with the requisite dash and initiative were not forthcoming. The defeat of the Turks was due in the first place to the failure of their politicians to ensure the adequate organization and training of the army during peace time, in the second place to the want of a commander who had educated himself to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to him.

A separate campaign had been waged, as before, in Asia Minor. Here the Turks under Mukhtar Pasha had 57,000 men in two corps, the one on the side of Batoum and Ardahan, the other between Erzerum and Kars. His opponent, Loris Melikov, had at first only some 28,000 infantry, but a disproportionate number of Cossack sotnias. The Russians advanced in three weak columns. On the 17th of May after bombardment the right column stormed Ardahan. The right and centre columns then closed inwards upon Kars, which they besieged, but the siege was given up in July, after Mukhtar, advancing to its relief with 35,000 men, had repulsed Melikov's attack at Zivin (June 26th). The left column occupied Bayazid without difficulty, but when it had proceeded thence on the Erzerum road the Russian garrison was blockaded by the Turks and the column retraced its steps to relieve the place. After this it halted at Igdir in the Araxes valley. Meanwhile the Turks on the coast had advanced, in concert with their fleet, and raised an insurrection amongst the Mahommedans of the littoral. They were eventually repulsed, but the insurrection was not completely suppressed until the summer of 1878.

In August Mukhtar, who had followed up Melikov's retreat from Kars, and won the victory of Kizil-Tepe, led 30,000 men in front of this position, and behind them the Kars garrison of 10,000. Ismail on the Bayazid side had 40,000 Dervish, at Batoum 17,000. But after an interval of two months Melikov was reinforced, while drafts for the armies in Europe were taken from Mukhtar, and the grand-duke Michael, assuming command of the Russians, defeated his opponent completely in the battle of the Aladja Dag (Oct. 15th). The remnants of Mukhtar's army retreated on Erzerum, and while part of the Russian army besieged Kars, part attempted to cut off the retreat of Ismail on the Bayazid road, the corps from the Araxes valley following the latter up. Ismail slipped past them, however, and rejoined Mukhtar at Erzerum. But the two together were no longer able to resist the superior numbers of the Russians, who defeated them in a last battle at Dexe Boyun (Nov. 4th). Kars was stormed on the night of the 11th of November.

THE SERVO-BULGARIAN WAR, 1885

THE Berlin Congress of 1878, by its revision of the treaty of San Stefano, created two states in the Balkan Peninsula—the principality of Bulgaria owning a nominal suzerainty to Turkey, and the autonomous province of eastern Rumelia, presided over by a Turkish governor-general, and apparently intended to remain in close relations with the porte. This settlement came to an end when the movement in favour of a united Bulgaria culminated (September 1885) in a revolution in the Rumelian capital. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, recognizing that the movement was irresistible and that, unless directed by authority, it might degenerate into anarchy and civil war, placed himself at its head, and, proceeding to Philippopolis, formally accepted the government of the united Bulgarian states. As it was assumed that the sultan would reassert his claim by force of arms, the Bulgaro-Rumelian forces were concentrated as rapidly as possible near the Turkish frontier. Prince Alexander, however, had taken the step of acknowledging the sultan's suzerainty; and Turkey was not inclined to begin a war which would probably cause a revolt in Macedonia and might end by rendering Russian influence paramount in Bulgaria. But, while a conference of ambassadors was vainly discussing the situation at Constantinople, the Gordian knot was cut by the announcement that Servia, seeking compensation for the aggrandizement of Bulgaria, had constituted herself the champion of the treaty of Berlin.

King Milan had issued orders for the Servian army mobilization on the very day of Prince Alexander's proclamation at Philippopolis, and large forces were concentrated (October 1st-12th) on the Bulgarian frontier. On the 19th the prince ordered troops to the quarter thus threatened, but it seems certain that, whilst in eastern Rumelia every preparation had been made for war, Prince Alexander had so little expectation of, and wish for, a war with Servia, that few measures were taken to supply the needs of a field army on that side, though fortifications were begun at several places, notably at Sofia and Slivnitza, towards the end of October.

Unlike the Servian army, which contained few permanent units and consisted mainly of militiamen, the standing army of Bulgaria, trained and commanded by Russian officers since 1877-1878, was organized on the German system of filling up relatively strong *cadres* to war strength and forming additional units. When fully mobilized the field army numbered about 55,000 men. The Rumelian forces (militia) consisted in all of about 35,000 men. Besides these forces was the "Bandit brigade" of Captain Panitza, an irregular force some 3,000 strong, composed of Macedonians, Turks, Jews and other miscellaneous volunteers. This force did good service as a flying right wing of the main army. In the Bulgarian army the whole of the staff and superior officers, as well as about half the regimental captains, were Russians. When the mobilization of the Bulgarian and Rumelian forces was decreed by the prince, the whole of the Russian officers were at once withdrawn, and the heavy task of creating a staff and selecting young officers for all the superior commands had to be undertaken in front of the enemy. Moreover, when on the 14th of November Milan finally declared war, the Bulgarian forces were mostly far away beyond the Balkans on the Turkish frontier. The Servian main army (under King Milan), and the army of the Timok promptly crossed the frontier and soon came in contact with small forces of the enemy. On the Timok little or nothing of importance took place throughout the war, as the forces opposing the army of the Timok near Vidin effectually neutralized that force. In front of Dragoman and Trn Bulgarians fell back, engaging in stubborn rearguard combats at every favourable place. The Servian "Army of the Nishava" advanced but slowly and

with hesitation, while the most strenuous exertions were made by Prince Alexander and his newly-formed staff to collect their far-distant troops in the Slivnitza position. Every commander was given the simple order to march on Slivnitza. The civilian population was warned to be ready with supplies to meet the troops by the roadside, and under these peculiar conditions, and extraordinary difficulties of country and weather, the Bulgarians marched on the decisive point at the highest possible speed of man and horse. Some remarkable marches are recorded: the 8th infantry, 4500 strong, covered 59 m. in thirty-two hours, leaving only sixty-two men behind; the 3rd and part of another Rumelian battalion reached Sofia so exhausted that they were sent to the front on horse-back, two men to each horse; the troops that were sent up by rail were packed in open trucks, sixty men to a truck. The furious energy displayed had its reward on the field of battle. Before the last shot of the battle of Slivnitza was fired, nearly half of the entire forces of Bulgaria and Rumelia were in the lines, and 14,000 men more faced the army of the Timok at Widdin. With the main army—a striking display of what could be accomplished by patriotism and vigour—were fifty-six pieces of artillery, most of which had been dragged over the Balkan passes in mid-winter.

The position of Slivnitza, barring the high road between Nish and Sofia, had been extensively fortified, but when the Servians opened their attack on the 17th of November, there were but few troops available to occupy the works. On the right of the Bulgarian line was the Meka Krud height, occupied by some battalions under Captain Benderev; here fighting went on through the short winter day, which ended with a gallant and for the time successful, counter-attack by six Bulgarian battalions led by Benderev. The prince, not yet ready for the offensive, withdrew these troops to their original position. In the centre, near the high road, a hot and, at one moment of the day, almost successful attack of the Servians ended with their complete repulse. The latter had had 17,000 men against the Bulgarians' 11,000; yet they had, owing mainly to faults in the superior leading, been unsuccessful. Next day their chances of victory would be even less, for the defenders were hourly reinforced from Sofia, and on the 18th were actually somewhat superior in numbers. On this day the Servians made a very heavy attack on the Bulgarian left wing, which was eventually repulsed, though not without great difficulty, by the newly arrived troops from Sofia. Later a half-hearted attack was made on the centre, and from his position on Meka Krud Benderev again attacked the Servian "Danube" division. On this day a Servian division pushed the Bulgarians out of Breznik, but made no farther advance either on Sofia or on the left flank of the Bulgarians at Slivnitza, in spite of orders to do so. On the 19th alarm and consternation at Sofia, caused by the presence of hostile forces at Breznik, were so great that Alexander left the command in the hands of his chief of staff, Major Guchev, and hurried back to the capital in order to organize the defence. The Servian leader was, however, as inactive on the 19th as on the 18th, and when he at last moved forward towards Slivnitza it was only with a portion of his force; this was driven back, by a detachment from the left wing of the Bulgarian position, to Rakita. Meanwhile, the active Benderev had reopened his attack on the Danube division. Twice he was repulsed, but finally at about 3 P.M. his battalions carried the heights held by the Servians. A little before this the Bulgarian centre likewise moved forward, and, though a final attack of the Servians on the gap caused by the absence of the Bulgarian troops detached towards Breznik came near to success, the prince returned to the battlefield to find his troops everywhere victorious and driving the enemy before them. Two days later, reorganized and reinforced, the Bulgarians took the offensive and carried the Dragoman pass.

On the 25th Prince Alexander received at Tzaribrod proposals for an armistice from King Milan; these were not accepted, and the Bulgarian army, crossing the frontier, advanced in several columns upon Pirot, where the army of the Nishava took up a defensive position in the town and on the surrounding heights. A two-days' engagement followed (26th and 27th of November). On the 26th the Bulgarians were successful, but a heavy counter attack on the following day almost snatched the victory out of their hands, and it was only after a severe contest lasting eleven hours that the Servians finally gave way. The Bulgarians were not permitted to reap the fruits of their success. As they were preparing to pursue the defeated and now greatly demoralized enemy on the 28th, the Austrian minister at Belgrade arrived at headquarters and hostilities ceased. The intervention of Austria saved the Servian army, which was greatly demoralized, and was now threatened by the united Bulgarian force of nearly 55,000 men. On the same day the army of the Timok was repulsed with heavy loss in an attack on Vidin.

Servia escaped almost unpunished from her war of aggression. The young Bulgarian army, with its improvised staff and newly-appointed field officers, displayed admirable marching power and fighting qualities, and the Rumelian militiamen proved themselves to be good soldiers. The Servians had, however, fought with great bravery also, and the victory must be ascribed in the main to the personal influence, the strenuous exertions and the sound military judgment of Prince Alexander; and the brief but decisive campaign set the seal to Bulgarian unity.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898

On the 15th of February 1898 the U.S. battleship "Maine," which had been sent to Havana on the 25th of January, was destroyed in Havana harbour by an explosion, with a loss of 266 lives. An American board of inquiry, of which Captain W. T. Sampson was president, made an extensive examination of the wreck, and reported to the navy department on the 21st of March that the explosion was caused by an exterior mine, the principal reason for this decision being the upheaval of the ship's bottom.¹ On the 20th of April President McKinley approved a resolution demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba and setting noon of the 23rd of April as the latest date for a reply to the demand. Before this could be delivered by the American minister in Madrid, the Spanish government sent him his passports. On the 22nd the president declared a blockade of Cuban ports; on the 24th the Spanish government declared war; and on the 25th the United States Congress declared that war had existed since the 21st.

The American government had begun to prepare for war as early as January: ships on several foreign stations had been drawn nearer home, and those in Chinese waters were collected at Hong-Kong; the North Atlantic squadron, the only powerful one, had been sent from Hampton Roads into the waters of Florida for manœuvres; after the destruction of the "Maine" the chief part of the ships in the Atlantic were concentrated at Key West; the battleship "Oregon" was ordered east from the Pacific; \$50,000,000 was voted (March 9) "for the national defence"; steps were taken to purchase auxiliary cruisers, yachts and tugs, which were rapidly equipped; large supplies of ammunition were ordered, and Key West became an active base of preparation; Captain Sampson, senior officer of the North Atlantic squadron, was appointed its commander-in-chief with rank of acting rear-admiral; and a "flying squadron" composed of the armoured cruiser "Brooklyn" (flag), the battleships "Texas" and "Massachusetts," and the fast cruisers "Minneapolis" and "Columbia," with Commodore W. S. Schley in command, was stationed at Hampton Roads.

There was a great preponderance of large ships on the side of the United States; only in torpedo craft and small gunboats was Spain superior. The American ships were highly efficient; in Spain everything was unready; Admiral Cervera felt that to send a Spanish squadron across the Atlantic was to send it to destruction, and when he had collected his squadron (including two cruisers from Havana) at the Cape Verde Islands in March, he renewed his expostulations, in which he was supported by a council of war. But on the 24th of April he was peremptorily ordered to leave for Porto Rico, without definite instructions or plan of campaign.

The American flying squadron was held at Hampton Roads, so great was the fear of attack by Spanish ships; and armed auxiliaries and fast cruisers were employed in patrolling the coast east of New York; these could have rendered good service elsewhere, but would have been of no use in repelling an attack by Cervera's squadron had it come that way.

The joint resolution of Congress of the 20th of April had declared that the

¹ The Spanish authorities made an examination, but did not inspect the interior, the chief diver reporting that "the bilge and keel of the vessel throughout its entire extent were buried in the mud, but did not appear to have suffered any damage." It has been suggested that the explosion was the work of Cuban sympathizers who thus planned to secure American assistance against Spain. It was not until 1910 that Congress made an appropriation (and an inadequate one then) for raising the "Maine."

relinquishment by Spain of authority in Cuba was the object of American action; the struggle thus naturally centred about the island. All operations were thus near at hand, Havana, the real objective in Cuba, being only about 100 m. from Key West. A political reason for confining action to the western Atlantic was that an immediate attack upon the coasts of Spain might have aroused the strongly pro-Spanish sympathy of continental Europe into greater activity. The regular United States army, the only available force until war was declared and a volunteer force was authorized, had been assembled at Tampa, Florida, New Orleans and Chickamauga, Georgia, but until the control of the sea was decided, the army could not prudently be moved across the Strait of Florida. Cervera's fleet was thus the real objective of the navy, and had to be settled with before any military action could be undertaken.

Rear-Admiral Sampson left Key West early on the 22nd, and began the blockade of Havana and the north coast of Cuba as far as Cardeñas, 80 m. east, and Bahía Honda, 50 m. west. His North Atlantic squadron of 28 vessels of all kinds, of which the armoured cruiser "New York" (flag), the battleships "Iowa" and "Indiana," and the monitors "Puritan," "Terror" and "Amphitrite," were the most important, and which included six torpedo-boats, was increased to 124 vessels by the 1st of July, chiefly by the addition of extemporized cruisers, converted yachts, &c.

In the Pacific, the American squadron—the protected cruisers "Olympia" (flagship of Commodore George Dewey), "Baltimore," "Raleigh" and "Boston," the small unprotected cruiser "Concord," the gunboat "Petrel," the armed revenue cutter "Hugh M'Culloch," with a purchased collier "Nanshan" and a purchased supply ship "Zafiro"—left Hong-Kong at the request of the governor and went to Mirs Bay, some miles east on the Chinese coast. Ordered (April 25) to begin operations, particularly against the Spanish fleet which he was directed to capture or destroy, Dewey left Mirs Bay on the 27th, and arrived off Luzon, in the Philippines, on the 30th of April. The Spanish admiral Montojo anchored to the eastward of the spit on which are the village and arsenal of Cavite, in a general east and west line, keeping his broadside to the northward. His force consisted of the "Reina Cristina," the "Castilla" (an old wooden steamer which had to be towed); the "Isla de Cuba" and "Isla de Luzon" (protected cruisers of 1050 tons); the "Don Juan de Austria" and the "Don Antonio de Ulloa" (gunboats of about 1150 tons), and the "Marques del Duero" (of 500 tons). There were six guns (3 breech-loaders) in battery at or near Cavite.

Dewey stood on during the night, and passed into the Boca Grande (about 5 m. broad), paying no attention to rumours of torpedoes in a channel so broad and deep, and at midnight passed El Fraile (a large rock, $1\frac{1}{2}$ m. from the south side), from which two shots were fired at him, and he was also fired at by the "Cavite" and one of the city batteries. When he sighted the Spanish squadron to the southward he ordered his transports and the revenue cutter "Hugh M'Culloch" out into the bay, and stood down in column with the "Olympia," "Baltimore," "Raleigh," "Petrel," "Concord" and "Boston" at 400 yd. intervals. When within 5000 yds. he ported his helm, and at 5.41 A.M. opened fire. He stood westwards along the Spanish line, using his port batteries, turned to starboard and stood back, gradually decreasing his distance to 2000 yds. At 7 o'clock the Spanish flagship attempted to come out and engage at short range, but was driven back by the American fire. The Spanish squadron was now in very bad plight, but the seriousness of its condition was not fully known to the American commander. At 7.35 Dewey withdrew, gave his men breakfast, and had a consultation of commanding officers. Before he re-engaged at 11.10 the "Cristina" and "Castilla" had broken into flames, so that the remainder of the action consisted in silencing the Cavite batteries and completing the destruction and demoralization of the smaller Spanish ships, which the "Petrel" was ordered in to burn. The victory was complete. All the Spanish ships¹ were sunk or destroyed. The injury done the American ships was practically nil. The Spanish lost 167 killed and 214 wounded, out of a total of 1875. The Americans had 7 slightly wounded out of 1748 men in action. Dewey took possession of Cavite, paroled its garrison, and awaited the arrival of a land force to capture Manila.

The blockade of Havana had progressed without incident, beyond the capture of a number of Spanish steamers and sailing vessels,² and the shelling of some new earthworks at Matanzas on the 27th of April; but on the 11th of May a small action was fought at Cardeñas, in which the Americans were repulsed and Ensign Worth Bagley, the first American officer to lose his life in the war, was killed. On the same day a partially successful attempt was made, under a heavy fire from the shore, to cut the cable between Cienfuegos and Havana.

Cervera had left the Cape Verde Islands on the 29th of April with four armoured cruisers, the "Almirante Oquendo," "Infanta Maria Theresa" and "Vizcaya" (sister ships of 7000 tons) and the "Cristobal Colon" (same size; differently equipped) and three torpedo-

¹ Three of the best were afterwards raised and repaired by American engineers.

² The "Buenaventura," the first prize of the war, was taken by the gunboat "Nashville" off Key West on the 23rd of April.

boat destroyers—a type not then represented in the American navy—"Furor," "Terror" and "Pluton." On hearing (May 1) of Cervera's departure, Sampson went east 1000 m. to San Juan, Porto Rico, with the armoured cruiser "New York," the battleships "Iowa" and "Indiana," the cruisers "Montgomery" and "Detroit," and one torpedo-boat. In going east he calculated on using a speed of 10 knots, on getting to San Juan on the 8th, about the time the Spaniards would reach its longitude, and if they were not there, on returning off Havana before they could get to Havana harbour. He wished to prevent Cervera's refitting at San Juan, from which place the American coast would be within easy reach, New York being only about 1400 m. away. But the speed of the American squadron fell short of Sampson's expectation; he reached San Juan on the 12th, stood in to see if Cervera was in the harbour, and opened fire upon the fortifications. He did not press the attack since Cervera was not present, and at once started back for Havana without news of Cervera, who was then in fact off Martinique, with orders to go to San Juan. When he heard that Sampson was at San Juan, he steamed to Curaçoa, where he arrived on the 14th of May and where the authorities allowed him to coal. He reached Santiago de Cuba early on the 19th without being sighted *en route* by any of the American scouts, though several were in the vicinity. Sampson thought the Spanish squadron might have returned to Spain.¹ But he learned that the enemy had not turned back, on the night of the 15th, when a telegram from the navy department directed him to proceed with all despatch to Key West. He got there on the afternoon of the 18th, and found the flying squadron ("Brooklyn" (flag), "Massachusetts," "Texas," and "Scorpion"), which left on the next morning (19th) for Cienfuegos, then regarded by the navy department as the certain objective of the Spanish squadron. The battleship "Iowa," the gunboat "Castine," the torpedo-boat "Dupont" and the collier "Merrimac" sailed to join Schley on the 20th, and gave him a force sufficient to meet Cervera. Sampson was advised by the department (on the 20th) "to send by the 'Iowa' to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos," but he directed Schley in an order of the 21st if he was satisfied that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos to proceed with all despatch to Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron was there to blockade it.

Commodore Schley arrived off Cienfuegos on the 22nd, and held to the opinion that Cervera was there until the 24th, when Commodore M'Calla of the "Marblehead" communicated with the insurgents some miles westwards, and learned the truth. Schley started that evening for Santiago, 300 m. distant, but on the afternoon of the 26th was 20 m. south of the port. Early on the 27th Schley received a despatch from the navy department suggesting that a Spanish squadron was in Santiago and bidding him see "that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action." Schley replied "... cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account . . . much to be regretted cannot obey orders of department. . . . forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Passage"; in the controversy that arose out of these events Schley's critics insisted that the "Iowa" and the "Massachusetts" had at this time enough coal to carry them three times the distance from Santiago to Key West.

Sampson with the "New York" had arrived early on the 28th of May off Key West. When Schley's telegram, which had much disturbed the Washington officials, was forwarded to Sampson, he secured permission to go at once to Santiago with the "New York" and "Oregon" (which had arrived at Key West on the 26th of May in excellent condition after her voyage of nearly 16,000 m. from the Pacific) to turn back Schley's heavier ships. Before he started he received a telegram from Schley stating that he would remain off Santiago. It is now known from the documents published by Admiral Cervera that the Spanish squadron, in the interval preceding the 28th, when Schley arrived in sight of the port, was on the point of leaving Santiago. On the morning of the 29th two Spanish cruisers were seen a short distance within the entrance, and on the 31st Schley, with the "Massachusetts," "Iowa" and "New Orleans," stood in and made an attack upon these and the batteries at long range (8500–11,000 yds.). On the 30th Sampson, leaving a squadron on the north side under Commodore Watson, stood for Santiago at a speed of 13 knots. He arrived early on the 1st of June and work was at once begun on the preparations for sinking the collier "Merrimac" in the entrance channel, which was less than 200 feet broad in parts available for ships. The preparations for a quick sinking were chiefly carried out by naval constructor Richmond P. Hobson, who went in, in the early morning of the 3rd of June, with a crew of seven men. The steering gear was disabled by a shell, and the ship drifted too far with the tide and was sunk in a broad part of the channel where it did not block the egress of Cervera's squadron. Cervera sent word to Sampson that Hobson and his men, who had been captured, were unhurt. They were exchanged on the 7th of July.

On the 6th of June the batteries at the entrance were bombarded and their weakness was ascertained. Sampson thereupon placed, every evening, a battleship (relieved every

¹ A telegram (not received by Cervera) had been sent to Martinique on the 12th of May, authorizing the squadron's return.

two and a half hours) close in, with a searchlight turned on the channel, making it impossible, as Cervera afterwards said, for the Spanish squadron to escape by night. The port of Guantánamo, 40 m. east of Santiago, was occupied by the "Marblehead" and "Yankee" on the 7th, a battalion of marines from the transport "Panther" landed there on the 10th, and the port was used thereafter as a base and coaling station. On the 14th the Spanish land forces retired before an expedition of the American marines, who remained in occupation until the 5th of August.

A blockade of San Juan, Porto Rico, by one or two fast ships was kept on account of the presence there of the destroyer "Terror," but this vessel, coming out (June 22) with a gunboat to attack the auxiliary cruiser "St Paul," suffered so severely that she could hardly return to port, and was thereafter unserviceable.

When war was declared the total military forces of the United States consisted of 27,822 regulars and 114,602 militia. An act of the 22nd of April had authorized the president to call upon the states and territories for men in proportion to their population, the regimental and company officers to be named by the governors of the states, the general and staff officers by the president. A first call was made for 125,000 men, and a month later a second call for 75,000. On the 26th of April large additions to the regular army were sanctioned for the war. The quotas were filled with extraordinary rapidity, and in May 124,776 had volunteered. The troops were concentrated chiefly at Chickamauga, Georgia, at Camp Alger, Virginia, and at Tampa, Florida, which was selected as the point for the embarkation of the expeditionary force for Cuba, and where Major-General W. R. Shafter was in command. With the exception of unimportant small expeditions, everything was delayed until control of the sea was assured, though some thirty large steamers were held in readiness near Tampa. After the arrival of Cervera at Santiago, the blockade of his squadron and the request (June 7) of Admiral Sampson to send a land force for co-operation, the troops embarked on the 7th and 8th of June, but a start was not made until the 14th, owing to a false report that Spanish warships were in Nicholas Channel. On the 29th the fleet of 32 transports, under convoy, arrived off Santiago. The whole force consisted of about 17,000 officers and men, 16 light field guns, a train of heavier pieces, and some 200 vehicles. General Shafter selected Daiquiri, about 18 m. east of Santiago, for the point of landing, and the harbour entrance (preferred by Sampson) was disregarded. The fleet furnished all its available boats, and on the 22nd-25th the army was landed on a rough coast with scarcely any shelter from the sea; after the first day Siboney, 7 m. nearer Santiago, was used as well as Daiquiri. With the exception of three volunteer regiments (the 1st volunteer cavalry, known as the Rough Riders, of which Theodore Roosevelt was lieutenant-colonel; the 2nd Massachusetts and the 71st New York Volunteers) these troops were composed almost wholly of regulars, most of whom had served on the plains against the Indians. Soon afterwards more volunteers arrived.

No opposition was made to the landing and the small Spanish contingents at Daiquiri and Siboney were withdrawn without doing any damage to the equipment of the railway which ran from Santiago to the iron mines at these points. The American troops (commanded by Major-General Joseph Wheeler until the 29th, when General Shafter landed) pushed forward, as soon as they landed, and found a small Spanish rearguard which was covering the concentration of outlying detachments on Santiago and which was entrenched $2\frac{1}{2}$ m. beyond Siboney, at Las Guásimas. Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young with 964 dismounted cavalry engaged (June 24), and after a sharp action, in which he lost 16 killed and 52 wounded, drove back the enemy, of whom 11 were killed out of some 500 engaged. The advance was slow and a week elapsed before Shafter was ready to fight a battle in front of Santiago. Here the defenders, under General Arsenio Linares, held two positions, the hill of San Juan, barring the direct road to Santiago, and the village of El Caney, to the northward of the American position at El Pozo. The plan of attack on the 1st of July was Shafter's, but owing to the illness of Shafter the actual command was exercised by the subordinate generals, Joseph Wheeler, H. W. Lawton and J. F. Kent. General Lawton's division was to attack and capture El Caney, and thence move against the flank and rear of the defenders of San Juan, which would then be attacked in front by Kent and Wheeler from El Pozo. But Lawton for nine hours was checked by the garrison of El Caney, in spite of his great superiority in numbers (4500 to 520); at 3 p.m. the final assault on El Caney was successfully delivered by General A. R. Chaffee's brigade. Only about 100 of the Spanish garrison escaped to Santiago; about 320 were killed or wounded, including General Vara del Rey, who, with a brother and two sons, was killed. In the meantime Wheeler and Kent had an equally stubborn contest opposite San Juan hill, where, in the absence of the assistance of Lawton, the battle soon became a purely frontal-fire fight, and the rifles of the firing line had to prepare the attack unaided. The strong position of the Spaniards, gallantly defended by about 700 men, held out until 12.30, when the whole line of the assailants suddenly advanced, without orders from or direction by superior authority, and carried the crest of the Spanish position. A notable part in the attack was taken by the 1st volunteer cavalry or "Rough Riders," commanded by Colonel Leonard Wood and Lieut.-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt. The Spaniards had no closed

reserves, and their retreat was made under a devastating fire from the Americans on the captured hills. On the American side over 1500 men out of 15,000 engaged, including several of the senior officers, were killed or wounded; and in one of Kent's brigades three successive commanders were killed or wounded. On the Spanish side, out of the small numbers engaged, over 50% were out of action. Linares himself was severely wounded, and handed over the command to General José Toral. The Cubans on the American right failed to prevent General Escario from entering Santiago with reinforcements from the interior, and at the beginning of the investment General Toral's forces numbered about 10,000 men of the army and a naval contingent from the fleet.

Though victorious, the American army was in danger: after great fatigue under a tropical sun by day, the time spared at night from digging trenches was spent on a rain-soaked ground covered with thick vegetation; the soldiers' blankets and heavy clothing had been cast aside in the attack; and there was insufficient food, because it was difficult to haul supplies over the one poor road from the base of supplies at Siboney. There was even discussion of retiring to a point nearer Siboney. Brisk firing was continued on the 2nd and 3rd of July, with a considerable number of casualties to the Americans. On the morning of the 3rd a demand was sent to the Spanish commander to surrender, with the alternative of a bombardment of the city to begin on the 4th. This in effect had already begun on the 1st, when Admiral Sampson fired a number of 8-in. shells from a point 3 m. east of the harbour entrance over the hills into the city, using a range of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ land miles. The result of this and the threat of General Shafter was an exodus of many thousands of civilians towards El Caney, where the American supplies were heavily taxed to support them.

On the morning of the 3rd of July Sampson, in his flagship the "New York," left the fleet to confer with General Shafter at Siboney with regard to combined operations at the harbour entrance.¹ At 9.31, when he had gone about 5 m., the "Maria Teresa" was seen coming out. The ships in front of the port were the yacht "Gloucester," the battleships "Indiana," "Oregon," "Iowa," and "Texas," the armoured cruiser "Brooklyn" and yacht "Vixen" in the order named from east to west, making a semicircle about 8 m. in length. The "Massachusetts" and "Suwanee" were coaling at Guantánamo. The "Iowa" hoisted the signal "Enemy coming out." All at once stood in toward the Spanish ships, which were standing westwards along shore, and began a heavy fire. The "Maria Teresa" (flagship) was followed at 800-yd. intervals by the "Vizcaya," "Colon" and "Oquendo." They were firing vigorously, but most of their projectiles went far beyond the American ships. The "Brooklyn" (flag of Commodore Schley, the senior officer present) made a turn to starboard, which seems to have caused the "Texas" to stop and back, and to have given the "Colon" the opportunity of passing almost unscathed. The "Maria Teresa" and "Oquendo" had taken fire almost at once, and, as their water mains (outside the protective deck) were cut, they were unable to extinguish the flames: they were run ashore at 10.15 and 10.20 respectively, about $6\frac{1}{2}$ m. west of Santiago, burning fiercely. The "Vizcaya" and "Colon" were still standing westwards. Cervera's destroyers, the "Pluton" and "Furor," had come out last, some distance behind the "Oquendo," and were received with a heavy fire from the "Indiana" and from the unarmoured "Gloucester," which engaged them at close quarters. They attempted to close, but were cut to pieces. The "New York," Sampson's flagship, had passed, and stood on signalling the "Iowa" and "Indiana" to go back and watch the port, lest an attack be made on the American transports. The torpedo-boat "Ericsson" was ordered to rescue the men from the two Spanish ships ashore, and the flagship, with all the others, stood on in pursuit of the "Vizcaya" and "Colon." The "Vizcaya" hauled down her colours off Aserraderos, 15 nautical miles west of Santiago, and was there run ashore burning about 11.15 A.M. The "Iowa" was ordered to stop and rescue her men, and the "Oregon," "Brooklyn" and "Texas" (and behind them the flagship) settled down to the chase of the "Colon," some 6 m. ahead of the nearest American ship. She was, however, slacking her speed, and at 12.40 the "Oregon" opened with her 13-in. guns at a range of 9000 yds., as did also the "Brooklyn," with her 8-in. When the "Oregon" had fired five shells, the "Colon" hauled down her colours, and was beached at the mouth of the Rio Turquino, where in spite of endeavours to recover her, she became a total wreck. The whole Spanish fleet was destroyed; Admiral Cervera was taken prisoner; Captain Villamil, commanding the torpedo flotilla, went down with his ship; and Captain Lazaga of the "Oquendo" was drowned. Over 500 Spaniards were killed or wounded, and the survivors (except a few who escaped to Santiago) were prisoners. On the American side only one man was killed and ten were wounded, and no ships received serious injury.

After the naval victory combined operations were arranged for attacking the batteries of the harbour, but little more fighting occurred, and eventually a preliminary agreement

¹ Shafter had urged that the squadron should enter the harbour and take the city. Sampson (and the Navy department) were unwilling to risk losing a ship in the well-mined harbour and wanted the army to move on the forts and give the American squadron an opportunity to drag the harbour for mines.

was signed on the 15th, and the besiegers entered Santiago on the 17th. In accordance with the terms of the capitulation, all the Spanish forces in the division of Santiago de Cuba surrendered and were conveyed to Spain. The total number amounted to about 23,500, of whom some 10,500 were in the city of Santiago. The exposure of the campaign had begun to tell in the sickness of the Americans: yellow fever had broken out to some extent; and not less than 50% were attacked by the milder forms of malarial fever. The army, indeed, was so weakened by illness that the general officers united in urging its removal from Cuba. Major-General Nelson A. Miles, the general-in-chief, had arrived with reinforcements on the 12th of July, but the majority of these men were retained on board ship.

The fleet and the army gathered in Guantánamo Bay; and a new flying squadron, the "eastern squadron," was organized under Commodore John C. Watson, to proceed by way of the Mediterranean to the Philippines, threatening the Spanish coast, in order to meet a Spanish "reserve squadron," which had been formed towards the end of May, and which was to be sent on to the eastern coast of the United States, and thence to Cuba, but which was diverted toward the Philippines, and left Cadiz, on the 16th of June, for the East. This squadron turned back on the 8th of July after hearing the news of the Spanish defeat at Santiago.

On the 7th of May a telegram had been received from Dewey at Manila: "I control bay completely, and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold." The cruiser "Charleston" and the steamer "Peking," with ammunition, supplies and troops, were sent to him at once. Major-General Wesley Merritt, to whom was assigned the command of the troops for the Philippines, first requested a force of 14,000, and afterwards asked for 20,000 men. On the 25th of May the first troops, 2491 in number, under Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, sailed in three transports from San Francisco, touched at Honolulu, and were conveyed thence by the "Charleston." On the 20th of June possession was taken of the island of Guam, and on the 30th of June the ships arrived in Manila Bay. A second detachment of troops, 3586 in number, under Brigadier-General F. V. Greene arrived on the 17th of July; on the 25th of July General Merritt, who had been appointed governor-general, arrived; and on the 31st the five transports with which he had left San Francisco arrived with 4847 men, making nearly 11,000 men at Manila, with 5000 more on the way. General Merritt moved his forces from Cavite, and established an entrenched line within a thousand yards of the Spanish position at Manila, from which, on the night of the 31st of July, a heavy fire of musketry and artillery was opened, causing a loss to the Americans of 10 killed and 43 wounded, and for the next few days night-firing was frequent from the Spanish lines. On the 7th of August, a joint note from Dewey and Merritt, announcing that bombardment might begin at any time after forty-eight hours, and affording opportunity for the removal of non-combatants, was sent to the Spanish captain-general, Fermin Jaudenes, who replied that he was surrounded by the insurgents,¹ and that there was no place of refuge for the sick and for the women and children. A second joint note demanding surrender was declined by the Spanish commander, who offered to refer it to Madrid. This was refused, and preparations were made for an attack. There were 13,000 troops within the city fortifications, but with the strong fleet in front, and with the beleaguering force of Americans and insurgents ashore, resistance was hopeless. When the combined assault of army and navy was made on the 13th there was no great resistance, and a white flag was hoisted at 11 o'clock, within one and a half hours after the fleet opened fire, a formal capitulation being signed the next day, the 14th of August. The total loss of the Americans during the whole campaign was 20 killed, 105 wounded.

Immediately after the surrender of Santiago (July 17), preparations were made for the invasion of Porto Rico with 3500 troops which had been sent as reinforcements to Santiago, but had not landed. They were largely reinforced and left Guantánamo, under General Miles, on the 21st of July, convoyed by a strong squadron. Fajardo, at the extreme north-eastern end of the island, was given out as the objective point of the expedition, but after sailing the plans were changed, and the towns on the south side were occupied, practically without resistance. The attitude of the population was exceedingly friendly, and opposition was not met until advance was begun northward. The troops were divided into four columns, advancing from Guanica around the western end of the island to Mayaguez: from Arroyo at the eastern end to meet the San Juan road at Cayey; from Ponce by the fine military road, 70 m., to San Juan; and the fourth column by way of Adjuntas and Utuado, midway of the island. The various movements involved several skirmishes, the chief opposition being met by the western column on the 10th of August, and by the column from Ponce on the 9th, when the Americans lost 1 killed and 22 wounded; the

¹ On the 19th of May, Emilio Aguinaldo, who had been at Hong-Kong, had landed from one of the American vessels at Cavite, and on the 1st of July, when the American troops landed, had proclaimed himself president of the Philippine Republic. The political attitude which he assumed was not sanctioned by the American authorities. At the head of the insurgents he had instituted a close siege of Manila.

Spanish, 126 killed and wounded, and over 200 prisoners. A further advance on the San Juan highway would probably have developed greater resistance, but news of the suspension of hostilities intervened. The total American loss had been 3 killed and 40 wounded. On the 12th of August operations were begun by the "Newark" and other vessels against Manzanillo. But during the night news arrived of the signing of the peace protocol on the 12th, and of an armistice, of which the Americans were informed by the Spanish commander under a flag of truce.

The total American loss was—in the navy, 1 officer, 17 men killed; in the army, 29 officers, 440 men. The health of the American fleet was kept remarkably. Its average strength during the 114 days of hostilities was 26,102; the deaths from disease during this time were 56, or at the rate of 7 per 1000 per year. As nearly the whole of the service was in the tropics, and in the summer or wet season, this is a convincing proof of the efficiency in sanitary administration. The army did not fare so well, losing by disease during May, June, July and August, 67 officers and 1872 men out of an average total of 227,494. Its larger proportion of illness must of course be ascribed, in part, to its greater hardships. The war department was accused of gross maladministration; but the charges were not upheld by an investigating committee. The lack of proper preparation by the war department and the ignorance and thoughtlessness of the volunteers were the principal reasons for the high death-rate in the army.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899-1902

For the purposes of history the South African War may be conveniently divided into five distinct periods. The first comprises the Boer invasion, terminating with the relief of Ladysmith on the 28th of February. The second, the period of Boer organized resistance, may be said to have finished with the occupation of Komati Poort in October 1900 (a month after Lord Roberts's formal annexation of the Transvaal) and the flight of President Kruger. The third may be characterized as a period of transition; it marks the adoption in earnest of a guerrilla policy on the part of the enemy, and an uncertain casting about on the part of the British for a definite system with which to grapple with an unforeseen development. This phase endured up to the failure of the Middelburg negotiations in March 1901. The next stage was that which saw the slow building up of the blockhouse system and the institution of small punitive columns, and may be considered to have extended until the close of 1901. The fifth and last period—which, after all other expedients had failed, finally brought the residue of uncaptured and unsundered burghers to submission—was the final development of the blockhouse system, wedded to the institution of systematic “driving” of given areas, which operations were in force until the 31st of May 1902, when peace was ratified at Pretoria.

The first of these periods saw the severest fighting of the campaign. It opened with the investment of Mafeking by a Transvaal force under P. A. Cronje and the envelopment of Kimberley by Free State commandos under General Wessels. But these were minor operations. The main Boer effort was made in Natal, where their forces were commanded by P. J. Joubert, while Lieut.-General Sir George White was the British commander-in-chief. The northern part of Natal presented two faces of a triangle to the two enemies, the short base being formed by the Tugela River. Close to the head of the triangle at Dundee and Glencoe was posted a small British force under Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons. Against this force there advanced a Boer force under Lukas Meyer from the east, and, more slowly, the foremost portion of the main Boer army from the north, while at the same time other Transvaalers descended upon the railway between Glencoe and Ladysmith, and the Free Staters from the passes of the Drakensberg advanced towards Ladysmith, the British centre of operations at which the reinforcements sent from India gathered. On the 20th of October the Dundee brigade vigorously and successfully attacked Talana Hill, and drove back Lukas Meyer, but this success was dearly bought. Symons was mortally wounded, and 226 officers and men were killed and wounded. Half the mounted men lost their way in attempting to pass the enemy's flank and were taken, and the brigade, threatened to its left rear by Joubert's advance and by the force that had seized the railway, only escaped being enveloped by retreating upon Ladysmith, where it arrived in an exhausted state on the 26th of October. Meanwhile Sir George White had discovered the Boer force on the railway, and, though anxious on account of the advance of the Free Staters, on the 21st, stimulated by the news of Talana, he sent out a force of all arms under General (Sir John) French to drive the Boers from Elandslaagte and so to clear Symons's line of retreat. This was accomplished by French and his subordinate, Colonel (Sir) Ian Hamilton, in the action of Elandslaagte on the 21st of October (British losses, 258 all ranks). But on the 22nd the Free Staters' advance caused the victorious force to be recalled to Ladysmith, and the third action north of that town, Rietfontein (24th), was only a demonstration to cover the retirement of the Dundee force. By the 29th of October all the British forces at the front and their reinforcements had fallen in on Ladysmith,

which the Transvaalers on the north and east and the Free Staters on the west side began to invest. Before the junction of the two allied wings was complete Sir George White attempted by a general attack to break up their line. The result of this decision was the battle of Lombard's Kop, outside Ladysmith, in which the whole of the available British force was engaged. The engagement was disastrous to the British, who had undertaken far too comprehensive an attack, and the Natal Field Force was obliged to fall back upon Ladysmith with the loss of 1500 men, including a large number of prisoners belonging to the left column under Lieut.-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton, who were cut off at Nicholson's Nek and forced to surrender by a mixed force of Transvaalers and Free Staters under Christian de Wet. From that day the rôle of the Natal Field Force was changed from that of a mobile field army into that of a garrison, and two days later it was completely isolated, but not before General French had succeeded in escaping south by train, and the naval authorities had been induced by Sir George White's urgent appeals to send into the town a naval brigade with a few guns of sufficient range and calibre to cope with the heavy position artillery which Joubert was now able to bring into action against the town.

General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been appointed to the supreme command in South Africa as soon as it was perceived that war was imminent—his force being one army corps in three divisions, the divisional generals being Lord Methuen, Sir W. Gatacre and Sir C. E. Clery—arrived in Cape Town, ahead of his troops, on the day following Lombard's Kop. The situation which presented itself was delicate in the extreme. In Natal practically the whole of the available defence force was swallowed up by the steady success of the invasion; on the western frontier two British towns were isolated and besieged; and Boer commandos were on the point of invading Cape Colony, where the Dutch population seemed on the verge of rebellion. The army corps was about to arrive, practically as a whole unit, in South Africa; but it was evident that the exigencies of the situation, and the widely divided areas of invasion, would at least defer the execution of the plan which had been formed for an invasion of the Orange Free State from Cape Colony. The first duty was to effect the relief of the British forces which had been rendered immobile, and another duty imposed by political circumstances was to relieve Kimberley (where Cecil Rhodes was), while the prospect of rebellion forbade the complete denudation of the central part of the colony. Thus Sir Redvers Buller had no choice but to disintegrate the army corps. Clery and some brigades were sent to Natal; Gatacre with less than a brigade, instead of a division, was despatched to Queenstown, Cape Colony; while Lord Methuen, with a division, was sent off to relieve Kimberley. As November wore on, the situation did not improve. Cape Colony was invaded; while in Natal a flying column of Boers, pushing down from the Tugela, for a short time isolated the newly arrived force under General (Sir) H. J. T. Hildyard, which opposed Joubert's advance on Pietermaritzburg at Estcourt. The situation in Natal seemed so serious that on the 22nd of November Sir Redvers Buller left Cape Town and sailed for Durban. In the meantime Lord Methuen had commenced his march to the relief of Kimberley. He encountered resistance at Belmont on the 23rd, but attacking resolutely he drove the Boers out of their strong positions. Two days later he won another action at Enslin. Still persevering he moved on to the Modder, where he was seriously opposed by De la Rey and P. A. Cronje, the latter having posted down from Mafeking with 2,000 men and arrived on the previous night. The Boers, who held a river line, kept the British attack at bay all day, but eventually fell back, relinquishing the position after dark, as their right had been turned by General Pole-Carew's brigade. It was a long and wearing fight, in which the British lost 485 killed and wounded, and what was more serious, Lord Methuen (himself wounded) found that his force had exhausted its forward momentum, and that he would have to collect supplies and reinforcements on the Modder before fighting his next battle. The extent of the operations and the gravity of the situation now began to be felt in England; every available man was called up from the reserves, and the war office made what at the time appeared to be adequate provision for the waste which it was seen would occur. On the 30th of November the mobilization of a sixth division was ordered, offers of colonial aid were accepted, and every facility provided for local recruiting in the South African ports. Thus in the early days of December confidence was considerably restored. Buller was arranging for the relief of Ladysmith, which had already shown its spirit by two successful sorties against the besiegers' batteries. In every theatre the British strength was consolidating. But the full significance of the situation presented by these two small nations in arms had not yet been appreciated. The confidence restored by the lull during the early part of December was destined to be roughly shattered. On the 10th of December Gatacre essayed a night march and attack upon the enemy's position at Stormberg, and, misled by his guides in unknown ground, was himself surprised and forced to return with a loss of 719. On the following day Lord Methuen delivered an attack upon Cronje's position between the Upper Modder River and the Kimberley road, a line of kopjes called Spytfontein and Magersfontein. In a night attack on Magersfontein hill the Highland brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation, and lost its general, A. G. Wauchope, and 750 men, and in



Photo Downey.

ROBERTS.

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, the "Bobs" of the British soldier, born 1832, leader of the victorious expedition against Kabul in 1878, and commander-in-chief of the British armies during the first year of the South African War.



the battle by day which followed the other brigades were unable to retrieve the failure, the total losses amounting to about 950. But even this could be suffered with equanimity, since Buller was about to bring his own force into play, and Buller, it was confidently supposed, would not fail. He had collected at Chieveley in Natal a brigade of mounted men, four brigades of infantry and six batteries of artillery, and he carried with him the trust alike of the army and the nation.

On the 15th of December Buller made his effort and failed. Behind the Tugela at Colenso were Louis Botha's forces covering the siege of Ladysmith, and, imperfectly acquainted with the topography, Buller sent a force to turn Botha's left, in conjunction with a frontal attack. But the flank attack became entangled in mass in a loop of the river and suffered heavily, and two batteries that formed part of the frontal attack came into action within a few hundred yards of unsuspected Boer trenches, with the result that ten guns were lost, as well as in all some 1100 men. Buller then gave up the fight. The full nature of the failure was not realized by the British public, nor the spirit in which the general had received the finding of fortune. He lost heart, and actually suggested to White the surrender of Ladysmith, believing this to be inevitable and desiring to cover White's responsibility in that event with his own authority; but White replied that he did not propose to surrender, and the cabinet at home, aware of Buller's despondency, appointed Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the supreme command, with Major-General Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. A wave of military enthusiasm arose throughout the empire, and as the formation of a seventh division practically drained the mother-country of trained men, a scheme for the employment of amateur soldiers was formulated, resulting in the despatch of Imperial Yeomanry and Volunteer contingents, which proved one of the most striking features of the South African campaign. Pending the arrival of Lord Roberts and reinforcements, the situation in South Africa remained at a deadlock: the three besieged towns—Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith—still held their own, but no headway was made by the relief columns; all they could do was to stand on the defensive. The only bright spot, as far as the British were concerned, was to be found in northern Cape Colony, where General French, with two cavalry brigades and details, by his skilful tactics and wonderful activity kept at arm's length a superior force of the enemy in the vicinity of Colesberg, an achievement the more noteworthy since he had pitted against him both De la Rey and De Wet, two of the three men of military genius produced by the war on the Boer side. On the 6th of January the Boers in Natal made a desperate attempt to storm Ladysmith. The garrison, though already weakened by privation and sickness, made a stubborn resistance, and after one of the fiercest engagements of the war, repulsed the attack at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill with severe loss to the enemy, itself having 500 casualties.

When Lord Roberts arrived in Cape Town on the 10th of January 1900 the three garrisons were still invested, and the relieving forces were still maintaining their rôle of passive resistance, while at the same time restraining the Dutch in Cape Colony. The commander-in-chief's first duty was to create a field army out of the tangle of units in Cape Colony. In the meantime, Sir Redvers Buller, who had been reinforced by Sir Charles Warren and the 5th division, essayed a second attempt to cross the Tugela, by turning the Boer left. But much time was consumed and the plan underwent several modifications before its execution began in earnest on the 16th of January. Warren was placed in command of the main body, which crossed the Tugela at Trichardt's Drift on the 17th and 18th. The mounted troops engaged a Boer force north-west of the point of passage, but were brought back to take part in a general right wheel of the forces of the Tugela, pivoting on Trichardt's Drift. But meantime the mobile enemy, whose original flank had been turned, had gathered at the new centre of gravity, and the upshot of several days' fighting was the retreat of the British. They had penetrated the enemy's right centre by the seizure of Spion Kop, but the force there became the target for the concentrated attacks of the Boers, and, after suffering heavily, was withdrawn (Jan. 24, 1900), with a loss of 1700 men.

By the 1st of February Lord Roberts had matured his plans and begun to prepare for their execution. On the 3rd of February he ordered a demonstration against the right of the Boer position at Spytfontein-Magersfontein to cover the withdrawal of General French and the cavalry from before Colesberg, and the concentration of his army at Modder River, disregarding another set-back in Natal to Sir Redvers Buller, who had against his advice made a third attempt to relieve Ladysmith on the 5th of February, and failed to make good the purchase which he secured across the Tugela (Vaal Krantz).

Lord Roberts's plan was first to concentrate to his left, taking every measure to induce the Boers to believe that the original scheme of invasion by the centre would now be resumed, and in this purpose he succeeded so well that his field army with the necessary transport for a cross-country march was assembled between the Orange and the Modder without serious mishap. Cronje at the new centre of gravity was not reinforced, all available Boers drawing down towards Colesberg. The concentration effected, Cronje still believed that the relief of Kimberley was the object of the gathering behind Modder River, and therefore held on to his Magersfontein kopje. The relief of Kimberley was indeed

urgent, for dissensions between Rhodes and the military authorities had become acute. But to this part of the task only the cavalry division assembled under French was assigned. The army itself was to force Cronje into the open and then advance on Bloemfontein from the west. Roberts began his operations on the 11th of February. French started from Ramdam (near Graspan) eastward on that day, intending to make a wide sweep round Cronje's immobile army. Skirmishing with De Wet in the first stages of their ride, the cavalry brigades crossed the Modder at Klip Drift on the 13th. Cronje sent only detachments to oppose them, but these detachments were broken through by a sword-in-hand charge of the whole division, and Kimberley was relieved on the 15th. The infantry, meeting with great difficulties in its crossing of the Riet at Waterval owing to the country and its own unwieldy transport, followed $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 days later. But Cronje had now realized his danger, and slipped away westward behind French and in front of the leading infantry at Klip Drift. This was deflected by Kitchener westward to follow up the Boer rearguard, and after some delay the remainder of the infantry, at first fronting northwards, swerved westward likewise, while French from Kimberley, with such of his men as he could mount on serviceable horses, headed off Cronje in the north-west. The result, after one premature and costly assault on Cronje's lines had been made by Kitchener, was the surrender of 4000 Boers at Paardeberg with their leader on the 29th of February, the anniversary of Majuba. At the same moment came in news at last of the relief of Ladysmith.

It was part of Roberts's purpose to relieve the pressure in Natal by his own operations. Buller began his fourth advance on the 14th of February, and though this was checked the foothold gained was not abandoned, and a fifth and last attempt (Pieter's Hill) was successful. Ladysmith was relieved on the 28th of February. It had fared worst of all the beleaguered garrisons, and its 22,000 inhabitants were almost at their last gasp when relief came. The casualties from shell-fire had been few, but those from sickness were very heavy. Buller's operations, too, had cost at Colenso 1100 men, at Spion Kop 1700, at Vaal Krantz 400, and now in the last long-drawn effort 1600 more—over 5000 in all. But the tide of war had changed. The Natal invaders fell back to the mountains which enclose the north of the colony; Oliver and Schoeman retired from Cape Colony before the small forces of Gatacre and Clements; and the presidents of the republics, realizing that the British Empire was capable of more resistance than they had calculated upon, put forward feelers aiming at the restoration of the *status quo* before the war. These proposals were rejected by Lord Salisbury: there could be no end now but a complete destruction of the Boer power.

The surrender of Cronje and the relief of Ladysmith for the time being paralysed the Boer resistance. Two half-hearted attempts were made on the 7th and 10th of March, at Poplar Grove and Drieffontein, to stem Lord Roberts's advance upon Bloemfontein, President Kruger himself arriving on the scene to give confidence to his burghers; but the demoralization was so great that neither the military genius of the few nor the personal influence of the president could bolster up an adequate resistance, and on the 13th of March 1900 Lord Roberts's army marched into the Free State capital. This great move was persevered in and accomplished, in spite of the fact that at the very outset of the cross-country march (Feb. 13) the great body of transport which had been collected at Ramdam had been cut off by De Wet (who had stayed on the Riet after French had shaken him off). It was therefore only made possible at all by reducing the rations of the fighting men to a minimum and by undertaking the risks of changing the line of communication three times. Naturally and necessarily the capture of Bloemfontein was followed by a period of reaction. It was not until the 29th of March that the new railway communication recommenced to feed the army. In the meantime rebellion had broken out in the Prieska district of Cape Colony, which was promptly quelled by Lord Kitchener. The halt at Bloemfontein was marked by the publication of proclamations, offering protection to the burghers, which, however, the invaders had not yet the power to fulfil. The enforced halt was unfortunate; it not only resulted in a bad outbreak of enteric, but it gave the Boers time to recuperate, and by the beginning of April they again took the initiative. The death of their commandant-general, Piet Joubert, on the 28th of March, seemed to mark a change in the fortunes of the Republican army. Christian De Wet, who had first come into prominence as the captor of Lord Roberts's convoy at Waterval, and was now operating east and south-west of Bloemfontein in order to counteract the influence of Roberts's numerous flying columns which rode hither and thither offering peace, added to his laurels by ambushing Broadwood's mounted brigade and horse artillery at Sannah's Post, just outside Bloemfontein, on the 31st of March. Four days later he reduced a detachment at Reddersburg, and then went south and invested Colonel Dalgety and a mixed force at Wepener, which was relieved after ten days by General Hunter's Ladysmith division, brought round to Aliwal North from Natal.

These successes, if they retarded Roberts's progress, at least enabled him to rearrange his forces in accordance with the new situation at leisure, and to re-establish his transport, rail and wheeled, and on the 1st of May the main army moved northwards upon the

Transvaal capital. The main advance was taken with one cavalry and three infantry divisions (the cavalry commanded by French, and the infantry divisions by Generals Tucker, Pole-Carew and Ian Hamilton). Rundle's division took the right of the advance; Methuen and Hunter moving from Kimberley, formed the left. Kelly-Kenny, Colville and Chermiside held the communications based on Bloemfontein. A flying column detached from Hunter, under Mahon, in conjunction with Colonel H. C. O. Plumer's Rhodesian levies from the north, on the 17th of May relieved Mafeking, where Colonel (Lieut.-General Sir) R. S. S. Baden-Powell had throughout shown a bold front and by his unconventional gaiety as well as his military measures had held off the assault until the last. The same day the Natal Field Force under Buller moved up into the Biggarsberg and occupied Dundee. On the 10th of May Lord Roberts had crossed the Sand River; on the 12th of May he entered Kroonstad. After a halt of eight days at Kroonstad, the main army again moved forward, and, meeting but small resistance, marched without a halt into Johannesburg, which was occupied on the 31st of May, the Orange Free State having been formally annexed by proclamation three days earlier. On the 30th of May President Kruger fled with the state archives, taking up his residence at Waterval Boven on the Komati Poort line. The gold-mines were now securely in the possession of the British, and on the 5th of June Lord Roberts's army occupied the capital of the Transvaal practically without resistance, setting free about 3000 British prisoners of war detained there.

It had been anticipated that the occupation of both the capitals would have brought the hostilities to a close, but this was not the case, and though after the 5th of June regular resistance was at an end, the army of occupation had still to face two years of almost unprecedented partisan warfare. On the 8th of June Sir Redvers Buller, who had made a long halt after the relief of Ladysmith and reorganized his army and its line of communication, forced his way over Alleman's Nek, and on the following day occupied Laing's Nek, the Natal gate to the Transvaal, while the field marshal fought a widespread battle against Botha, De la Rey and Kemp at Diamond Hill, 20 m. east of Pretoria. The object of this action was to push back the Boers from the neighbourhood of Pretoria, but no sooner was this done than the north-western Transvaal became active, in spite of Hunter's and Baden-Powell's advance from Mafeking through this district. As the British line of operations now extended eastward from Pretoria, the advance of these Boers to the Magaliesberg threatened their rearward communications, and as Buller had moved far more slowly than the main army there was not as yet an alternative line through Natal. Most serious of all was the pressure between Bloemfontein and the Vaal, where the Free Staters, under De Wet and other commanders, had initiated the guerilla as soon as Botha and the Transvaalers retired over the Vaal and ceased to defend them by regular operations. Large forces had been left behind during the advance on Johannesburg for the protection of the railway and the conquered territory, and these were now reinforced from Kimberley and elsewhere as well as from detachments of the main army. These, under Sir Archibald Hunter and Sir Leslie Rundle, successfully herded Prinsloo with 4000 Free Staters into the Brandwater Basin (July 29)—a very satisfactory result, but one seriously marred by the escape of De Wet, who soon afterwards raided the Western Transvaal and again escaped between converging pursuers under Kitchener, Methuen, Smith-Dorrien, Ian Hamilton and Baden-Powell.

Before this Lord Roberts had initiated a movement from Pretoria to sweep down to Komati Poort on the Portuguese frontier, in which Buller, advancing across country from the south, was to co-operate. On the 26th to 27th of August the combined forces engaged and defeated Botha in the action of Belfast or Bergendal, with the result that the enemy dispersed into the bush-veld north of the Middelburg railway. On the 30th of August the remainder of the British prisoners were released at Nootgedacht. On the 6th of September Buller, crossing the track of the main army at right angles, occupied Lydenburg in the bush-veld, and five days later the aged president of the republic took refuge in Lourenço Marques. On the 13th of September Barberton was occupied by French, and on the 25th Komati Poort by Roberts's infantry. From October the military operations were confined to attempts to reduce the guerilla commandos which had taken the field. Mr. Kruger, deserting his countrymen, left for Europe in a Dutch man-of-war, and General Buller sailed for Europe. The Boer leaders definitely decided upon a guerilla and a wearing policy, deliberately dispersed their field army, and then swelled and multiplied the innumerable local commandos. On the 25th of the month the ceremony of annexing the Transvaal was performed at Pretoria.

In November the prevailing opinion was that the war was over, and Lord Roberts, who had been appointed commander-in-chief at home, left South Africa, handing over the command to Lord Kitchener. Then followed a long period of groping for a means to cope with the development of guerilla tactics, which for the next six months were at their zenith. The railway communications were constantly damaged, isolated posts and convoys captured, and the raiders always seemed able to avoid contact with the columns sent in pursuit. De Wet, after escaping from Brandwater Basin, was hunted north-westward, and crossed into the Transvaal, where, joining the local guerilla bands, he surrounded an infantry brigade at Fredrikstad. But, unable to reduce it, and threatened on all sides,

he turned back. On the 6th of November he was severely handled and his guns and wagons were captured at Bothaville. But this misadventure only stimulated him. His emissaries roused the Free Staters west of Bloemfontein, and disaffection broke out in Cape Colony to an alarming degree, while, as forerunners of the promised invasion, scattered bodies of Free Staters crossed the Orange River to swell the rebellion. From Bothaville De Wet made for Thaba Nchu, where the Bloemfontein garrison held a cordon of posts. These were traversed on the 16th of November and the raiders passed on to Bethulie capturing Dewetsdorp and 500 men *en route*. Pursued closely and finding the rivers in flood De Wet hid some of his men under Kritzinger near the Orange and himself doubled back, traversing again the line of posts east of Bloemfontein. Kritzinger, Hertzog and bodies of Cape rebels raided Cape Colony as soon as they were able to cross the Orange, and Hertzog penetrated so far that he exchanged shots on the Atlantic coast with a British warship. All that the British forces under Sir Charles Knox and others could do was to localize the raids and to prevent the spread of rebellion. So far, however, energy and vigilance made them successful. Botha meanwhile held his own in the northern Transvaal, both against forces from Pretoria, Middelburg and Lydenburg, and against the Rhodesian Field Force under Sir F. Carrington, which had been sent up from Beira (by arrangement with the Portuguese) to Southern Rhodesia. At the close of 1900 the commandos under the direct influence of Louis Botha attacked the railway posts on the Middelburg railway and captured Helvetia. De la Rey operated in the western Transvaal, and in concert with Beyers, whose presence in this region was not known to the British, he inflicted a sharp reverse on General R. A. P. Clements at Nootgedacht in the Hekpoort valley on the 13th of December. Beyers then slipped away to the east, crossing the line between Johannesburg and Pretoria with impunity. Lord Kitchener called for more men, and on the 22nd of December the war office announced that 30,000 more mounted men would be despatched to the seat of war.

With the opening of 1901 Lord Kitchener tried new schemes. He withdrew all his detached garrisons except in the most important centres, and set himself to make his railway communications perfectly secure. He determined to make the area of operations a waste, and instituted the concentration camps, into which he intended to bring the whole of the non-combatant inhabitants of the two republics. He despatched French with a large force to clear the south-eastern districts of the Transvaal and for the rest maintained a force to watch De Wet, and organized a defence force in Cape Colony, while using the residue of his mounted men to sweep the country of stock, forage and inhabitants. Although there were no great disasters, the new policy was not prolific in success. The enemy invariably dispersed before superior forces, and the removal of the women and children from the farms did not have the effect of disheartening the burghers as had been anticipated—it rather mended their vitality by relieving them of responsibility for their families' welfare. Nor were the Boer leaders destitute of comprehensive schemes. Botha arranged to penetrate Natal, De Wet to make a second attempt on the Colony, in connexion with Hertzog and Kritzinger. On the 10th of February De Wet, with five guns and 3000 men, carried out his promised invasion of Cape Colony. Passing the Bloemfontein-Thaba Nchu line a third time, he crossed the Orange to join Hertzog and rouse the Cape Dutch. But this invasion failed. By judicious use of the railway Kitchener concentrated sufficient troops in the colony to cope with the attempt, and, after being hunted for eighteen days, De Wet escaped back into the Orange River Colony with the loss of all his guns, munitions of war and half his force. In the northern Transvaal a force under Sir Bindon Blood cleared the country, but could not prevent Viljoen from escaping eastward to join Botha. Botha's activity in the south-east caused Kitchener to despatch a large force under French thither. This swept the country up to the Swaziland border. But Botha escaped. On the 3rd of March, after various raids and adventures in company with Smuts and Kemp, De la Rey, the lion of the western Transvaal, essayed an attack upon Lichtenburg, in which he was heavily repulsed. Signs of weakness were now apparent, and as a result Louis Botha, acting with the authority of Schalk Burger, the representative of President Kruger, opened negotiations with Kitchener. A meeting took place at Middelburg, Transvaal, on the 28th of February. These negotiations, however, broke down mainly over the treatment to be awarded to Cape rebels.

The hostilities now entered upon a new phase. The establishment of a line of defensive posts between Bloemfontein and Ladybrand, though De Wet had three times traversed it, had given Kitchener an idea, and he resolved upon the scheme of fencing in areas by chains of blockhouses such as those already constructed for the protection of the railways. In the meantime, while these posts were under construction, the harrying of the commandos by mobile columns was continued. In March Babington, pursuing De la Rey after the latter's Lichtenburg misadventure, captured three guns and six maxims near Ventersdorp. In April Plumer occupied Pietersburg, the last remaining seat of government open to the enemy. Rawlinson captured a laager and guns at Klerksdorp, and though neither De Wet nor De la Rey had been brought to book, matters had so far improved in May that municipal government was given to Johannesburg, and a certain number of mines were allowed to recommence working. Kemp was defeated by Dixon at Vlakfontein, after a desperate

encounter. June brought little of moment, though the Boers scored two minor successes, Kritzinger capturing the village of Jamestown in Cape Colony, and Müller reducing a force of Victorians at Wilmansrust, south of Middelburg. In July there were further evidences of weakness on the part of the Boers, and Botha applied for permission to communicate with Kruger. This was allowed, but, as Kruger advised a continuance of the struggle, the slow course of the war continued. In the meantime, the concentration camps were becoming filled to overflowing, and a steady stream of captures and surrenders were reducing the hostile power of the republics.

In August a proclamation was promulgated formally threatening the Boer leaders who should not surrender with permanent banishment from South Africa, but this proclamation had very little effect. Smuts, with a small force from the Magaliesberg, traversed Orange River Colony and stimulated the Cape rebels afresh. But September showed some slight improvement in the situation in Cape Colony, where French was in supreme command. On the 5th Scobell captured Lotter, who was subsequently executed for murder: though this was balanced a few days later by Smuts's successful attack on the 17th Lancers at Tarkastad. In the south-eastern Transvaal Botha made a new effort to invade Natal, but, although he captured 300 men and three guns in an action on the 17th of September at Blood River Poort near Vryheid, his plans were rendered abortive by his failure to reduce the posts of Mount Prospect and Fort Itala in Zululand, which he attacked on the 26th, and he only escaped with difficulty from the converging columns sent against him. Desultory fighting continued till the close of the year, the balance of success being with the British, though on the 30th of October Botha, returning from the south-east towards Pretoria, defeated Colonel Benson's column at Bakenlaagte, Benson being killed. About the same time, the force in front of De la Rey and Kemp in the west being depleted to find the troops for larger operations, the Boers made a fierce surprise attack on Colonel Kekewich's column at Moedville, in which Kekewich was wounded and his troops hard pressed for a time. De la Rey next attacked part of Methuen's column near Zeerust, but was repulsed (Oct. 24). Affairs again took an unsatisfactory turn in Cape Colony, and on the 8th of October the whole colony was placed under martial law. In November an unsuccessful attempt was made by several columns to run De Wet to earth in the Lindley district, whither, after his second raid on Cape Colony, he had returned. But in December matters improved. The reverse at Bakenlaagte was repaired by a force under Bruce Hamilton. This swept the south-eastern Transvaal as French had done, and with no better effect, for Botha escaped. But the British commander thereupon began a constant succession of night marches and raids which practically blotted out the resistance in the eastern Transvaal. The corps of National Scouts (formed of burghers who had taken the oath of allegiance) was inaugurated and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange reopened. By the end of the year the blockhouse system was complete, but this phase of the war was destined to close badly as De Wet on Christmas Eve captured a large force of Yeomanry at Tweefontein, west of Harrismith.

With 1902 the last phase of this protracted struggle commenced. The blockhouse system was practically finished, and Kitchener determined upon a new means of harassing the enemy, who still had a total of about 25,000 men in the field. But the blockhouses had already begun to serve the purpose for which they were designed. In the past the mobile columns, of which there were over sixty in the field, had always been bound to the railway for supply; now convoys could be pushed out to them along whatever blockhouse line they touched. In January Bruce Hamilton continued his successful night marches, and late in the month General Ben Viljoen was captured in the Leydenburg district. The only set-back was the descent which Beyers made upon Pietersburg, breaking into the concentration camp and carrying off a number of able-bodied refugees. Early in February Lord Kitchener commenced his first drive, and it was so successful that it was evident that the key to the situation had been found. First the country east of the line Bloemfontein-Vereeniging was swept four times over, then the method was employed in the Transvaal, east and west, and finally against the Cape rebels. There were a few small reverses, of which De la Rey's successful rush upon Paris's column and capture of Lord Methuen was the most important; but when some initial mistakes in the composition of the driving lines, which robbed the earlier drives of part of their effect, were made good, the system worked like a machine. The Boers were at last convinced of the futility of any attempt to prolong the struggle, and on the 23rd of March the representatives of the Boer governments came into Pretoria. Six weeks were spent in negotiation, and then a meeting of delegates, under the presidency of General Kemp, was held at Vereeniging.

As a result of this conference articles of peace were signed at Pretoria on the 31st of May, and the South African War was a history of the past. The terms of peace may be condensed into the following points: (1) Surrender of all burghers in the field, with all arms and munitions of war; (2) all burghers duly declaring themselves subjects of King Edward VII. to be repatriated; (3) no burghers who should surrender to be deprived of either their liberty or property; (4) no proceedings to be taken against burghers for any legitimate acts of war during the period of hostilities; (5) the Dutch language to be taught in public

schools on the request of the parents, and to be allowed in courts of law; (6) sporting rifles to be allowed upon the taking out of licences; (7) the military administration to be superseded by civil administration as soon as possible, the civil administration to lead up to self-government; (8) the question of the native franchise not to be considered until after the introduction of self-government; (9) landed property not to be subjected to any special tax to defray the cost of the war; (10) a commission to be formed to facilitate the repatriation of the burghers, a grant of £3,000,000 being given as compensation for the destruction of farms.

In the whole war the British lost 5774 killed and 22,829 wounded, while the Boers lost about 4000 killed. The number of Boer prisoners in the hands of the British at the end of the war was about 40,000.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-5

CHAPTER I

BATTLES OF YALU AND LIAO-YANG

THE seizure by Russia of the Chinese fortress of Port Arthur, which she had a few years previously, in concert with other powers, compelled Japan to relinquish, was from the Russian point of view the logical outcome of her eastward expansion and her need for an ice-free harbour on the Pacific. The extension of the Trans-Siberian railway through Manchuria to Port Arthur and a large measure of influence in Manchuria followed equally naturally. But the whole course of this expansion had been watched with suspicion by Japan, from the time of the Saghalien incident of 1875, when the island power, then barely emerging from the feudal age, had to cede her half of the island to Russia, to the Shimonoseki treaty of 1895, when the powers compelled her to forego the profits of her victory over China. The subsequent occupation of Port Arthur and other Chinese harbours by European powers, and the evident intention of consolidating Russian influence in Manchuria, were again and again the subject of Japanese representations at St Petersburg, and these representations became more vigorous when, in 1903, Russia seemed to be about to extend her Manchurian policy into Korea. No fewer than ten draft treaties were discussed in vain between August 1903 and February 1904, and finally negotiations were broken off on February 5th.¹ Japan had already on the 4th decided to use force, and her military and naval preparations, unlike those of Russia, kept pace with her diplomacy.

This was in fact an eventuality which had been foreseen and on which the naval and military policy of Japan had been based for ten years. She too had her projects of expansion and hegemony, and by the Chino-Japanese War she had gained a start over her rival. The reply of the Western powers was first to compel the victor to maintain the territorial integrity of China, and then within two years to establish themselves in Chinese harbours. From that moment Japanese policy was directed towards establishing her own hegemony and meeting the advance of Russia with a *fait accompli*. But her armaments were not then adequate to give effect to a strong-handed policy, so that for some years thereafter the government had both to impose heavy burdens on the people and to pursue a foreign policy of marking time, and endured the fiercest criticism on both counts, for the idea of war with Russia was as popular as the taxes necessary to that object were detested. But as the army and the navy grew year by year, the tone of Japanese policy became firmer. In 1902 her position was strengthened by the alliance with England; in 1903 her army, though in the event it proved almost too small, was considered by the military authorities as sufficiently numerous and well prepared, and the arguments of the Japanese diplomatists stiffened with menaces. Russia, on the other hand, was divided in policy and consequently in military intentions and preparations. In some quarters the force of the new Japanese army was well understood, and the estimates of the balance of military power formed by the minister of war, Kuropatkin, coincided so remarkably with the facts that at the end of the summer of 1903 he saw that the moment had come when the preponderance was on the side of the Japanese. He

¹ Belated declarations of war appeared on the 10th.

therefore proposed to abandon Russian projects in southern Manchuria and the Port Arthur region and to restore Port Arthur to China in return for considerable concessions on the side of Vladivostok. His plan was accepted, but "a lateral influence suddenly made itself felt, and the completely unexpected result was war." Large commercial interests were in fact involved in the forward policy, "the period of heavy capital expenditure was over, that of profits about to commence," and the power and intentions of Japan were ignored or misunderstood. Further, Dragomirov, a higher military authority even than Kuropatkin, declared that "Far Eastern affairs were decided in Europe." Thus Russia entered upon the war both unprepared in a military sense, and almost entirely indifferent to its causes and its objects. To the guards and patrols of the Manchurian railway and the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, 80,000 in all, Japan could, in consequence of her recruiting law of 1896, oppose a first-line army of some 270,000 trained men. Behind these, however, there were scarcely 200,000 trained men of the older classes, and at the other end of the long Trans-Siberian railway Russia had almost limitless resources.¹ The strategical problem for Japan was, how to strike a blow sufficiently decisive to secure her object, before the at present insignificant forces of the East Siberian army were augmented to the point of being unassailable. It turned, therefore, principally upon the efficiency of the Trans-Siberian railway, and in calculating this the Japanese made a serious under-estimate. In consequence, far from applying the "universal service" principle to its full extent, they trained only one-fifth of the annual contingent of men found fit for service. The quality of the army, thus composed of picked men (a point which is often forgotten), approximated to that of a professional force; but this policy had the result that, as there was no adequate second-line army, parts of the first-line had to be reserved, instead of being employed at the front. And when for want of these active troops the first great victory proved indecisive, half-trained elements had to be sent to the front in considerable numbers—indeed the ration strength of the army was actually trebled. The aim of the war, "limited" in so far that the Japanese never deluded themselves with dreams of attacking Russia at home, was to win such victories as would establish the integrity of Japan herself and place her hegemony in the Far East beyond challenge. Now the integrity of Japan was worth little if the Russians could hope ultimately to invade her in superior force, and as Port Arthur was the station of the fleet that might convoy an invasion, as well as the symbol of the longed-for hegemony, the fortress was necessarily the army's first objective, a convincing Sedan was the next. For the navy, which had materially only a narrow margin of superiority over the Russian Pacific Squadron, the object was to keep the two halves of that squadron, at Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively, separate and to destroy them in detail. But in February weather these objects could not be pursued simultaneously. Prior to the break-up of the ice, the army could only disembark at Chemulpo, far from the objective, or at Dalny under the very eyes of its defenders. The army could therefore, for the moment, only occupy Korea and try to draw upon itself hostile forces that would otherwise be available to assist Port Arthur when the land attack opened. For the navy, instant action was imperative.

On the 8th of February the main battle-fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Togo, was on the way to Port Arthur. During the night his torpedo boats surprised the Russian squadron in harbour and inflicted serious losses, and later in the day the battleships engaged the coast batteries. Repulsed in this attempt, the Japanese established a stringent blockade, which tried the endurance of the ships and the men to the utmost. From time to time the torpedo-craft tried to run in past the batteries, several attempts were made to block the harbour entrance by sinking vessels in the fairway, and free and deadly use was made by both sides of submarine mines. But, though not destroyed, the Port Arthur squadron was paralysed by the instantaneous assertion of naval superiority.

Admiral Alexeiev, the tsar's viceroy in the Far East and the evil genius of the war, was at Port Arthur and forbade the navy to take the risks of proceeding to sea. For a time, when in place of Admiral Starck (who was held responsible for the surprise of February), Admiral Makárov, an officer of European reputation, commanded the fleet, this lethargy was shaken off. The new commander took his ships to sea every day. But his energetic leadership was soon ended by a tragedy. A field of electro-mechanical mines was laid by the Japanese in the night of April 12th-13th, and on the following day the Japanese cruisers stood inshore to tempt the enemy on to the minefield. Makárov, however, crossed it without accident, and pursued the cruisers until Togo's battle-fleet appeared, whereupon he went about and steamed for port. In doing so he recrossed the mine-field, and this time the mines were effectual. The flagship "Petrovavlovsk" was struck and went down with the admiral and 600 men, and another battleship was seriously injured. Then the advocates of passivity regained the upper hand and kept the squadron in harbour, and henceforward for many months the Japanese navy lay unchallenged off Port Arthur, engaging in minor operations, covering the transport of troops to the mainland, and watching for the moment when the advance of the army should force the Russian fleet


¹ The total Russian army on a *peace* footing is almost 1,000,000 strong.



Photo Topical

ADMIRAL TOGO.

ADMIRAL COUNT TOGO, born 1847, commander-in-chief of the Japanese fleet in 1904, when the Russian navy was almost annihilated in the Japanese seas. In 1906 he received the British Order of Merit.



to come out. Meantime seven Japanese cruisers under Vice-Admiral Kaimamura went in search of the Russian Vladivostok squadron: this, however, evaded them for some months, and inflicted some damage on the Japanese mercantile marine and transports. The Japanese had not waited to gain command of the sea before beginning the sea transport of that part of their troops allotted to Korea. The roads of that country were so poor that the landing had to be made, not on the Straits of Tsushima, but as far north as possible. Chemulpo, nearer by 50 m. to Port Arthur than to Japan, was selected. On the first day of hostilities Rear-Admiral Uriu disembarked troops at Chemulpo under the eyes of the Russian cruiser "Variag," and next day he attacked and destroyed the "Variag" and some smaller war-vessels in the harbour, and the rest of the 1st army (General Kuroki) was gradually brought over during February and March, in spite of an unbeaten and, under Makárov's régime, an enterprising hostile navy. But owing to the thaw and the subsequent break-up of the miserable Korean roads, six weeks passed before the columns of the army (Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions), strung out along the "Mandarin road" to a total depth of six days' march, closed upon the head at Wiju, the frontier town on the Yalu. Opposite to them they found a large Russian force of all arms.

The Russian commanders, at this stage at least, had not and could not have any definite objective. Both by sea and by land their policy was to mass their resources, repulsing meantime the attacks of the Japanese with as much damage to the enemy and as little to themselves as possible. Their strategy was to gain time without immobilizing themselves so far that the Japanese could impose a decisive action at the moment that suited them best. Both by sea and by land, such strategy was an exceedingly difficult game to play. But afloat, had Makárov survived, it would have been played to the end, and Togo's fleet would have been steadily used up. One day, indeed (May 15th), two of Japan's largest battleships, the "Hatsume" and the "Yashima," came in contact with free mines and were sunk. One of them went to the bottom with five hundred souls. But the admiral was not on board. The Russian sailors said, when Makárov's fate was made known, "It is not the loss of a battleship. The Japanese are welcome to two of them. It is *he*." Not only the skill, but the force of character required for playing with fire, was wanting to Makárov's successors.

It was much the same on land. Kuropatkin, who had taken command of the army, saw from the first that he would have to gain three months, and disposed his forces as they came on the scene, unit by unit, in perfect accord with the necessities of the case. His expressed intention was to fight no *battle* until superiority in numbers was on his side. He could have gained his respite by concentrating at Harbin or even at Mukden or at Liao-Yang. But he had to reckon with the fleet¹ at Port Arthur. He knew that the defences of that place were defective, and that if the fleet were destroyed whilst that of Togo kept the sea, there would be no Russian offensive. He therefore chose Liao-Yang as the point of concentration, and having thus to gain time by force instead of by distance, he pushed out a strong covering detachment towards the Yalu.

But little by little he succumbed to his *milieu*, the atmosphere of false confidence and passivity created around him by Alexeiev. After he had minutely arranged the Eastern Detachment in a series of rearguard positions, so that each fraction of it could contribute a little to the game of delaying the enemy before retiring on the positions next in rear, the commander of the detachment, Zasulich, told him that "it was not the custom of a knight of the order of St George to retreat," and Kuropatkin did not use his authority to recall the general, who, whether competent or not, obviously misunderstood his mission. Thus, whilst the detachment was still disposed as a series of rearguards, the foremost fractions of it stood to fight on the Yalu, against odds of four to one.

The Japanese 1st army was carefully concealed about Wiju until it was ready to strike. Determined that in this first battle against a white nation they would show their mettle, the Japanese lavished both time and forethought on the minutest preparations. Forethought was still busy when, in accordance with instructions from Tokio, Kuroki on the 30th of April ordered the attack to begin at daybreak on the 1st of May. For several miles above Antung the rivers Yalu and Aiho are parallel and connected by numerous channels. The majority of the islands thus formed were held and had been bridged by the Japanese. The points of passage were commanded by high ground a little farther up where the valleys definitely diverge, and beyond the flank of the ill-concealed positions of the defence. The first task of the right division (12th) was to cross the upper Yalu and seize this. To the Guard and 2nd divisions was assigned the frontal attack on the Chiuliencheng position, where the Russians had about one-half of their forces under Major-General Kashtalinski. On the 30th of April, Inouye's 12th division accomplished its task of clearing the high ground up to the Aiho. The Russians, though well aware that the force in their front was an army, neither retired nor concentrated. Zasulich's medieval generalship had been modified so far that he intended to retreat when he had taught the Japanese a lesson, and therefore Kuropatkin's original arrangements were not sensibly modified. So it came about that

¹ Not, as is often assumed, the fortress itself.

the combined attack of the 2nd and Guard divisions against the front, and Inouye on the left flank and rear, found Kashtalinski without support. After a rather ineffective artillery bombardment the Japanese advanced in full force, without hesitation or finesse, and plunging into the river, stormed forward under a heavy fire. A few moments afterwards Zasulich ordered the retreat. But the pressure was far too close now. Broken up by superior numbers the Russian line parted into groups, each of which, after resisting bravely for a time, was driven back. Then the frontal attack stopped and both divisions abandoned themselves to the intoxication of victory. Meanwhile, the right attack (12th division) encountering no very serious resistance, crossed the Aiho and began to move on the left rear of the Russians. On the side of the defence, each colonel had been left to retire as best he could, and thus certain fractions of the retreating Russians encountered Inouye's advancing troops and were destroyed after a most gallant resistance. The rearguard itself, at Hamatan, was almost entirely sacrificed, owing to the wrong direction taken in retreating by its left flankguard. Fresh attempts were made by subordinates to form rearguards, but Zasulich made no stand even at Fenghwang-cheng, and the Japanese occupied that town unopposed on the 5th of May. The Japanese losses were 1100 out of over 40,000 present, the Russians (chiefly in the retreat) at least 2500 out of some 7000 engaged.

The Yalu, like Valmy, was a moment in the world's history. It mattered little that the Russians had escaped or that they had been in inferior numbers. The serious fact was that they had been beaten.

The general distribution of the Russian forces was now as follows: The main army under Kuropatkin was forming, by successive brigades, in two groups—I. Siberian corps (Stakelberg), Niu-chwang and Kaiping; II. Siberian corps, Liao-Yang. Zasulich (III. corps and various other units) had still 21,000. In the Port Arthur "fortified rayon," under Lieut.-General Stoessel (IV. corps), were 27,000 men, and General Linievich around Vladivostok had 23,000. These are, however, paper strengths only, and the actual number for duty cannot have been higher than 110,000 in all. The Trans-Siberian railway was the only line of communication with Europe and western Siberia, and its calculated output of men was 40,000 a month in the summer. In October 1904, therefore, supposing the Japanese to have used part of their forces against Port Arthur, and setting this off against the absence of Linievich and Stoessel, Kuropatkin could expect to have a sufficient superiority in numbers to take the offensive. His policy was still, "No battle before we are in superior force."

For the moment it was equally Japan's interest to mark time in Manchuria. Still intent upon the Russian Port Arthur squadron, she had embarked her 2nd army (General Oku, 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th divisions) during April, and sent it to Chinampo whence, as soon as the ice melted and Kuroki's victory cleared the air, it sailed to the selected landing-place near Pitzewo. Here, under the protection of a continuous chain of war-vessels between the Elliot Islands and the mainland, Oku began to disembark on the 5th of May. But the difficulties of the coast were such that it took three weeks to disembark the whole and to extend across the peninsula to Port Adams. Oku then, leaving the 5th division behind, moved down with the rest towards Kinchow, and after storming that place found himself face to face with a position of enormous strength, Nanshan Hill, at the narrowest part of the peninsula, where part of a Russian division (3000 only out of 12,000 were actually engaged) had fortified itself with extreme care. On the 26th of May took place the battle of Nanshan. The Japanese attack was convergent, but there was no room for envelopment; the Russian position moreover was "all-round" and presented no flanks, and except for the enfilade fire of the Japanese and Russian gunboats in the shallow bays on either side the battle was locally at every point a frontal attack and defence. The first rush of the assailants carried them up to the wire and other obstacles, but they were for many hours unable to advance a step farther. But the resolute Oku attacked time after time, and at last the 4th division on his right, assisted by its gunboats, forced its way into the Russian position. The Russians had just begun to retreat, in accordance with orders from higher authorities. But it was a second undeniable victory. It was, moreover, a preface to those furious assaults on Port Arthur which, because they were the expression of a need that every soldier felt, and not merely of a tactical method, transcend all cool-blooded criticism. The Japanese losses were 4500 out of 30,000 engaged or 15%, that of the Russians fully half of the 3000 engaged. The victors captured many guns, but were too exhausted to pursue the Russians, whose retirement was not made in the best order.

The transports were now conveying the 6th and 11th divisions to Pitszewo; these were to form the 3rd army (Nogi) for operations against Port Arthur. Oku exchanged his 1st division for the 6th. The 2nd army then turned northward (3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th divisions). The 10th division, forming the nucleus of the 4th army, had begun to land at Takushan on the 19th of May. The 2nd and 4th armies were the left wing of a widespread converging movement on Liao-Yang. Oku had the greatest distance to march, Kuroki the smallest. The latter therefore had to stand fast in the face of the Russian

Eastern Detachment, which was three days' march at most from Feng-hwang-cheng and could be supported in three more days by Kuropatkin's main body, whereas the pressure of Oku's advance would not begin to be felt by the Russian Southern Detachment until the twelfth day at earliest. It was necessary therefore for the first objective to make a slight concession to the second. Oku had to start at the earliest possible moment, even though operations against Port Arthur were thereby delayed for a week or two. In fact, Oku's march began on June 13th, Kuroki's on June 24th; the moves of the intermediate forces at various dates within this time.

Meanwhile Kuropatkin, assembling the main army week by week, was in a difficult



position. His policy of gaining time had received a severe blow in the failure of his executive officer to realize it, and that officer, though his unpursued troops quickly regained their *moral*, had himself completely lost confidence. On the news of the battle (coupled with that of a fresh army appearing on the Korean coast),¹ Kuropatkin instantly sent off part of his embryo central mass to bar the mountain passes of Fenshuiling and Motienling against the imagined relentless pursuit of the victors, and prepared to shift his centre of concentration back to Mukden. The subsidiary protective forces on either flank of Zasulich had promptly abandoned their look-out positions and fallen back to join him. But the commander-in-chief, soon realizing that the Japanese were not pursuing, reasserted

¹ This was the 2nd army, waiting in the port of Chinampo for the moment to sail for Pitszewo.

himself, sent the protective troops back to their posts, and cancelled all orders for the evacuation of Liao-Yang. From this time forward, Kuropatkin allowed his subordinates little or no initiative. A few days later, Zasulich's persistent requests to be allowed to retreat and the still uncertain movements of the 2nd army induced him once more to prepare a concentration on Mukden. But on the 6th of May he learned that the Japanese 1st army had again halted at Feng-hwang-cheng and that the 2nd army was disembarking at Pitszewo, and he resumed (though less confidently) his original idea. The Eastern protective detachment, now strengthened and placed under the orders of Count Keller, was disposed with a view to countering any advance on Liao-Yang from the east by a combination of manœuvre and fighting.¹ It was at this moment of doubt that Alexeiev, leaving Port Arthur just in time and profoundly impressed with the precarious state of affairs in the fleet and the fortress, gave the order, as commander-in-chief by land and sea, for an "active" policy (19th May). Kuropatkin, thus required to abandon his own plan, had only to choose between attacking the 1st army and turning upon Oku. He did not yield at once; a second letter from the viceroy, the news of Nanshan, and above all a signed order from the tsar himself, "Inform General Kuropatkin that I impose upon him all the responsibility for the fate of Port Arthur," were needed to bring him definitely to execute a scheme which in his heart he knew to be perilous. The path of duty for a general saddled with a plan which he disapproves is not easily discoverable. Napoleon in like case refused, at the risk of enforced resignation, but so did Moreau; the generality of lesser men have obeyed, but so did Suvárov.

Stakelberg's I. Siberian corps was therefore reinforced towards the end of May up to a strength of above 35,000. But it remained a detachment only. The Liao-Yang central mass was still held in hand, for the landing of the 4th army—really only a division at present—at Takushan and the wrong placing of another Japanese division supposed to be with Kuroki (really intended for Nogi) had aroused Kuropatkin's fears for the holding capacity of Keller's detachment. Moreover, disliking the whole enterprise, he was most unwilling to use up his army in it. The Russians, then, at the beginning of June, were divided into three groups, the Southern, or offensive group (35,000), in the triangle Neuchwang-Haicheng-Kaiping; the Eastern or defensive group (30,000), the main body of it guarding the passes right and left of the Wiju-Liao-Yang road, the left (Cossacks) in the roadless hills of the upper Aiho and Yalu valleys, the right (Mishchenko's Cossacks and infantry supports) guarding Fenshuiling pass and the road from Takushan; the reserve (42,000) with Kuropatkin at Liao-Yang; the "Ussuri Army" about Vladivostok; and Stessel's two divisions in the Kwantung peninsula.

On the other side the 1st army was at Feng-hwang-cheng with one brigade detached on the roads on either hand, the left being therefore in front of the Takushan division and facing the Fenshuiling. Oku's 2nd army (4 divisions or 60,000 combatants) was about Port Adams. This last was the objective of the attack of Stakelberg's 35,000. Kuropatkin's orders to his subordinate were a compromise between his own plan and Alexeiev's. Stakelberg was to crush by a rapid and energetic advance the covering forces of the enemy met with, and his object was "the capture of the Nanshan position and thereafter an advance on Port Arthur." Yet another object was given him, to "relieve the pressure on Port Arthur by drawing upon himself the bulk of the enemy's forces," and he was not to allow himself to be drawn into a decisive action against superior numbers. Lastly, on June 7th, while Stakelberg was proceeding southward on his ill-defined errand, Kuropatkin, imposed upon by the advance of the Takushan column to Siu-yen, forbade him to concentrate to the front, only removing the veto when he learned that the 4th army had halted and entrenched at Siu-yen.

On the 14th, all his arrangements for supply and transport being at last complete, Oku moved north. Although he was still short of part of the 6th division, he was in superior force. He had, moreover, the perfectly definite purpose of fighting his way north, and at Telissu or Wafangkou on the 14th of June, as he expected, he came upon Stakelberg's detachment in an entrenched position. On the 14th and 15th, attacking sharply on the Russian front and lapping round both its flanks, Oku won an important and handsome victory, at a cost of 1200 men out of 35,000 engaged, while the Russians, with a loss of at least 3600 out of about 25,000 engaged, retired in disorder. Thus swiftly and disastrously ended the southern expedition.

¹ One isolated incident which deserves mention took place at this time, the bold raid of Colonel Madritov and 500 Cossacks against the communications of the 1st army. The raid (involving a ride of 240 m. forward and back) was carried out in entire ignorance of the battle of the Yalu, and on arriving at Anju Madritov found nothing to attack, the 1st army having after its victory adopted a short line of communication from a sea base near the Yalu mouth. This incident suggests two reflections—first that raids or attacks in rear of the "centre of operations" are valueless, however daring, and second that had Zasulich, in his determination to be worthy of his knighthood, concentrated for battle, the presence of the Madritov detachment on the field would have prevented the lamentable and costly misunderstandings of the retreat on Hamatan.

Meantime, except for the movement on Siu-yen already mentioned,¹ and various reconnaissances in force by Keller's main body and by Rennenkampf's Cossacks farther inland, all was quiet along the Motienling front. Kuroki entrenched himself carefully about Feng-hwang-cheng, intending, if attacked by the Russian main army, to defend to the last extremity the ground and the prestige gained on the 1st of May.

From this point to the culmination of the advance at Liao-Yang, the situation of the Japanese closely resembles that of the Prussians in 1866. Haicheng represents Münchengrätz, Liao-Yang Gitschin, and the passes east of Liao-Yang Nachod and Trautenau. The concentration of the various Japanese armies on one battlefield was to be made, not along the circumference of the long arc they occupied, but towards the centre. Similarly, Kuropatkin was in the position of Benedek. He possessed the interior lines and the central reserve which enables interior lines to be utilized, and a stroke of good fortune prolonged the period in which he could command the situation, for on the 23rd of June an unexpected sortie of the Russian Port Arthur squadron paralysed the Japanese land offensive. In the squadron were seen the battleships damaged in the February attacks, and the balance of force was now against Togo, who had lost the "Yashima" and the "Hatsuse." The squadron nevertheless tamely returned to harbour, Togo resumed the blockade and Nogi began his advance from Nanshan, but the 2nd and 4th armies came to a standstill at once (naval escort for their sea-borne supplies being no longer available), and the 1st army, whose turn to advance had just arrived, only pushed ahead a few miles to cover a larger supply area. On the 1st of July the Vladivostok squadron appeared in the Tsushima Straits, and then vanished to an unknown destination, and whether this intensified the anxiety of the Japanese or not, it is the fact that the 2nd army halted for eleven days at Kaiping, bringing the next on its right, 4th army, to a standstill likewise. Its next advance brought it to the fortified position of Tashichiao, where Kuropatkin had, by drawing heavily upon his central reserve and even on the Eastern Detachment, massed about two army corps.

On the 24th Oku attacked, but the Russian general, Zarubayev, handled his troops very skilfully, and the Japanese were repulsed with a loss of 1200 men. Zarubayev, who had used only about half his forces in the battle, nevertheless retired in the night, fearing to be cut off by a descent of the approaching 4th army on Haicheng, and well content to have broken the spell of defeat. Oku renewed the attack next day, but found only a rearguard in front of him, and without following up the retiring Russians he again halted for six days before proceeding to Haicheng to effect a junction with the 4th army (Nozu), which meantime had won a number of minor actions and forced the passage of the mountains at Fenshuiing South.²

The 1st army, after its long halt at Feng-hwang-cheng, which was employed in minutely organizing the supply service—a task of exceptional difficulty in these roadless mountains—reopened the campaign on the 24th of June, but only tentatively on account of the discouraging news from Port Arthur. A tremendous rainstorm imposed further delays, for the coolies and the native transport that had been laboriously collected scattered in all directions. The Motienling pass, however, had been seized without difficulty, and Keller's power of counter-attack had been reduced to nothing by the despatch of most of his forces to the concentration at Tashichiao. But Oku's 2nd army was now at a standstill at Kaiping, and until he was further advanced the 1st army could not press forward. The captured passes were therefore fortified (as Feng-hwang-cheng had been) for passive resistance. This, and the movements of the 4th army, which had set its face towards Haicheng and no longer seemed to be part of a threat on Liao-Yang, led to the idea being entertained at Kuropatkin's headquarters that the centre of gravity was shifting to the south. To clear up the situation Keller's force was augmented and ordered to attack Kuroki. It was repulsed with a loss of nearly 1000 men in the action at the Motienling (17th July), but it was at least ascertained that considerable forces were still on the Japanese right, and upon the arrival of a fresh army corps from Europe Kuropatkin announced his intention of attacking Kuroki. And in effect he succeeded in concentrating the equivalent of an army corps, in addition to Keller's force, opposite to Kuroki's right. But having secured this advantage he stood still for five days, and Kuroki had ample time to make his arrangements. The Japanese general occupied some 20 m. of front in two halves, separated by 6 m. of impassable mountain, and knowing well the danger of a "cordon" defensive, he met the crisis in another and a bolder fashion. Calling in the brigade detached to the assistance of Nozu as well as all other available fractions of his scattered army, he himself attacked on the 31st of July, all along the line. It was little more than an assertion of his will to conquer, but it was effectual. On his left wing the attacks of the

¹ The occupation of Siu-yen was chiefly the work of the brigade pushed out to his left by Kuroki. Only a portion of the 10th division from Takushan helped to drive away Mishchenko's Cossacks.

² The 5th division of the 2nd army had been sent to join the 10th as the latter approached Hsimucheng. The Guard brigade of Kuroki's army which had served with Nozu in the advance had now returned to Feng-hwang-cheng.

Guard and 2nd divisions (action of Yang-tzu-ling) on the Russian front and flank failed, the frontal attack because of the resolute defence, the flank attack from sheer fatigue of the troops. Count Keller was killed in the defence. Meantime on the Japanese right the 12th division attacked the large bodies of troops that Kuropatkin had massed (Yu-shu-ling) equally in vain. But one marked success was achieved by the Japanese. The Russian 35th and 36th regiments (10th European corps) were caught between two advancing columns, and, thanks to the initiative of one of the column leaders, Okasaki, destroyed. At night, discouraged on each wing by the fall of Count Keller and the fate of the 35th and 36th, the whole Russian force retired on Anping, with a loss of 2400, to the Japanese 1000 men.

This was the only manifestation of the offensive spirit on Kuropatkin's part during the six months of marking time. It was for defence, sometimes partial and elastic, sometimes rigid and "at all-costs," that he had made his dispositions throughout. His policy now was to retire on Liao-Yang as slowly as possible and to defend himself in a series of concentric prepared positions. In his orders for the battle around his stronghold there is no word of counter-attack, and his central mass, the special weapon of the commander-in-chief, he gave over to Bilderling and to Zarubayev to strengthen the defence in their respective sections or posted for the protection of his line of retreat. Nevertheless he had every intention of delivering a heavy and decisive counterstroke when the right moment should come, and meantime his defensive tactics would certainly have full play on this prearranged battlefield with its elaborate redoubts, bombproofs and obstacles, and its garrison of a strength obviously equal (and in reality superior) to that of the assailants.

The Japanese, too, had effected their object, and as they converged on their objective, the inner flanks of the three armies had connected and the supreme commander Marshal Oyama had taken command of the whole. But, as the event was to prove, the military policy of Japan had failed to produce the requisite number of men for the desired Sedan, and so, instead of boldly pushing out the 1st army to such a distance that it could manœuvre, as Moltke did in 1866 and 1870, he attached it to the general line of battle. It was not in two or three powerful groups but in one long chain of seven deployed divisions that the advance was made.


On the 25th of August the 2nd and 4th armies from Haicheng and the 1st army from the Yin-tsu-ling and Yu-shu-ling began the last stage of their convergent advance. The Russian first position extended in a semicircle from Anshantien (on the Liao-Yang-Haicheng railway) into the hills at Anping, and thence to the Taitse river above Liao-Yang; both sides had mixed detachments farther out on the flanks. The first step in the Japanese plan was the advance of Kuroki's army to Anping. Throughout the 25th, night of 25th-26th, and 26th of August, Kuroki advanced, fighting heavily all along the line, until on the night of the 26th the defenders gave up the contested ground at Anping. Hitherto there had only been skirmishing on a large scale on the side of Hai-cheng. Kuropatkin having already drawn in his line of defence on the south side towards Liao-Yang, the 2nd and 4th Japanese armies delivered what was practically a blow in the air. But on the 27th there was a marked change in the Japanese plan. The right of the 1st army, when about to continue the advance west on Liao-Yang, was diverted northward by Oyama's orders and ordered to prepare to cross the Taitseho. The retirement of the Russian southern force into its entrenchments emboldened the Japanese commander-in-chief to imitate Moltke's method to the full. On the 28th, however, the 1st army made scarcely any progress. The right (12th) division reached the upper Taitseho, but the divisions that were to come up on its left were held fast by their opponents. The 29th was an uneventful day, on which both sides prepared for the next phase.

The Russians' semicircle, now contracted, rested on the Taitseho above and below the town, and their forces were massed most closely on either side of the "Mandarin" road that the 1st army had followed. Opposite this portion of the line was the Guard and the 4th army. Oku was astride the railway, Kuroki extending towards his proposed crossing-points just beyond Kuropatkin's extreme left (the latter was behind the river. On the 30th the attack was renewed. The Guard, the 4th army and the 2nd army were completely repulsed.

On the night of the 30th the first Japanese troops crossed the Taitseho near Lien-Tao-Wun, and during the 31st three brigades were deployed north of Kwan-tun, facing west. The Russian left wing observed the movement all day, and within its limited local resources made dispositions to meet it. Kuropatkin's opportunity was now come. The remainder of the 2nd division was following the 12th, leaving a nine-mile gap between Kuroki and Nozu, as well as the river. It was not into this gap, which had no military significance, but upon the isolated divisions of the 1st army that the Russian general proposed to launch his counterstroke. Reorganizing his southern defences on a shorter front, so as to regain possession of the reserves that he had so liberally given away to his subordinates, he began to collect large bodies of troops opposite Kuroki, while Stakelberg and Zarubayev, before withdrawing silently into the lines or rather the fortress of Liao-Yang, again repulsed Oku's determined attacks on the south side. But it was not in confidence of victory

that Kuropatkin began the execution of the new plan—rather as a desperate expedient to avoid being cut off by the 1st army, whose strength he greatly overestimated.

On the morning of the 1st of September—the anniversary of Sedan, as the Japanese officers told their men—Oyama, whose intentions the active Kuroki had somewhat outrun, delivered a last attack with the 2nd and 4th armies and the Guard on the south front, in the hope of keeping the main body of the Russians occupied and so assisting Kuroki, but the assailants encountered no resistance, Zarubayev having already retired into the fortress. North of the Taitszeho the crisis was approaching. Kuroki's left, near the river, vigorously attacked a hill called Manjuyama which formed part of the line of defence of the XVII. corps from Europe. But the right of the 1st army (12th division) was threatened by the gathering storm of the counterstroke from the side of Yentai Mines, and had it not been that the resolute Okasaki continued the attack on Manjuyama alone, the Japanese offensive would have come to a standstill. Manjuyama, thanks to the



courage of the army commander and of a single brigadier, was at last carried after night-fall, and the dislodged Russians made two counter-attacks in the dark before they would acknowledge themselves beaten. Next morning, when Kuroki, who had conceived the mistaken idea of a general retreat of the Russians on Mukden, was preparing to pursue, the storm broke. Kuropatkin had drawn together seven divisions on the left rear of the XVII. corps, the strength of the whole being about 90,000. On the extreme left was Orlov's brigade of all arms at Yentai Mines, then came the I. Siberian corps (Stakelberg), then the X. corps, then the XVII. But Orlov, perplexed by conflicting instructions and caught in an unfavourable situation by a brigade of the 12th division which was executing the proposed "pursuit," gave way—part of his force in actual rout—and the cavalry that was with him was driven back by the Kobi (reserve army) brigade of the Guard. The fugitives of Orlov's command disordered the on-coming corps of Stakelberg, and the outer flank of the great counterstroke that was to have rolled up Kuroki's thin line came to an entire standstill. Meantime the X. corps furiously attacked Okasaki on the Manjuyama, and though its first assault drove in a portion of Okasaki's line, a second and a third, made in the night, failed to shake the constancy of the 15th brigade. Misunderstandings

and movements at cross-purposes multiplied on the Russian side, and at midnight Kuropatkin at last obtained information of events on the side of Yentai Mines. This was to the effect that Orlov was routed, Stakelberg's command much shaken, and at the same time Zarubayev in Liao-Yang, upon whom Oku and Nozu had pressed a last furious attack, reported that he had only a handful of troops still in reserve. Then Kuropatkin's resolution collapsed, although about three divisions were still intact, and he gave the order to retreat on Mukden.

Thus the Japanese had won their great victory with inferior forces, thanks "in the first instance to the defeat of General Orlov. But at least as large a share in the ruin of the Russian operations must be attributed to the steadfast gallantry of the 15th brigade on Manjuyama." The losses of the Japanese totalled 23,000, those of the Russians 19,000. Coming, as it did, at a moment when the first attacks on Port Arthur had been repulsed with heavy losses, this brilliantly successful climax of the four months' campaign more than restored the balance. But it was not the expected Sedan. Had the two divisions still kept in Japan been present Kuroki would have had the balance of force on his side, the Russian retreat would have been confused, if not actually a rout, and the war would have been ended on Japan's own terms. As it was, after another day's fighting, Kuropatkin drew off the whole of his forces in safety, sharply repulsing an attempt at pursuit made by part of the 12th division on the 4th of September. The railway still delivered 30,000 men a month at Mukden, and Japan had for a time outrun her resources. At St Petersburg the talk was not of peace but of victory, and after a period of reorganization the Russians advanced afresh to a new trial of strength. But the remainder of the Manchurian campaign, like the second half of the war of 1859, was nothing more than a series of violent and resultless encounters of huge armies—armies far larger than those which had fought out the real struggle for supremacy at Liao-Yang and Magenta.

CHAPTER II

FALL OF PORT ARTHUR AND BATTLE OF MUKDEN

At this time the siege of Port Arthur had only progressed so far that the besiegers were able to realize the difficulties before them. Nogi landed on the 1st of June, and his army (1st and 11th divisions) gradually separated itself from Oku's and got into position for the advance on Port Arthur. Dalny, the commercial harbour, was seized without fighting, and a month was spent in preparing a base there. But so far from retiring within his fort-line Stessel took up a strong position outside. Dislodged from this on the 26th of June, the Russians checked Nogi's further advance on July 3-4 by a fierce, though unsuccessful, counterstroke. Having been reinforced by the 9th division and two extra brigades of infantry, Nogi advanced again on the 26th. The Russians, having had a month wherein to intrench themselves, held out all along the line; but after two days and one night of fighting amongst rocks and on precipitous hill-sides, the Japanese broke through on the night of July 27-28. Stessel then withdrew in good order into Port Arthur, which in the two months he had gained by his fighting manœuvre had been considerably strengthened. Nogi had already lost 8000 men.

The defences of Port Arthur, as designed by the Russians in 1900, and owing to the meagre allotment of funds only partially carried out before the war, had some tincture, but no more, of modern continental ideas. There was a continuous enceinte of plain trace round the Old Town, at a distance of 1000 to 2000 yds. from it, which had not and could not have had any influence on the issue of the siege. The main line of defence followed the outer edge of the amphitheatre of hills surrounding the harbour. These hills had their greatest development on the N.E. side, their outer crests being some 4000 yds. from the Old Town. West of the Lun river the defensive line offered by the hills is less defined, and the line adopted for the permanent works was on the north only 3000 yds. from the harbour and 2000 yds. from the New Town. Running S.W. and S. back to the coast, it gradually draws in quite close to the S.W. end of the harbour. The total length of this line from sea to sea is some 12 m. Its most obvious weakness is that 5000 yds. N.W. of the harbour and New Town the now famous "203-Metre Hill" overlooks both. Here it had been intended to construct permanent works, but considerations of expenditure had caused this to be deferred.


On this main line of defence some seven or eight permanent works had been disposed (it is difficult to define with accuracy, as some of the concreted works were little better than semi-permanent in character). Some of these had been prepared with interior parapets and platforms of concrete for medium guns. Fort Ehr-Lung was of this character. The general design appears to have been grounded on the French detached forts of the 'seventies, as the front parapet was designed for infantry and the interior, 10 ft. higher, for guns. The ditch, 30 ft. deep, excavated in the rock, was flanked by counterscarp galleries. The living casemates were under the gorge parapet. A grave



Photo Topical.

COUNT NOGI.

COUNT MARESUKI NOGI, Japanese general, born 1849, the heroic captor of Port Arthur from the Chinese in 1894, and again, after a desperate defence by the Russians, in 1904, commander of the third army corps in the battle of Mukden, finished his career by a dramatic suicide on the occasion of the funeral of the Mikado in 1912.



defect in the design was that there was no covered communication between these casemates and the parapets. Fort Chi-Kuan had no artillery parapet. The ditch, 12 to 15 ft. deep, was defended by counterscarp galleries. The casemates in the gorge, partially cut off from the terreplein by a couple of deep sunk yards of areas, could be defended in the last resort as a keep. In addition to this the terreplein was retrenched. In both of these forts there was an apparently meaningless projection at the gorge. It is possible that these were embryonic "batteries traditoires" to flank the intervals. Fort Sung-Shu was of the same type as Chi-Kuan. These three were the only permanent forts seriously attacked.

The permanent works were supplemented before the siege began by a prodigious development of semi-permanent works and trenches. Every knoll had its redoubt or battery, and the trenches were arranged line behind line, to give supporting, cross and enfilade fire in every direction. Thus on the north front, from Chi-Kuan battery to Sung-Shu, a distance of about two miles, there were three permanent forts and seven semi-permanent works and batteries. Behind these was the "Chinese Wall," and behind that more batteries and trenches. On the north-west front, 203-Metre Hill, in advance of the main line, was occupied by strong semi-permanent works, with trenches and redoubts to either flank; and 174-Metre Hill, 1500 yds. beyond it, was also held. The Lun-Ho valley where it cut through the line was closed by entanglements and fougasses, and swept by batteries on each side. In front of the centre, the Waterworks Redoubt, a semi-permanent work covering the Port Arthur water supply, and connected by trenches with the four Temple Redoubts a mile away to the west, formed a strong advanced position. Wire entanglements were disposed in repeated lines in front of the defences, but they were not of a strong type. The Russians, with the resources of the fleet at their disposal (just as at Sevastopol), used great numbers of machine guns and electric lights, and the available garrison at first was probably, including sailors, 47,000 men.

Such were the defences that the Japanese attacked, with a force at the outset (30th of July) little more than superior numerically to the defenders, and an entirely inadequate siege train (18 6-in. howitzers, 60 4·7-in. guns and howitzers, and about 200 field and mountain guns). They were imperfectly informed of the strength of the garrison and the nature of the defences. Recollections of their easy triumph in 1894 and perhaps thoughts of Sevastopol, German theories of the "brusque attack," the fiery ardour of the army, and above all the need of rapidly crushing or expelling the squadron in harbour, combined to suggest a bombardment and general assault. The bombardment began on the 19th of August and continued for three days, while the infantry was spreading along the front and gaining ground where it could. The real assault was made on the night of the 21st on the two Pan-Lung forts (semi-permanent) on the centre of the north-eastern front. The fighting was of the utmost severity, and continued through the 22nd; and although the stormers captured the two forts they were absolutely unable to make any further progress under the fire of the permanent forts Ehr-Lung and Chi-Kuan on either side of, and the Wan-tai fort behind, Pan-Lung. Every attempt to bring up supports to the captured positions failed, and the Russians concentrated on the spot from all quarters. On the night of the 23rd-24th, just as the assault was being renewed, Stessel delivered a fierce counter-attack against the lost positions, and the result of an all-night battle was that though the forts were not recaptured, the assault was repulsed with over 5000 casualties, and the Japanese in Pan-Lung were isolated. This sortie raised the spirits of the Russians to the highest pitch. They seemed indeed to have broken the spell of defeat. On the Japanese side 15,000 men had been killed and wounded in three weeks. The Russians strengthened their works around the captured forts in such a way as effectually to prevent farther advance, and the Japanese 3rd Army had now to resign itself to a methodical siege. Small sorties, partial attacks¹ and duels between the Japanese guns and the generally more powerful ordnance of the fortress continued. The siege approaches were first directed against the Temple-Waterworks group, which was stormed on the 19th and 20th of September. Pan-Lung was connected with the Japanese lines by covered ways, approaches were begun towards several of the eastern forts, and on the 20th of September 180-Metre Hill was stormed, though the crest was untenable under the fire from 203-Metre Hill. The Japanese were now beginning to pay more attention to the western side of the fortress, and from the 19th to the 22nd there was hard fighting around 203-Metre Hill, the attack being eventually repulsed with the loss of 2000 men. Operations in the west were thereupon abandoned for the time being, and the eastern forts remained the principal objective of the attack. Heavier howitzers had been sent for from Japan, and on the 1st of October the first batteries of 28 centimetre (11 in.) howitzers came into action. They fired a shell weighing 485 lb. with a bursting charge of 17 lb. On the 12th, the Japanese took the trenches between the Waterworks Redoubt and Ehr-Lung, and cut the water-supply. Saps were then pushed on against Ehr-Lung, and to help in their progress a Russian advanced work called "G"

¹ A particular feature of these constant night-fights was the effective use of the defenders' searchlight, not only to show up the enemy but to blind him.

was captured on the 16th, by a skilfully combined attack of infantry and artillery. From this time forward there was a desperate struggle at the sapheads on the north front.¹

On the 26th of October another assault was made on Chi-Kuan Fort and Battery, and was continued at intervals, varied by Russian counter-attacks, till the 2nd of November. By this time the Japanese were becoming disheartened. They had incurred an additional loss of 13,000 men without substantial gain, except a lodgment on the counterscarp of Sung-Shu. This prepared the way for mining, which had already been begun at Ehr-Lung. On the 17th of November seven mines were exploded at Sung-Shu, which blew in the back of the counterscarp galleries. At Ehr-Lung on the 20th of November three mines were exploded, which half filled the ditch, and the Japanese later on sapped across to the escarp over the *débris*. At Chi-Kuan, the counterscarp gallery had been breached by an ill-managed Russian mine on the 23rd of October and the Japanese got in through the breach and made a lodgment. They did not, however, get possession, of the whole of the counterscarp galleries before about the middle of November. On the 22nd of November the Japanese assaulted the trench round Chi-Kuan battery. It was captured and retaken by counter-attack twice between 6 P.M. and 1 A.M. In this fight each side was using corpses as breastworks.

On the 26th of November another assault was made on the same lines as that of the 30th of October. By this time the besiegers were sapping under the escarps of the northern forts, and it would have been better to delay. But the situation was serious in the extreme. In Manchuria Kuropatkin's army had reasserted itself. From Europe Rozhstvenski's squadron was just setting sail for the Far East. Marshal Oyama sent his principal staff officers to stimulate Nogi to fresh efforts, and some exhausted units of the besieging army were replaced by fresh troops from Japan. With 100,000 men and this urgent need of immediate victory, Nogi and the marshal's staff officers felt bound to make a third general assault. The siege works had indeed made considerable progress. The ditches of Sung-Shu and Ehr-Lung were partially filled. They held most of the ditch of Chi-Kuan Fort and were cutting down the escarp, and two parallels had been made only 30 yds. from the Chinese Wall at "G" and Pan-Lung.

The general attack was made at 1 P.M. At Sung-Shu the stormers got into the fort, but suffered much from the artillery on the western side of the Lun-ho valley, and were beaten out of it again in 20 minutes; 2000 men tried in vain to get up the Lun-ho valley to take Sung-Shu in rear. At Ehr-Lung they could not get over the outer parapet. At "G" they took a portion of the Chinese Wall and lost it again, other trenches with a cross fire being behind. At Pan-Lung the machine guns on the Wall prevented them from leaving the parallel. At Chi-Kuan Fort the terreplein of the fort had been covered with entanglements defended by machine guns on the gorge parapets, and the Japanese could make no way. Briefly, there was a furious fight all along the line, and nothing gained. On the 27th of November, after losing 12,000 men, the assault was abandoned. On the north front the Japanese returned to mining.

But so urgent was the necessity of speedy victory that the fighting had to continue elsewhere. And at last, after every other point had been attempted, the weight of the attack was directed on 203-Metre Hill. A battery of 11-inch howitzers was established only one mile away. On the 28th of November assaults were made and failed. On the 30th of November an attack with fresh troops failed again. On the 1st of December there was a heavy bombardment by the big howitzers, which obliged the Russians to take shelter in rear of the ruined works. On the 2nd of December the Russians tried a counter-attack. During the next two days the artillery were busy. The engineers sapped up to the ruins of the western work, saw the shelters on the reverse slope and directed artillery fire by telephone. Thirty-six guns swept the ground with shrapnel. Finally on the 5th of December the Japanese attacked successfully. Their losses in the last ten days at 203-Metre Hill had been probably over 10,000. Those of the Russians were about 5000, chiefly from artillery fire.

This was the turning-point of the siege. At once the 11-inch howitzers, assisted by telephone from 203-Metre, opened upon the Russian ships; a few days later these were wholly *hors de combat*, and at the capitulation only a few destroyers were in a condition to escape. The siege was now pressed with vigour by the construction of batteries at and around 203-Metre, by an infantry advance against the main western defences, and by renewed operations against the eastern forts. The escarp of Chi-Kuan was blown up, and at the cost of 800 men, General Sameyeda (11th division) personally leading his stormers, captured the great fort on the 19th of December. The escarp of Ehr-Lung was also blown up, and the ruins of the fort were stormed by the 9th division on the 28th

¹ Hand grenades and extemporized trench mortars were used on both sides with very great effect. The Japanese hand grenades consisted of about 1 lb. of high explosive in a tin case; the Russian cases were of all sorts, including old Chinese shell. The Japanese employed wire-netting screens to stop the Russian grenades. Various means were tried for the destruction of entanglements. Eventually it was found that the best plan was to sap through them.

of December, though a mere handful of the defenders prolonged the fighting for eight hours and the assailants lost 1000 men. Sung-Shu suffered a worse fate on the 31st, the greater part of the fort and its defenders being blown up, and on this day the whole defence of the eastern front collapsed. The Japanese 7th and 1st divisions were now advancing on the western main line; the soul of the defence, the brave and capable General Kondratenko, had been killed on the 15th of December, and though the Japanese seem to have anticipated a further stand,¹ Stessel surrendered on the 2nd of January 1905, with 24,000 effective and slightly wounded and 15,000 wounded and sick men, the remnant of his original 47,000. The total losses of the 3rd Japanese Army during the siege were about 92,000 men (58,000 casualties and 34,000 sick).

Meanwhile the Japanese navy had scored two important successes. After months of blockade and minor fighting, the Russian Port Arthur squadron had been brought to action on the 10th of August. Admiral Vitheft, Makarov's successor, had put to sea shortly after the appearance of the 3rd Army on the land front of Port Arthur. The battle opened about noon, 20 m. south of the harbour; the forces engaged on each side varied somewhat, but Togo finally had a superiority. Admiral Vitheft was killed. As the Russians became gradually weaker, the Japanese closed in to within 3 m. range, and Prince Ukhtomsky (who succeeded to the command on Vitheft's fall) gave up the struggle at nightfall. The Russians scattered, some vessels heading southward, the majority with the admiral making for Port Arthur, whence they did not again emerge. All the rest were either forced into neutral ports (where they were interned) or destroyed, among the latter being the third-class cruiser "Novik," which had already earned a brilliant reputation for daring, and now steamed half round Japan before she was brought to action and run ashore. The victors blockaded Port Arthur, until near the close of the siege, when, after going ashore and examining the remnant of the Russian fleet from 203-Metre Hill, Togo concluded that it would be safe to return to Japan and give his ships a complete refit. Kaimura's squadron, after various adventures, at last succeeded on the 14th of August in engaging and defeating the Russian Vladivostok squadron (Admiral Jessen). Thus the Russian flag disappeared from the Pacific, and thenceforward only the Baltic fleet could hope seriously to challenge the supremacy of the Japanese navy.

The remainder of the war on land, although it included two battles on a large scale and numerous minor operations, was principally a test of endurance. After Liao-Yang there were no extended operations, the area of conflict being confined to the plain of the coast side of the Hun-ho and the fringe of the mountains. Japan had partially accomplished her task, but had employed all her trained men in this partial accomplishment. It was questionable, even in October, 1904, whether she could endure the drain of men and money, if it were prolonged much further. On the other hand, in Russia opposition to the war, which had never been popular, gradually became the central feature of a widespread movement against irresponsible government. Thus while the armies in Manchuria faced one another with every appearance of confidence, behind them the situation was exceedingly grave for both parties. A state of equilibrium was established, only momentarily disturbed by Kuropatkin's offensive on the Sha-ho in October, and by the Sandepu incident in the winter, until at last Oyama fought a battle on a grand scale and won it. Even then, however, the results fell far short of anticipation, and the armies settled down into equilibrium again.

After the battle of Liao-Yang Kuropatkin reverted for a moment to the plan of a concentration to the rear at Tieling. Politically, however, it was important to hold Mukden, the Manchurian capital, and since the Japanese, as on previous occasions, reorganized instead of pursuing, he decided to stand his ground, a resolution which had an excellent effect on his army. Moreover, growing in strength day by day, and aware that the Japanese had outrun their powers, he resolved, in spite of the despondency of many of his senior officers, to take the offensive. He disposed of about 200,000 men, the Japanese had about 170,000. The latter lay entrenched north of Liao-Yang, from a point 9 m. west of the railway, through Yentai Station and Yentai Mines, to the hills farther east. There had been a good deal of rain, and the ground was heavy. Kuropatkin's intention was to work round the Japanese right on the hills with his eastern wing (Stakelberg), to move his western wing (Bilderling) slowly southwards, entrenching each strip of ground gained, and finally with the centre—i.e. Bilderling's left—and Stakelberg, to envelop and crush the 1st Army, which formed the Japanese right, keeping the 4th Army (Nozu) and the 2nd Army (Oku) in countenance by means of Bilderling's main body. The manœuvre began on the 5th of October, and by the evening of the 10th, after four days of fairly heavy advanced-guard fighting, chiefly between Bilderling and Nozu, Stakelberg was in his assigned position in the mountainous country, facing west towards Liao-Yang, with his left on the Taitseho. The advance of Bilderling, however, necessarily methodical and slow in any case, had taken more time than was anticipated. Still, Bilderling crossed

¹ As regards food and ammunition, the resources of the defence were not by any means exhausted, and General Stessel and other senior officers of the defence were tried by courts-martial, and some of them convicted, on the charge of premature surrender.

the Sha-ho and made some progress towards Yentai, and the demonstration was so far effectual that Kuroki's warnings were almost disregarded by the Japanese headquarters. The commander of the 1st Army, however, took his measures well, and Stakelberg found the greatest trouble in deploying his forces for action in this difficult country. Oyama became convinced of the truth on the 9th and 10th, and prepared a great counter-attack. Kuroki with only a portion of the 1st Army was left to defend at least 15 m. of front, and the entire 2nd and 4th Armies and the general reserves were to be thrown upon Bilderling. On the 11th the real battle opened. Kuroki displayed the greatest skill, but he was of course pressed back by the four-to-one superiority of the Russians. Still the result of Stakelberg's attack, for which he was unable to deploy his whole force, was disappointing, but the main Japanese attack on Bilderling was not much more satisfactory, for the Russians had entrenched every step of their previous advance, and fought splendidly. The Russian commander-in-chief states in his work on the war that Bilderling became engaged *à fond* instead of gradually withdrawing as Kuropatkin intended, and at any rate it is unquestioned that in consequence of the serious position of affairs on the western wing, not only did Stakelberg use his reserves to support Bilderling, when the 12th division of Kuroki's army was almost at its last gasp and must have yielded to fresh pressure, but Kuropatkin himself suspended the general offensive on the 13th of October. In the fighting of the 13th-16th of October the Russians gradually gave back as far as the line of the Sha-ho, the Japanese following until the armies faced roughly north and south on parallel fronts. The fighting, irregular but severe, continued. Kuropatkin was so far averse to retreat that he ordered a new offensive, which was carried out on the 16th-17th. Putilov and Novgorod hills, south of the Sha-ho, were stormed by the Russians and the Japanese made several efforts to retake these positions without success. Kuropatkin wished to continue the offensive, but his corps commanders offered so much opposition to a further offensive that he at last gave up the idea. The positions of the rival armies from the 18th of October, the close of the battle of the Sha-ho, to the 26th of January 1905, the opening of the battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai)—a period almost entirely devoid of incident—may be described by the old-fashioned term "winter quarters." The total losses of the Russians are stated as 42,000 men, but this is very considerably exaggerated; the Japanese acknowledged 20,000 casualties.

In January 1905, apart from Mishchenko's cavalry raid in rear of Oyama's forces (January 8th-16th) the only change in the relative positions of Oyama and Kuropatkin as they stood after the battle of the Sha-ho was that the Japanese had extended somewhat westwards towards the Hun-ho. The Russians, 300,000 strong, were now organized in three armies, commanded by Generals Linievich, Gripenberg and Kaulbars; the total strength of the Japanese 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies and reserve was estimated by the Russians at 220,000. Towards the end of January Kuropatkin took the offensive. He wished to inflict a severe blow before the enemy could be reinforced by the late besiegers of Port Arthur, and sent Gripenberg with seven divisions against Oku's two on the Japanese left. The battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai), fought in a terrible snowstorm on the 26th and 27th of January 1905, came near to being a great Russian victory. But the usual *décousu* of Russian operations and their own magnificent resistance saved the Japanese, and after two days' severe fighting, although Gripenberg had not been checked, Kuropatkin, in face of a counter-attack by Oyama, decided to abandon the attempt. The losses were roughly 8,000 Japanese to over 10,000 Russians.

Both sides stood fast in the old positions up to the verge of the last and greatest battle. Kuropatkin was reinforced, and appointed Kaulbars to succeed Gripenberg and Bilderling to the command of the 3rd Army vacated by Kaulbars. On the other hand, Nogi's 3rd Army, released by the fall of Port Arthur, was brought up on the Japanese left, and a new army under Kawamura (5th), formed of one of the Port Arthur and two reserve divisions, was working from the upper Yalu through the mountain towards the Russian left rear. The Russian line in front of Mukden from the Hun-ho, through the Putilov and Novgorod hills on the Sha-ho, to the mountains, was 47 m. long, the armies from right to left being II. (Kaulbars), III. (Bilderling) and I. (Linievich); a general reserve was at Mukden. On the other side from left to right, on a line 40 m. long, were Oku (2nd Army), Nozu (4th), Kuroki (1st) and Kawamura (5th), the general reserve in rear of the centre at Yentai and the 3rd Army in rear of Oku. Each side had about 310,000 men present. The entire front of both armies was heavily entrenched. The Russians had another offensive in contemplation when the Japanese forestalled them by advancing on the 21st of February. The 5th Army gradually drove in Kuropatkin's small detachments in the mountains, and came up in line with Kuroki, threatening to envelop the Russian left. The events on this side and misleading information induced Kuropatkin to pay particular attention to his left. The Japanese 1st and 5th Armies were now engaged (25th February), and elsewhere all was quiet. But on the 27th the fighting spread to the centre, and Nogi (originally behind Oku) was on the march to envelop the Russian right. He was held under observation throughout by Russian cavalry, but it seems that little attention was paid to their reports by Kuropatkin, who was still occupied with Kuroki and Kawamura, and even denuded his right of its reserves to reinforce his left. With a

battle-front exceeding two days' marches the wrong distribution of reserves by both sides was a grave misfortune. Kuropatkin was at last convinced, on the 28th of February, of the danger from the west, and did all in his power to form a solid line of defence on the west side of Mukden. Nogi's first attack (1st-2nd March) had not much success, and a heavy counterstroke was delivered on the 2nd. Fighting for localities and alterations in the interior distribution of the opposing forces occupied much time, and by the 3rd, though the battle had become severe, Kuropatkin had merely drawn in his right and right centre (now facing W. and S.W. respectively) a little nearer Mukden. His centre on the Sha-ho held firm, Kuroki and Kawamura made but slight progress against his left in the mountains. Nogi and Oyama were equally impressed with the strength of the new (west) Russian front, and like Grant at Petersburg in 1864, extended farther and farther to the outer flank, the Russians following suit. The Japanese marshal now sent up his army reserve, which had been kept far to the rear at Yentai, to help Nogi. It was not before the evening of the 6th of March that it came up with the 3rd army and was placed in position opposite the centre of the Russian west front. On the rest of the line severe local fighting had continued, but the Russian positions were quite unshaken, and Kuropatkin's reserves—which would have been invaluable in backing up the counter-attack of the 2nd of March—had returned to face Nogi. He had organized another counterstroke for the 6th, to be led by Kaulbars, but this collapsed unexpectedly after a brief but severe fight.

Kuropatkin now decided to draw in his centre and left towards Mukden. On the 7th, the various columns executed their movement to the Hun-ho with complete success, thanks to good staff work. The Japanese followed up only slowly. Nogi and Kaulbars stood fast, facing each other on the west front; after the arrival of the general reserve, Nogi was able to prolong his line to the north and eventually to bend it inwards towards the Russian line of retreat. Bilderling and Linievich were now close in to Mukden and along the Hun-ho. On the other side Oku had taken over part of Nogi's line, thus freeing the 3rd army for further extension to the north-west, and the rest of the 2nd army, the 4th, the 1st and the 5th were approaching the Hun-ho from the south (March 8th). On this day the fighting between Nogi and Kaulbars was very severe, and Kuropatkin now made up his mind to retreat towards Tieling. On the 9th, by Oyama's orders, Nogi extended northward instead of further swinging in south-eastward, Oku now occupied all the original line of the 3rd army, Nozu alone was left on the south front, and Kuroki and Kawamura began to engage Linievich seriously. But Nogi had not yet reached the Mukden-Tieling railway when, on the night of the 9th, every preparation having been made, Kuropatkin's retreat began. On the 10th, covered by Kaulbars, who held off Nogi, and by strong rearguards at and east of Mukden, the movement continued, and though it was not executed with entire precision, and the rearguards suffered very heavily, the Russians managed to draw off in safety to the northward. On the evening of the 10th, after all their long and hardly contested enveloping marches, Nogi's left and Kawamura's right met north of Mukden. The circle was complete, but there were no Russians in the centre, and a map of the positions of the Japanese on the evening of the 10th shows the seventeen divisions thoroughly mixed up and pointing in every direction but that of the enemy. Thus the further pursuit of the Russians could only be undertaken after an interval of re-organization by the northernmost troops of the 5th and 3rd armies. But the material loss inflicted on the Russians was far heavier than it had ever been before. It is generally estimated that the Russian losses were no fewer than 97,000, and the Japanese between 40,000 and 50,000. Japan had had to put forth her supreme effort for the battle, while of Russia's whole strength not one-tenth had been used. But Russia's strength in Europe, with but one line whereby it could be brought to bear in the Far East, was immaterial, and on the theatre of war a quarter of the Russian field forces had been killed, wounded or taken.

It remains to narrate briefly the tragic career of the Russian Baltic fleet. Leaving Libau on the 13th-15th of October 1904, the fleet steamed down the North Sea, expecting every night to be attacked by torpedo-boats. On the 21st, in their excitement, they opened fire on a fleet of British trawlers on the Dogger Bank, and several fishermen were killed. This incident provoked the wildest indignation, and Russia was for some days on the verge of war with England. A British fleet "shadowed" Rozhdestvenski for some time, but eventually the Russians were allowed to proceed. On reaching Madagascar, Rozhdestvenski heard of the fall of Port Arthur, and the question of returning to Russia arose. But a reinforcement under Rear-Admiral Nebogatov was despatched from the Baltic via Suez early in March 1905, and the armada proceeded by the Straits of Malacca, Nebogatov joining at Kamranh Bay in Cochin China. The united fleet was formidable rather in number than in quality; the battleships were of very unequal value, and the faster vessels were tied to the movements of many "lame ducks." Rozhdestvenski had, moreover, numerous store-ships, colliers, &c. Nevertheless, the Japanese viewed his approach with considerable anxiety, and braced themselves for a final struggle. Of the various courses open to him, Togo prudently chose that of awaiting Rozhdestvenski in home waters. The Russians left Kamranh on the 14th of May, and for a time disappeared into the Pacific. It was assumed that they were making for Valdivostok either via Tsushima strait or by the Pacific. Rozhdestvenski chose the former course, and on the 27th of May



the fleets met near Tsushima. About 1.45 P.M., the Russians, who were still in a close cruising formation, attempted to open out for battle as the Japanese approached. The Russian battleships, originally heading N.N.E., swerved to the E., as the Japanese battle squadron passed across their front. Togo's fire was concentrated first on the "Osliabia," the leading Russian battleship, and by 2.25 she was *hors de combat*. At this time both the battle-fleets were running E. Togo, concentrating his fire on each ship in succession, and seeking by superior speed to head off the Russians, now inclined towards the S.E., and the Russians conformed. At 3, the Russian flagship "Suvarov" had fallen out of the line, though still firing. Rozhdestvenski himself had been wounded, and the command had devolved on Nebogatov. Shortly afterwards the Russians suddenly turned N., and sought to pass, across the wake of Togo's battle-fleet, up the straits. Thereupon the leading Japanese ships promptly turned together, covered by the rear ships, which ran past them on the original course and then came round in succession; this manœuvre was so well executed that the Japanese again headed off their enemy, who swerved for the second time towards the E. The Japanese thereupon executed the same manœuvre as before, and steamed S.E. again (about 4.40). They were not unscathed, but the Russians were suffering far more severely. Meanwhile, the cruisers on both sides had been heavily engaged. The Russian cruisers kept on the right of their battleships, while the Japanese, very superior in speed, ran S., S.E. and E. across the rear of the enemy's main squadron, and about 3 ranged up alongside the Russian cruisers. The latter were slower, and hampered by the crowd of damaged battleships, store-ships and colliers; before 5 they were in the greatest confusion, which was presently increased by the battleship squadron, now turned back and heading W., with Togo in pursuit. The Russians again broke our northward; but some of the Japanese squadrons hung on to the remnant of the enemy's battle-fleet, and the others dealt with the numerous Russian vessels that were unable to keep up. Then Togo called off his ships, and gave the torpedo craft room and the night in which to act. At daylight the larger ships joined in again, and before long the whole Russian fleet, with few exceptions, had been captured or sunk.

After the disasters of Mukden and Tsushima, and being threatened with internal disorder in European Russia, the tsar, early in June, accepted the mediation of the president of the United States, and *pourparlers* were set on foot. The war meanwhile drifted on through May, June and July. Linievich, who succeeded Kuropatkin shortly after the battle of Mukden, retired slowly northward, re-organising his forces and receiving fresh reinforcements from Europe. A Japanese expedition occupied Saghalien (July 8-30), and another, General Hasegawa, advanced through Korea towards Vladivostok. But the fighting was desultory. The peace negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on the 9th of August, and by the end of the month the belligerents had agreed as to the main points at issue, that Russia should cede the half of Saghalien, annexed in 1875, surrender her lease of the Kwangtung peninsula and Port Arthur, evacuate Manchuria and recognize Japan's sphere of influence in Korea. The treaty of peace was signed on the 23rd of August 1905.

THE TURCO-ITALIAN WAR, 1911-12

ON September 28, 1911, the Italian ultimatum demanding that Turkey should permit the military occupation of Tripoli was presented to the Porte, and on the 29th the Italian Government declared war. Italy, having taken the initiative in the dispute, was in advance of Turkey with her preparations. In order to give the Italian expedition a national character, a special force was formed of contingents from different army corps, and was assembled at Naples, Genoa and Palermo. The Italian fleet had been practically ready since September 1st, and needed only to summon its reservists. Lieut.-General Caneva was appointed Supreme Commander of the naval and military forces, composed as follows :

Navy.—Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Aubry. First and Second Squadrons (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions). *First Squadron* : 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 8 destroyers ; *Second Squadron* : 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers ; *Training Division* : 4 battleships, 1 cruiser ; *Independent Division* : 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, and a torpedo flotilla ; *Red Sea Division* : 5 cruisers, 6 torpedo craft.

Expeditionary Army Corps. 1st Division, (1st and 2nd Brigades) ; 2nd Division, (3rd and 4th Brigades) ; *Army Troops*, 7 battalions infantry, 6 mountain batteries, besides technical troops, 2 dirigibles and 6 aeroplanes. *Total* : 31 battalions, 6 squadrons, 18 batteries, about 40,000 men. Steps were taken to mobilise a 3rd, and subsequently a 4th Division.

The Turkish Navy consisted of 4 battleships, 2 protected cruisers and 27 torpedo craft, besides some old gun boats in the Red Sea. The inefficiency of the *personnel* rendered this fleet a negligible factor. The Turkish force in the vilayet of Tripoli consisted of the 42nd Independent Division, (14 battalions, 10 squadrons, 6 batteries) with an actual strength of about 5000, to which must be added some 3000 Redifs. The coast defences of Tripoli town were old-fashioned masonry forts armed with obsolete guns. Munir Pasha was in command of the troops. Three Turkish divisions were stationed in Yemen, whence a raid might seem possible against Eritrea.

The Libyan coastline is rocky, and difficult of access. Marsa Tobruk is the best harbour. Tripoli itself is exposed in northerly winds ; Benghazi and Derna are open roadsteads. The country consists of an arid plateau divided into two portions, corresponding to Tripolitana and Cyrenaica, by the deep indentation of Sydra Bay. Caravan roads enter the province on the east from Sollum and Siwa ; on the west along the coast by Zuara, and further inland by Nalut to Gharian. Important oases in the interior are Azizie and Gharian, in the west, and Aujila in the east. The population of the interior consisted of Berbers and nomad Arabs. The chief influence among the latter was that of the Senussi sect.

Naval Operations.—During the first week of the war, the Duke of the Abruzzi's Independent Division sank or blockaded in their ports, all the Turkish torpedo craft in the Adriatic. In deference to Austrian sentiment, these operations were then suspended. On the 4th of October part of the 1st Squadron seized Marsa Tobruk, which was required as a base. The Turkish fleet had left Beyrout on September 28th and had only learned of the outbreak of war when off Rhodes next day. No attempt was, apparently, made by the Italians to intercept it, and it reached the Dardanelles on October 1st. On October 3rd, when the exodus of Italian subjects was complete, the 2nd Squadron and Training Division bombarded the coast forts of Tripoli ; the garrison, except for a few gunners, had withdrawn inland towards Gharian. On the 4th, the forts were finally silenced and on the 5th the town was occupied by a naval brigade. A blockade of the Libyan coast was declared on the 3rd of October.

Transport of the Italian Expeditionary Force.—Some 40 transports had been chartered for the expedition; tonnage was allowed at the rate of 1300 tons per battalion; 900 per squadron and 1100 per battery. About 1000 infantry and artillery of the 2nd Division sailed on October 5th to garrison Marsa Tobruk. But for the rest of the force a pause of some days ensued. Meanwhile the situation at Tripoli was critical, as the enemy were showing signs of activity; five infantry battalions were therefore hurried on in advance, reaching Tripoli on the 11th of October. The transport of the bulk of the 1st Division commenced on the 9th and was concluded on the 18th, by which time about 20,000 troops had landed. The remaining 5 battalions of this division were landed at Homs on October 21st.

The transports conveying 10,000 men of the 2nd Division arrived off Benghazi on October 18th escorted by part of the 1st Squadron. On the morning of the 19th, fire was opened by the ships and a landing was effected on Giuliana Point, west of the harbour, in the face of opposition by some 300 Turkish regulars and 2000 Arabs. In the afternoon the troops, under General Ameglio, advanced on Berca, which was captured by nightfall. After a nocturnal bombardment by the fleet Benghazi was occupied by the Italians on the 20th. The rest of the 2nd Division occupied Derna on the 18th, an attempt made on the 11th having failed, owing to bad weather. During the passage of these convoys from Italy to Africa, the Independent Naval Division patrolled the entrances to the Aegean Sea.

Land Operations.—The Italian operations were limited, at the outset, to the occupation of the coast towns. The defeat of Adowa (1896) had not been forgotten and public opinion favoured a cautious policy. It was hoped that the Arabs would accept the situation, and that the Turkish troops, cut off from the coast, would surrender or retreat across the frontier. The Italian entrenchments round Tripoli had a front of 10 miles; on the right, west of Bu Mellian wells, the field of fire was good; in the centre, near "Fort" Mesri—an old earthwork—it was indifferent; for two miles on the left, in the oasis, it was limited to a few yards.

The Turks had now established an advanced base at Ain Zara. Early on October 23rd, Neschat Bey, who had succeeded Munir Pasha, directed a strong attack through the oasis, against the left of the Italian line. At the crisis of the fight, when most of the reserves had been drawn in, the Arabs in the suburbs behind the entrenchments treacherously rose in arms, and assailed the Italians in rear. The situation was for a time most critical, and it was only after eight hours' fighting that the attack was driven off by the remaining reserves. After this incident, drastic measures were taken to disarm the natives and to clear the zone in rear of the outpost line. On October 26th the Turks again attacked the centre and left of the line, and were only repulsed when most of the Italian reserves had been employed.

General Caneva now withdrew his left to Mesri and Dahra, abandoning Fort Hamidieh and "Fort" Mesri. The attacks on the 23rd and 26th had cost the Italians 374 killed and only 158 wounded, the small proportion of the latter being remarkable.

It was now evident that the Arab population must be considered hostile and that more troops would be needed. General Caneva was, therefore, reinforced by the 3rd Division from Italy; the 1st and 3rd Divisions at Tripoli were organized as an Army Corps under General Frugoni.

On November 5th the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy was decreed, possibly as an indication that no compromise would be accepted.

Thus reinforced, General Caneva resumed the offensive. On the 7th of November Fort Hamidieh was retaken by a brigade of the 3rd Division, and on the 26th, after an attack by three brigades, the old outpost line and "Fort" Mesri were reoccupied. This success was followed up on December 4th by an attack on the Turkish base at Ain Zara. The advance was carried out in three columns, of a brigade each, which converged on the Turkish position. The Turks, finding their flanks threatened, abandoned their camp and eight guns, and retreated towards Gharian, leaving detachments at Tarhuna and Azizie. Ain Zara was now strongly fortified by the Italians; Tajura was occupied, and the whole oasis was cleared of the enemy.

On the night of December 18th and 19th, a force of three battalions, one squadron, and one battery under Colonel Fara, set out from Ain Zara to surprise a hostile force reported at Bir Tobras. Misled by incorrect maps the column lost its way; at day-break the enemy was encountered in superior force; after maintaining its ground with difficulty during the day, the column withdrew by night to Ain Zara. That a disaster was averted was due to the skill and gallantry of Colonel Fara, who was rewarded by promotion to Major-General.

Heavy rain fell from November 13th onward, adding greatly to the discomfort of the troops and increasing the difficulty of operations.

During this period the aeroplanes had done good service, in spite of violent winds; the dirigibles had, however, been reshipped to Italy for repairs owing to damage suffered in a storm in December 1911.

Meanwhile in Cyrenaica the Turks had attacked Benghazi on the night of December

10th and 11th and Derna on December 16th and 26th. On the latter occasion the Italians lost 4 killed and 77 wounded. In January Enver Bey, who had now assumed command of the Turks in this quarter, took up a central position near Benghazi, and tried to entice the Italians beyond the range of the ship's guns. Additional reinforcements (including one brigade 4th Division and a combined brigade) reached Cyrenaica in November and December 1911.

The total number of Italian troops in Africa at the end of 1911 had risen to 100,000 distributed approximately as follows:

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.
Tripoli and Ain Zara	37	6	18
Homs	5		2
Benghazi	18	2	5
Derna	13	1	3
Tobruk	6		2
	79	9	30

In addition 4 battalions, 2 squadrons and 10 batteries were awaiting embarkation at Naples. A battalion of Askaris from Eritrea reached Tripoli early in February 1912.

The Turks and Arabs combined were estimated at 12,000 round Tripoli and 10,000 to 20,000 in Cyrenaica.

The Winter of 1911-12.—After the action of Bir Tobras the war entered on a new phase, which lasted till April 1912. Except for local enterprises the Italians remained on the defensive on land, allowing the enemy to waste his strength in attacking their entrenchments. These attacks were pressed with great vigour and sometimes succeeded against outlying works, but were always repulsed in the end with heavy loss to the assailants. The only exception to this policy was an attempt to occupy Zuara with troops of the 10th Brigade from Italy. The town was bombarded on the 17th of January, but no landing could be effected owing to the rough weather and to the opposition of the Turks entrenched on the beach.

The seizure of the French vessels "Manouba" and "Carthage" by Italian warships January 16th and 18th, on suspicion of carrying contraband and combatants, evoked a protest from France; Italy finally gave way and released the vessels.

On January 18th and 19th the defensive perimeter of Tripoli was extended by the occupation of Gargaresch; on February 27th the heights of Merkeb, two miles south-east of Homs were captured by the Italians and held in spite of efforts by the Turks to retake them on February 28th and March 5th and 6th. On February 11th and again on March 3rd vigorous attacks were made on the Italian lines at Derna; on the latter occasion Enver Bey is said to have been wounded. Marsa Tobruk was attacked on February 23rd and again on March 11th.

On March 12th a brilliant success was gained by General Ameglio over a strong force of the enemy assembled near the Fojat oasis within range of the defences of Benghazi. The attack was carried out by two columns supported by heavy artillery; the enemy were completely defeated, losing 400 killed. The Italians lost 29 killed and 62 wounded. This victory earned General Ameglio a step in rank.

Meanwhile, on February 23rd, Italian cruisers had appeared off Beirut and had sunk two small Turkish warships which were in the port. This step was, perhaps, intended as a warning that Italy would extend her sphere of operations if peace were not concluded.

Operations in the Red Sea.—The Italian operations in the Red Sea were directed to neutralising the Turkish gun boats in this sea, and, indirectly, to putting pressure on Turkey by hampering her operations in Yemen. On January 7, 1912, owing to reports of an intended raid on Eritrea, some Italian destroyers searched the channels among the Farsan Islands and put seven Turkish gun boats out of action, while two cruisers bombarded Jebel Tahr and Loheia. A blockade was then declared of the coast between 14° 30' N. and 15° 11' N. This limit was afterwards extended to 15° 15' N. so as to include Kamaran Island. On various occasions Turkish camps and forts at Akaba, Hodeidah, Mocha, Djebana, and Sheikh Said were shelled by Italian warships.

Operations in the Spring of 1912.—An attempt at mediation having failed early in March, steps were taken by Italy for more active operations. The next phase of the war consisted in the strengthening of the Italian hold on the Mediterranean littoral, and the extension of naval operations to the Aegean.

The town of Zuara, near the Tunisian frontier, served the Turks as a collecting centre for contraband of war, smuggled in over the Tunisian frontier. On April 10th a force of about 10,000 men from Italy, Tripoli and Homs, was landed on the Macabez Peninsula, under cover of a demonstration by the fleet against Zuara. Forwa, on the mainland, which is accessible by a ford from Macabez, was occupied next day. The enemy still retained Sidi Said at the neck of the peninsula and could use the caravan route through Regdalin, 10 miles further inland.

The dirigibles "P2" and "P3," which had now returned from Italy, flew over from

Tripoli during these operations, and subsequently carried out reconnaissances, and dropped bombs into hostile camps and entrenchments.

On May 2nd the garrison of Homs captured Lebda, two miles further east along the coast, and retained it in spite of determined attacks on May 30th, and June 8th and 12th. On the latter occasion the Turco-Arabs captured two forts, but were finally repulsed with a loss of 400 killed.

Admiral Aubry died on March 4th and was succeeded by Admiral Viale. On April 15th, the 1st Squadron left Taranto and a concentration with part of the 2nd Squadron and the Duke of Abruzzi's flotilla took place in the southern Aegean. On the 18th, after cutting the cables between Lemnos and Imbros, the fleet (less the 3rd Division) under Admiral Viale approached the Dardanelles, preceded by two cruisers which tried to lure the Turkish ships out of the channel. Failing in this object the fleet bombarded the outer forts. Meanwhile the 3rd Naval Division destroyed some wireless telegraph stations in the Southern Aegean, and sank a Turkish gunboat at Vathy (Samos). Under cover of these operations the Italians occupied the island of Stampalia, where they established a naval station; the Turks replied by closing the Dardanelles to all traffic, an action which involved them, as was perhaps foreseen by the Italians, in difficulties with neutrals. The straits were reopened for traffic on May 10th.

Early on May 4th a force consisting of about 10,000 troops from Benghazi, Tripoli and Tobruk, in 7 transports, arrived off the island of Rhodes. A disembarkation was effected in Kalithea Bay on the south coast of the island, while a portion of the fleet demonstrated against the town; 8000 troops were disembarked in two hours and the whole force within eight hours. The town of Rhodes was occupied next morning, but the majority of the garrison withdrew to Psithos, twelve miles inland. On May 15th, by a skilfully combined movement with two columns, which landed by night on opposite sides of the island, and a third which moved inland from the town of Rhodes, the Turkish force, about 1000 strong, was forced to surrender. By the end of May the Italians had occupied the islands of Stampalia, Neros, Piscopos, Kharki, Rhodes, Scarpanto, Casos, Karpachos, Patmos, Kalminos, Lipsos, Kos and Simi.

Meanwhile, at Tripoli, it had been decided to crush a Turco-Arab force which was entrenched at the oasis of Zanzur. The total force employed was 13,000 men. At day-break on June 8th, the attacking force (2 Brigades 1st Division) advanced eastwards from Gargaresch, keeping touch with the fleet on its right. The remaining troops were held in reserve in two bodies, at Gargaresch and Bu Mellian, to protect the left flank and rear of the attack. After severe fighting the 1st Division captured the position, but other bodies of Arabs hurried up from the south and intervened between the 1st Division and Gargaresch, till the advance of the second group of reserves compelled them to retire. The Italians then fortified a point on the coast north of Zanzur but the oasis itself was not yet occupied.

Occupation of Misrata.—The victory of Zanzur enabled General Caneva to spare troops for the occupation of the important oasis of Misrata. On June 15th a composite division about 10,000 strong, drawn from Italy, Tripoli, Derna and Benghazi, under General Camerana, landed at Bu Sceifa, five miles from Misrata, under cover of a demonstration by the fleet at Ziliten. After repelling an attack by 5000 Turco-Arabs on July 2nd, Camerana moved against Misrata on the 9th. The advance was made in three columns, the right column keeping touch with the fleet. The centre column took Zuruk after severe fighting while the right column routed the enemy's left. The force then occupied Misrata. The Italian casualties were 9 killed and 121 wounded. An attack on Gherem by General Fara (southwest of Misrata) on July 20th brought on a rear guard action which cost the Italians 19 killed and 87 wounded.

Meanwhile, on the western frontier, on June 26th, Garioni had attacked the enemy's position at Sidi Said with two columns, one advancing along the Peninsula and one moving parallel to it from Fort Forwa. After three days' fighting, the enemy were driven from successive positions and fell back to Sidi Ali. The Arabs could, however, still use the road through Regdalin and Zuara and the occupation of these places was therefore decided on. Garioni's force was first increased to 20,000 men. On August 4th a demonstration was made to the south-west of Tripoli by the 3rd Infantry Division. On the same night a force of 5000 men (6 battalions and 2 batteries) under General Tassoni, landed just east of Zuara which was captured next morning. Simultaneously Garioni's force moved east along the coast from Macabez and joined hands with Tassoni. The enemy withdrew to Regdalin. On August 15th the combined forces under Garioni captured the Samad hills, between Regdalin and Mensua, thus definitely closing the coastal roads to contraband traffic.

General Caneva's policy of allowing the enemy to wear themselves out by attrition, had caused some discontent in Italy. It was urged that for 100,000 regular troops to remain on the defensive against some 6000 Turks and 20,000 Arabs was injurious to Italian prestige. On September 5th, it was announced that, the first phase of the campaign having been concluded by the occupation of all the points of the coast, General Caneva's task was accomplished. He was then recalled, and two independent commands were

formed under Generals Briccola and Ragni in Tripolitana and Cyrenaica respectively. It was understood that an expedition to Gharian would take place in the autumn of 1912.

The last naval operation took place on the night of July 12th and 13th, 1912. About midnight five Italian torpedo boats, under Commander Millo, entered the Dardanelles to attack the Turkish fleet anchored above the narrows. After reaching Kilid Bahr under a heavy fire, the leading boats were stopped by steel cables and the flotilla retired. Four of the boats were hit but none seriously damaged. The fear of an Italian landing compelled the Turks to keep 30,000 troops within reach of the Dardanelles forts.

We now reach the closing phase of the war. Early on September 22nd a force of three brigades from Tripoli attacked the Turco-Arab position south of Zanzur. The defenders, who were estimated at 8000, were driven off by 8 A.M. Two impetuous counter-attacks by Turco-Arab reinforcements, which hurried up from Suani Beni Adam, were defeated by the evening after fierce fighting at close quarters. The Italians lost 208 killed and 256 wounded.

The last serious fighting took place in Cyrenaica. On September 15th the Italian garrison of Derna had advanced their line to Kasr el Lebn and Casa Aronne three miles south-east of the town. On the 17th these positions, which were held by three brigades, were attacked by Enver Bey with a strong force supported by guns. After severe fighting the Turco-Arabs were repulsed with a loss of 1100 killed. On October 7th the Italians captured the important position of Sidi Abdullah, three miles south-west of Derna; under cover of this operation a battalion and two batteries landed at Bombah, which was occupied without fighting. On October 11th, the Italian line was still further advanced on the Sidi Abdullah plateau, the enemy being driven back with heavy losses.

The Italian troops now present in Libya numbered about 110,000, viz. Tripoli and neighbourhood 45,000; Zuara and Sidi Said 15,000; Homs 6000; Misrata 10,000; Benghazi 12,000; Derna 20,000; Tobruk 6000. The Turco-Arab forces were estimated at about 40,000, with a few guns.

Meanwhile, the Balkan crisis had arisen, and the Turkish mobilization was being hampered by inability to transport troops across the Aegean Sea.

Peace with Italy was indispensable, but the negotiations came to a deadlock on October 12th. Preparations were being made in Italy for active naval operations when on October 15th the Porte accepted the Italian terms, and peace was signed. Turkey agreed to withdraw her troops from Libya, without formally recognising Italian sovereignty. Italy consented to restore the captured islands and to guarantee a portion of the Ottoman debt corresponding to the revenues of Libya.

The war had cost Italy about sixteen millions sterling, up to the end of August 1912, or £47,250 a day.

THE BALKAN WAR, 1912

MILITARY conventions for joint action against Turkey had been signed during the summer of 1912 between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece and Montenegro. Some preparatory naval and military measures were taken by the allies during September, at first secretly, and more openly on the announcement in the latter part of September that grand manœuvres of 200,000 Turkish troops were to be held near Adrianople. The manœuvres in question were cancelled on the advice of the Powers, and the Turkish reservists were dismissed; nevertheless, on September 30th, the four States of the Balkan League issued orders for mobilization, a step to which the Porte replied by a similar order on October 1st, and by impounding some 150 Greek vessels lying in Ottoman ports. Mobilization and concentration appear to have been completed in Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece about October 12th to 16th; and in Montenegro, where distances are shorter, by the 7th. In Turkey serious delay was caused by the inability to transport troops over the Aegean because of the war with Italy, and by the absence of many units from their peace stations owing to recent political disturbances.

Montenegro, having finished her concentration first, declared war on October 8th. This step was probably taken to anticipate intervention by the Powers; it may also have been desired to capture Scutari before its defences could be further strengthened, and to detain as many Turkish troops as possible in the west. On October 13th the other States of the Balkan League presented an identic note to Turkey demanding reforms in Macedonia, and the demobilization of the Turkish Army. On the 17th the Porte, declining further negotiations, declared war on Bulgaria and Servia. Some attempt was made to detach Greece from the League, but on the evening of the 17th that Power declared war upon Turkey.

The Turkish territory in Europe was divided geographically into three principal regions, forming distinct theatres of war:—an eastern region of open country in Thrace; a western mountainous region between the Vardar Valley and the Adriatic; and a central belt of rugged country between the Aegean Sea and the Rhodope Mountains; the latter range was crossed by passes on the Uskub-Sofia and Serres-Struma Valley-Sofia roads, but was otherwise impassable for large bodies. Strategically, the eastern theatre of war, on the direct road to Constantinople, was of greatest importance, and it was in this direction that Bulgaria deployed her largest masses. But the geographical conditions and the territorial ambitions of the other allied States favoured a development of their chief strength in the western theatre of war.

The Bulgarian forces destined to invade Thrace consisted of 8 regular divisions, various reserve brigades (afterwards formed into 2 additional divisions), and one cavalry division, with a total strength of about 200,000. These troops were organized in three armies:—the 1st Army (General Kutincheff), comprising the 1st and 8th Divisions (50,000 men with 100 guns), which was originally assembled near Sofia and then secretly transported by rail through Philippopolis to Yamboli; the 2nd Army (General Ivanoff), composed of the 3rd and 8th Divisions and the Cavalry division (50,000 men with 260 guns), which was concentrated about Tirnova; and the 3rd Army (General Dimitrieff) with the 4th, 5th, 9th Divisions (72,000 with 250 guns), which was concentrated east of Yamboli. A secondary force composed of the 7th Division (General Todoroff), about 24,000 strong, was assembled near Dubnitza; the object of this force was to invade Macedonia by the Struma and Mesta Valleys and preserve communication between the allied forces in the eastern and

western theatres of war. Finally the 2nd Division (24,000) under General Kovacheff was to cross the frontier south of Haskovo and safeguard the right of the 2nd army. A Bulgarian detachment, said to be formed from the 1st Army Inspection, accompanied the 2nd Servian Army along the Kustendil-Uskub road. The total force under arms at the outset was 340,000. General Savoff was in chief command, with headquarters at Stora Zagora.

The Servian forces were concentrated in 4 groups or armies:—the 1st Army, consisting of three 1st line, or two 2nd line divisions, and 1 cavalry division (about 97,000 with 232 guns), under the Crown Prince and General Putnik, on the Nish-Vranya road; the so-called 2nd Army (General Stephanovich), composed of one 1st line division (21,000 with 36 guns), strengthened by a Bulgarian detachment, on the Kustendil-Uskub road; the 3rd Army (General Yankovich), composed of one 1st line and two 2nd line divisions (50,000 with 120 guns), near Kursumlje; and a 4th or Ibar Army (General Zikhovitch), consisting of one 2nd line division (15,000) at Raska, with detachments of 7000 and 3000 3rd line troops at Ivanjica and Vzece respectively. The total force under arms was 200,000 men with 430 guns.

The Greek forces were assembled in two principal masses. On the east the main army of 4 divisions (44,000), afterwards increased by 3 reserve divisions, under the Crown Prince and General Dangelis, was concentrated near Larissa and Trikala with a view to operations in Thessaly against the Turkish Southern Army; on the west a secondary group (originally about 12,000) under General Sapuntsakis, based on Missolonghi, was to neutralize the Turkish forces in Epirus, and capture Prevesa.

The Montenegrin forces formed 3 armies:—a Central Army, under Prince Danilo, of 5 brigades (14,000 men), with 20 guns; a Southern Army of 3 brigades (8000 men), with heavy artillery; and a Northern Army of 3 brigades (9000 men), with 12 guns. The first two armies were destined to advance north and south of Lake Scutari against the town of Scutari and Mount Tarabosch. The Northern Army was to invade the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, and join the Servians. Headquarters were at Podgoritzza.

The Turkish forces were organized in 3 principal armies and several minor groups, as follows: (1) A Main or Eastern Army in Thrace, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 17th and 18th Army Corps and a cavalry corps, besides various *Redif* divisions, making, it is said, about 116,000 rifles, 3000 sabres and 312 guns in all at the outbreak of war. This force, which was commanded by Abdullah Pasha, was based on Constantinople, Eregli, and Rodosto, and was being concentrated in the area Dimotika, Eski Baba, Kirk Kilisse, Adrianople. The latter place was surrounded by a girdle of strong modern forts with a perimeter of at least 22 miles, and garrisoned by about 32,000 men under Shukri Pasha. Kirk Kilisse had only 3 permanent forts, but these had been supplemented by numerous semi-permanent works, converting it into an entrenched camp. (2) A Western Army destined to oppose the Servians, consisting of the 5th, 6th and 7th Corps and six *Redif* divisions (94,000 with 260 guns), under Zekki Pasha; the greater part of this army was in the Plain of Uskub, with advanced posts pushed up towards Vranya and Kustendil; three divisions, with numerous Arnaut auxiliaries, making about 40,000 in all, were in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar and in the Lab Valley. (3) A Southern Army, including 2 independent and 1 Asiatic *Redif* divisions, about 30,000 in all, under Hassan Tahsin Pasha, concentrated at Kozhani and Diskata, and intended to oppose the Greek main army. In addition there was a force of 24,000, known as the Struma Army (24,000) at Serres and a detachment of 15,000 near Gumuljina, keeping touch between the Turkish Eastern and Western armies. There were also independent groups of 18,000 under Essad Pasha in Epirus, between Janina and the Greek frontier; and of 20,000 chiefly Albanian *Redifs*, at Scutari and Tuzi under Hassan Riza Pasha. The above figures are necessarily only estimates, representing the best information available at Christmas 1912. The numbers in Thrace were being constantly augmented by the arrival of troops from Asia. Ali Riza Pasha was in chief command in Macedonia. The supreme command of the whole forces was given to Nazim Pasha.

As regards the maritime forces, the Greek Navy (1 modern cruiser, 21 torpedo craft and 1 submarine) was assembled off Salamis; 4 destroyers purchased in England and 3 obtained from Germany were still on their way out. The Bulgarian flotilla (6 coast-defence torpedo boats) was at Varna, which port, like that of Burgas, was fortified and defended by mine fields. The Turkish Fleet (3 battleships, 2 cruisers and 20 torpedo craft) was in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; both these Straits were defended by powerful coast defences; while the Dardanelles channel was mined at Chanak.

Eastern Theatre of War.

Operations of the Bulgarian Armies.—The Turks hoped to complete their concentration on the railway while the Bulgarians wasted their strength against Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople. They apparently believed that the latter fortress, which lies on the natural line of invasion from Eastern Rumelia, would be the first objective of the invaders. General Savoff's initial dispositions were designed to confirm this impression, though his main attack was really to be directed against Kirk Kilisse.

On October 19th the 2nd Army (Ivanoff), which had advanced from about Simenli-Tirnova, moving on both banks of the Maritza, occupied the frontier post of Mustapha Pasha; on the two following days it closed on Adrianople from the north and west; meanwhile, the 3rd Army (Dimitrieff) was advancing on Kirk Kilisse from the north in four columns, on a front of 30 miles (Petra to Samakov); the 1st Army (Kutincheff) advanced on the right (west) of the 3rd army.

From October 22nd to the 24th the 1st and 3rd Bulgarian Armies were engaged north and north-west of Kirk Kilisse. It appears that the Turks, who had brought 70,000 men up to this flank, attempted a night attack, which was repulsed by the Bulgarians, and that a panic then ensued among certain *Redif* divisions. Kirk Kilisse was captured on the 24th with large quantities of supplies, and the Turkish army, much disorganized, fell back to the railway and to Bunarhissar. Dimitrieff's centre was moved forward to Kavakli, where a Turkish rearguard was driven back after an obstinate fight.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Army had attacked Adrianople (22nd-23rd), but had failed to capture any of the main defences; a Turkish sortie had been repulsed with the loss of 12 guns. On October 23rd the 1st Bulgarian Army pushed its right wing to the Tunja Valley, north of Adrianople; it next advanced its left wing to the Maritza Valley, south of that fortress, thus completing the investment (Oct. 29th). The Bulgarian cavalry occupied Eski Baba (Oct. 27th), capturing 4 locomotives and 243 trucks.

While these operations were in progress, the 2nd Bulgarian Division had crossed the Rhodope range from the north, and defeated a Turkish force at Kirjali (Oct. 20th); part of this division then descended the Arda valley to join the 2nd Army before Adrianople. Further east, the main body of General Todoroff's force in the Struma Valley had captured the important Kresna defile and was approaching Demirhissar, while a force detached to the Mesta Valley had occupied Buk on the Salonica-Dedeagach railway, thus severing communication between the Turkish Eastern and Western Armies; other portions of the 7th Division had advanced south-west to Kochana and Strumnitza.

The Bulgarian 1st and 3rd Armies made no further advance till October 28th; the pause, which was perhaps due to the failure of the attack on Adrianople, enabled Abdullah Pasha¹ to effect a change of front to the line Lule Burgas-Viza; this position, 20 miles in extent, was held by the 4th, 1st and 2nd Corps (in order from left to right), while the 3rd Corps was in reserve in rear of the right. Abdullah Pasha's plan was to remain on the defensive on the left at Lule Burgas, while his right wing, supported it is said, by some troops landed at Midia, took the offensive towards Kirk Kilisse.

The Bulgarians attacked on the 29th with the 1st Army, reinforced by 3 brigades from the troops investing Adrianople, against Lule Burgas, and with the 3rd Army against Viza. The Turkish positions in the open country on the left were poorly entrenched; their troops had been for days without food, and ammunition was scarce. From the first their artillery was overwhelmed by the better served guns of the Bulgarians. On the 31st their left centre (1st Corps) gave way, and on November 1st the whole left wing fell back in some disorder to Chorlu, abandoning a great part of its artillery. The 3rd Corps in the hilly and wooded ground, on the right flank gained some success on October 31st, but on November 2nd it too was driven back. The Bulgarians only pursued for a short distance, and the Turks retreated slowly towards the Chatalja lines, covered by a cavalry division. This battle ended the first stage of the war in Thrace, which had cost the Turks about 30,000 killed and wounded and at least 20,000 missing.

For reasons which remained obscure the Bulgarian Army—or at any rate its right wing—halted on the battlefield till November 7th; this delay was concealed at the time, and reports were disseminated in the Press of a vigorous pursuit, and of a second victory near Cherkesskeui. Actually the Turkish rearguard did not leave Chorlu till November 6th; on the following day the Bulgarians advanced on both sides of the railway; on the 10th-11th their right wing drove the Turks out of Rodosto in spite of the fire of a Turkish warship; by the 13th they had pressed the Turks back across the Kara Su.

The Chatalja lines, in which the Turkish Army was now assembled, were a position of great natural strength extending along a chain of heights across the peninsula from sea to sea, protected on either flank by lakes, and in front by a swampy river valley. The defences consisted of about 110 works of various dates, armed with heavy guns and providing several tiers of fire. Owing to the absence of pursuit, the Turkish army had largely recovered from its disorganization, and the arrival of Asiatic reinforcements had to some extent replaced the losses suffered at Lule Burgas. But cholera had broken out and was making ravages among the troops and refugees in rear of the lines.

On November 17th the Bulgarians unmasked their batteries and commenced an attack with the 1st Army (3 divisions) on the Hamidieh forts west of Hademkeui, and with the 3rd Army (4 divisions) against the Turkish lines south of Lake Derkos. The Bulgarian artillery, consisting chiefly of field batteries, was unable to silence the enemy's fortress guns on the higher ground. The Turkish warships rendered effective assistance on the southern flank. After gaining ground on the night of the 17th-18th, the attacking

¹ Accounts differ as to whether Nazim Pasha or Abdullah Pasha was in command.

troops were either withdrawn or driven back across the Kara Su, and the action was broken off by the Bulgarians under cover of an artillery cannonade on the 19th. The bulk of the Bulgarian forces was withdrawn west of Chatalja village, and billeted in villages along the railway, covered towards the east by entrenchments about Chilskeui and Kalissakeui.

Meanwhile, negotiations for an armistice had been commenced at the instance of Turkey. The Allies demanded as guarantees the surrender of the besieged fortresses and the evacuation of the Chatalja position, conditions which the Turks, elated by their success, refused even to consider. Hostilities were resumed on November 21st, but discussions were again commenced on the 24th, and no serious land fighting took place in this quarter till the signature of the armistice (Dec. 3rd).

The reports of an intended attack on the Dardanelles led the Turks to assemble 30,000 troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula, where Torgut Sheket Pasha was appointed to command. Some Kurdish and Hamidieh cavalry were shipped across the Sea of Marmora to operate in the Kuru Dag and Tefkur Dag hills, north of the Peninsula.

Meanwhile, in the central theatre of war, General Todoroff with the main body of the 7th Division had advanced from Demirhissar on Salonica, reaching that town just after its capitulation to the Greeks. Portions of this army then occupied Kavalla (Nov. 15th) and Serres (Nov. 20th).

The end of November was marked by a Bulgarian victory near the Aegean coast. As already mentioned, a force of 15,000 Turks had been defeated at Kirjali on October 20th and had retired towards Gumuljina, where their presence constituted a threat on the rear of the troops investing Adrianople. During November, operations against this force were undertaken by various Bulgarian detachments; one column of the 2nd Division, advancing from Kirjali, drove the Turks southwards to Gumuljina; while other columns consisting largely of cavalry, pushed down the Maritza valley to cut the Turks off from Dedeagach. Gumuljina was captured on November 22nd; the Turks then retired along the railway to Fere station, and finally took up a position north of Merhanli village. There the Bulgarian columns closed round them, and after an artillery combat on the 26th, the whole force surrendered on the 27th. The prisoners numbered 12,000, including Yawer Pasha and his two divisional commanders. While these operations were in progress, a portion of one of the Bulgarian columns, which had descended the Maritza valley, had entered Dedeagach (Nov. 26th), capturing large quantities of rolling stock; another detachment had moved farther east to Malgara, midway between Dedeagach and Rodosto. The occupation of Dedeagach rendered possible the transfer of part of General Todoroff's army to Thrace. This force, numbering about 12,000, was embarked at Salonica in Greek transports between November 23rd and 27th, and landed at Dedeagach about the 28th-30th. Railway communication from Dedeagach to Dimotika was opened about November 22nd.

Of the siege of Adrianople meanwhile few details became known; the garrison under Shukri Pasha maintained an active defence, and, in spite of prolonged bombardment and numerous costly attacks, no important success was gained by the besiegers, except the capture of the Kara Tepe and Papas Tepe forts on November 10th. It does not appear that the Bulgarian ordnance was of sufficient power for the task imposed on it. After the capture of Kirk Kilisse (Oct. 24th) a portion of the investing force was withdrawn to reinforce the field army, and their places were taken by the 3rd line troops. At the beginning of November 45,000 troops of the 1st and 2nd Servian Armies are said to have joined the besieging force. Attempts by the garrison to break out towards the south and east were repulsed on November 18th and 24th. A final unsuccessful assault was made on the west front just before the conclusion of the armistice.

The Bulgarian recruits of the 1913 and 1914 contingents were called out to replace losses, and left for the front after a short training on November 25th.

Western Theatre of War.

Operations of the Servian Armies.—The Servian plan of campaign was apparently for the 1st and 2nd Armies to converge on the plain of Uskub while the 3rd Army safeguarded the right flank of the movement, captured Prishtina, and moved on Uskub via the Kachanik Pass. The 4th Army, in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, was to get touch with the Montenegrins and neutralize the Moslem elements in this region. On the other hand Zekki Pasha's intention was, it is stated, to keep his army concentrated near Uskub, and act on interior lines against the Servian 1st and 2nd Armies; while the troops in the Sanjak were to prevent a junction of the Servians and Montenegrins, and to raid the Servian communications.

On October 19th the 1st Servian Army crossed the frontier, and on the 22nd—after delaying, to allow the advance of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to make itself felt—it came in touch with the Turkish 6th and 7th Corps near Kumanovo. The Turks attacked on the 23rd, but were repulsed; early on the 24th the Servian 1st Army took the offensive, assisted by a detachment of the 2nd Army, and gained a complete victory. Meanwhile

the Servian 2nd Army had occupied Strazin on November 22nd, and had reached Kratovo, where part of the Turkish 5th Corps was defeated on the 26th. The Turkish Army, demoralised by its defeat at Kumanovo and finding its retreat threatened, evacuated Uskub without further fighting, abandoning most of its artillery (115-120 guns) and immense quantities of stores. The Servians entered Uskub on the 26th.

The greater part of Zekki Pasha's Army retired from Uskub to Kaprulu; but one detachment, too late to follow this road, escaped westwards to Kalkandele. After a vain attempt to reorganize the troops, Kuprulu was abandoned on November 1st, and the Turkish army continued its retreat in two portions, a detachment following the Vardar Valley, while the main body retired through Perlepe towards Monastir.

Meanwhile, the Servian 3rd Army had taken Mitrowitz and Prishtina (October 22nd)—the latter after severe fighting—and was advancing by Ferisovich towards Prisrend. In the Sanjak of Novi Bazar the 4th Army had captured Sjenica on October 24th, gaining touch with the Montenegrins, and Novi Bazar after 3 days' fighting on October 27th. Plevlje was taken on the 28th, the Turkish garrison escaping over the Austrian frontier; Nova Varosh surrendered on November 5th. By the middle of November the region north of Kachanik Pass was practically in the hands of the Allies. The main body of the 4th Servian Army reinforced by two newly formed reserve divisions then moved towards Ipek, and continued the pacification of the country.

After the capture of Uskub the Servian armies were partly reconstituted. One 2nd line division of the 1st Army and the one division of the 2nd Army, under General Stephanovitch, were dispatched by rail, via Sofia, to assist the Bulgarians in Thrace. A portion of the 1st Army, consisting chiefly of cavalry, pushed down the Vardar Valley, defeated some Turkish detachments at Demir Kapu, and Doiran (Nov. 5th), and eventually entered Salonica after its surrender to the Greeks on November 8th.

The bulk of the 1st Army (4 divisions) pursued the main body of Zekki Pasha's Army along the Kuprulu-Monastir road. The Turkish rearguard was defeated in a two days' battle (Nov. 4th-5th), near Perlepe, which town was occupied on the 6th. Here the advance of the Servians appears to have been suspended for a week, owing perhaps to difficulties of supply and to a heavy snowfall which commenced on November 7th.

The 3rd Servian Army moved from Ferisovich against the Turkish detachment which had retired westwards from Uskub; this army occupied Kalkandele on October 31st. From this point the pursuit was continued by the Morava 2nd line division, which now came under the orders of the 1st Army, to Gostivar (Nov. 3rd), and thence to Kirchevo; here the Turks were reinforced, but were again defeated after heavy fighting on November 6th. The Morava Division now suspended its pursuit and prepared to co-operate with the 1st Army's advance from Perlepe on Monastir.

Though a decisive battle was still to be fought, political reasons induced the Servians to send the remainder of Yankovich's army (2 divisions) on a difficult march across the snow-covered mountains to the Adriatic coast. The route taken was by Prisrend, and across the Mirdite country, where the troops were well received. The Servians captured Alessio on November 17th-18th after slight opposition, with the aid of 5 Montenegrin battalions. After a short rest at Alessio a portion of the 3rd Army, accompanied by several hundred Malissores, marched southwards along the Adriatic coast to Durazzo, which they reached on November 28th.

The main body of the 1st Servian Army (4 divisions and 1 cavalry division) appears to have resumed its advance about November 14th, by which time the Morava 2nd line Division from Kirchevo had come up in line with it on the right. The Turkish Army, consisting of the remains of the 5th, 6th and 7th Corps, occupied a front of 20 miles from Novak to Gopes; 2 independent divisions were in reserve at Monastir. Their total strength is variously put at 35,000 men with 50 guns and 90,000 men with 100 guns. On the 17th, without waiting for the arrival of the Greek Main Army from Salonica, the Servian troops forced the passage of the swift running Cerna, wading breast deep through the icy water. On the 18th and 19th the Morava Division, on the right flank, enveloped the Turkish left, while the approach of the Greek Army from Ostrovo threatened their line of retreat. After four days' fighting, in which the Servian gunnery again asserted its superiority, the Turks gave way (November 19th-20th). Some fragments of their army broke through towards Florina and Gonitza, and reached the Grammos mountains; but the greater part were dispersed or fell into the hands of the Greek columns near Banitza. The Servians captured 5,000 prisoners and the greater part of the Turkish artillery. Their cavalry pursued as far as Florina, where they joined hands with the Greeks. The Morava Division captured Resna on November 21st, and a force was then dispatched via Elbassan (Dec. 1st) to Tirana, where touch was gained with the Servian troops at Durazzo. Dibra surrendered on November 29th. On the same day, at Valona, Ismail Kemal Bey proclaimed the independence of Albania.

Operations of the Montenegrin Armies.—Montenegro had started the war, and on October 9th all three Montenegrin armies were set in motion. The Northern Army (Vukovich) occupied Bjelopolje on the 13th, and then turned off towards Berane, where the

Turks (5 battalions, and 3,000 Arnauts) were defeated on the 15th with the loss of 700 prisoners and 12 guns. Berane was occupied on the 16th. Vukovich next occupied Plava (Oct. 19th), and Ipek, after an obstinate defence, on October 31st. Meanwhile, a portion of his army had advanced to Sjenica, where it got touch with the Servians on October 24th. Farther north an irregular brigade crossed the Tara and attacked Plevlje on October 28th in conjunction with the Servians.

The Central Army fired the first shot in the war on October 9th. On the 10th it stormed the fortifications of Dechich; on the 14th it obtained the surrender of Tuzi with six Nizam battalions and three guns. Meanwhile General Martinovich's army was advancing south of Lake Scutari; a right wing detachment of this army was thrown across the Boyana River. Both armies were, however, brought to a standstill in the second week of October, before the defences of Scutari and Mt. Tarabosh; siege operations were then commenced and were carried on chiefly by artillery fire, but the fortifications proved too strong for the Montenegrin guns; the defence was active, and repeated sorties were made against the investing troops.

In November one brigade of Martinovich's army was detached southwards along the Adriatic coast and occupied San Giovanni de Medua on the 16th, afterwards assisting the Servians to capture Alessio on the 17th-18th. On November 23rd this brigade was recalled to the siege of Scutari where the situation had become critical owing to the attitude of the Mirdites. On the 28th all the Montenegrin forces—except some detachments in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar—were ordered to concentrate round Scutari; the King then took over the supreme command, with General Vukovich as Chief of the Staff. Operations round Scutari were continued during the peace conference, as the armistice was not recognised by the Turkish commander.

Operations of the Greek Armies.—On October 18th the Greek Main Army crossed the frontier at the Meluna Pass; on the 19th the Turkish advanced troops were driven from Elassona; a Greek detachment was sent from the latter place to Caterina (on the coast) which was occupied on the 28th. Meanwhile the Main Army advanced northwards and completely defeated the Turkish Southern Army at the Sarantoporos Defile, capturing 22 guns. The Greeks pursued through Serfije (Oct. 23rd) to Kozhani, whence the 5th Division was detached as a left flank guard, towards Banitzza. The rest of the Greek Army advanced to Verria, which was reached, after some fighting at the Tripotamos defile, on October 29th. The Turkish Struma Army made a final attempt to save Salonica by taking up a position with its main body (25,000 men) at Yenidje Vardar on the left flank of the Crown Prince's line of advance, while a detachment at Plati Bridge barred the direct route to Salonica. The Greek Army defeated both these forces on November 2nd, capturing 14 guns, and, after a difficult march across the swampy Kampania plain, received the surrender of Hassan Tahsin Pasha and 29,000 Turkish troops at Salonica on November 8th. An attempt by part of the garrison to break out towards the east was frustrated by Toclroff's Bulgarian force on the 9th.

The 5th Greek Division, 4,500 strong, which had diverged to the north-west from Kozhani, engaged a Turkish rearguard at Nalbandkeui on October 29th; on November 2nd it was attacked near Banitzza by 15,000 Turks and fell back on Sorovech; here it suffered a further reverse on November 5th and retreated towards Kozani, losing—it is said,—12 guns which were retaken by the Servians at Monastir.

On November 15th 5 divisions of the Greek Main Army left Salonica, to co-operate with the Servian 1st Army, marching in two columns, one via Kailar, which picked up the 5th Division on its way, and one by the direct Salonica-Vodena road, on Monastir. The 2 columns united near Banitzza, encountering little opposition, though their approach no doubt influenced the result of the battle of Monastir. As it was, they captured large numbers of prisoners and several guns in the defiles of Pisoderi and dispersed some bodies of Turkish troops retreating via Florina. On November 25th, the Greek cavalry, supported by an infantry division, attacked Kastoria (south-west of Sorovech), capturing more prisoners and guns. In December the Main Army, advancing by Goritzza, defeated the Turks at the Sangoni Pass, and then pushed on towards Janina.

The Western Greek Army under General Sapuntsakis crossed the frontier near Arta on the outbreak of war, and detached a force with some heavy guns to besiege Prevesa; that fortress surrendered on November 4th, after bombardment by sea and land, with 500-600 prisoners. The main column continued its advance towards Pentipigadia, but met with a slight reverse on October 23rd. On November 14th General Sapuntzakis had again advanced and had captured Mount Metsovo. On November 28th his troops appeared before Janina. Meanwhile the Turkish force in Epirus had been reinforced by the remnants of the Western Army from Monastir.

Hostilities were continued during the Peace Conference, as the Greeks were not parties to the armistice. About December 10th an attack was made on the Turkish position near Janina, while a force of 2 Greek battalions and some irregulars was landed at Santa Quaranta to effect a diversion on this flank. This detachment was re-embarked after an encounter with 8 Turkish battalions west of Janina. On December 12th-13th the Greeks attacked Janina and made some progress towards the Bizani fort; on the 20th-22nd

the Turks took the offensive against the Greek forces south of Janina but were repulsed with heavy losses.

Naval Operations

Except in the inland seas the Greek fleet had held undisputed maritime command throughout the war. About October 17th some destroyers were detached to the Ionian Sea to assist in the siege of Prevesa and blockade the Epirus coast; about December 4th Greek warships are said to have bombarded Valona and occupied the island of Sasseno, evoking a protest from the Albanian provisional government. The remainder of the fleet, under Admiral Conduriotis, acting in the Aegean, occupied Mudras Bay (Lemnos) as a base, on October 21st, and blockaded the Dardanelles. Subsequently the islands of Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, Ikara, Psara, and Strati were captured by the fleet, and troops were landed on Chios and Mitylene, where fighting continued for some weeks. On October 31st a Greek torpedo boat sank the old Turkish cruiser Feth-i-Bulend in Salonica harbour.

The Turkish fleet was occupied during October in convoying transports from Trebizond and Sinope to Constantinople, and in blockading the coast of Bulgaria. In November it assisted in the defence of the Chatalja lines, enfilading the Bulgarian attacks on the southern flank. On November 21st the cruiser Hamidieh was badly damaged by a Bulgarian torpedo attack about 15 miles off Varna. On December 16th the Turkish fleet issued from the Dardanelles and exchanged shots with the Greek squadron, afterwards retiring within the straits.

After negotiations commencing on November 25th between the plenipotentiaries of the Turks and Allies at Bagchekeui, in front of the Chatalja lines, an armistice was signed on December 3rd between Turkey on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro on the other. The chief conditions were that the belligerent armies should retain the positions they then occupied; that the besieged fortresses should not be revictualled, and that the Bulgarian army should receive supplies by way of the Black Sea and of Adrianople, but not for ten days after the signing of the armistice. It was also stipulated that negotiations should begin in London on December 13th. Greece declined to sign the armistice, being unwilling to relax the blockade of the Epirus coast. The interruption of the Turkish maritime communications was therefore maintained during the peace conference.

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